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This thesis explores the transformations of evidence in health research 
synthesis studies – studies that bring together evidence from a number of 
research reports on the same/ similar topic. It argues that health research 
synthesis is a broad and intriguing field in a state of pre-formation, in spite of the 
fact that it may appear well established if equated with its exemplar method – 
the systematic review inclusive of meta-analysis. Transformations of evidence 
are processes by which pieces of evidence are modified from what they are in 
the primary study report into what is needed in the synthesis study while, 
supposedly, having their integrity fully preserved. Such processes have 
received no focused attention in the literature. Yet they are key to the validity 
and reliability of synthesis studies. This work begins to describe them and 
explore their frequency, scope and drivers. A ‘meta-scientific’ perspective is 
taken, where ‘meta-scientific’ is understood to include primarily ideas from the 
philosophy of science and methodological texts in health research, and, to a 
lesser extent, social studies of science and psychology of science thinking. A 
range of meta-scientific ideas on evidence and factors that shape it guide the 
analysis of processes of “data extraction” and “coding” during which much 
evidence is transformed. The core of the analysis involves the application of an 
extensive Analysis Framework to 17 highly heterogeneous research papers on 
cancer. Five non-standard ‘injunctions’ complement the Analysis Framework – 
for comprehensiveness, extensive multiple coding, extreme transparency, 
combination of critical appraisal and critique, and for first coding as close as 
possible to the original and then extending towards larger transformations. 
Findings suggest even lower credibility of the current overall model of health 
research synthesis than initially expected. Implications are discussed and a 
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This thesis is about transformations of evidence performed in the process of 
integrating a number of health research studies – “synthesising” the knowledge 
contained in them. When taken out of its source study, a piece of evidence 
inevitably undergoes changes. It has to be enabled to stand more easily on its 
own, without its contextual support. It may need to be made more similar to 
other evidence with which it is to be combined, while not compromising its 
integrity. Its capacity to transform into something somewhat different but still 
true to its nature may need to be tested. Such transformations of evidence are 
constantly performed by health researchers involved in “research synthesis”. 
Can I trim you? Can I extend you? Are you a good brick? Are you a square 
peg? Can I round you off? At the same time, such transformations of evidence 
remain curiously under the radar of formal representations and theoretical 
explorations of health research synthesis. To my knowledge, nobody has made 
them the focus of an in-depth investigation. 
 
Perhaps this is understandably so. These transformations are largely automatic, 
apparently minor and often mundane. They also seem too idiosyncratic, too 
local, not a matter to be dealt with in the abstract. When stumbling upon a 
difficulty with them, one usually sees a difficulty with this piece of evidence, 
relative to this question, relative to my limited understanding of the topic.  
 
Yet these transformations of evidence are feeding into research outcomes that 
determine the healthcare received by each and every one of us, no matter how 
little healthcare we need or how limited its provision. By being part of health 
research synthesis studies, and as I will argue in this work – a crucial one – 
they are part of the effects of evidence-based medicine (EBM). If you have 
needed healthcare in the developed world in the last, for instance, ten years, 
you have felt the consequences of evidence-based medicine and those 
transformations, for good or bad. If you have needed healthcare in the 
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developing world over the same period, you have most likely felt the 
consequences of their absence.  
 
Those little processes of transformations of evidence in health research 
synthesis also offer a view to big philosophical questions of how much we can 
trust evidence and research and whether evidence is better thought of as solid, 
fixed and about the things it is about or as flexible, freely moving and adaptive, 
and about many other things than the ones it is about. This thesis is about such 
philosophy of science questions, too. 
Finally, those little processes of transformations of evidence in health research 
synthesis offer a view to daily challenges of the information and consumer age 
– how to choose the academic papers we read, the plane ticket we book, the 
cake we get in the patisserie, the enterprise where we invest our money or, 
back to health, the dietary and exercise pieces of advice we try to adjudicate 
between. Health research synthesis shares many of the decision making factors 
involved in such everyday undertakings – the multitude of information, the need 
to evaluate options against a number of criteria, the direct relevance of 
outcomes to the well-being of individuals, the concern with costs, and, as it will 
become clearer in the course of this work, more of the imperfect rationality of 
such undertakings than apparent at first sight. 
But let us look closer into health research synthesis. The first snapshots we will 
take will be examples from three research topics – cancer, dementia and 
depression. Publications on cancer will be used in the case study for this thesis. 
Dementia is the disease which over two-thirds of my academic colleagues have 
told me they are most afraid of. Depression is the ailment which I would think 
they most often suffer with. 
As of January 2013, PubMed, the leading gateway to medical and life sciences 
literature, providing access to more than 22 million citations, holds over 2,4 
million references on cancer, over 284,000 references on depression and over 
137,000 references on dementia. The ones published in 2012 are 76,624 on 
cancer, 17,667 on depression and 8,475 on dementia.1 If you have been trying 
                                                          
1
 The numbers will increase at least slightly in subsequent months, as there are some delays in 
indexing papers. Search run 31 Jan 2013. “Dementia”, “depression” and “neoplasms” (the 
Medical Subject Heading for cancer) were used as search terms, as free text words. 
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to keep up to date with the literature on cancer, in 2012 you would have needed 
to read close to 210 publications a day, every day. For depression, the 
respective number is slightly over 48 publications a day. You stood a better 
chance with dementia with about 23 papers (but then you may not remember 
which ones you have read …). 
This extraordinary publication speed has generated new needs for screening, 
selecting, abstracting and integrating research and numerous responses to 
those needs. One such response – research synthesis – will be the broad topic 
of this thesis. In addition to research studies being potentially many, research 
findings are often conflicting, sample sizes and detected effects often small, and 
the quality of studies variable. It is thus necessary to appraise critically and 
combine/synthesise evidence from a number of studies in order to support 
decisions about healthcare. According to some views of research synthesis, this 
is its core – the integration of evidence and, preceding this, its critical analysis 
so that biased and insufficiently comparable evidence can be excluded.  
The exemplar health research synthesis method is the “systematic literature 
review”. A standard schematic representation of it for those outside health 
research will be something like the following. If we want to know, for instance, if 
psychotherapy or drugs are more effective for depression, our best bet is to 
perform a systematic review comparing the effectiveness of both intervention 
types. To do this, researchers will perform extensive literature searches to 
identify as many relevant studies as possible. Ideally, these will be randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs). Researchers will then bring the evidence, for each of 
the intervention types, together. Ideally, this will take the form of numerical 
integration, through the statistical technique of meta-analysis. The evidence for 
the effectiveness of psychotherapy and antidepressants thus obtained will then 
be compared and a judgement made.  
The misleading simplicity of this representation has contributed to philosophers 
of evidence-based medicine persevering in their long standing interest in the 
RCT, gesturing at the technique of meta-analysis, but completely ignoring the 
complexity of the context of which these become a part in a systematic review. 
Moreover, there is much more to the field of research synthesis than the 
exemplar method. Four already dating reviews identify over 30 ‘other’ synthesis 
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methods between them (Dixon-Woods et al., 2004; Ades and Sutton, 2006; 
Pope, Mays and Popay, 2007; Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009). In a very 
general outline, this thesis aims to draw attention to the broad field of health 
research synthesis as it is fast developing within evidence-based medicine and 
to suggest that there is much to it that is philosophically intriguing and 
challenging. 
Returning to numbers, 12,218 (15.9%) of the above mentioned 76,624 
publications on cancer from 2012 offer some type of research synthesis, in the 
form of a “review”, “systematic review”, “meta-analysis”, “guideline” or “practice 
guideline”.2 For depression and dementia, the respective numbers are 1,752 
(9.9%) and 1,272 (15.0%). Reviews and other integrative work are clearly 
proliferating, with some variability across fields. One interesting question is 
whether so many reviews are needed and, if so, why this is the case. A ratio of 
primary to secondary research ranging between 1 to 6 (cancer) and 1 to 10 
(depression) is clearly at odds with the fact that literature reviews in the health 
sciences tend to have hundreds of references. Does this reflect regretfully low 
levels of research coordination and high frequency of duplication? Or is it, 
rather, a consequence of the fact that pieces of evidence and research claims 
can belong to numerous contexts, including numerous integrative projects? If 
so, are such integrative projects broadly similar, involving a minimal change of 
context for the primary research evidence and claims? Or are at least some of 
them largely unrelated and even rival projects, where recontextualisations of 
pieces of evidence and claims result in substantial changes to their meanings 
and function? If this is the case, how much can we trust evidence and its 
syntheses? 
 
This thesis will address precisely questions about the capacity of evidence to 
change its form and place, meaning and function, and the implications of this 
capacity for our trust in the outcomes of research synthesis studies.  
The broad context of this work is thus methods of research synthesis, 
alternatively called methods of “evidence synthesis”, “knowledge synthesis”, 
“integrative methods”, “methods of research integration”, “aggregation of 
                                                          
2
 Figure obtained by limiting to the above article types on PubMed. 
16 
 
evidence”, “systematic reviews”, etc. This broad area is largely defined in 
relation to the framework of evidence-based medicine, whether as a direct 
realisation of its principles and practices or as a range of responses to its 
limitations.  
The immediate context of the focus of the thesis is the initial processing of 
material from primary studies selected for inclusion in a synthesis study (that is, 
after initial judgements of relevance have been made). This initial processing 
includes the reading of primary studies, the identification of pieces of 
information in these that are relevant to the synthesis study, and the “extraction” 
of these pieces of information (usually referred to as “data extraction”).  
The focus of the thesis is on processes of ‘transformation’ and ‘re-location’, re-
positionings of evidence that are under way during data extraction and whose 
aim is either to draw out similarities between a piece of evidence from a certain 
primary study and pieces of evidence from other studies to be included in the 
synthesis, or to assign a piece of evidence to an appropriate location in the 
synthesis framework that differs, formally or functionally, from its location in the 
source study.  
These issues will be explored in the thematic context of research on behaviours 
and ‘mental contents’ (cognitions, emotions, attitudes, etc.) that may have an 
effect on the incidence, trajectory, experience, recovery or mortality from 
cancer. A case study will be carried out involving data extraction from such 
research.  
Finally, the perspective taken will be that of the ‘meta-scientific’ fields, with an 
emphasis on debates from the philosophy of science and methodological work 
on research synthesis from the field of health research itself. Less 
systematically, work from the social studies of science and the psychology of 
science will be utilised. In this introductory chapter, I begin to outline the 






2. What is health research synthesis and why does it matter? 
  
2.1. Research/ knowledge synthesis understood broadly 
 
In a classic article entitled “Types of Synthesis and Their Criteria”, Strike and 
Posner suggest that the concept of (knowledge) synthesis is one of “excessive 
breadth”, “inherently vague” and “with boundaries that can be made sharp only 
in arbitrary ways” (Strike and Posner, 1983: 346-347). This is unsurprising – the 
most widely shared element in definitions of synthesis appears to be “the 
putting together of parts or elements so as to make up a complex whole” (as in, 
for instance, Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2013; Harper, 2013; Google – 
“define: synthesis”). Such an activity has few rivals in terms of inclusiveness. A 
broad terrain for the activities and products of health-related knowledge/ 
research synthesis is marked out.3 They can be as varied as the summary and 
interpretation of findings in a primary study report or review article; the bringing 
together of two or more theories into a supposedly higher order theory; the 
aggregation of evidence of effectiveness from individual studies into a summary 
outcome as in meta-analysis; the writing of a textbook; the assemblage of a 
bibliographic database. More application-focused activities and outcomes can 
also be added: the generation of a decision making model; the making of a 
research-based judgement or decision; the process and products of 
interdisciplinary work; the development of a public health programme; the fusion 
of knowledge and practices coming from a range of sources and traditions, as in 
integrative medicine;4 even the creation of an artefact – from a new piece of 
equipment to a living cell, as in synthetic biology. The list can continue 
indefinitely. 
                                                          
3
 In this thesis, research synthesis rather than knowledge synthesis is generally used in a sense 
very similar to the one ascribed by Strike and Posner to ‘synthesis’ (and which is referred to as 
“knowledge synthesis” in the editorial remark preceding the chapter).  
 
4
 There are different understandings of what integrative medicine involves. One view 
emphasises the integration of orthodox medicine and alternative and complementary therapies. 
Another seems to remain in ‘proper’ research domains but be more inclusive than biomedicine 
(e.g. to include the behavioural and social sciences). It draws on ideas of complexity theory and 
explanatory pluralism to justify integration of knowledge from different areas (Michael 
Cournoyea offered a critical philosophical analysis of the latter at the Philosophy of Medicine 
Roundtable, San Sebastian, Spain, 2-3 Nov 2011). 
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Such an inclusive understanding of knowledge/research synthesis in a health 
and medical context will “stretch the concept towards vacuity” (Strike and 
Posner, 1983: 347). But it is too early to be specific if we want to avoid being 
arbitrary and contributing to knowledge fragmentation. At least from one point of 
view – which I will be defending – the field of health research synthesis is in a 
state of pre-formation, with its boundaries, objects, phenomena, key issues, 
terminology, etc. yet to be defined. It appears defined only if we equate 
research synthesis with its core exemplar, the systematic review inclusive of 
meta-analysis, which is a frequent move because of the immense popularity 
and impact of such reviews. But once we broaden our vision towards related 
methods, even if only towards those defined with reference to the core 
exemplar, we realise that we do not know what defines and distinguishes the 
variety of methods of research synthesis and where they fall in a field of logical 
possibilities (itself non-described) of integrating health research evidence. In 
Chapter 2 I discuss terminology, proposals for defining features of research 
synthesis, particular synthesis methods and a broad map of the field. Here I 
outline some of the most visible, to insiders and informed outsiders, elements of 
the field – namely its exemplar method, the systematic review inclusive of meta-
analysis, and the central role of synthesis studies in clinical practice, health 
policy and academic research. I also discuss briefly the recent proliferation of 
alternative methods – another clearly identifiable tendency, though primarily by 
researchers.  
 
2.2. The systematic review and meta-analysis – outside and within 
evidence-based medicine 
 
The exemplar research synthesis method and product in the medical and health 
sciences is the systematic review inclusive of a meta-analysis as associated 
with the evidence-based medicine movement (e.g. Evidence-Based Medicine 
Working Group, 1992; Sackett et al., 1996; Petticrew, 2001; Higgins and Green, 
2008; Straus et al., 2011). Both respond to a concern that “the conception of 
research review and integration that prevails in the social and behavioral 
sciences is one in which the activity is viewed as a matter of largely private 
judgement, individual creativity, and personal style. Indeed, it is and ought to be 
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all of these to some degree; but if it is nothing but these, it is curiously 
inconsistent with the activity (viz., scientific research) it purports to illuminate” 
(Glass et al., 1981:14). Systematic reviews inclusive of meta-analysis aim to 
reduce bias by a variety of means – by identifying ‘all relevant literature’, by 
following a transparent process, and by policing the methodological quality of 
included studies. They also use statistical means to reduce the imprecision of 
individual study findings. 
Reviews aiming to reduce bias and methods aiming to reduce statistical 
imprecision by bringing evidence together have certainly been available long 
before the inception of evidence-based medicine in the 1990s and have been 
developing outside of medicine, too. In a historical overview of research 
synthesis, Chalmers, Hedges and Cooper (2002) suggest that the need to 
synthesise research evidence has been recognised for well over two centuries 
(op. cit.: 12). This takes the form of work that reviews critically what has been 
published on a subject, with specific efforts made “to reduce the likelihood of 
being misled by biases and chance” (13). For instance, in the 18th century, 
James Lind, a Scottish naval surgeon, wrote his famous treatise on scurvy in 
which he also included “a Critical and Chronological View of what has been 
published on the subject”. That, in Lind’s words, contained “a great deal of 
rubbish” (Chalmers, Hedges and Cooper, 2002: 13-14).  At the end of the 19th 
century, Herbert Nichols published a 76-page review of psychological theories 
and experiments. As far as numerical synthesis is concerned, in early 19th 
century, a French statistician, Legendre, developed the method of least squares 
to enable the combination of data from different astronomical observatories (op. 
cit.: 14). 
 
“The science of research synthesis as we know it today” is seen by Chalmers, 
Hedges and Cooper to begin to emerge in 1904 (op. cit.: 14). Karl Pearson, 
director of the Biometric Laboratory at University College London, published a 
paper in the British Medical Journal where he gathered 11 studies on immunity 
and mortality from typhoid amongst soldiers. He calculated correlation 
coefficients for each of the studies (for correlation between immunity and 
inoculation and mortality and inoculation) and determined their mean values 
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(ibid.). This work is often referred to as the beginnings of meta-analysis.5 Three 
years later Joseph Goldberger, of a laboratory that was to give rise to the US 
National Institutes of Health, performed an analysis of data on bacteriuria in 
typhoid fever and outlined what are now seen as many of the criteria and steps 
in research synthesis. These were identifying pertinent studies, applying criteria 
to select studies for analysis, abstracting and tabulating data, and performing 
statistical analysis of the abstracted data to obtain the mean rate of bacteriuria 
(Chalmers, Hedges and Cooper, 2002: 14-15).  
In the first half of 20th century, methods of research synthesis were also 
developed in educational research, physics and agriculture (op.cit.: 15). 
Currently, there are systematic reviews in such diverse topics as advertising, 
agriculture, archaeology, astronomy, biology, chemistry, criminology, ecology, 
education, entomology, law, manufacturing, parapsychology, psychology, public 
policy, and zoology (Petticrew, 2001: 99). 
In spite of such multidirectional history and spread, the systematic review and 
meta-analysis have gained their power through the movement for evidence-
based medicine. The degree of explicitness of protocol, the strong infrastructure 
supporting the production of systematic reviews and meta-analyses, and the 
enormous impact of their findings are new phenomena arising within the context 
of evidence-based medicine and shaping medicine and healthcare more than 
any other field. For instance, there are over 5,000 completed Cochrane 
systematic reviews (with the Cochrane Collaboration being the trend-setter in 
systematic reviews, discussed below) while the number of Campbell reviews (a 
parallel organisation that performs systematic reviews on crime and justice, 
education, international development and social welfare) is slightly over 90 (The 
Cochrane Collaboration, 2013a; The Campbell Collaboration, 2013).6 In a 
review of qualitative research synthesis, Major and Savin-Baden (2011) 
identified 160 health research synthesis articles vs. 11 coming from education. 
                                                          
5
 Accounts differ between sources. Beecher’s JAMA study (1955) on placebo effects vs. drug 
effects is another study referred to as the first meta-analysis of medical research. The term 
meta-analysis was first used, in the familiar statistical sense, by Glass in his work in educational 
psychology (Glass, 1976). Bohlin (2012) offers a somewhat different but equally compelling 
historical account to that of Chalmers, Hedges and Cooper (2002). 
 
6
 There were 93 Campbell Collaboration reviews as of June 13: Crime and justice reviews – 35, 




The only ‘proper’ systematic reviews in philosophy7 are of medical ethics 
literature, a minor and not exactly high status niche in philosophy. In contrast, a 
traditional literature review is practically no longer an option for a stand-alone 
review in health research.  
The most robust component of the infrastructure supporting the production of 
systematic reviews within the context of evidence-based medicine is, 
undoubtedly, the Cochrane Collaboration. The latter is an “international, 
independent, not-for-profit organisation of over 28,000 contributors from more 
than 100 countries, dedicated to making up-to-date, accurate information about 
the effects of health care readily available worldwide” (The Cochrane 
Collaboration, 2013b). Its home page features a quote from The Lancet 
representing the Collaboration as rivalling the Human Genome Project in its 
potential implications for modern medicine (Naylor, 1995).8 Its history is traced 
back to Archie Cochrane's book Effectiveness and Efficiency: random 
reflections on health services (Cochrane, 1972). In 1992, the funding for a 
Cochrane Centre, whose aim was “to facilitate the preparation of systematic 
reviews of randomised controlled trials of health care”, was approved as a 
research and development initiative of the British National Health Service (The 
Cochrane Collaboration, 2013a). As mentioned above, the number of Cochrane 
Reviews in the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews exceeds 5,000 
(ibid.). The most recent (2011)9 Impact Factor of the Cochrane Database of 
Systematic Reviews was 5.912. This ranked the database in the top 10 
worldwide journals in the Medicine, General & Internal category (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2013). In January 2011, The Collaboration was accepted as a “Non-
Governmental Organization in Official Relations with the World Health 
                                                          
7
 I assume a sense of ‘systematic’ in the tradition of evidence-based medicine, where, for a 
review to be called ‘systematic’, at least some of the essential features discussed in Chapter 2, 
Section 3.2. should be clearly expressed. In a looser sense, there are certainly numerous 
systematic reviews in philosophy. 
 
8
 There is something disingenuous in the way the comparison with the Human Genome Project 
is presented on the Cochrane website though. Naylor’s article, an authored article rather than a 
Lancet editorial as might be inferred from the quote’s attribution to The Lancet, explores the 
limits of evidence-based medicine of which the Cochrane Collaboration is a prime realisation 








Organization” (The Cochrane Collaboration, 2013a).10 Usage data for the 
Cochrane Library from 2009 show that "[e]very day someone, somewhere 
searches The Cochrane Library every second, reads an abstract every two 
seconds and downloads a full-text article every three seconds" (The Cochrane 
Collaboration, 2013c). 
There are probably two most immediate associations for ‘systematic review’ 
amongst health researchers. One is of an extensive literature searching, in over 
a dozen databases, through search strategies of hundreds of lines and abstruse 
syntax, fully decodable only by the information specialist who developed them. 
The second association is of a tedious or trance-like process of “sifting” where 
from the over-inclusive first search (often between 5,000 and 20,000 citations) a 
small number of thematically relevant and methodologically robust studies are 
identified (e.g. 15-20).  
More formally and inclusively, a systematic review seeks to “to collate all 
empirical evidence that fits pre-specified eligibility criteria in order to answer a 
specific research question.  It uses explicit, systematic methods that are 
selected with a view to minimizing bias, thus providing more reliable findings 
from which conclusions can be drawn and decisions made” (Green et al., 2011: 
1.2.2). The following features have been identified as its key characteristics: 
clearly stated objectives; pre-defined eligibility criteria for studies; an explicit, 
reproducible methodology; a systematic search aiming to identify all relevant 
studies; an assessment of the validity of the findings of the identified studies; 
and a systematic presentation and synthesis of the reviewed studies’ 
characteristics and findings (ibid).  
The Cochrane systematic review follows a detailed procedure outlined in an 
over 600-page handbook, the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of 
Interventions (Higgins and Green, 2008). In an online version, it is updated 
regularly to reflect methodological advances and user feedback, with a most 
recent update from March 2011 (Higgins and Green, 2011). Briefly, the review 
                                                          
10
 NGOs in Official Relations have “the right to appoint a representative to participate, without 
right of vote, in WHO's meetings or in those of the committees and conferences convened 
under its authority” (Section 6.1. in 
http://www.who.int/civilsociety/relations/principles/en/index.html). Special thanks to Lucie 
Binder, Lisa Bero and Jeremy Grimshaw of the Cochrane Collaboration for clarifying the status 
of The Cochrane Collaboration in relation to WHO. 
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process is initiated through the development of a protocol which states the 
review question, its background, and the objectives and methods of the review 
(Green et al., 2011: 2.2). Review questions are expected to follow the “PICO-
format” and indicate the type of population of interest, the type of intervention 
and its comparators, and the types of outcomes of interest (Participants, 
Interventions, Comparisons and Outcomes). The review question is stated 
broadly through the review objectives and specified in detail through the 
eligibility criteria for studies (O’Connor et al., 2011). Randomised controlled 
trials are the preferred study type to be included in a systematic review due to 
the method’s status as the gold standard for evaluating the effectiveness of 
interventions. The review then proceeds towards the identification of studies 
that meet the pre-determined eligibility criteria. Attempts are made to identify all 
relevant studies through extensive searching, such as in electronic bibliographic 
databases and study registers, through citation tracking and contacting study 
authors. From the pool of studies produced by the searches, relevant studies 
are selected in accordance with the eligibility criteria and data of interest to the 
review are collected. Structured tools are used for assessing the risk of bias 
(study quality). On the basis of this assessment, studies are included in or 
excluded from further analysis.  
Depending on the availability of methodologically sound studies and their 
“homogeneity” (roughly, similarity), a meta-analysis can be performed. Meta-
analysis is a statistical procedure which integrates the results of several 
independent studies considered by the analyst to be “combinable” (Egger and 
Smith, 1997; Huque, 1988). Degree of homogeneity is determined on the basis 
of statistical tests for heterogeneity of study outcomes, such as the Cochran’s Q 
or the I2 test (Egger, Smith and Phillips, 1997). Beyond certain levels (e.g. a 
value for I2 >= 0.85), it is considered that the study results do not reflect a single 
underlying effect and meta-analysis is not performed (Egger, Smith and Phillips, 
1997; Leonardi-Bee and Rolfe, 2007). The levels of homogeneity/heterogeneity 
also inform preferences for the general model within which the meta-analysis is 
carried out – fixed effects models in cases of homogeneity/low heterogeneity 
and random effects models in cases of moderate heterogeneity. Statistical tests 




Meta-analysis methods use weighted averages of study results, with larger trials 
being given higher weights than smaller ones. As there is no single ‘correct’ 
method for meta-analysis and each method draws on certain assumptions, the 
robustness of findings is tested, through sensitivity analysis, to different 
assumptions and inclusion criteria. This works through splitting findings by, for 
instance, method (fixed/random effects), methodological quality (higher/lower), 
publication bias (more or less likely), and early termination (yes/no) and 
comparing the estimates for the sets of evidence thus obtained (Egger, Smith 
and Phillips, 1997). If rigorously conducted, meta-analyses are seen as 
enabling a more objective appraisal of the evidence than traditional reviews, 
providing a more precise estimate of treatment effects, and facilitating 
explanations of heterogeneity between individual study results (Egger and 
Smith, 1997; Egger, Smith and Phillips, 1997). 
Most dramatically (and at least in some cases for good reasons), systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses are seen as saving human lives and public 
resources. One of the earliest examples of the fact that evidence accumulated 
as individual studies, unless explicitly brought together, does not ‘fully exist’ and 
fails to influence practice and policy is provided in a paper by Antman et al. 
published in The Journal of the American Medical Association in 1992 (the 
same year and the same journal in which the paper announcing the evidence-
based medicine “paradigm” was published, see Evidence-Based Medicine 
Working Group, 1992). Antman et al. compared the results of meta-analyses of 
randomised control trials on the treatment of myocardial infarction to 
recommendations of clinical experts published over the same period in 
traditional reviews and textbooks. Recommendations were found to be at odds 
with the summaries of trials. Ineffective treatments were being recommended. 
Highly effective treatments were not. There were significant time lags between 
the publication of studies and changes in the recommendations of experts. 
“[L]ives that could have been saved were lost, and resources were wasted” 
(Sutton et al., 2000: 6). Another classic example is of evidence of infant 
sleeping position and sudden infant death syndrome (Gilbert et al., 2005). 
Sleeping on the front was recommended in books between 1943 and 1988 on 
the basis of theoretical extrapolations. If a systematic review were performed as 
early as the 1970s, there would have been statistically significant findings for an 
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increased risk of sudden infant death syndrome associated with this sleeping 
position. Over 10 000 infant deaths could have been prevented in the UK and at 
least 50 000 in Europe, the USA, and Australasia (op. cit.). 
To bring us closer to our times, there are still media echoes of a broadly 
discussed, at the end of 2012, Lancet review on over-diagnosis through breast 
cancer screening (e.g. Gallagher, 2012). Extrapolation from the results of one of 
the meta-analyses in the review suggests that about three cases are over-
diagnosed and treated for one breast cancer death prevented (Independent UK 
Panel on Breast Cancer Screening, 2012). Although focus group evidence 
suggests that women still consider screening worthwhile (ibid.), the balance of 
benefits and harms of breast cancer screening has been adjusted. Again, this 
has resulted from explicitly bringing together evidence which, although available 
as individual studies, was not ‘real enough’ before having been reviewed and 
meta-analysed.  
In an interesting example of relativism of perspectives, while critics of EBM and 
the mainstream systematic review tend to see both of these as oppressive 
orthodoxy, proponents of EBM may consider themselves ‘rebels’ or ‘anti-
establishment’ or at least inconvenient voices. For instance, messages of going 
against accepted opinion were very strong at the 2011 Cochrane Colloquium in 
Madrid.11 To use a more formal reference, “research synthesis sometimes 
yields unwelcome results that challenge strongly held opinions and other vested 
interests” (Chalmers, Hedges and Cooper, 2002: 25). 
In summary, the exemplar methodological dyad of the medical and health 
research synthesis field – the systematic review and meta-analysis –  is geared 
towards answering questions of effectiveness of interventions. It aims to 
aggregate very specific information from primary studies into a numerical 
outcome within a broader textual review. It places a strong emphasis on the 
formulation of a highly specific question and the meticulous identification of ‘all’ 
studies that are relevant to it. It prioritises evidence obtained through RCTs. It 
evaluates studies and sanctions their inclusion in the final synthesis through the 
use of quality assessment tools. It aims to be maximally transparent. It is seen 
                                                          
11
 Such claims were made in a number of keynote presentations – 19
th
 Cochrane Colloquium, 
19-22 Oct 2011, Madrid, Spain. 
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as having the potential to save lives and resources and/or as providing the 
basis for more informed decision making. 
 
2.3. Newly emerging methods of health research synthesis 
 
Characteristics such as the above make the systematic review with meta-
analysis a credible and widely used methodology. But it has well recognised 
limitations and specificity of application. Some of the research synthesis 
opportunities it leaves open are immediately visible. For instance, one of the 
most frequently raised criticisms of evidence-based medicine is that RCT 
evidence is only one type of evidence relevant to healthcare practice and policy 
making and that other types of evidence should also be routinely used (Chapter 
2, Section 4.2 discusses this in detail). Within health research, the case has 
been made most strongly for adding to systematic reviews and/or synthesising 
qualitative research evidence (Green and Britten, 1998; Popay, Rogers and 
Williams, 1998; Dixon-Woods, Fitzpatrick and Roberts, 2001; Barbour and 
Barbour, 2003;  Popay, 2006).  
The potential of qualitative research to broaden the scope of evidence-based 
medicine arises from some of its basic orientations (Green and Britten, 1998). 
An orientation towards naturalism, in the sense of placing health behaviours in 
their everyday context, allows to explore the gap between optimum effects from 
clinical trials and likely effects shaped by everyday concerns. A commitment to 
identifying subjective interpretations of “objective” variables, for instance 
objective health problems and findings, helps understand the sometimes 
apparently irrational strategies patients use to deal with health problems. The 
interest in process can reveal, for example, the dynamics of accommodating 
symptoms, diagnoses and treatments within a patient’s “biography”. Focus on 
interactions can direct attention towards encounters between doctors and 
patients, where conflicting explanatory systems about health and illness tend to 
clash and negotiation is needed so that good outcomes can be achieved. 
Findings resulting from these basic orientations of qualitative research can 
sensitise practitioners to issues they can then usefully explore with patients (op. 
cit.: 1230-1). Evidence of effectiveness in controlled circumstances can thus be 
27 
 
supplemented with evidence of the appropriateness of interventions (the extent 
to which they meet self-perceived needs of recipients) and of factors affecting 
decisions and actions (Popay, Rogers and Williams, 1998; Popay, 2006). 
Further rationales for adding qualitative research evidence to systematic 
reviews include identifying and refining the review question; identifying 
meaningful outcomes to be evaluated by the review; adding weight to, 
challenging or explaining the results of the quantitative synthesis; assisting in 
making recommendations about improving interventions and implementing 
them in “real life”, etc. (Dixon-Woods, Fitzpatrick and Roberts, 2001; Popay, 
2006).  
Work on integrating qualitative research has been a newcomer to evidence-
based medicine not only because of resistance against the interpretiveness, 
subjectivity, small sample sizes, metaphorical language, etc. of qualitative 
methods by proponents of the traditional systematic review, but also because of 
doubts from within. “By its very nature and purposes, qualitative research 
appears resistant to, and endangered by, efforts to synthesize studies. Just as it 
goes against the nature of poetry to attempt to summarize even one poem 
about love, so it seems both epistemologically and ethically inappropriate to 
attempt to summarize findings from one or more qualitative studies about 
human experiences of health and illness” (Sandelowski, Docherty and Emden, 
1997: 366). “For those who hold that each qualitative study is a unique 
representation of multiple realities or truths the idea of synthesising several 
studies is anathema” (Pope and Mays, 2006: 143). Britten et al. (2002) 
summarise the resistances of qualitative researchers in four main directions. 
First, synthesis studies cannot but ignore the rich detail which characterises 
good qualitative research, as primary studies are conducted in highly diverse 
contexts. As a result, generalisations will fail to do justice to the original studies. 
Next, attempts to develop functional equivalents of meta-analysis are 
epistemologically naïve. Third, generalisations, whatever their form, have no 
real grounding and value.12 Finally, the language games of evidence-based 
medicine and qualitative research are incompatible (op.cit.: 214). In an impasse 
where qualitative research “appears endangered both by efforts to synthesize 
                                                          
12
 The structure of my sentences in this succession required a more liberal paraphrasing of this 
one, which I hope captures the unsaid correctly. The original was: “Yet others would reject any 
form of generalisation at all”. 
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studies and by failure to do so” (Sandelowski, Docherty and Emden, 1997: 365), 
work on qualitative research synthesis has been steadily growing. As of March 
2013, The Cochrane Qualitative Evidence Synthesis (QES) Register contains 
over 7,100 references to methodology papers relevant to qualitative evidence 
synthesis and examples of qualitative evidence synthesis (Cochrane QES 
Register, 2013). Work to describe and conceptualise this variety is lagging 
behind. In a seminal 2009 paper for which the Register was not available, 
Barnett-Page and Thomas identified nine more broadly used and three 
“fledgling” approaches for the synthesis of qualitative research (Barnett-Page 
and Thomas, 2009). Features of qualitative research synthesis and specific 
methods, in their relationship to the mainstream systematic review, are 
discussed further in Chapter 2, Section 3. 
Although qualitative research synthesis appears to be the richest and most 
intensely developing alternative field within the research synthesis landscape, it 
is not the only one. Dixon-Woods et al. (2004) identify 14 methods for the 
integration of qualitative and quantitative evidence. Ades and Sutton (2006) 
catalogue a range of statistical approaches for multiple-parameter evidence 
synthesis in epidemiology and medical decision making. The methodology of 
overviews – reviews of reviews – has also been developing (Becker and 
Oxman, 2011). A large number of studies have produced syntheses without 
extending a particular study design into a full-blown method.  
Such methodological developments have, however, arisen generally 
independently and unaware of one another. Overall, they tend to have the 
systematic review with meta-analysis as their only reference enterprise. The 
field of research synthesis remains uncharted. Outside of the systematic review 
and some major alternative methods, such as meta-ethnography (Noblit and 
Hare, 1988; Britten et al., 2002), realist synthesis (Pawson, 2002a,b; Pawson et 
al., 2004) and meta-narrative (Greenhalgh et al., 2005), it is largely unknown 
not only to health researchers most broadly but also to synthesis researchers 
specialising in particular methods. Attempts at mapping innovation in research 
synthesis, for instance through literature reviews, have been contained within 
narrowly defined niches – qualitative research (Barnett-Page and Thomas, 
2009; Major and Savin-Baden, 2011), qualitative and quantitative research 
(Dixon-Woods et al., 2004), statistical syntheses (Ades and Sutton, 2006). Such 
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reviews of subfields are only a few and dating. Further to that, their primary 
achievement has been to identify and catalogue scattered synthesis methods 
rather than carry out in-depth critical analysis of the nature, types, promises and 
limitations of research synthesis. Only initial steps have been made, for 
instance, to compare approaches; identify their philosophical underpinning and 
fundamental assumptions; specify methodological types; survey what types of 
data have been covered and which are still receiving limited attention; highlight 
good practices that have emerged in one location that may need to be 
generalised across the field; explore the variety of processes and products 
characterising research synthesis work. In Chapter 3, I outline one possible 
map for the field of research synthesis (which is similarly far from addressing 
such questions but hopefully improves our understanding of the ‘methodological 
objects’ implicated in them). In summary, the field of alternative methods is 
dynamic, fragmented and uncharted.  
 
2.4. Impact of health research synthesis studies 
 
Health research synthesis work has an immense impact on clinical practice, 
commissioning, health policy, medical education and academic research, to 
name the most obvious areas of influence. Although reviews are seen 
traditionally as a way for a scientific community to take stock, it is probably fair 
to say that current health research synthesis is primarily a route to informing 
practice, policy and commissioning rather than a way of organising and 
reporting on scientific knowledge for research purposes. It is also probably fair 
to say that a piece of health and medical research needs to become part of a 
synthesis so as to be able to exert a rationally sanctioned influence on 
healthcare practice, policy and commissioning.13 Synthesis projects are 
becoming increasingly the backbone of practice guidelines and policy papers. In 
the UK for instance, all practice guidelines currently developed by the National 
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 Research can, of course, influence policy in many ways, e.g. mediated through its 
representations in the media or through the hype generated by its promise. My claim is that if 
good process of applying the principles of evidence-based medicine is followed, then the only 
way in which a piece of research can influence practice, policy and commissioning is by 




Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) are underpinned by systematic 
reviews. Practice guidelines are, in turn, used by commissioners to purchase 
services and by inspectors in service monitoring and evaluation. Their use is 
also encouraged by “field teams” involved in guideline dissemination and by 
professional bodies and patient groups (Macbeth, 2011). At the intersection 
between the academic and the practical, the British Medical Journal published 
between 26 and 42 systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses per year between 
2004 and 2011. The numbers represented between 12% and 22% of all 
research in it.14 From a more narrowly academic perspective, Chairs in research 
synthesis are beginning to appear on the job market. Although the influence of 
research synthesis has been coming primarily from mainstream systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses, the demand for alternative, e.g. more narrative and 
conceptual syntheses, is also growing and they too are being incorporated in 
health services decision making. The field of research synthesis is thus defining 
of the healthcare we receive and of the patterns of work in the medical and 
health academic community. At the same time it is almost invisible to the wider 
society and most scholarly fields interested in health, medicine and research, 
including the philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine. 
 
3. Interest of the ‘meta-scientific’ fields in health research synthesis 
 
‘Meta-scientific fields’ (or, more loosely, ‘meta-sciences’) is used here to denote 
areas of traditional academic disciplines dedicated to exploring the processes 
and products of science and research (both natural and social 
sciences/research). Of the established and conceivable intersections, the fields 
of philosophy and history of science are by far the best developed (2111 
references containing philosophy of science in title – British Library Main 
Catalogue, Feb 2013. History of science – 1866; sociology of science – 183, 
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 The data are based on the reporting of study design in a paper’s title or abstract which may 
not be a fully accurate representation of actual study designs. ‘Research’ includes empirical 
research publications as well as methodological articles about research methods or issues 
around reporting research. Other types of articles are published in the BMJ, too (e.g. editorials, 
letters, news). If these are taken into account, the relative presence of systematic reviews and 
meta-analyses in the BMJ will be reduced. Sincere thanks to Sara Schroter of the BMJ for 




psychology of science – 44, social studies of science – 30; anthropology of 
science – 18).15 The meta-scientific perspective I will take is constituted 
primarily by philosophy of science work, to a lesser extent by social studies of 
science work, and by psychology of science thinking further in the background. 
At least prima facie, the issue of research/evidence synthesis, understood as 
bringing together primary research studies into a secondary research study, is 
practically not discussed, at this level of abstraction and in any of the typical 
health research synthesis terms (e.g. evidence/research synthesis, systematic 
review, integrative methods, aggregation of evidence, etc.), in the philosophical 
literature. Of 25 citations containing “evidence synthesis OR research 
synthesis” and 36 containing “systematic review” in the Philosopher’s Index16, 
two were directly relevant (Bohlin, 2012 and Vergnes et al. 2010, discussed 
below). A large proportion of the retrieved citations were to actual research 
syntheses on ethical issues.17 
The social studies of science and history of science journals are even more 
reticent as regards research synthesis. No citations were returned by searches 
on “research synthesis”, “evidence synthesis” and “systematic review” in the 
Social Studies of Science; Science, Technology, & Human Values and Science 
Technology & Society.18 Searches in Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences returned one highly relevant paper through “evidence synthesis” 
(Stegenga, 2011, discussed below). In the papers retrieved by “research 
synthesis” (one) and “systematic review” (four in addition to the Stegenga 
paper), the concepts were all in the bibliographies with one exception. There, 
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 The search is only illustrative. It does not include searches by Subject (citations retrieved by a 
subject search were fewer though). 
 
16
 Search run Feb 2013. When “evidence synthesis” and “research synthesis” were searched as 
phrases (rather than both “evidence” and “synthesis” appearing together in a citation), the 
retrieval was 0. 
 
17
 There were also references to papers discussing syntheses or aggregation of other types of 
material – e.g. Wylie’s criticism of Miriam Solomon’s arguments in favour of “aggregation” of 
individual opinions in opposition to group deliberation (Wylie, 2006). In a very broad review, this 
research will be relevant.  
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systematic reviews were problematised to some extent but this remained 
peripheral to the paper.19 Inquiring theoretical and philosophical journals in 
psychology (due to the lack of a specialised psychology of science journal) was 
similarly unproductive. Theory & Psychology returned two and New Ideas in 
Psychology returned four citations containing “systematic review”. These were 
bibliography or ‘matter of fact’ references or references to other meanings of the 
concept.20 None of the two journals contained a reference to “research 
synthesis” or “evidence synthesis”. Philosophical Psychology and the Journal of 
Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology returned no citations containing 
“research synthesis”, “evidence synthesis” or “systematic review”.21 
Leaving aside research syntheses of medical ethics papers (e.g. McCullough, 
2007; Strech et al., 2008), the philosophical and other meta-scientific 
publications identified through these and further searches appear to cover the 
following minimal set of issues. Stegenga (2011) offers a critical exploration of 
meta-analysis by attending to the numerous decisions made while performing it. 
These “allow wide latitude for subjective idiosyncrasies to influence its 
outcomes” (op. cit.: 497). He argues that meta-analysis falls short of being “the 
platinum standard of evidence” which many believe it to be and suggests that 
“an older tradition of evidence in medicine – the plurality of reasoning strategies 
appealed to by the epidemiologist Sir Bradford Hill – is a superior strategy for 
assessing a large volume and diversity of evidence” (ibid.). No mention is made 
of alternative synthesis methods apart from “social methods” for amalgamating 
evidence such as consensus conferences. Cartwright and again Stegenga 
(2011) propose a model for the amalgamation of evidence through building 
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 Search run Feb 2013, no year limits, search “all fields”. Provider – Science Direct.  The 
‘exception’ paper was Knaapen and Weisz (2008). The problematisation of systematic reviews 
related to their embodiment of changing norms of scientific rigour and objectivity and being a 
new form of standardisation. The focus of the paper was the standardisation of premenstrual 
syndrome. 
20
 Both searches run Feb 2013, no year limits. Access to Theory & Psychology – Sage, through 
journal website (no library subscription). Concepts searched for in “all content”. Access to New 
Ideas in Psychology – Science Direct. Concepts searched for in “all fields”. Examples of uses: 
systematic review of the highs and lows of life in life history dialogue, a systematic review 
included in the references, appeal to conducting systematic reviews on computer supported 
learning tools, etc. 
 
21
 Both searches run Feb 2013, no year limits. Access to Philosophical Psychology – Ebsco. 
Concepts searched for in “Title, Abstract and Full text”. Access to the Journal of Theoretical and 
Philosophical Psychology – Ebsco, through PsycARTICLES. Concepts searched for in all fields. 
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mechanism-explicit causal models (discussed further in Chapter 2, Subsection 
3.5.2.4). Bohlin (2012) presents a fascinating and thorough historical account of 
the rise of meta-analysis and systematic reviews. Vergnes et al. (2010) consider 
the ethics of systematic reviews, particularly in terms of unethical or ethically 
compromised studies that may be contained in them and the fact that research 
participants have given informed consent for the original studies and not 
necessarily for meta-studies of these.  
 
Although there is a change since 2010, when the same searches in the social 
studies of science, history of science and theoretical and philosophical 
psychology journals returned uniformly 0 articles, it appears evident that the 
meta-scientific fields are failing to notice the huge complexity and impact of 
health research synthesis. There is no easily detectible sign of a change in 
tendencies either (e.g. shifting of discussions at philosophy of medicine 
events).22 At the same time, relevant work is more than abundant. Research 
synthesis touches on a range of core debates within the philosophy of science 
and other meta-scientific fields, such as unity and disunity of the sciences, 
(in)commensurability of research traditions, quality criteria in science, the 
relationship between theory and data, the theory-ladenness of observations, the 
indeterminacy of theory by data, the nature of evidence, theory choice, 
reductionism, the nature of interdisciplinary work, the production of scientific 
facts, the social and political influences on research, to name but a few. The 
meta-scientific perspective on research synthesis issues is thus both not there 
and pervasive. In the literature review (Chapter 2), I try to draw a range of 
disconnected meta-scientific debates together by virtue of their relevance to 
issues of research synthesis. 
Due to the limitations of the meta-scientific debate, I will also be turning to the 
‘meta-methodological’ debate. There is a type of methodological texts in the 
sciences, or elements of such texts, which, rather than or along with describing 
a method, take an analytical and/or critical perspective towards it, its application 
and outcomes. Such texts may, for instance, critique an established or 
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 E.g. Progress in Medicine Conference, Bristol, 13-15 April 2010; Philosophy of Medicine 
Roundtable, San Sebastian, Spain, 2-3 Nov 2011; philosophy of medicine sessions at the 3
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Biennial Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice Conference, Exeter, 22-24 June 2011; 




emerging method by demonstrating its limitations and the unintended 
consequences of its application. They may be laying the foundations of a new 
method, which typically involves the articulation of its theoretical and, 
occasionally, philosophical commitments and its contextualisation amidst 
scientific and pragmatic concerns. Publications of this type thus share many of 
the characteristics of the literature from the meta-scientific fields. I will call them 
‘meta-methodological’ (and occasionally ‘methodological’ if the applied 
methodological and the meta-methodological in them are too hard to separate). 
The distinction from ‘meta-scientific’ will be important only if debates arising 
within and outside medical and health research are explicitly compared. I will 
use ‘meta-scientific’ as the generic term. 
In contrast to the meta-scientific debate on health research synthesis, the meta-
methodological one is rich and fast growing, in parallel with the growing number 
and variety of actual research synthesis studies and methods. Describing it 
reliably is, however, a research project in its own right. Meta-methodological 
considerations are scattered across research synthesis fields which are still to 
be identified consistently. Terminology varies considerably. With regard to 
newly emerging methods in particular, meta-methodological arguments tend to 
be only passing comments in publications reporting on actual synthesis studies. 
The pool of relevant publications is thus enormous. Quality-wise, the robustness 
and depth of conclusions in the meta-methodological discussion are still quite 
low – as a result of both its scatteredness and its tendency to appear as 
incipient arguments growing out of other work. Again, in the literature review in 
Chapter 2, I attempt to draw traditionally disconnected elements of the meta-
methodological debate together.  
 
4. Transformations of ‘evidence’ during ‘data extraction’ in health 
research synthesis studies 
4.1. Bringing transformations of evidence from the margins into a 
focus 
Summary descriptions of the research synthesis process tend to list the 
following elements: formulating the review question; developing inclusion 
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criteria for studies; searching for studies; identifying research evidence 
(performing literature searches); selecting studies; data extraction; quality 
assessment; analysis and synthesis of data; report writing; dissemination 
(based on Higgins and Green, 2009; Centre for Reviews and Dissemination, 
2009). I suggest that the current health research synthesis discourse 
marginalises the substantial degree of processing of ‘the parts’ from the primary 
studies that go into ‘the whole’ of the synthesis study and encourage a 
perceptual switch: from seeing all or most of the evidence taken out of primary 
studies as 1) known-to-be-relevant and 2) remaining unchanged in its 
movement between the source study and the synthesis study to seeing a large 
part of that evidence as worked upon to establish both relevance and 
combinability. On the positive side, a much greater richness, versatility and 
inter-connectedness become visible. A piece of evidence becomes a repository 
of many more messages and potential uses. The scope of its potential 
relevance is broadened. Synthesis studies become much more interconnected 
and mutually informative. On the negative side, evidence and the findings of 
synthesis studies come to be seen as much less secure and reliable. 
In this thesis, I will be demonstrating the centrality of processes of 
transformation of evidence in research synthesis. I will be arguing for a stronger 
complementary perspective on evidence which emphasises its transformations, 
freedom of movement and, possibly more negatively, multiple loyalties. Such a 
perspective is highly unusual in health research synthesis debates. The 
phenomena it brings into focus belong to rather distant realms of health 
research practice and discourse. Once the perceptual filter is supplied, 
however, there is nothing easier than seeing indications of processes of 
transformation and active management of relevance and similarity everywhere 
in research synthesis studies, methodological texts in the field, and the day-to-
day concerns and discussions of synthesis researchers. The recognition is 
already there and in fact quite banal if left at that level. 
To go beyond this, I will aim to specify empirically this general claim about 
transformations characterising research synthesis studies by undertaking and 
observing a process of data extraction. I will begin to explore, among other 
things: what is involved in processes of transformation; what factors enable, 
constrain and shape them; and how pervasive and deep-running (or otherwise) 
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the potential of evidence for transformations is. Findings will then be related to 
our trust in and expectations of research synthesis methods. Directions for their 
improvement will also be considered. 
 
4.2. ‘Evidence’, ‘data’ and ‘data extraction’ – starting points that are 
about to change 
Some clarification of word usage may be needed before I introduce the topic, 
aims and scope of the thesis in greater detail. This concerns the concepts of 
‘evidence’, ‘data’ and ‘data extraction’. All three are central to the vocabulary of 
health research synthesis but their meanings are far from fixed. To start with, 
‘evidence’ and ‘data’ are used broadly, to refer to any unit of information that is 
identified in a primary study as potentially relevant to a synthesis study. In the 
case of typical systematic reviews, ‘evidence’ and ‘data’ have become 
established as the standard generic terms for units of information of interest. It 
can be argued, however, that such practice is problematic. The compromise 
with precision is particularly apparent in qualitative synthesis methods and 
studies, where many of the relevant units of information clearly amalgamate 
theory and evidence or represent interpretations rather than data.23 Some 
authors of qualitative syntheses prefer to refer to ‘findings’ instead of ‘evidence’ 
or ‘data’ in recognition of that. Others emphatically refer to ‘evidence’, mainly as 
a rhetorical device affirming the quality, value and importance of non-RCT 
research. In the text below, I temporarily put those difficulties aside. As there 
has been no in-depth analysis in the literature of the units of information taken 
out of primary studies for inclusion in a synthesis study and thus no precise and 
fixed vocabulary, I provisionally resort to the terms that are most typically used. 
The issue is taken up again in the literature review and in Chapter 3. 
 
‘Data extraction’ in a research synthesis context is, at its most basic, the 
process of identifying evidence of interest from primary studies and (partly) de-
contextualising it with a view to its contribution to and re-contextualisation into 
the synthesis study. In terms of mechanics, it covers the processes of reading 
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 The separation between ‘theory’, ‘interpretations’ and ‘evidence’ and ‘data’ made here is seen 
as a matter of degree, with the separation being sometimes easier, sometimes more difficult. I 
address the issue repeatedly throughout the thesis. 
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primary reports, picking information potentially relevant to the synthesis study 
and recording it on a data extraction/ data collection form. The data collection 
form is seen as a “bridge” between what is reported by the source study authors 
and what is ultimately reported in the review (Higgins and Deeks, 2011: 7.5.1). 
It functions as 1) a summary of the review question and the criteria for eligibility 
of studies; 2) a historical record of decisions and changes thereof that are made 
during the review process; and as 3) the source of data to be analysed (Meade 
and Richardson, 1997; Higgins and Deeks, 2011: 7.5.1). 
 
In the context of synthesis methods for qualitative research, the discourse of 
‘coding’ is much more frequent than that of data extraction. Qualitative coding is 
the process of “defining what the data are about”, of “categorizing segments of 
data with a short name that simultaneously summarizes and accounts for each 
piece of data”. Codes show how data have been selected, separated and 
sorted, which is the first step towards making analytic interpretations (Charmaz, 
2006: 43). Further consideration of data extraction is given in Chapter 3 and of 
coding in Chapters 2 and 3. For the moment, I will use “data extraction” as the 
generic term. 
 
4.3. Transformations of evidence during data extraction – what does 
it mean exactly? 
It is difficult to respond to this question with even a basic definition. This is not a 
concept that has been used in relation to evidence in research synthesis 
studies. I will start unfolding it through offering a list of examples and some 
initial conceptual and critical comments. 
 
4.3.1. Routine, minor transformations 
In health research synthesis studies, at least some evidence is transformed or 
re-described in preparation for synthesis in a manner that is generally 
considered routine and minor. This applies to both numerical and textual 
evidence. In systematic reviews inclusive of meta-analysis, evidence often 
needs to be standardised so as to become of a uniform format and amenable to 
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meta-analysis. “Conversions”, as they are also called (e.g. Higgins and Deeks, 
2011: 7.7), are usually necessitated by differences and incompleteness in 
reporting. For example, the parameters typically used in meta-analysis in the 
case of continuous outcomes are the number of participants, the mean and 
standard deviation for each intervention group. Their values, however, may not 
be available directly but obtainable from other statistics. A missing standard 
deviation can be calculated or estimated from a standard error, confidence 
interval, t-test statistic, F-test statistic or a p-value (op.cit.: 7.7.3.3). In the 
following formula, the standard deviation is obtained from the standard error of 
the mean, multiplied by the square root of the sample size: 
 
(op. cit.: 7.7.3.2) 
Conversions (transformations) like these are formulaic and thus highly 
transparent, replicable and largely reversible. What is involved in the process is 
known, although more or less secure assumptions may need to be made.  
 
Verbal claims also undergo such routine, minor transformations. Consider a 
synthesis study of children’s understanding of healthy eating. 24 Dixey et al. 
(2001) found that children “have some understanding of the idea that there are 
not healthy and unhealthy foods, but healthy and unhealthy diets” (op. cit.: 76). 
This and the findings of five other studies were synthesised into evidence that 
children had a “good understanding of the concept of healthy eating”. Such 
transformations are unavoidable – if you want a synthesis, you accept them – 
and tend to be seen by synthesis researchers as minor and generally 
unproblematic. It becomes more controversial whether they are so minor and 
unproblematic when some of the original data are noted: All the things that are 
bad for you are nice and all the things that are good for you are awful or The fat 
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 The task to develop a synthesis from the excerpts of six studies on healthy eating in children 
was given to students in an online module on Research Synthesis I undertook between May 
2010 and July 2010 with The Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-ordinating 
Centre (EPPI-Centre) at the Institute of Education, London. It was a scaled-down version of an 
actual research synthesis performed by members of the teaching team (Rees et al., 2011). The 




squashes the heart and the arteries get blocked (op. cit.: 74). There is much 
more and much less in nice bad things, awful good things and squashed hearts 
than “a good understanding of the concept of healthy eating”. 
 
4.3.2. ‘Re-location’ of evidence 
At least some evidence in health research synthesis studies is attributed, in 
preparation for synthesis, to a class of entities, events, processes, relationships, 
etc. that is different to the one in the source publication. Such ‘re-location’ of 
evidence is usually seen as strongly interpretive. For instance, in a pilot study 
on decision making about weight loss25 evidence that media images are 
associated with an increase in the importance of weight as a basis for women’s 
self-esteem and a decrease in their body satisfaction and eating (Strahan, 
2003) and evidence that heavy television viewing is associated with increased 
purging behaviours in Asian-Pacific adolescents (Pinhey and Okinaka, 2004) 
were both re-located from their original domains (broadly, research on the effect 
of media images on health) to a new domain concerning the effect of short-
lived, minute environmental stimuli on dynamic perceptions of one’s weight and 
body. The re-location used roughly the following path. Thin images were seen 
as a kind of minor, possibly subliminally processed, external stimulus. They 
were shown by the cited studies to affect body satisfaction, the relative 
importance of weight to self-esteem, eating and purging behaviours. With some 
further substitutions and amalgamations of concepts and theoretical 
derivations26 the cited studies were interpreted as showing that thin images 
affected the sampled individuals’ perceptions of their bodies and weight. 
Combined, the above amounted to vicarious evidence lending support to a 
hypothesis that the dynamic component in self-perceptions of weight may have 
been underestimated in research and that minor, possibly subliminally 
processed, external stimuli may contribute substantially to the dynamics of 
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 This study (on which I worked, unpublished) compared the research and broader social 
discussion on decision making about weight loss.  
 
26
For instance, perception of one’s body and weight was seen to be covering some of the 
elements of satisfaction and importance of weight. Perception of one’s body and weight was 
also seen as a mediator between being exposed to thin images and engaging in dysfunctional 




those self-perceptions. Prima facie at least, the evidence here has been 
subjected to much more intense and controversial processing than the evidence 
from the preceding examples. This level of processing is typical of more 
‘interpretive’ qualitative synthesis studies. 
Such interpretation heavy re-locations do not happen in qualitative research 
only. Meta-analysis is dependent upon similar processes. Evidence from a 
particular study is attributed to newly formed groups that shift focus away from 
the defining features of a sample, setting, intervention, etc. as these have been 
asserted in the original study. The ‘things’ from the original studies are re-
located or perspectivally transformed into new kinds of things through a revised 
category attribution. For instance, a recent Cochrane review of interventions in 
established atopic eczema (Bath-Hextal et al., 2012) brought together, as 
studies on dietary supplements, studies of three fish oil supplement diets, two 
vitamin D diets, and single studies of diets supplemented with zinc, selenium, 
vitamin E, vitamin B6, sea buckthorn oil, hempseed oil and sunflower oil. 
Uncontroversially, zinc became dietary supplement for the purposes of this 
review. More controversially, through the same process, zinc became 
equivalent to sunflower oil. 
The other side of a new category formation is that of exclusion from a class. In 
the vocabulary adopted here, these are cases where transformations are found 
to be impossible or insufficiently warranted. For example, in a recent Cochrane 
review of “behavioural and cognitive-behavioural group-based parenting 
programmes for early-onset conduct problems in children aged 3 to 12 years” 
(Furlong et al., 2012) studies were excluded because an intervention also 
included individual interaction between a professional and a parent, rather than 
only group sessions; because children had learning difficulties, rather than only 
conduct problems; because the intervention addressed not only parenting 
problems but also included the training in social skills of the children; because 
many of the children in a study were above 12 years of age, etc. (op. cit., see 
table on Characteristics of excluded studies). Supposedly, both the inclusions 
and exclusions are made on the basis of features that have been clearly 
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described in the original study or are “analytic”, entailed by the original study 
category.27 
The above examples have hopefully given some substance to the claim that 
processes of transformations are key to research synthesis work. Some further 
observations will be added under 4.4 concerning the importance and 
prevalence of those processes. 4.5 comments on the vocabulary of 
‘transformations’, ‘re-locations’ and ‘re-descriptions’. 
 
4.4. How trustworthy are those transformations and how much does 
this matter? 
As indicated above, my interest in transformations of evidence is ultimately an 
interest in their trustworthiness, which, in turn, is a guide to the trustworthiness 
of research synthesis studies and the development of adequate expectations of 
these. We need starting points in terms of credibility of transformations. 
Currently, these can be obtained mostly indirectly or through anecdotal 
evidence. 
One sign that transformations of evidence are not highly reliable while also 
being consequential is the practice of double data extraction in research 
synthesis (i.e. the practice of two researchers independently identifying and 
recording the information from the primary study which is to be used in the 
synthesis study). In the case of traditional systematic reviews, 
double/independent data extraction is standard practice. When this is not 
feasible as a full-blown process, a proportion of the material (e.g. 20%) is 
processed by two researchers. Such relatively relaxed standards are not always 
an option. For instance, double data extraction is mandatory for Cochrane 
reviews28 (Higgins and Churchill, 2011). “It is strongly recommended that more 
than one person extract data from every report to minimize errors and reduce 
                                                          
27
 Criticism of those processes of class attribution and collapsing of differences in the context of 
meta-analysis are well familiar to philosophers. I am trying to contextualise them amongst a 
range of processes transforming the evidence and entities of interest in research synthesis. 
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 Meaning that good reasons for its non-observance must be provided rather than that the 




potential biases being introduced by review authors. As a minimum, information 
that involves subjective interpretation and information that is critical to the 
interpretation of results (e.g. outcome data) should be extracted independently 
by at least two people” 29 (Higgins and Deeks, 2011: 7.6.2). Methodological 
texts justify the need for double data extraction not only through arguments but 
through empirical research, too. For instance, the Cochrane Handbook cites 
Jones et al. (2005) who found high prevalence though low impact of data 
extraction errors (errors in 20 out of 34 reviews). Gøtzsche et al. (2007) found 
that a minimum of seven out of 27 reviews had substantial errors in data 
extraction.  
In the mainstream systematic review and other ‘more objectivist’ synthesis 
methods, differences between researchers are seen as a sign that an error has 
been made or that at least one of the decisions is of lower quality. 
Disagreements are resolved in discussion between the two researchers, 
potentially with the help of a more experienced arbiter. Errors or lower quality 
decisions are corrected. Criteria and rules are specified further if necessary. 
The researchers’ approach may also be additionally “calibrated”. The strong 
emphasis on such processes of control over data extraction is there to ensure 
the validity and reliability of the synthesis outcome. But it can also be read as a 
photographic negative. It addresses the fact that the explicit instructions of the 
method do not constrain unambiguously the handling of the evidence. A 
replication of the study is incorporated into the study design because of a high 
likelihood of error and/or high degree of indeterminacy, both with potentially 
substantial consequences for the outcome. 
In qualitative or mixed research synthesis methods, double (or triple) coding or 
data extraction is also standard practice (e.g. Thorne and Paterson, 1998; 
Walter et al., 2004; Oliver et al., 2005; Smith, Pope and Botha, 2005). 
Discrepancies in data extraction are expected here, too. But only to an extent 
they are seen as a matter of quality differences. Discrepancies are more often 
taken as a consequence of legitimate differences of perspective, as resulting 
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 The Handbook gives advice on the background and training of extractors, too: “it is preferable 
that data extractors are from complementary disciplines, for example a methodologist and a 
topic area specialist. It is important that everyone involved in data extraction has practice using 
the form and, if the form was designed by someone else, receives appropriate training” (Higgins 
and Green, 2011: 7.6.2). 
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from the ambiguity of data and language, and/or reflecting different researchers’ 
sensitivities to different aspects of the data. In any case, the discussion 
between the coders supports the generation of higher quality material to be 
used in the synthesis. At the same time the indeterminacy involved in turning 
primary study evidence into synthesis study evidence is there, a shadow in the 
background.  
A feature concerning the reporting of double data extraction also raises doubts 
of its reliability, especially relative to the above cited empirical findings on errors 
in data extraction. There is no established practice of reporting the degree of 
initial inter-researcher disagreement in synthesis studies, including that in data 
extraction. It can be argued that such reporting is superfluous. A rigorous 
process was followed. Inter-researcher disagreement was superseded or used 
to good advantage. Its extent is irrelevant to the assessment of the synthesis 
product. Perhaps it is irrelevant. In contast, it can also be argued that it is 
missing at least partly because it belongs to a backstage that does not speak 
particularly well of the validity and reliability of health research synthesis 
findings. Most probably, the degree of disagreement in data extraction is highly 
variable rather than consistently high, depending both on the specifications of 
the method and the particular data used. In some cases it may be genuinely 
minimal. In other cases it may be minimal because of very restrictive 
methodological specifications, which pass over the richness of data and 
compromise validity for reliability, or at the cost of intense calibration of the 
practice of researchers. In still other cases, it may be disconcertingly large and 
best not brought to light. For instance, in coding for a test synthesis in which I 
participated, one of us, both trained researchers, generated 18 and the other 75 
codes for the same source material, working to specifications of the same 
method as laid out in the same publication and having read the same 
instructions. This is probably an extreme case and it is a single one. But while it 
is rational to discount it for those reasons, it is also rational not to dismiss it.  
 
Over the last few pages, I have made loom large transformations in data 
extraction and the fact that practices ensuring their reliability are, as a 
photographic negative, indicative of problems inherent in them. In case the 
44 
 
direction of attention has begun to imply that transformations rule data 
extraction and that they are unreliable, I want to balance this out. It may be the 
case, it may not be. This is one of the questions I will be asking here. My 
starting point is that the transformations of evidence and the ways in which they 
may be unreliable need more attention, but that there are enough literal, non-
transformative data extraction and enough minor, totally appropriate, 
unproblematic transformations in synthesis studies. For instance, if a number of 
studies find that children prefer fruit to vegetables (as has been the case, see, 
for instance, Dixey et al., 2001) and if the synthesis question explores children’s 
attitudes to healthy eating, it seems unproblematic to extract the evidence about 
this preference and unnecessary to subject it to any pre-processing before 
aggregating it. At this level of abstraction, it is hardly important if children in 
some schools know that tomatoes are a kind of fruit and in others do not. 
Similarly, there seem to be numerous transformations that are made easily and 
intuitively and which are regarded as unproblematic. For instance, evidence on 
“perceptions of weight” relative to objective measures of weight, on “judgements 
of weight status” relative to objective measures of weight and on “degree of 
error in self-reports of weight” relative to objective measures of weight are, for 
all practical intents and purposes, evidence on the same issue. The processes 
of transformations and re-locations are thus neither fully defining of research 
synthesis studies, nor by default fraught with uncertainty (unless we disavow 
the possibility for any certainty whatsoever, be it only pragmatic). This has two 
important consequences. First, ‘straightforward’ cases of no or minimal 
transformation and no or fully acceptable uncertainty can be used as a yardstick 
in exploring what is happening in more complex cases. Second, straightforward 
cases can be seen as the stable basis underpinning synthesis studies, which 
makes synthesis studies meaningful and feasible. One of the versions of the 
most generic concern of this thesis is what the parameters of this 
meaningfulness and feasibility are, and how we can improve on them. 
 
4.5. Another note on vocabulary 
The vocabulary of transformations, re-locations and re-descriptions used so far 
is provisional but needs some preliminary clarification nonetheless. I have used 
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‘transformation’ or ‘re-description’ where the source evidence is indeed ‘lost’ for 
the synthesis, where it has been substituted by a representation of the source 
study evidence that claims to be the source study evidence. This is the case, for 
instance, when the technical procedure used is one of reading a primary study 
report and filling in, in a data extraction table, a new description for a particular 
evidential statement or a set of statements. A similar situation can be observed 
when information is coded for in the margins of a paper and it is the code that 
will be used in the synthesis.  
The use of procedures and display formats which preserve the original evidence 
intact or secure immediate access to it is, however, becoming widespread.30 
This is the case when the coding is performed in specialised electronic software 
(see Chapter 4, Section 3.3. for a brief discussion of packages). There, the 
original statement is directly visible or a click away. In such cases a vocabulary 
of ‘transformations’ may be seen as at best dramatic and at worst misleading. 
The evidence is still as it was. What has happened is that a new statement or 
category has appeared. Discussing such processes and outcomes in terms of 
re-classification or subsumption under a new hypothesis may appear more 
appropriate. I prefer ‘transformations’ as at a later stage the original evidence 
will nonetheless be superseded. It is the claim under which the original 
evidence was re-classified or the new hypothesis which it came to support that 
will continue into the synthesis study, not the evidence from the source study. 
Refinements of terminology concerning transformations will be one of the 
concerns of this work. 
 
5. Aims, scope and approach of the thesis – initial specifications 
 
5.1. Broad aims 
Most broadly, I will aim to give a descriptive account of the transformations and 
re-locations of evidence under way during data extraction for the purposes of 
research synthesis studies – what they involve, their frequency and range (on a 
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 In 2010, when the original version of this chapter was written, a Word data extraction form 
was still quite frequent, possibly dominating the way in which synthesis studies were carried out. 




continuum of ‘small’ to ‘big’ transformations), and their drivers (the factors that 
enable, constrain, shape, determine them). The outcomes of this exploration will 
be seen as throwing light on the validity and reliability of research synthesis 
studies – i.e. the extent to which we can trust their results. They will also be 
used to underpin proposals for methodological developments to help improve 
the rigour and heuristic potential of transformations in synthesis studies. More 
theoretically, findings will inform our thinking on the nature of evidence. In 
particular, its position on three overlapping continua will be considered: of 
stability vs. flexibility (capacity to preserve or change its form and contents in 
cases of re-use), fixedness and adaptability (within a particular framework or to 
a range of frameworks), and singularity vs. multiplicity of meaning. 
 
5.2. Scope 
The processes of transformation and re-location of evidence will be viewed 
primarily as processes concerned with similarity and relevance. The context in 
which they will be investigated will be that of initial processing of primary study 
material (through data extraction). The transformations and re-locations of 
interest will be ones of textual or textual plus numerical material, to the 
exclusion of purely numerical, formulae-based transformations. This material 
will be highly varied, drawn from a range of research papers on cancer informed 
primarily by behavioural, social sciences and humanities thinking. The process 
of data extraction will be introspectively observed (observed as performed by 
the author) and will be in response to a guiding synthesis question on, broadly 
speaking, changes in behaviours and mental contents and their relationship to 
outcomes in cancer. 
These choices exclude numerous approaches and contexts to exploring 
processes of transformation and re-location of evidence which are likely to be 
key to an adequate account. For instance, processes of transformation and re-
location can also be explored as a field of negotiation, where researchers 
negotiate what a valid interpretation of a particular piece of evidence is. Or they 
can be seen from a cognitive psychological perspective and the mechanisms 
relating input to output experimentally explored. Data extraction is at best the 
second stage where data are re-located – judgements of relevance in study 
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selection are an earlier phase where re-locations of evidence may happens. 
Much data will also undergo further transformations before the final synthesis is 
reached. Levels of transformation and re-location in synthesis studies involving 
highly varied material (to be addressed here) will be markedly higher than in 
synthesis studies of largely similar source material (with the most popular 
method, the mainstream systematic review, being of the latter type). 
 
These inclusion-exclusion decisions have been made with the aim of capturing 
some of the most fundamental, interesting and opaque processes implicated in 
the processing of information to be included in a synthesis study while also 
ensuring feasibility of the work. Below are some justifications. 
 
The context of data extraction is the first stage in a synthesis study where 
varied and analytically intense transformations of evidence happen. 
Transformations may be underway during the earlier stage of abstract sifting – 
namely as re-locations where studies of a distant theoretical framework are 
seen as relevant and re-located to the theoretical framework of the synthesis 
study. However, transformations during abstract sifting involve limited analysis 
and no change in the form and contents of evidence. Data extraction is thus a 
natural starting point for exploring processes of transformation most broadly. 
I chose the perspective of similarity and relevance as it seems to reflect what 
are, arguably, the primary aims of processes of transformation and re-location 
in the context of research synthesis studies – of ensuring similarity, of ensuring 
relevance, of testing for similarity and of testing for relevance. I will question this 
framing throughout the thesis, while taking as a starting point that all processes 
of transformation and re-location of evidence serve: 1) to ensure that relevant 
pieces of evidence become sufficiently similar, along a dimension of interest, so 
that they can be brought together into an aggregated piece of evidence or 
summary statement concerning the dimension of interest; 2) to ensure that 
broadly relevant (to the synthesis study) pieces of evidence are attributed to the 
‘right’ object (e.g. group of patients, type of intervention, type of context) or the 
‘right’ parameter within the synthesis framework (concept, hypothesis, etc.); 3) 
to test for lines of relevant similarity between pieces of evidence which are not 
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immediately recognisable; and 4) to test for relevance of a piece of evidence 
which does not fit immediately within the emerging synthesis framework.  
Only textual material or textual plus numerical material will be explored for 
feasibility reasons. The decision to narrow the scope of the work in this way 
took into account several factors. Most of the research to be analysed in the 
case study was likely to be health research informed by the behavioural and 
social sciences and the humanities. Such research is either fully narrative, or 
combines narrative and numerical elements with a predominance of the former. 
The synthesis question to be used to guide the data extraction was rather 
broad. As such, it seemed to require that a narrative be developed first. Textual 
transformations currently appear much more opaque than numerical 
transformations. Finally, numerical transformations seem to become relevant 
after initial data extraction rather than as part of it. ‘Textual or textual plus 
numerical material’ is used to refer to statements that are purely textual; 
statements that incorporate numbers; and the partly textual – partly numerical 
contents of tables (which are another way of representing propositional 
knowledge). Even when numerical information is included, however, the type of 
transformations and re-locations of interest will be ones which are performed 
through language and concepts, rather than statistical techniques.31  
Highly varied material was preferred for the case study so that as broad a range 
of transformations can emerge, ‘difficult cases’ can be encountered (e.g. it is, 
presumably, much more difficult to combine scientific and humanities thinking 
than two RCTs on the same topic) and so that the limits of the processes of 
transformation can become clearer.  
Finally, I chose a largely introspective methodology as it would allow me to 
accommodate the greatest variety of questions. None of the alternatives I was 
forgoing was of superior rigour, although each had some relative advantages. 
There seemed to be three first-line approaches to exploring questions of 
transformations and re-locations of evidence during data extraction: 1) 
comparing the contents of source studies and that of respective data extraction 
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tables from completed or in-progress syntheses; 2) observing the process of 
data extraction while performed by researchers and eliciting introspective 
reports from them, possibly in combination with 1); and 3) performing the 
process myself, observing its deployment and taking extensive notes on the 
observations, possibly in combination with 1). A number of practical and 
methodological reasons led to the third choice. For instance, data extraction 
tables or coded documents of synthesis studies other than systematic reviews 
are not typically published and not easy to obtain. Also, published or shared 
tables are extensively edited and thus some of the unembellished processing is 
lost. Observing and inquiring about other researchers’ work would slow down 
studies that tend to be required within tight timeframes. The questions asked of 
the research participants might frame their reports too strongly, while a fully 
open, non-leading inquiry about a process which is not normally discussed may 
limit unacceptably the collected data. Most importantly, however, performing the 
data extraction myself was going to allow me to extend standard practice. I 
could explore a set of conjectures and opportunities for methodological 
innovation that would otherwise have remained closed for investigation.  
If I need to prioritise the ways in which these choices limit the generalisability of 
findings, I will suggest that findings from this study are likely to overestimate the 
extent and non-transparency of transformations during data extraction (by virtue 
of focusing on highly heterogeneous studies and excluding purely numerical 
transformations) as well as obscuring the importance of transformations during 
other stages of the synthesis process (by virtue of focusing on data extraction). 
 
5.3. Approach 
The performance, observation and exploration of a process of data extraction 
from recent publications on cancer will be at the core of the study, with the data 
extraction guided by the following test synthesis question: 
What services and interventions are likely to be effective in changing 
behaviours and mental contents (cognitions, emotions, attitudes, etc.) 
that can affect the incidence, trajectory, experience, recovery or mortality 
from cancer? In a contextualised version of this question, what is the 
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contribution to improved cancer outcomes of such services and 
interventions relative to biomedically-based ones (e.g. medication, 
screening, genetic tests, etc.)? 
I will not be aiming to complete a synthesis study. The test synthesis question is 
so broad that it is unrealistic to seek an answer to it not only within the 
constraints of this work but also in the context of a standard research project 
resourced for several years and a small- to medium-sized team. The test 
synthesis question aims to draw in highly varied, potentially hard-to-combine 
material and direct the data extraction. The observation of the data extraction 
will be guided by a detailed Analysis Framework specifically developed for this 
work, drawing on ideas from the philosophical and other meta-scientific 
literature as well as ideas arising from my previous engagement with research 
synthesis studies. The data extraction and observation processes will not be 
easily separable. For instance, probing into the reasons for certain 
transformations is a way of observing the process but also a way of extending it. 
Data extraction for research synthesis purposes naturally involves self-
observation, at the very least for bias control and critical analysis. Most 
consequentially, this difficulty of separating the observation from the extraction 
will result in the stretching of standard data extraction, as some of the questions 
guiding the observation will be about unexplored opportunities and limits. For 
instance, the data extraction performed here will be much more comprehensive 
(more of the information within a paper will be used) and will aim consistently, 
rather than occasionally, to elicit multiplicity of meanings (involve the consistent 
extraction of the same piece of data under several categories). These issues 
are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
5.4. Narrower (but still broad) aims 
The following key questions will be addressed with the aim of informing a 
descriptive account of transformations of textual evidence (including textual 
evidence incorporating numbers) in the process of data extraction for the 
purposes of health research synthesis: 
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 What is involved in transformations and re-locations of textual evidence 
during its decontextualisation from the source study for the purposes of 
its recontextualisation into the synthesis study? What steps are involved? 
What information is used? What judgements are made? What types of 
transformations are emerging? 
 
 How frequent are those transformations and re-locations of evidence and 
what is their range? How often do they happen?  How ‘big’ or ‘small’ are 
they ‘on average’? How much change do the ‘big’ transformations 
introduce and how close do the ‘small’ ones keep to the original 
evidence? 
 
 What is it that drives transformations? What factors enable, constrain, 
shape, determine them? In particular, what features of study reports – 
the main source of evidence for research synthesis – drive them? 
 
The following key questions will be addressed with the aim of providing initial 
pointers for critical analysis of current approaches and proposals for 
methodological improvements: 
 
 Does extracting more data, envisioning more uses for it and heightening 
the transparency of the data extraction process even further – which will 
be prominent features of the methodology employed in this study – 
ultimately facilitate and enhance the quality of data extraction and 
synthesis, notwithstanding the more complex process? For instance, 
does such a process enable the identification of more relevant and 
stronger lines of similarity? Or, on the contrary, does it bring forth 
differences between studies which demonstrate that few pieces of 
evidence are justifiably combinable?  
 
 Using findings on the effectiveness of the case study approach (roughly 
of ‘more data’, ‘more uses’ and ‘greater transparency’) as a comparator, 
what can be said about the ability of current health research synthesis 
methods to optimise the potential of available evidence and put it to new 
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uses? Does the field as a whole tend to overestimate the fixedness and 
incommensurability of evidence coming from different research 
traditions? I.e. does it see too much difference and fail to transform and 
re-locate evidence enough? Or, on the contrary, does it go too far, too 
quick? To what extent do current health research synthesis methods 
incorporate adequate methodological steps to constrain or enable the 
transformations and re-locations of evidence? What are the implications 
for our trust in health research synthesis? 
 
 What further methodological steps can be developed so that 
transformations and re-locations of evidence become more rigorous and 
creative? How feasible would it be to introduce such steps? 
 
These narrower but still broad aims will be specified further in Chapter 4. 
 
6. Personal background to this work 
In this final section I will describe how I came to the issue of research synthesis 
and a philosophical and broader meta-scientific exploration of it. This helps 
explain some of the methodological choices made (e.g. decisions to test certain 
hypotheses that were not derived from the literature review or choice of search 
strategies), examples given so far (many of which on overweight and obesity), 
as well as some of the presentation style.  
I became interested in research synthesis through a project on identifying 
publications on health-related values in diabetes, obesity, schizophrenia and 
dementia (understood broadly to include issues such as patients’ and other 
stakeholders’ values, perceptions, preferences, beliefs, experiences, 
satisfaction, quality of life, etc.) and mapping their key messages (Petrova et al., 
2012a, b). I also conducted a pilot synthesis which aimed to compare the 
research and the broader social debate on decision making about weight loss. 
As the methodology of the mainstream systematic review could offer the most 
detailed guidance on developing literature searching strategies, I started 
reading on it. As it was not suited to the development of conceptual syntheses, 
which was my aim, I was on the lookout for alternative synthesis methods. 
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This involvement in search strategy development and research synthesis 
methods came shortly after an MA in which the philosophy of science module 
had made me as excited and jittery as no other.32 Some of the ideas presented 
there felt revelatory and liberating. Others had to be wrong – because I did not 
like them. The juxtaposition of an engagement which required pragmatic 
outcomes and a theoretically informed perspective generated a number of 
concerns. Some of these, as I found later, have been extensively addressed 
within the critical debate on evidence-based medicine. 
Others of my concerns did not seem to be receiving any focused attention. The 
main of these was that there must be something wrong with our methods or 
conduct of primary research, our methods or conduct of synthesis studies, 
and/or our idea of science equalling quality and rigour if so many systematic 
reviews reach a conclusion that “there is insufficient high quality evidence and 
more research is needed”. This was the conclusion I had come to expect of 
systematic reviews. This was the conclusion colleagues would so often deliver 
or hear and which has the status of a usually trite and sometimes hilarious 
community joke. I recently checked if this perception was not a matter of bias, 
where we tend to notice the negative rather than the positive. For lack of 
published data, I carried out a microstudy of 32 recent Cochrane systematic 
reviews (most recent in February – March 2012). More than three primary 
studies were included in 23 of these reviews (i.e. in nine reviews evidence was 
clearly insufficient in volume, too). Within these 23 reviews, assessments of low 
risk of bias dominated in only 3 studies (13.0% of 23 and 9.4% of 32).33 These 
assessments concerned primary studies which, typologically, are believed to 
have a low risk of bias (mostly RCTs). If the overwhelming perception of 
researchers and the ratios from this pilot study are on the right track, most 
health research, even when it has gone through peer-review, is of low quality. 
Research synthesis both further polices peer-reviewed studies, including those 
of the gold standard design, and makes do with this degree of quality. Is there 
something wrong with the standards of research synthesis studies, with the 
quality of our primary research, or with our expectations of research? Should we 
                                                          
32
 Which I owe to Professor Tim Thornton. 
 
33
 They used the GRADE system, which meant that a number of discrete assessments of risk of 
bias were performed. 
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rather say that the majority of studies were of standard (rather than low) quality 
and, expectedly, that there were few or no exceptional studies? 
Logic (or perhaps sensitivity to failures to live up to a self-created image, as 
shaped by my psychology training) also made me question the ‘integrity’ of 
systematic reviews. They are so committed to comprehensiveness, 
‘extremeness’ in literature searching as a way of achieving rigour but do not 
match this with comprehensiveness, ‘extremeness’ in data extraction. They 
make so much of their transparency (and indeed, they are remarkably 
transparent of what decisions have been taken and why in comparison to any 
traditional review), yet some of their processes are black boxed or only 
superficially transparent-ised. For instance, why have studies for subgroup 
analysis been grouped in this way rather than another and what are the 
potential consequences? Why not discuss the many ways in which database 
platforms and indexing terms affect search strategy retrieval and from there 
findings? Why not give the data for inter-rater disagreement, which rarely starts 
as a beautiful picture as much as it may end up as one? How truly conducive to 
rigour is it that we have the input and output of some transformation decisions in 
a table when these are far from reflective of rigour and only exemplary cases? 
Why are health research synthesis methods failing to question themselves with 
the intensity with which they question primary research? Of these ‘failures of 
integrity’, what I perceived as limitations of transparency became a key interest 
for me. The reason, to the extent to which I can reliably identify it, is another 
consequence of my psychological training. I am acutely aware of the many 
ways in which we self-deceive and trust in a far greater rationality and self-
awareness than we are justified to. I see this pattern as applying to science and 
research, too, rather than to our everyday lives only. 
My third main concern was associated with the creative use of data while 
avoiding the danger of finding what you want to find. In the pilot synthesis on 
decision making about weight loss I mentioned, a storyline emerged some of 
whose elements were heavily researched within the context of weight loss and 
others had a corresponding blank slate. At the same time there was vicarious 
evidence to draw in support of those claims, with some transformation. Was this 
a good use of the potential and multiplicity of evidence or was it a stretching to 
fit a belief? Could we try to re-interpret data in as many directions as we can 
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think of and then compare the numerous pictures that emerge? What happens if 
we apply ideas about pluralism in the philosophy of science to how we analyse 
data and group phenomena for the purposes of research synthesis? Such 
concerns and questions explain many of the methodological decisions which 
will be introduced in Chapter 3 much better than the literature review, where 
similar debates were not apparent.  
To conclude this section on personal starting points and their effect on this 
work, I will make a comment on ‘belonging’ and its impact on the writing style 
adopted here. Presumably, connecting methodological debates on research 
synthesis and debates from the philosophy of evidence-based medicine, 
philosophy of science and the meta-scientific fields more broadly must have a 
huge heuristic potential. The merger, however, is not easy and not only 
because the meta-scientific fields have not addressed research synthesis 
extensively. My personal impressions from talking to health research colleagues 
and health professionals and attending philosophy of medicine events where 
health professionals were present is that, polite comments aside, philosophy of 
medicine is, at best, considered interesting but complex and detached from 
actual research and clinical practice; at worst, completely misguided, telling 
nothing of real use to medical science or even harmful; and somewhere in the 
middle “as strange or as missing the point or as demeaningly ironic” (Krieger, 
1992: xvii cited in Chang, 2011).34 
 
In commenting on health research papers I have been writing prior to starting 
my PhD, clinical colleagues would often suggest cuts to theoretical paragraphs. 
They would jokingly remark that “it is too complex for doctors”. In hearing what 
my PhD is on, several health research colleagues and doctors have said it is 
very interesting but “too complex for my little brain” (Yours?!). A quote from a 
highly regarded blog on “dubious and dishonest science” which features 
primarily health and medicine related posts (Colquhoun, 2006-2013) illustrates 
an extreme of the other typical attitude mentioned above, of a perception of 
uselessness or harm: 
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Having long since decided that it was Fisher, rather than philosophers, 
who had the answers to my questions, why bother to write about 
philosophers at all? It was precipitated by joining the London Evidence 
Group. Through that group I became aware that there is a group of 
philosophers of science who could, if anyone took any notice of them, do 
real harm to research (Colquhoun, 2011). 
I cannot hope to change such attitudes (and in many respects I do share a view 
that the philosophy of evidence-based medicine could and should be better) but 
I have taken them into account. I tried to keep the philosophical and other 
theoretical and critical elements of this work clear and readable by health 
researchers and clinicians, too. Stylistically, this thesis shifts much. It tends to 
take discourse features of the field where an issue it discusses at a particular 
moment is typically located, whether philosophy, health research, sociology of 
science or psychology, with the former two dominating. It is, however, probably 
closest to a health research or ‘education and debate’ publication for a general 
medical journal, with a higher frequency of I-forms. Thematically and 
conceptually rather than stylistically, I hope that it falls in a good middle – 
between philosophy, the broader meta-scientific field, and the health sciences.  
 
7. Structure of the thesis 
 
This introductory chapter is followed by a literature review of three main parts. 
The first is on the concept of research synthesis, defining features and types of 
research synthesis, and specific methods other than the mainstream Cochrane-
type systematic review inclusive of meta-analysis. I present both tabular 
summaries and extended descriptions of exemplars. I discuss issues of 
research synthesis primarily on the basis of sources from health research due 
to the limitations of the meta-scientific debate outlined above. The second main 
part of the literature review covers debates on five supposedly basic carriers of 
empirical knowledge – data, evidence, findings, facts and claims both from a 
meta-methodological (health sciences) perspective and a meta-scientific 
perspective. The third (much shorter) part of the literature review addresses key 
debates on ‘transformations’ .The literature review is a dense chapter due to the 
need to address an unstructured topic – research synthesis, a range of very 
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broad concepts – such as evidence, data and transformations, and to do so 
both from a meta-scientific and meta-methodological perspective. It needs its 
breaks of reading. 
 
Chapter 3 is a brief Postscript to Literature Review – Prescript to Methods 
chapter. The literature review could not create a coherent picture for many of 
the key concepts needed for the subsequent exploration. The debates adduced 
in it were often too disparate, too fragmented. In the Postscript-Prescript 
chapter I stabilise some shaky grounds concerning research synthesis, data 
extraction and units of analysis/synthesis so that the investigation can proceed.  
 
In Chapter 4, I present the approach, methods and tools used for the case study 
of data extraction from research papers on cancer. I justify the choice of cancer 
as topic for the case study and outline the approach to sampling papers. I 
describe the Analysis Framework used to guide the data extraction and five key 
‘injunctions’ which complement it – for comprehensiveness, extensive multiple 
coding, extreme transparency, combination of critical appraisal (for 
methodological rigour) and critique (of fundamental assumptions of a piece of 
work), and for coding as close as possible to the original, with no or minimal 
transformations, and then extending towards larger transformations. A key 
component of the analysis toolkit is the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings, 
also described in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 5, I present findings from the empirical investigation of the 17 papers 
from which data were extracted. As the ‘behaviours’ of the tools and the findings 
obtained through their application were quite different to what I expected, I re-
conceptualised ‘transformations’ and organised the emerging findings around 
this revised view. A substantial part of the chapter is dedicated to findings about 
similarities and differences between pieces of evidence. These similarities and 
differences concern composition and structure, thematic contents, and 
standardised parameters such as cancer-related and socio-demographic 
parameters. I also present findings about the inherent multiplicity of pieces of 
evidence and the extent of missing information in pieces of evidence. Finally, I 
summarise my observations on the deployment of the processes of 
transformation and on the difficulties and affordances of capturing it.  
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In Chapter 6, I summarise and re-interpret the case study findings with the aim 
of throwing light on the credibility of current synthesis methods and 
opportunities for methodological improvements. I specify the intellectual 
contributions of this work and its limitations. I also offer an ambitious and 
perhaps utopian vision of a new model of health research synthesis before 
concluding with comments on its feasibility and application in minimal ways. 
 
A note on graphical conventions may be needed before closing this chapter. 
The layering of quotes in a study which looks into studies that represent other 
studies can be complex. For instance, there are cases when I am quoting a 
piece of research where a research participant is quoted who herself quotes 
another person. The picture is further complicated by the fact that the study 
looks at how the same thing can be represented in this way and in that way and 
in that other way, as a result of many different transformations. Finally, it is a 
study in a little explored area and as such requires the introduction of a number 
of new terms. I have adopted a convention where other scholars’ quotes or 
terms appear in double quotation marks and my rephrases or terms are in 
single quotation marks. I ‘mention’ words35 or indicate a metaphorical, ironic or 
hesitant usage also with single quotation marks. Italics are used for quoting too, 
usually with longer quotes. They are also used for placing emphases. The 
graphical conventions in studies where a wide range of perspectives and meta-
commenting are implicated is in itself a topic for exploration. Overall, my aim 
has been to facilitate reading, the attribution of claims and the prioritisation of 
messages in a way that leaves the conventions inconspicuous (in some cases 
this means that slight variations are there from context to context). Please let 
the text lead you – it is only worth remembering the difference between single 
and double quotation marks around newly introduced terms. Single quotation 
marks are around my terms which, at the moment, have no currency. Double 
quotation marks are around other scholars’ terms. 
Now onto a chapter where double quotation marks prevail – the literature 
review. 
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 In the sense of the philosophical ‘use-mention’ distinction, where to ‘mention’ a word is to 
draw attention to the signifier. Above, I ‘mentioned’ mention. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
There is an interesting somewhat hidden, somewhat false paradox at the heart 
of research synthesis studies. They are often said to be bringing forward and 
together ‘what is known’ on a topic. But if this is needed, then we do not 
properly know the known. The known may be known in terms of being there, 
having been discovered or generated by some, but not properly known in terms 
of being inaccessible to many. It may be perceived as known, but when joined 
with other known things to be shown as false. It may be known to many in their 
seclusion and believed to be precious, unique knowledge, but once its 
sharedness in isolation becomes known, its value degrades. In any case, there 
is something truer, more definitive, more useful to be known by extracting 
further knowledge from what we know or by ascribing credibility and importance 
to it. 
 
This promise is sometimes met, sometimes not. Sometimes what was vaguely 
known will come out as all that was to be known, albeit more clearly. We are 
likely to feel disappointed but may also be reassured. Sometimes we will find 
out that we know less than we thought we did. We may feel at a loss but excited 
at the opportunity, too. Sometimes superior knowledge may be generated but 
be lifeless, a “terminally boring recital or catalogue of previous studies” 
(Schwandt, 1998: 410). The outcome of a research synthesis and the response 
to it are unpredictable. 
 
With such a framing, centuries of scholarly work on knowledge and meta-
knowledge are beckoning with their relevance. I wish I could buy more Big 
Issues.  
  
1. Contents and structure of this chapter 
This literature review has four main sections. In Section 2, I describe the variety 
of approaches used to collect information and make decisions about the 
coverage of the review. In Section 3, I outline current thinking on health 
research synthesis. I begin by presenting more abstract claims and debates 
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concerning the ‘nature’ and ‘defining features’ of research synthesis36 and follow 
these by brief descriptions of exemplary synthesis methods outside the 
mainstream systematic review. Finally, I draw on the difficulties I encountered in 
identifying exemplar synthesis methods to articulate further features of the field. 
In Section 4, I present a range of views concerning five main carriers of 
empirical knowledge – data, evidence, findings, facts and claims. In trying to pin 
down the unit of analysis/synthesis in research synthesis, I became aware of 
the immense variety of units suggested. I chose the above partly because they 
are mentioned frequently in research synthesis texts, partly because they are 
likely to be amongst the most basic possible units of analysis/ synthesis. This 
section also includes a brief discussion of widely accepted ‘paradigms’ in health 
research which are presumed to be shaping evidence, data, findings, etc. Their 
apparent incommensurability is often used as an argument against the viability 
of certain types of research synthesis. 
In Section 5, I consider the literature on ‘transformations’.  
Due to the novelty of questions and approach and the fact that very different 
literatures were brought together, no stable picture emerges from the literature 
review. In the brief next chapter, Postscript to Literature Review – Prescript to 
Methods, I temporarily stabilise uncertain starting points so as to proceed with 
the investigation.  
 
2. Scope, approaches and inclusion/ exclusion criteria for the 
literature review 
In prefacing a volume on The Structure of Scientific Theories, Frederick Suppe 
suggests that “[i]t is only a slight exaggeration to claim that a philosophy of 
science is little more than an analysis of theories and their roles in the scientific 
enterprise” (Suppe, 1977: 3). With concepts like research synthesis, evidence, 
data and transformations, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that one can 
include the whole of the philosophy of science, the broader meta-scientific field 
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 Nobody who has read and studied with Professor John Dupré can use words like ‘nature’, 
‘defining features’ and ‘essence’ without long and impassioned explanations concerning the 
plurality of things that things can be (or occasional quotation marks in their stead). 
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and all the methodological literature in health research in this literature review. 
This section describes the main decisions I took so that the review can be 
feasible while striving towards systematicity and rigour. Such transparency is 
certainly out of form in a philosophy of science thesis but feels indispensable in 
a piece of work discussing research synthesis. I sought a compromise in 
brevity. 
I took two main approaches in identifying relevant literature. The first was the 
use of what in primary research is known as “maximum variation sampling” 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 233), aiming to ensure that as much as possible of 
the variety of circulating debates can be tapped into. The second was the 
performance of what I will call ‘microstudies’ – pragmatic small scale studies of 
imperfect methodology which, in spite of their limitations, are still more reliable 
than impressionistic claims concerning the same issues.  
To enable maximum variation sampling, I first mapped issues by consulting a 
range of major and/or highly relevant databases and collections. I used this 
approach for topics that were central to the work and well defined at least in 
some respects. For instance, the search on ‘evidence’ involved searching the 
British Library catalogue, the Philosopher’s Index, PhilPapers online, MEDLINE, 
PsycINFO, readers in the Philosophy of Science, the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ‘books on evidence’, and my personal collection accumulated over 
a number of years. The searches on ‘research synthesis’ involved searching the 
British Library catalogue, MEDLINE, PsycINFO, the Philosopher’s Index, 
individual journals identified through the list of ZETOC,37 my personal collection, 
and ‘passive’ searches through alerts from the Cochrane Qualitative and 
Implementation Methods Group.   
 
In the case of ‘transformations’ – a topic which ‘does not exist’ in the way 
proposed in the thesis – I first articulated, as key subthemes corresponding to 
aspects of the concept, the background knowledge on the basis of which the 
concept emerged. I then refined those subthemes and articulated new ones 
through further reading and conceptual analysis. Finally, I identified exemplar 
texts for all subthemes. With topics which I took to be less central to the 
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formulation of the thesis questions (e.g. data, findings, facts), I sought exemplar 
texts directly. This was usually through relatively simple searches, citation 
tracking and advice rather than through microstudies. 
I took the meta-methodological literature on research synthesis and the 
philosophical literature in evidence-based medicine as the primary literatures for 
the review. However, in a number of cases relevant debates in those fields were 
limited or lacking (e.g. discussions of data in the philosophy of evidence-based 
medicine) or derivative of debates in a neighbouring field (e.g. discussions of 
paradigm differences in the methodological literature on research synthesis 
seem entirely derivative of discussions of paradigm differences in the 
methodological literature on primary, mostly mixed methods, research). In such 
cases I reviewed literature from the broader or closest field.  
I performed microstudies primarily to ensure the rigour of selecting issues to 
present but also to collect information that was lacking in the literature. The 
latter is in line with the appeal of Onwuegbuzie and Frels (2011) who maintain 
that a ‘literature review’ label is restrictive for what should nowadays be 
included in a literature review. The microstudies included two thematic analysis 
microstudies performed in QSR NVivo (QSR International, 2013),38 two 
linguistic content analysis microstudies, and a number of bibliometric 
microstudies. 
The first of the thematic analysis microstudies aimed to identify types of goals, 
outcomes and rationales for performing research syntheses. It involved coding, 
until saturation, of exemplary texts on innovative synthesis methods. I then 
tested the codes thus generated against texts on the mainstream method and 
further texts on innovative methods (selection of findings in 2.4). The second 
thematic analysis microstudy aimed to identify recent tendencies in the 
philosophy of medicine and philosophy of evidence-based medicine. It involved 
coding the contents of relevant abstracts retrieved from the Philosopher’s Index 
for the last five years, 2007-2012 (120 abstracts; search string “philosophy of 
medicine OR evidence based medicine OR EBM”; search run Feb 2012, 
findings in 3.2.2).  
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 One of the popular software packages for the analysis of qualitative data. Versions 8 through 
to 10 were used. 
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The linguistic content analysis microstudies were used to identify attributes and 
labels ascribed to ‘data’ in two exemplary methodological texts – the Cochrane 
Handbook (Higgins and Green, 2008) on the quantitative side and Green and 
Thorogood’s Qualitative Methods for Health Research (2004) on the qualitative 
side. The identification of phrases containing ‘data’ was done through the 
search function of Adobe rather than formal word frequency analysis and 
software (findings presented briefly in 3.1.1). 
 
Finally, the bibliometric microstudies included: 1) identification of the most cited 
papers on evidence-based medicine in the Web of Science so that these can be 
used to structure the presentation of the debate on evidence in the meta-
methodological literature (see 3.2.1); and 2) identification of relative interest in 
new and emerging synthesis methods as measured by number of citations in 
PubMed, the Web of Science and Google scholar (2.5.1). 
Micro as they were, those studies were time consuming. Such an approach 
could not be applied to all topics. A sizeable proportion of the literature I 
included thus came from simple searches, opportunistic familiarity, availability 
and advice. Most notable influences outside of my supervisors’ advice and the 
(less than perfect) holdings of the Exeter University library were events on data 
sharing hosted at my home institution and one of its lead researchers, Dr 
Sabina Leonelli,39 and technical briefings by Professor Barry Barnes. 
 
3. Research synthesis from the perspective of the health sciences  
Good succinct definitions of research synthesis understood broadly, but also of 
specific methods of it, are hard to find. Definitions tend to be: 
minimal: Literature reviews accumulate learning and avoid the pitfalls of relying 
on single studies (Harden et al., 2004: 794); 
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 Such as the international workshop on Data-driven research in the biological and biomedical 
sciences, Exeter, 15-16 April 2010, and the Making Sense of Large Datasets Conference, 




narrowly procedural: Conventional systematic review developed as a specific 
methodology for searching for, appraising, and synthesising findings of primary 
studies (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006: bmc 240); 
somewhat repetitive: All reviews involve combining multiple studies for the 
purpose of demonstrating their collective relevance for solving some problem, 
for understanding some issue, for explaining some relationship, and so on. 
Reviewing is an interpretive undertaking insofar as it is an effort to make sense 
of those studies and to establish their meaning (Strike and Posner, 1983a). A 
view widely held is that reviews are a means of collecting and organizing the 
results of previous studies so as to produce a composite of what we have 
already learned about a particular topic (Schwandt, 1998: 409); 
 
substantially laden with theory: From a Bayesian perspective, synthesis of 
research evidence is a decision-making process, and individuals who make 
decisions do not approach evidence in isolation (Roberts et al., 2002: 1596-7); 
 
a bumpy combination of formality and informality: Systematic reviews or 
research syntheses can be thought of as a technique for sorting out the bits of 
the jigsaw, weighing up where they might go, and putting bits together. They 
also help us see more clearly where there are gaps. Systematic reviews are 
more cumulative and more critically robust and, along with the related idea of 
evidence-based policy and practice, have been likened to ice breakers sailing 
through the pack ice of opinion and assertion (Sutton et al., 2000: 6); 
 
or beautifully poetic but little instructive: Qualitative metasynthesis is  ... a 
complex exercise in interpretation: carefully peeling away the surface layers of 
studies to find their hearts and souls in a way that does the least damage to 
them (Sandelowski, Docherty and Emden, 1997: 370). 
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 The BMC journals, which are only published electronically, indicate underneath each page 
number that it is “not for citation purposes” (every article starts from p. 1).  Adding bmc 
acknowledges that their numbers are special – but not so special so that they are not used for 
citation purposes … 
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I will take as a starting point the following broad conception: ‘health research 
synthesis’ is used here to refer to the process(es) and/or outcome(s) of bringing 
together information from, primarily or only, health research reports where an 
attempt is made to articulate the process in some detail. In the Postscript to 
Literature Review – Prescript to Methods Chapter, I will provide an extended 
account of research synthesis as understood in this work. 
 
3.1. Nomenclature  
Current texts concerning the bringing together of health research reports refer 
to “systematic reviews”, “reviews”, “overviews”, “structured reviews”, “systematic 
narrative reviews”, “evidence synthesis”, “best evidence synthesis”, “research 
synthesis”, “systematic (research) synthesis”, “summaries of research”, 
“integrative research”, “secondary research”, “aggregation” (of research, 
evidence, data), “knowledge accumulation”, “meta-analysis”, “synopses”, “meta-
aggregation”, to name some of the most frequently applied ones.41 The ‘process 
vocabulary’ of the field includes “synthesising”, “pooling”, “integrating”, 
“aggregating”, “summarising”, “accumulating”, “assembling”, “compressing”, 
“reducing”, “condensing”, “drawing together”, “combining”, “collating”, etc.  
Some of these generic terms are used in narrower and/or value-laden ways in 
particular contexts. For instance, ‘synthesis’ may be preserved only for ‘wholes 
that are more than the sum of their parts’ – for outcomes that go beyond the 
averaging of results or juxtaposition of briefly presented study descriptions. 
Thus, synthesis can be variably opposed to “mere”, “simple” summaries, 
reviews, aggregations of findings, etc. or other only “summative”, “cumulative” 
outcomes (e.g. see Greenhalgh et al., 2005: 428; Paterson et al., 2001: preface 
p. 2; Noblit and Hare,1988; Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009). For others, a 
study can be a synthesis even if it only “involve[s] the juxtaposition of findings 
from multiple studies, perhaps with some analysis of common themes or 
findings across studies” (Popay et al., 2006: 7). Still others tend to preserve 
‘synthesis’ for the ‘synthesis proper’ part of a review, which comes after 
                                                          
41
 Meta-analysis may seem out of place here since generic terms concerning research synthesis 
are discussed, but at least in earlier years ‘meta-analysis’ has been used generically too and 
further qualified, as in “qualitative meta-analysis” (Schreiber, Crooks and Stern, 1997 who credit 
Stern and Harris, 1985 with the first use of the term). 
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specifying the review question, literature searching, study quality appraisal, data 
extraction and before the reporting of findings. They tend to oppose methods for 
performing reviews to methods for performing (solely) a synthesis (e.g. Popay 
et al., 2006:10-11, Dixon-Woods et al, 2006: bmc 6). 
 
‘Summaries’ and ‘synopses’, too, can have more specific meanings.  For 
instance Haynes, one of the pioneers of EBM, proposes the “5S model” – of 
studies, syntheses, synopses, summaries, and systems – for the evolution of 
information services for evidence-based healthcare decisions (Haynes, 2006). 
In this model a synthesis is a systematic review and synopses are “succinct 
descriptions of an individual study or a systematic review” (op. cit.: 162). 
Together with studies, syntheses and synopses tend to address one aspect of 
the management of a health condition (e.g. the effectiveness of a specific drug). 
Summaries, in contrast, “provide a full range of evidence concerning 
management options for a given health problem”. Finally, systems, such as an 
advanced electronic medical record, are “decision support services that match 
information from individual patients with the best evidence from research that 
applies” (op. cit.: 162-3).  
For the moment, I will not be adhering to any of the distinctions proposed. One 
of the aims of this work is to see what distinctions are worth preserving or 
creating in the field. Although my central term will be ‘research synthesis’, I will 
also be using others, in particular ‘review’ and ‘integration’.  
 
3.2. Defining features of research synthesis studies  
The Cochrane Handbook posits five features defining of a systematic review: 1) 
clearly stated objectives, along with pre-defined eligibility criteria for studies; 2) 
an explicit, reproducible methodology; 3) a systematic search aiming to identify 
all relevant studies; 4) an assessment of the validity of the findings of the 
identified studies; and 5) a systematic presentation and synthesis of the 
reviewed studies’ characteristics and findings (Higgins and Green, 2011: 1.2.2). 
Various combinations of these have been defended as essential to non-
mainstream synthesis studies and research synthesis as a whole. Yet all of 
them as a set and each of these separately have also been subjected to 
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extensive criticism (maybe with the exception of the fifth feature, which has 
received limited attention). A range of positions are discussed below for the first 
four of the proposed defining features.  
 
3.2.1. Clearly stated objectives and pre-defined eligibility criteria 
 
The requirements of clearly stated objectives and pre-defined eligibility criteria 
for including studies in a review are often interpreted as a requirement for a well 
formulated research question: “In Cochrane reviews, questions are stated 
broadly as review ‘Objectives’, and specified in detail as ‘Criteria for considering 
studies for this review’” (i.e. eligibility criteria)42 (Higgins and Green 2011: 5.1.1). 
“A statement of the review’s objectives should begin with a precise statement of 
the primary objective, ideally in a single sentence. Where possible the style 
should be of the form ‘To assess the effects of [intervention or comparison] for 
[health problem] in [types of people, disease or problem and setting if 
specified]’. This might be followed by one or more secondary objectives” (ibid).   
 
Some new and emerging methods also insist on a clearly formulated research 
question, such as framework synthesis (Lloyd Jones, 2005) or realist synthesis 
(Pawson, 2002a, b; Pawson et al., 2004). In the context of other methods, 
however, the advance specification of a precise review question is perceived as 
“neither possible nor desirable” (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006: bmc 3). The format 
of the initial research question may need to be “broad, open-ended” 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2005: 420). In reviews of complex evidence the number of 
review questions may be “almost infinite”, to be curtailed by pragmatic criteria 
(ibid., note 1). The question may not be “finally ... settled until the end of the 
review” (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006: bmc 3).43  
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 Eligibility criteria also relate to quality assessment, see below. 
 
43
 Undoubtedly, there are differences of approach, driven by differences of question types, 
source material, epistemological convictions, etc. Yet at least some of the controversy follows 
from stipulating different beginnings for a synthesis study and from differences in 
representational style. In a Cochrane review, for example, the question is developed during the 
protocol development stage. This is an advance specification of a precise question only if we 




With eligibility criteria, there is a similar spread of positions. The Cochrane 
Handbook provides detailed guidance on identifying study characteristics to 
inform them. The prompts to consider in developing the thematic aspect of 
eligibility criteria are enlisted on five pages (Higgins and Green, 2008: 85-90). In 
general, it is useful to consider exactly what intervention is delivered, at what 
intensity, how often it is delivered, who delivers it, and whether people involved 
in delivery of the intervention need to be trained” (Higgins and Green, 2008: 86). 
 
Some of the newly emerging methods attempt to emulate this degree of 
specificity. Texts that problematise it usually do so from a quality assessment 
perspective: primarily the methodological requirements in eligibility criteria are 
attended to (see also 3.2.3 on quality assessment and 4.2 on evidence). One of 
the few aspects of eligibility as thematic relevance to be addressed critically, yet 
somehow always in passing, concerns “background” or “secondary” papers. 
This is the broader range of publications that have had an influence on a review 
but are not formally included in it (Marston and King, 2006). A subissue here is 
that with conceptual reviews, once you have read a paper, you cannot unread it 
and fully exclude it from your synthesis, even if you do not use its claims and 
data directly (Booth, 2011). 
 
3.2.2. Comprehensive literature searches 
 
The performance of a comprehensive literature search is probably the most 
defining characteristic of conventional research synthesis studies in terms of 
researchers’ perceptions. “Systematic reviews of interventions require a 
thorough, objective and reproducible search of a range of sources to identify as 
many relevant studies as possible (within resource limits)” (Higgins and Green, 
2008: 97). This will include searching the major health and medical databases, 
any subject-specific databases, trial registers, conference proceedings, grey 
literature sources, screening the contents pages of particular highly relevant 
journals, hand searching, contacting study authors, etc. Time and budget 
restraints are nevertheless clearly acknowledged (Higgins and Green, 2008: 
97). There is also a move to develop simplified approaches to literature 
searching, partly capitalising on the improved reporting of studies, the improved 
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bibliographic indexing, and the accumulation of entries on RCT databases. It 
has been suggested that exhaustive searches are no longer cost-effective 
(Royle and Waugh, 2005). 
 
Some alternative approaches and studies appropriate the feature of exhaustive 
and reproducible literature searches (e.g. Walter et al., 2004; Oliver et al., 2005; 
Smith, Pope and Botha, 2005). Others question the value of such searches in 
view of the possible outcomes of subsequent (qualitative) analysis of all this 
data – namely unacceptably “gross generalisations”, “trite conclusions” (Noblit 
and Hare, 1988: 27-8). Concepts such as theoretical saturation, conceptual 
saturation, iterativity are advanced as more appropriate (Pawson et al., 2004; 
Dixon-Woods et al., 2006; Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009). In realist synthesis 
for instance, theoretical saturation is the aim, and neither “encyclopaedic 
coverage of all possibly relevant literature”, nor a “census” of all evidence is 
sought (Pawson et al., 2004: 20, v). Arguments against exhaustiveness of 
searches are often accompanied by expressions of dissatisfaction with 
reproducible, highly structured searches (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006, Greenhalgh 
et al., 2005). A “more organic” process is adopted, “fit[ing] better with the 
emergent and exploratory nature of the review questions” (Dixon-Woods et al., 
2006: bmc 3). The paradox of performing a comprehensive search while not 
knowing what is there in the field is also frequently noted.44 
 
3.2.3. Quality assessment 
Quality assessment – and the evidence hierarchies, tools and scales associated 
with the concept – is probably the most vigorously contested feature of 
systematic reviews. Some of the intensity of the debate comes from the phrase 
itself, and practitioners of evidence-based medicine are cautious in using it. 
Nevertheless, the performance of some appraisal of study validity, risk of bias, 
confidence in estimates of effect is a cornerstone of the exemplar method. The 
EBM hierarchies of evidence provide the foundations for risk of bias 
assessment, through ranking the robustness of very broad methodological 
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 I have often heard it raised by researchers (e.g. at the presentation of Booth, A., 2011). A 
good reference evades me. Noblit and Hare make a related point – that it is difficult to know 
when one is being exhaustive since not all studies are published or publicly available (Noblit 




types. Details of the mainstream approach will be discussed under 4.2. 
Evidence.  
 
Alternative methods take again a variety of positions. Some apply “rigorous 
selection criteria” and “standards for scientific rigour” (Sherwood 1997: 33-34). 
A commitment to structured evaluation procedures can branch off in a range of 
choices. Arguments in favour of alternative, for instance qualitative, hierarchies 
of evidence and general expectations of their contents are put forward (Popay, 
Rogers and Williams, 1998). EBM-style tools for broad use are developed, such 
as the CASP qualitative research checklist (Critical Appraisal Skills Programme, 
2013; for application see, for instance, Walter et al., 2004). Customised quality 
assessment tools are designed (e.g. Karunananthan et al., 2009; Oliver et al., 
2005) or existing ones adapted (e.g. Thorne and Paterson, 1998). Context-
sensitive approaches are suggested, such as the “best evidence synthesis” of 
Slavin where inclusion/ exclusion is decided on the basis of what is available in 
the literature on a particular topic (1995).45  
 
Many alternative approaches are more radical. They take a stance, for instance, 
against evaluating quality at the start of a synthesis, against prioritising 
methodological criteria, and against treating the quality of a study as uniform 
across all its aspects. For instance, Pawson et al. suggests that “[t]rue quality 
appraisal comes at the coup de grâce and not as a preliminary pre-qualification 
exercise” (Pawson et al., 2004: 23; see also Noblit and Hare, 1988: 11, 34-35). 
The value of a study may not be in its empirical findings but in concepts, ideas 
and insights that are not affected by methodological flaws. Thus, a choice is 
made to apply no or minimal criteria of quality to exclude only “fatally flawed” 
studies at sampling (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006; bmc 4). More stringent 
judgements of quality may then be made during or after the analysis (e.g. Weed 
2005: 8; Kearney, 2001: 274). In addition, it is often the case that excluding 
studies is not an option – once very specific theories concerning very specific 
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 Slavin offers a very clear analogue from law to explain this: “In law, there is a principle that 
the same evidence that would be essential in one case might be disregarded in another 
because in the second case there is better evidence available. For example, in a case of 
disputed authorship, a typed manuscript might be critical evidence if no handrwritten copy is 
available, but if a handwritten copy exists, the typed copy would be inadmissible because it is 




aspects of an intervention are identified, the data that can test them can be 
rather hard to find. The process may be more akin to “scavenging” for 
information rather than allowing to pick and choose between studies (Pawson et 
al., 2004: 12, 21). 
 
More radically, appraisals of methodological rigour may be seen as insufficient 
to uncover flaws and uncertainties in the construction of a study. An 
examination of the social, historical, ideological, etc. context in which a piece of 
knowledge was produced is also required (Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009: 
bmc 3,7). Dixon-Woods et al. suggest the broader concept of “critique” as 
opposed to the conventional “critical appraisal” for methodological rigour. Such 
critique involves challenging “the ways in which the literature constructs its 
problematics”; the epistemological and normative assumptions it draws on; the 
traditions that have guided particular research fields; the particular forms of 
discourse available; the factors influencing the proposed solutions (op.cit.: bmc  
2, 6, 9). 
 
3.2.4. Transparency 
“Transparency” in a systematic review context is taken to stand for the 
explicitness of methodology, the generation of a clear audit trail, the auditability 
of the synthesis process. This will include, for instance, the full description of 
one’s search strategy, the referencing of all included/consulted studies, 
statements about degree of agreement between researchers performing the 
same process (inter-rater reliability), the inclusion in the review of data 
extraction tables, etc. Transparency enables clarity about the sensitivity of 
results to different assumptions and judgements (Sutton et al., 2000: 8), 
accountability, the independent assessment of bias, and the reproducibility of 
the process – in theory for its replication, but in practice primarily for the 
purpose of updating reviews. Transparency is an aspect of the “scientific and 
open way” in which systematic reviews are carried out (Sutton et al, 2000: 8). 
The requirement for transparency is also self-referential – it allows reviewers to 
appraise the systematicity of their process and correct for digressions in it as 
they go along.  
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Generally, alternative synthesis methods concur with the conventional 
systematic review on the value of transparency. But they also tend to challenge 
the degree to which it is desirable and achievable. For instance, Dixon-Woods 
et al. (2006) present Critical Interpretive Synthesis as a method that explicitly 
recognises the “authorial voice” and the non-transparency of some aspects of 
the review production, and “does not aim to offer a series of pre-specified 
procedures for the conduct of review” (op.cit.: 6, 10). Pawson et al. (2004) 
object to the “reproducibility principle”. First, it is on the grounds of the “sheer 
impossibility of making transparent every single decision involved in research 
synthesis” (op.cit.: 37). Experience, sagacity, intuition are used in making 
relevant judgements (ibid). Secondly, they question “whether objectivity in 
science has ever stemmed from standardisation of procedure” (38). For these 
authors, “laying down one’s methodological tracks”, “surfacing one’s reasoning” 
are there not for reproducibility purposes, but to expose a developing theory to 
scrutiny and critique, and in this way enable its revision and refinement (ibid). 
In the context of secondary data analysis, Hammersley (1997) also argues that 
the attempt to render the research process fully explicit creates hardly 
recognised ethical issues that relate to researchers, too. He quotes Bond in 
relation to an anthropologist’s fieldnotes: “[t]hey are personal property, part of a 
world of private memories and experiences, failures and successes, insecurities 
and indecisions”.46 “[T]he work of even the most competent researcher would 
look poor if documentation of the research process were compared to some 
idealised, overly rationalistic model”. Transparency thus comes with a danger of 
“researchers producing documentation that bears only a remote relationship to 
how the research was done” (Hammersley, 1997: 136). 
 
3.3. Classifications, typologies, ‘dimensions of difference’ 
As little informative as it may be, the strongest distinction in the field of research 
synthesis is still between conventional, Cochrane-type systematic reviews and 
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 Bond, G. C., 1990. Fieldnotes: Research in Past Occurrences. In: R. Sanjek, ed. Fieldnotes: 




‘other’ reviews. The individuation of review methods tends to go along the lines 
of comparison and contrast with the systematic review (and, in earlier years, 
with the traditional literature review), rather than claiming a membership of any 
of the classes discussed below. The quality of currently circulating 
classifications is also suboptimal. 
Possibly the most widespread positively defined distinction is between 
“aggregative” and “interpretive” reviews. It was first introduced by Noblit and 
Hare (1988), in their seminal book on meta-ethnography. Aggregative reviews 
“assemble” and “pool” data concerning largely comparable phenomena, 
potentially through the use of techniques such as meta-analysis. The concepts 
and variables under which data are summarised are seen as generally secure 
and well specified. Aggregative reviews are used mostly to test theories (Dixon-
Woods et al., 2006: bmc 2). Such reviews involve a belief in general laws of 
prediction and in increase of objectivity through the use of procedural methods 
(Gough and Elbourne, 2002: 226). In contrast, interpretive reviews, drawing on 
interpretive social science, look for an empathetic understanding of meaning 
and are “directed towards generating new conceptual understandings and 
theoretical explanations” (Pope, Mays and Popay, 2007: 72). “Mixed” reviews 
have also begun to be added to the dichotomy of aggregative (often 
quantitative) and interpretive (often qualitative) reviews (Pope, Mays and 
Popay, 2007; Harden, 2011). Mixed reviews are able to accommodate diverse 
evidence, including non-research evidence. This is an eclectic group: the 
sources mixed and approaches used vary widely (Pope, Mays and Popay: 95).  
 
In the context of qualitative research synthesis, the most detailed and 
streamlined framework for describing synthesis methods seems to be the 
“dimensions of difference” of Barnett-Page and Thomas (2009). They propose 
seven such dimensions:  
(1) the epistemology underlying the method – with distinctions drawn 
between “subjective idealism”, “objective idealism”, “critical realism”, 
“scientific realism” and “naïve realism”;  




(3) the approach to quality assessment – for instance, the use of 
checklists for assessing methodological quality or making unstructured 
judgements of how a research finding informs a theory;  
(4) the extent of problematising the literature – such as whether attempts 
are made to place it in its historical and socio-political context or 
deconstruct theories; 
(5) the degree of heterogeneity, diversity of primary studies;  
(6) the extent to which the synthesis goes “beyond” the primary studies to 
produce a whole that is more than the sum of its parts; 
and, finally, (7) the “synthetic product” in terms of its utility – whether it can 
be directly used by policy makers and programme developers or is “more 
complex and conceptual”, potentially “operating on the symbolic or 
metaphorical level” (op. cit.: 5-9).  
For the subfield of qualitative research synthesis, this is a detailed and 
informative framework, albeit presenting substantial difficulties in positioning 
studies along dimensions. 
Booth, Papaioannou and Sutton (2012) also stress that the classification of 
review types is multidimensional. They give examples of dimensions such as 
the purpose of the review, types of included studies, nature of included data, 
type of question, phenomenon investigated, underlying intent, context and 
“‘philosophy’ regarding subsequent use” (op. cit.: 20). They do not, however, 
explore those dimensions47 or apply them to the description of their own review 
typology. The latter includes 11 review types – critical review, integrative review, 
literature review, mapping review/systematic map, meta-analysis, mixed studies 
review/mixed methods review, overview, qualitative systematic 
review/qualitative evidence synthesis, rapid review, scoping review, state-of-
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 The examples illustrating them are limited and, overall, do not throw sufficient light on the 
contents of a particular dimension and its distinction from similar dimensions. E.g. purpose of 
the review is illustrated through the example of “the mapping review”, underlying intent through 
“meta-ethnography for theory generation or realist synthesis for theory verification”, and 
philosophy regarding subsequent use is illustrated through “best evidence synthesis”. It is not 
intuitively clear where the boundaries between purpose, intent and philosophy regarding 
subsequent use lie and how, for example, best evidence synthesis relates to philosophy 




the-art review and systematic search and review. These are characterised by 
means of brief overall descriptions and more or less heterogeneous comments 
and labels on type of search, presence or absence of appraisal of studies, type 
of synthesis and features of the analysis48 (op.cit.: 26-27). The authors add 
further examples of typologies and dimensions of difference from the literature 
(21) in what becomes a telling, and maybe not fully intended, illustration of the 
fact that no broadly accepted typologies of research synthesis studies/ reviews 
exist, that key features are bandied about but remain unspecified, and that 
existing typologies are quite loose in terms of descriptions of dimensions, points 
along those dimensions, and operationalisation criteria for locating studies 
relative to these. In the Postscript-Prescript chapter, I suggest a further 9-
component grouping of research synthesis studies, itself a ‘working hypothesis’. 
 
3.4.  Rationales, goals, outcomes  
Some detailed lists of the multitude of rationales, goals and outcomes of 
qualitative research synthesis have been produced (e.g. Dixon-Woods et al., 
2004, Major and Savin-Baden 2010), but there does not appear to be a 
systematic collation and presentation of these more broadly, to extend to other 
types of research synthesis. Seven broad areas emerged through coding, in 
NVivo, of relevant contents in methodological texts. Namely, research synthesis 
studies enable: 
 Increasing and stabilising knowledge on a particular topic/in a broad field; 
 Solving a pressing practical problem – primarily in clinical practice and 
policy making; 
 Responding to demands for effectiveness, convenience, ethics and 
accountability in the production and utilisation of information; 
 Improving the preconditions for knowledge (such as through identifying 
research directions or domains to underpin the development of 
measurement instruments and scales); 
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conceptual, chronological, graphical, tabular and qualitative, with some more extended 
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 Acquiring ‘knowledge about knowledge’: developing a meta-perspective 
on the work within a research field; 
 Enhancing the relative status of a research field; 
 Bringing research in one area to bear on research in another area where 
previous interactions have been limited – i.e. interdisciplinary work done 
in a systematic way and at the level of review studies. 
Below I give illustrations of claims concerning four of the above – the three 
types of rationale, goals and outcomes that seem to be invoked most often 
(acquiring more and more stable knowledge, the resolution of pressing 
problems, and responding to practical and ethical demands of information use) 
and one which seems to be gaining momentum through recent methodological 
developments (acquiring knowledge about knowledge). 
 
3.4.1. Increasing and stabilising knowledge 
Historically, research synthesis work has been seen primarily as enabling the 
accumulation of large amounts of data. This helps reach conclusions of much 
greater clarity, generality and confidence than available through individual 
studies. Synthesis studies generate large samples which may be very difficult, 
or practically impossible, to get in a single trial. The power of estimates is 
increased. Random error in the assessments of treatments may also be 
reduced. This is particularly important in widely practicable interventions with 
small or modest benefits for common and serious conditions. If their benefit is 
detected, such interventions can save thousands of lives (Sutton et al, 2000: 
10-11). Pooling studies for synthesis has “the ability to offset to some degree 
the limited scope of single reports”, to strengthen generality by the breadth of 
geographic and cultural settings (Kearney, 2001: 274). 
 
In qualitative and mixed methods syntheses, the emphasis seems to shift 
towards finding order in a field of knowledge, acquiring a (more) complete 
picture of it, and towards theory generation. Synthesis studies “can consolidate 
a body of widely scattered literature into a usable and coherent whole” 
(Paterson et al., 2001: 13); enable questions and ideas to be “meaningfully 
grouped and classified” (Greenhalgh et al., 2005: 423); help map out a full(er), 
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(more) complete picture concerning an issue of interest or a thematic field 
(Roberts et al., 2002). They also provide an opportunity for bringing forth easy-
to-miss phenomena and difficult-to obtain data types, e.g. about sensitive topics 
or hard-to-reach populations (Dixon-Woods et al., 2004: 4). 
Research synthesis can also enable the generation of (middle-range) theories 
and models (Estabrooks et al., 1994; Schreiber, Crooks and Stern, 1997; 
Finfgeld, 1999; Sherwood, 1999; Kearney 2001; Britten et al. 2002). These are 
likely to be of greater breadth, scope, generalisability, credibility and 
explanatory power than existing ones (Sandelowski, Docherty and Emden, 
1997; Sherwood, 1999; Paterson et al., 2001). The breadth of other carriers of 
knowledge can also be extended. Synthesis work often comes up with higher 
order analytical categories (Dixon-Woods et al., 2004) and “meanings that 
extend well beyond those presented in the available body of knowledge” 
(Paterson et al., 2001).  
 
3.4.2. Solving a pressing practical problem – primarily in clinical 
practice and policy making 
The more effective and judicious use of research findings to inform clinical 
practice comes up as the primary rationale for performing research synthesis 
work.49 In the words of Rosenberg and Donald, “[f]or decades people have 
been aware of the gaps between research evidence and clinical practice, and 
the consequences in terms of expensive, ineffective, or even harmful decision 
making”. In early days of evidence-based medicine, when clinicians were 
expected to identify and appraise the evidence themselves (see, for instance, 
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group,1992), the process was supposed to 
be prompted by occurrences in everyday clinical practice. It was to be carried 
out “for our patient”, for this particular “77 year old woman living alone ... 
admitted with non-rheumatic atrial fibrillation and her first bout of mild left 
ventricular failure” (Rosenberg and Donald, 1995: 1122). The ‘particular patient’ 
prompting and the individual clinician’s work of appraising are no longer a 
significant part of the vision of the synthesis process. Nevertheless, the 
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 This particular rationale is usually applied to evidence-based medicine and by extension to 
research synthesis.  
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rationale of producing evidence to be “harnessed” for everyday clinical practice 
(ibid) is still presented as paramount.  
The other main type of problems to require the identification and integration 
of research are found at the level of policy and organisational decision 
making.  For instance, meta-analysis and the movement towards evidence-
based medicine have been seen as a response to “[a]ccumulated public and 
private frustrations regarding escalating costs and substantial evidence of 
variation in medical practice” and as offering “immense” opportunities for 
improving routine practice (Clancy and Kamerow, 1996: 329). The potential 
of pooling together of evidence for policy purposes has led to the formation 
of a number of bodies with such a mandate. For instance, the Health 
Development Agency (HDA) in the UK “was established to, among other 
things, build the evidence base in public health, with particular reference to 
reducing inequalities in health” (Kelly and Swann, 2004: iv). It was thus 
“faced with the job of drawing together the known evidence and putting it in 
a form that could be usable for practitioners and policy-makers, and in such 
a way that the evidence could inform questions about effectiveness and 
inequalities” (ibid). In some cases, concerns about how exactly to bring 
together knowledge – which are highly relevant to the range of goals under 
the previous section – are seen as being at odds with practical needs and 
the urgency of human suffering:  
First, and most importantly, inequalities in health and the human pain and 
misery that flow from them are too great to be ignored on the grounds of 
philosophical or methodological problems. Certainly there are 
epistemological and practical differences between research traditions, 
but this in itself is not a reason for inaction. The HDA cannot detain itself 
with what, in our view, is a misrepresentation of the philosophical issues. 
The practical problem to be solved is that of the premature mortality and 
excess morbidity that disproportionately affect the poor to a far greater 
degree that the well-to-do (Kelly and Swann, 2004: v). 
 
The HDA’s position is that much of the methodological debate is 
completely unhelpful from a point of view of trying to bring about 
reductions in inequalities in health (ibid.). 
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3.4.3. Synthesis work as responding to demands for effectiveness, 
convenience, ethics and accountability 
A closely related and continuously re-echoed rationale – more out of frustration 
than a need to persuade – concerns the capacity of research synthesis to 
enhance dramatically the use of primary research. Integrative studies enable 
practitioners to deal with the information explosion, deluge of information 
(Rosenberg and Donald, 1995: 1122), tsunami of data (Hawkes, 2011), 
mountains of evidence (Pope, Mays and Popay, 2007: 3). They condense 
knowledge for clinicians, policy makers and researchers in a way that makes its 
use convenient, even possible. Arguments are also frequent for the avoidance 
of research duplication or disuse – this is seen as thwarting progress, unethical, 
“wasteful” (e.g. Sandelowski, Docherty and Emden, 1997: 366-7; Roberts et al., 
2002: 1596; Sutton, Cooper and Jones, 2009). 
 
3.4.4. Acquiring ‘knowledge about knowledge’  
A less debated potential goal of research synthesis, which, however, seems to 
be growing in importance with the development of methods like meta-narrative 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2005) and critical interpretive synthesis (Dixon-Woods et al., 
2006), concerns its capacity to question the foundations of a research field. 
Broad-based research synthesis studies can reveal the cultural, historical, 
social, disciplinary, etc. situatedness of research; the implications of this for 
conceptualisations of truth and progress in science; and the formative effects of 
research on practice, society and its own future. Research synthesis can thus 
be thought of as a method for engaging in the studies of science.  
I will only include one telling example from the work of Greenhalgh et al. (2005) 
to illustrate the type of insights which such work can offer. The aim of the team’s 
project, funded by the UK Department of Health, was to synthesise the 
knowledge base on the “[d]iffusion, spread and sustainability of innovations ... 
with a view to informing the modernisation agenda for UK health services” (op. 
cit.: 418). What the authors gradually came to recognise was the pro-innovation 
bias of much innovation research. The specific example of such a bias below 
concerns the effect of a context of food shortages on political ideology and 
80 
 
scientific priorities, and through them – on the interpretation of data. Years later, 
in a context of agricultural overproduction and conservation concerns, an 
entirely different interpretation is automatic to any ‘modern’ reader: 
Back in 1954, one of the Iowa farmers that I personally interviewed for my 
PhD dissertation research rejected all of the chemical innovations that I was 
then studying: weed sprays, cattle and hog feeds, chemical fertilisers, and a 
rodenticide. He insisted that his neighbours, who had adopted these 
chemicals, were killing their songbirds and the earthworms in the soil. I had 
selected the new farm ideas in my innovativeness scale on the advice of 
agricultural experts at Iowa State University; I was measuring the best 
recommended farming practice of that day. The organic farmer in my sample 
earned the lowest score on my innovativeness scale, and was categorised as 
a laggard (Rogers, 1995: 425 cited in Greenhalgh et al., 2005: 424-5).50 
At a more abstract level and in a Kuhnian vein, Greenhalgh et al. add that 
“[r]esearchers in different traditions had conceptualised, explained and 
investigated diffusion of innovations differently and had used different criteria for 
judging the quality of empirical work. Moreover, they told very different over-
arching stories of the progress of their research”. One of the outcomes of 
Paterson et al.’s meta-study methodology is, similarly, the identification of “both 
overt and subtle ways in which researchers have contributed to the current 
interpretation of chronic illness experience” and of practical implications of this 
interpretation (Paterson, B et al. 2001: Introduction, p. 14). So far, such critical, 
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3.5. New and emerging synthesis methods – examples and 
characteristics of the field 
 
3.5.1. An overview of methods based on four landmark reviews 
 
A ‘master’ review for the field of research synthesis, understood in some broad 
sense, is yet to appear. Texts offering an overview of available methods tend to 
stay within a particular niche, for instance qualitative synthesis (e.g. Barnett-
Page and Thomas, 2009; Major and Savin-Baden, 2011). More up-to-date, 
comprehensive and rigorous reviews of methods within particular niches are 
also needed. There are certainly advantages to research isolation and 
independence, such as incubation of minority ideas. But in the case of research 
synthesis the negative consequences of field fragmentation are beginning to 
weigh heavily. There is much duplication of effort, misplaced identity and 
uniqueness claims, self-righteousness, multiplication of vocabularies, and 
missed opportunities for the spread of methodological innovation and taking 
challenge and impetus from closely aligned work.  
 
To start representing the broad field of health research synthesis beyond the 
systematic review, the methods listed in four reviews were pulled together – 
Dixon-Woods et al. (2004) on integrating quantitative and qualitative research, 
Ades and Sutton (2006) on statistical methods for evidence synthesis, Pope, 
Mays and Popay (2007) on quantitative, interpretative and mixed synthesis 
methods, and Barnett-Page and Thomas (2009) on qualitative synthesis. The 
outcome is presented in Table T 2.1 below, along with bibliometric data for 
citations on PubMed (all and last five years), Web of Science and Google 
scholar. Briefly, it shows that in terms of PubMed citations for all years, the first 
five most popular synthesis methods are content analysis (403 citations 
retrieved), narrative synthesis (315), (qualitative) meta-synthesis (274), case 
survey (169) and thematic analysis/synthesis (165). The most actively 
developing methods, judged by the number of publications from the last five 
years relative to all publications on a method on PubMed, are critical 
interpretive synthesis (92.9% of publications are from the last five years – 13 
out of 14), realist synthesis (90.5% – 19/21), narrative synthesis (80.6% – 
254/315), meta-ethnography (76.3% – 58/76) and thematic analysis/synthesis 
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(77.0% – 127/165). The most popular methods as per citations of exemplary 
publications on Google scholar are qualitative comparative analysis (due to 
Ragin, 1987 with over 4,345 citations), hierarchical models of (statistical) 
evidence synthesis (Sutton et al., 2000 – 1050; Spiegelhalter et al., 2004 – 
743), meta-ethnography (Noblit and Hare,1988 – 995 citations), realist 
synthesis (Pawson, 2006 – 647) and (qualitative) meta-synthesis (Sandelowski 
et al., 1997 – 378).51 With regard to Web of Science citations, meta-
ethnography is the leading method (with 188 citations for Campbell et al., 2003), 
followed by (qualitative) meta-synthesis (Sandelowski et al., 1997 with 186 
citations), qualitative comparative analysis (Cress and Snow, 2000 – 152), 
thematic synthesis (Thomas and Harden, 2008 – 84) and the quantitative case 
survey (Yin and Heald, 1975 – 76). The table also lays out a range of 
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 Miles and Huberman, 1994 (with over 37,000 citations) came up highest but their work is a 
‘predecessor’ rather than one proposing a synthesis method. 
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Table T 2.1. Overview of alternative research synthesis methods – as identified by Dixon-Woods et al. (2004), Ades 
and Sutton (2006), Pope et al. (2007), and Barnett-Page and Thomas (2009)  
This is a long table of several layers of information. The following notes describe its contents and the principles for inclusion of information in it. 
The references accompanying descriptions of synthesis methods in the above reviews were taken to be “exemplar publications” for those synthesis 
methods. In some cases the referenced work was described in some detail in the reviews. In other cases only a reference was provided. Exemplar texts 
from outside health research were included only if they were a pioneering publication which has influenced health research too and/or if no examples 
from health research were given in the reviews (generally up to two publications from outside health research were included). Overall, exemplar texts 
include an actual synthesis of studies. In some cases important predecessors where no synthesis is offered or discussed are also listed (e.g. Miles and 
Huberman’s work, see entry 21 in the table). If this is the case, ‘the year of earliest exemplar’ (column 3 in the table) lists the year of the first worked 
example in a synthesis context. 
If a large number of health research publications were referenced in a review (which happens relatively rarely), up to 5 publications were included from 
that review (generally by order of presentation by the review authors, which tends to be chronological).  Discrepancies between reviews in terms of 
exemplar publications could result in more than 5 publications presented in the table. 
***** is used to introduce comments on uncertainties about the information presented (including because of discrepancies between reviews in terms of 
exemplar publications). They thus indicate findings which limit the drawing of clear conclusions and suggest that more in-depth investigation is required. 
Four types of bibliometric data are provided. These are 1) retrieval for the method name in PubMed for all years (search strategies can be found in 
Appendix to Chapter 2, Section 1); 2) retrieval for the method name in PubMed for the last 5 years; 3) citation counts in the Web of Science; and 4) 
citation counts in Google scholar. In cases where the Web of Science does not hold a publication type (e.g. books or grey literature), ‘not covered’ is 
entered in the box (‘not found’ is used when the publication could not be retrieved, either because it is not available on the Web of Science or the 
searching for it was ineffective). 
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Luce B R and Claxton K (1999)  
Redefining the analytical approach to 
pharmacoeconomics. 
 
Turner D, Wailoo A, Nicholson K et al. (2003)  
Systematic review and economic decision modelling for 









































Roberts K A, Dixon-Woods M, Fitzpatrick R et al. 
(2002)  
Factors affecting uptake of childhood immunisation: a 
Bayesian synthesis of qualitative and quantitative 
evidence.  
 
***** Earlier references to Bayesian meta-analysis 



























Yin R K and Heald K A (1975)  
Using the case survey method to analyse policy studies. 
 
Larsson R (1993)  
Case survey methodology: quantitative analysis of 
patterns across case studies.  
 
Jensen J L and Rodgers R (2001)  
Cumulating the intellectual gold of case study research.  
 
***** Last exemplar only in Dixon-Woods et al. (2004). 































































last 5 yrs 
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Pope et al. (2007) 
 
***** Primary 
research use only 
but “has potential 











Jensen J L and Rodgers R (2001)  
Cumulating the intellectual gold of case study research.  
 
Agranoff R and Radin B A (1991)  

















































Cooper N, Sutton A and Abrams K (2002)  
Decision analytic economic modelling within a Bayesian 
framework: application to prophylactic antibiotics’ use for 
caesarean section.  
 
Dowie J (2001)  
Towards value-based, science-informed public health 
















































Eddy D M (1989) 
The confidence profile method: a Bayesian method for 
assessing health technologies. 
 
Eddy D M, Hasselblad V and Shachter R (1992) 
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Evans D and Fitzgerald M (2002) 
Reasons for physically restraining patients and residents: 
a systematic review and content analysis.  
 
Suikkala A, Leino-Kilpi H (2001)  
Nursing student-patient relationships: a review of the 
literature from 1984–1998.  
 
Miller D and Reilly J (1995)  
Making an issue of food safety: the media, pressure 
groups and the public sphere. 
 
***** The reviews choose different exemplars. The first is 
in Dixon-Woods et al. and Barnett-Page and Thomas, the 
second in Barnett-Page and Thomas, and the third in 
Pope et al. 
  
***** Retrieval is substantial in PubMed, yet seen as a 



























































Dixon-Woods M, Kirk D, Agarwal S et al. (2005) 





Dixon-Woods M, Cavers D, Agarwal S et al. (2006) 
Conducting a critical interpretive synthesis of the 
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Ades and Sutton 
(2006) 
 






No named authors (1992) 
Cross-design Synthesis: A New Strategy for Medical 
Effectiveness Research.  
 
Droitcour J, Silberman G and Chelimsky E (1993) 
Cross-design synthesis: a new form of meta-analysis for 




















































***** likely  





Banning J (undated – 2003 is the year of a similar paper 
in the author’s publication list)  
Ecological Triangulation: An Approach for Qualitative 
Meta-Synthesis.  
 
Banning J (undated)  
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Harden A, Oakley A and Oliver S (2001)  
Peer-delivered health promotion for young people: a 
systematic review of different study designs.  
 
 
Oliver S, Oakley L, Lumley J and Waters E (2001) 
Smoking cessation programmes in pregnancy: 
systematically addressing development, implementation, 














































Estabrooks C, Field P and Morse J (1994)  















































Lloyd Jones, M. (2005)  
Role development and effective practice in specialist and 
advanced practice roles in acute hospital settings: 
systematic review and meta-synthesis. 
 
Brunton G, Oliver S, Oliver K & Lorenc T (2006)  
A Synthesis of Research Addressing Children's, Young 
People's and Parents' Views of Walking and Cycling for 
Transport. 
 
Oliver S, Rees R, Clarke-Jones L et al. (2008)  
A multidimensional conceptual framework for analysing 
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***** The reviews choose different exemplars. The first 
reference is in Pope et al. and the remaining two in 
Barnett-Page and Thomas.  
 
***** The first example (Lloyd Jones, 2005) is also 
included under Miles and Huberman’s cross-case 
analysis (method 21) and thematic analysis/synthesis 
(method 31). It also contains ‘meta-synthesis’ in the title 
and can thus be considered an example of meta-
























Estabrooks C, Field P and Morse J (1994)  
Aggregating qualitative findings: an approach to theory 
development. 
 
Dixon D (1996)  
Unifying concepts in parents’ experiences with health 
care providers.  
 
Kearney M (2001)  
Enduring love: a grounded formal theory of women’s 
experience of domestic violence.  
 
Eaves Y D (2001)  
A synthesis technique for grounded theory data analysis. 
 
 













































































last 5 yrs 
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Finfgeld D (1999)  
Courage as a process of pushing beyond the struggle.  
 
***** The reviews choose different exemplars, apart from 
Kearney (2001) which is present in all. The first two 
papers are from Dixon-Woods et al. and the latter two 
from Barnett-Page and Thomas. 
 
***** Eaves (2001) synthesises grounded theory texts to 
produce a technique for the analysis of primary data. It is 
likely to be applicable to synthesis studies but I believe 
the following claim of Barnett-Page and Thomas to be 
incorrect: “Eaves undertook her own synthesis of the 
synthesis methods used by these authors to produce her 
own clear and explicit guide to synthesis in grounded 






































Sutton A J, Abrams K R, Jones D R et al. (2000) 
Methods for Meta-Analysis in Medical Research. 
 
Whitehead A (2002) 
Meta-analysis of Controlled Clinical Trials. 
 
Spiegelhalter D J, Abrams K R and Myles J (2004) 
Bayesian Approaches to Clinical Trials and Health-care 
Evaluation.  
 
***** Numerous further exemplar texts given. The books 
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Noblit G W and Hare R D (1988) 
Meta-ethnography: synthesising qualitative studies.  
 
Paterson B L, Thorne S and Dewis M (1998) Adapting 
to and managing diabetes. 
 
Nelson A M (2002)  
A metasynthesis: mothering other-than-normal children.  
 
Beck C T (2002a)  




Beck C T (2002b) Postpartum depression: a 
metasynthesis. 
 
Jensen L A and Allen M N  (1994) 
A synthesis of qualitative research in wellness–illness.  
 
Britten N, Campbell R, Pope C et al. (2002) 
Using meta ethnography to synthesise qualitative 




Campbell R, Pound P, Pope C. et al. (2003) Evaluating 
meta-ethnography: a synthesis of qualitative research on 
lay experiences of diabetes and diabetes care. 
 
Clemmens D (2003)  







Image – the 
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Sandelowski M and Barroso J (2007) 
Handbook for Synthesizing Qualitative Research 
 
***** The reviews choose different exemplars. Of the 10 
publications above, 3 are referenced in all three reviews – 
Noblit and Hare (1988), Britten et al. (2002) and 
Campbell et al. (2003). 
 
***** Becks (2002 a and b), Nelson (2002), Clemmens 
(2003) and Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) refer to their 
























Weed M (2006)  
“Meta Interpretation”: A Method for the Interpretive 
Synthesis of Qualitative Research. 
 
***** Bibliometric search returns Finfgeld (1999) as 


































Greenhalgh T, Robert G, Macfarlane F et al. (2005)  
Storylines of research in diffusion of innovation: a 
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Gaber J (2000)  
Meta-needs assessment. 
***** The extent to which meta-needs assessment can be 
considered a separate approach is questioned by Dixon-
Woods et al.: “Meta-needs assessment provides a 
general framework combining elements of other 
approaches rather than a distinctive new approach in its 




















***** in Pope et al. 
(2007) mentioned 









Paterson B L, Thorne, S E, Canam C and Jillings C 
(2001) 
Meta-study of qualitative health research.  
 
Zhao S Y (1991) 
Metatheory, Metamethod, Meta-Data-Analysis – What, 













































Miles M B and Huberman M (1994)  
Qualitative data analysis: an expanded sourcebook.  
 
McNaughton D B (2000)  
A synthesis of qualitative home visiting research.  
 
Lloyd Jones, M. (2005)  
Role development and effective practice in specialist and 
advanced practice roles in acute hospital settings: 
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Ades A E and Cliffe S (2002) 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo estimation of a multi-
parameter decision model: consistency of evidence and 




























Harden A, Weston R and Oakley A (1999) 
A review of the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
peer-delivered health promotion for young people.  
































Popay J, Roberts H, Sowden A et al. (2006)  
Guidance on the conduct of narrative synthesis in 
systematic reviews.  
 
Arai L, Britten N, Popay J et al. (2007) 
Testing methodological developments in the conduct of 
narrative synthesis: a demonstration review of research 
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Ragin C C (1987)  
The comparative method: moving beyond qualitative and 
quantitative strategies.  
 
Ragin C C (2000) 
Fuzzy set social science.  
 
Melinder K A and Andersson R (2001) 
The impact of structural factors on the injury rate in 
different European countries.  
 
Cress D. and Snow D. (2000)  
The outcomes of homeless mobilization: the influence of 
organization, disruption, political mediation, and framing.  
 









































































Schreiber R, Crooks D and Stern P N (1997) 
Qualitative meta-analysis.  
McCormick J, Rodney P and Varcoe C (2003) 
Reinterpretation across studies: an approach to meta-
analysis.  
 
***** Reviews choose different exemplar publications. 
***** Schreiber et al. refer to an earlier use of the term 
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Sandelowski M and Barroso J (2007) 
Handbook for Synthesizing Qualitative 
Research. 
 
***** Bibliometric searches suggest a further article – 
Sandelowski  M, Barroso J and Voils C I (2007).  
 
***** Book also included as illustrative of meta-
ethnography, see 16. 
 
 













































Jensen L A and Allen M N  (1994) 
A synthesis of qualitative research in wellness–illness.  
 
Sherwood G (1997) 
Meta-Synthesis of Qualitative Analyses of Caring: 
Defining a Therapeutic Model of Nursing.  
 
 
Sandelowski M, Docherty S and Emden C (1997) 
Focus on qualitative methods. Qualitative meta-synthesis: 
issues and techniques.  
 
Sherwood, G. (1999) 
Meta-synthesis: merging qualitative studies to develop 
nursing knowledge.  
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Higginson I J, Finlay I, Goodwin D M et al. (2002)  
Do hospital-based palliative teams improve care for 
patients or families at the end of life?  
 
Nelson A M (2002)  
A meta-synthesis: mothering other than normal children.  
 
Schreiber R, Crooks D and Stern P N (1997) 
Qualitative meta-analysis.  
 
***** Very strong presence in Dixon-Woods et al. (all but 
last reference), only minimal in Pope et al. – they discuss 
it in relation to terminology of interpretive methods and do 
not individuate as a method. 
 
***** Some overlap with references under 16. meta-
ethnography. Also, a number of the references classified 
by Dixon-Woods et al. under ‘meta-ethnography’  and not 
appearing here contain ‘meta-synthesis’ in their title. 
 
***** Pope et al. include Schreiber et al. (1997) here, 
while Dixon-Woods et al. include it under qualitative 








See 16. on meta-
ethnography 
 
See 26. on 
qualitative meta-
analysis 
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Pawson R (2002) 
Evidence-based policy: in search of a method.  
 
Pawson R (2006) 
Evidence-based Policy: A Realist Perspective.  
 
Pawson R and Bellamy J (2006)  




Pawson R, Greenhalgh T, Harvey G and Walshe K 
(2005)  
Realist review – a new method of systematic review 









































































Lucas P J, Baird J, Arai L et al. (2007)  
Worked examples of alternative methods for the 
synthesis of qualitative and and quantitative research in 
systematic reviews.  
 
Harden A, Garcia J, Oliver S et al. (2004) 
Applying systematic review methods to studies of 
people's views: an example from public health research.  
 
***** Harden et al. (2004) speak of thematic analysis and 
do not mention "textual narrative synthesis". Harden is in 
the acknowledgements of Barnett-Page and Thomas’s 
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Garcia J, Bricker L, Henderson J et al. (2002) 
Women’s views of pregnancy ultrasound: a systematic 
review.  
 
Harden A, Weston R and Oakley A (1999) 
A review of the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
peer-delivered health promotion for young people.  
 
Neill S J (2000)  
Acute childhood illness at home: the parents’ perspective.   
 
Dixon-Woods M, Cavers D, Agarwal S et al. (2006) 
Conducting a critical interpretive synthesis of the 
literature on access to healthcare by vulnerable groups. 
 
Lloyd Jones M (2005)  
Role development and effective practice in specialist and 
advanced practice roles in acute hospital settings: 
systematic review and 
meta-synthesis. 
 
Thomas J and Harden A (2008) 
Methods for the thematic synthesis of 
qualitative research in systematic reviews.   
 
 
***** The reviews choose different exemplars. This can, 
however, be expected as thematic analysis is a broadly 
used and flexible method. The review authors choose to 
exemplify specific aspects of its use, e.g. Pope et al. point 
to Lloyd Jones (2005) as an example of sophisticated 
















































































































last 5 yrs 
No  






















***** Dixon-Woods et al. refer to Neill (2000) suggesting 
that that thematic analysis was used, incorrectly labelled 
as content analysis. 
 
***** Uncertain phrasing used, e.g. in Dixon-Woods et al.: 
“Other papers that appear to have adopted thematic 
approaches to synthesis include Harden et al. (1999)” 
(15). 
 
***** Barnett-Page and Thomas relate the thematic 
synthesis of Thomas and Harden (2008) to meta-
ethnography and grounded theory rather than thematic 
analysis in primary research. 
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3.5.2. Examples of methods – extended descriptions 
Below I describe four methods in greater detail, to give a more tangible sense of 
the nature of integrative projects outside the mainstream systematic review. 
Narrative synthesis is a highly flexible synthesis method used to combine 
heterogeneous studies. Bayesian synthesis (Roberts et al., 2002) is a highly 
structured method that brings together quantitative and qualitative studies and 
explicitly incorporates subjective judgement. Meta-narrative (Greenhalgh et al., 
2005) pays close attention to the ‘paradigm’ within which a study was generated 
and the combinability of studies from different paradigms. As a counterpoint in a 
field dominated by applied sciences proposals, I added a model coming from 
philosophy (Cartwright and Stegenga, 2011). 
 
3.5.2.1. Narrative synthesis 
In the context of the conventional systematic review, narrative synthesis is 
performed if meta-analysis is “either not feasible or not sensible” (Higgins and 
Green, 2008: 245). Put simply, narrative synthesis is a formalised version of the 
expert literature review (Greenhalgh et al., 2005).52 As per the most detailed 
guidance on narrative synthesis (Popay et al., 2006), although the latter can 
incorporate the manipulation of statistical data, it is primarily a textual approach 
aiming to “tell the story” – a trustworthy story – of the findings from the included 
studies (op.cit.: 5). It can be used in preparation for a specialist synthesis, such 
as meta-analysis or meta-ethnography; instead of an intended specialist 
synthesis, when the identified studies are found to be too dissimilar to allow for 
one; and when the review question demands the inclusion of a broad variety of 
studies (op.cit.: 7, 14). Narrative synthesis tends towards the “simple” 
juxtaposition of findings, but may involve a greater degree of integration and/or 
interpretation (7). 
 
Four main elements to a narrative synthesis process are identified in the 
guidance (11-16): 1) development of a “theory of change” – a theory of how the 
intervention works, why and for whom (not all reviewers performing a narrative 
                                                          
52




synthesis choose to do this); 2) development of  a preliminary synthesis; 3) 
exploration of relationships – between characteristics of studies and their 
findings, and between the findings of different studies; and 4) assessment of the 
robustness of the synthesis. For each of these elements, the authors suggest a 
range of tools and techniques (16-22).53 The preparation of a preliminary 
synthesis may be enabled by producing brief textual descriptions of studies; 
generating groupings and clusters of studies; tabulations of results, study 
characteristics and quality assessment outcomes; transformations of 
quantitative data into common metrics; “vote counting” to calculate the 
frequency of different types of results across studies; “translating data” through 
thematic or content analysis, etc. (16-19). The tools that focus on the synthesis 
process may include, for example, critical reflections on the synthesis process 
and contacting primary study authors to test the validity of synthesis 
interpretations (Popay et al., 2006: 22). 
 
3.5.2.2. Bayesian synthesis 
Roberts et al. (2002) develop a Bayesian approach to the synthesis of 
qualitative and quantitative evidence in the context of exploring factors affecting 
the uptake of childhood immunisation in developed countries. Within a Bayesian 
framework, the synthesis of research evidence is seen as a decision making 
process which individuals approach with pre-existing beliefs, subjective 
judgements and access to external sources of evidence. These contribute to “a 
prior probability distribution” (op. cit.: 1596-7). In generating prior distributions in 
this study, the reviewers first stated, independently of one another, their 
subjective beliefs about the factors likely to affect uptake of childhood 
immunisation and ranked them. They then read, in a randomised order, the 
qualitative studies retrieved through the literature searches, extracted relevant 
factors from them and indicated their relative importance. Each reviewer then 
produced a revised list of ranked factors. As a result of accessing the qualitative 
literature, pre-existing subjective beliefs shifted substantially and grew more 
similar, and some new factors were identified (op. cit.: 1597). Finally, common 
                                                          
53
 In their worked examples, the authors find that tools identified for one stage are quite similar 
to tools identified for another stage; do not find all tools helpful; and do not use some of the 
proposed tools. Also, they have not been able to identify any specific tools and techniques for 
developing a theory of change. 
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descriptive categories were generated so as to bring the reviewers’ lists 
together. The rankings for each factor from each reviewer were combined into a 
communal prior probability, with the probabilities for all factors calibrated to sum 
to unity (1597).  
 
Data extraction from the quantitative studies followed. The data were coded into 
the categories so far generated, with new categories also being added. The 
evidence obtained from the quantitative studies was then combined with the 
prior probability for a particular factor to form a posterior probability that this 
factor was important in determining immunisation uptake. For each factor, 
Bayes factor methods were used to compare two fixed effect meta-regression 
models for the log odds of uptake, with data from the quantitative studies used 
in fitting the models (1597-8). The addition of quantitative data resulted in 
posterior probabilities that differed, at times substantially, from the prior 
probabilities. For instance, the probability for “child’s health” determining 
immunisation uptake increased, and the factor was also raised from third most 
important to most important. The probabilities for the other two most important 
factors decreased (health professionals’ advice and structural issues) (1598).  
Findings were interpreted as showing that “use of either qualitative or 
quantitative research alone might not identify all relevant factors, or might result 
in inappropriate judgments about their importance, and could thus lead to 
inappropriate formulation of evidence-based policy” (1596). 
 
3.5.2.3. Meta-narrative 
Meta-narrative is a method for synthesising evidence across multiple 
disciplinary fields developed by Greenhalgh et al. (2005), through a project for 
systematically reviewing the literature on the diffusion, spread and sustainability 
of innovation (op. cit.: 418). It is conceptualised as drawing on Kuhn’s notion of 
paradigm while taking into account criticisms of the idea of incommensurability 
suggesting “that apparent differences in findings can always be explained at 
some level of abstraction” (428). Initially, the “over-arching storylines of the rise 
and fall of diffusion research” within each research tradition of interest were 
described. Identified were the key conceptual, theoretical, methodological and 
instrumental elements of the research ‘paradigm’; its key actors, events and 
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discoveries; and its prevailing language and imagery.  Thirteen “meta-
narratives” were thus developed, for fields as disparate as rural sociology, 
communication studies, marketing, health promotion, evidence-based medicine 
and complexity studies. Then, primary studies in each of the traditions were 
judged according to the tradition’s internal quality criteria, as derived through 
the analysis of seminal sources. Further to that, seven key dimensions 
concerning the diffusion of innovation in organisations were identified. The 
concepts and findings from each tradition concerning each of these dimensions 
were “distilled” from the meta-narratives and a narrative account of these given. 
Epistemological, as well as “pragmatic and realistic” explanations were sought 
for differences in findings and recommendations between traditions. Finally, the 
key messages from the literature and other relevant evidence (e.g. budget, 
policy making priorities) were brought together and recommendations for 
practice, policy and research were developed. 
 
3.5.2.4. Evidence synthesis through mechanism-explicit causal 
models – a proposal from philosophy 
This last example of emerging synthesis methods is of a model proposed by 
Cartwright and Stegenga (2011). (The designation above was added by me. 
Strictly speaking, the paper is not on research synthesis – phrases such as 
research/evidence synthesis, systematic review, etc. have not been used in it 
and the suggested scheme for “amalgamating” or combining evidence is one 
amongst several key concerns.) 
Cartwright and Stegenga outline a theory “for the use of evidence in predicting 
policy effectiveness in situ” (op. cit.: 292) – for evaluating the probability that, 
were a proposed policy to be implemented in the way it would in fact be 
implemented, it will produce the targeted outcome (292, 294). The theory has 
three central principles.  
The first principle is that a reliably successful way of evaluating the likelihood of 
a policy producing a targeted outcome is to construct a causal model. This is to 
include a list of the causes at work in the situation independent of the policy 
action, any changes in these resulting from the policy action, and a rule for 
calculating the joint effect of the causes (298). Although additivity of effects is a 
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common assumption in policy making – that adding a good thing can only 
improve results – things are not so simple (299). Ideally, the rule for calculating 
the joint effect is specified through an equation (303). On the one hand, such 
quantitative precision may be quite difficult to achieve in a policy context. On the 
other, equations too can leave a lot out, and a lot of what is relevant to policy 
success (303, 319).  
The second central principle of the proposed theory is that a cause is, following 
J. L. Mackie, an INUS condition - an Insufficient but Necessary part of an 
Unnecessary but Sufficient condition (304). This philosophical conceptualisation 
has a good parallel in epidemiology where a sufficient cause is thought of as a 
constellation of component causes which, together, are sufficient to cause a 
disease. Diagrammatically, this is often represented through pie charts, where a 
slice is a component cause (= INUS condition) and a pie is a sufficient cause 
(ibid.).  
Finally, the third main principle proposed is that “mechanisms matter”. Quite 
informally, a mechanism is thought of as an answer to the question of How 
would the policy variable bring about the desired effect? (317). The tracing of 
the causal pathway from variable to effect helps identify the auxiliary factors 
required if the policy variable is to operate successfully (ibid.). 
The above principles are intended as the basis for a guide to help users 
construct their own causal models and judge their adequacy against available 
evidence (321). This is in contrast to the predominant tendency in synthesis 
proposals coming from the empirical field. Evidence synthesis is researchers’ 











3.6. Some further characteristics of the field suggested by 
difficulties in identifying (exemplar) methods  
 Indefatigable I build in the light 
Ruthless I destroy in the night54 
Table T 2.1 highlighted a range of uncertainties concerning the history and 
exemplars of alternative synthesis method and, in some cases, my extraction of 
information from the reviews. In the process of obtaining information for the 
table, I encountered a number of further difficulties and limitations which are 
briefly described below. This negative meta-information, whose provision 
responds to demands for transparency and self-reflexivity, is also positive 
substantive information about the field and phenomena of interest.  
 
 
3.6.1. We do not know what we do not know 
To my knowledge, Table T 2.1 is the most comprehensive formalised list of 
research synthesis methods (as opposed to reference lists to methodological 
articles, for instance). Nevertheless, it is ruefully incomplete. Consider the 
following estimates. The total of PubMed citations identified by searches for the 
above 31 method names was found to be 2,344. The citation count for 
systematic reviews inclusive of meta-analysis on PubMed is currently 12,777.55 
The citation count for systematic reviews is 37,012. This means that the titles, 
abstracts and indexing terms of 24,235 systematic reviews held on PubMed do 
not include ‘meta-analysis’. A number of 2,344 does not go far in accounting for 
the methods those reviews have used, even when we acknowledge the 
likelihood that a large a proportion of those 24,235 reviews may not have been 
properly labelled and in fact include a meta-analysis or offer the default option 
of a narrative review. It accounts for even less than appearing at first sight as 
many alternative syntheses are not indexed as ‘systematic reviews’. 
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 Debelyanov, D., 1910. Black Song. Original in Bulgarian. 
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3.6.2. Issues of nomenclature 
At least some of the above inefficiency of identification of methods is due to 
issues of nomenclature. A key limitation of the PubMed searches is the 
assumption that the method names identified in the landmark reviews are 
relatively well established. This does not seem to be the case. Much more 
extensive than the simple search strategies used (see Appendix to Chapter 2, 
Section 1) are required for a rigorous exploration. 
For instance, some of the most popular terms in the field are polysemous. The 
field’s fragmentation also leaves authors unaware of relevant polysemy and 
few, if any, attempts at drawing distinctions are made. The term “meta-
synthesis” and its combinations with “qualitative”56 is one such example. It is 
used to refer to: 1) a phase within methods for the synthesis of systematic 
reviews (e.g. within the EPPI-approach, as per Pope, Mays and Popay, 2007, 
and the approach described by Ryan, Kaufman and Hill, 2009); 2) a number of 
particular methods for the synthesis of qualitative research, the degree of 
commonality between which is unknown (e.g. Jensen and Allen, 1996; 
Sherwood, 1997); 3) at least one method for the qualitative synthesis of 
quantitative research (Higginson et al., 2002); 4) at least one method for the 
synthesis of systematic reviews (Ryan, Kaufman and Hill, 2009); 5) the 
synthesis of qualitative research most broadly (e.g. Sandelowski, Docherty and 
Emden, 1997); 6) the interpretative synthesis of qualitative research more 
narrowly (as documented in Pope, Mays and Popay, 2007: 75); and, 7) not 
infrequently, for more than one of these in the same broad context with 
narrower contexts determining particular meanings (Ryan, Kaufman and Hill, 
2009). Although meta-synthesis is probably the clearest example of such 
polysemy, it is by no means an exception.57 The reverse of this problem – the 
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 E.g. “qualitative meta-synthesis” or meta-synthesis of qualitative research, studies, etc. 
 
57
 The terms ‘narrative synthesis’, ‘thematic analysis’ (used in a synthesis context), ‘thematic 





application of a number of terms for practically the same methodological entity – 
can also be observed.58 
 
 
4. The unit(s) of analysis/ synthesis in research synthesis studies 
I will now be turning to the next major section in the literature review – on 
candidate units for the most basic unit of analysis/synthesis in research 
synthesis. 59 ‘Evidence’, ‘data’, ‘findings’, ‘research’ and ‘studies’ seem to be the 
most frequent objects of integrative processes to be referred to in 
methodological texts on health research synthesis, but an abundance of other 
concepts is also used. Dixon-Woods et al. write, for instance, of integrating 
“qualitative and quantitative forms of evidence”60 or “qualitative approaches with 
trial designs” (Dixon-Woods et al., 2004: 1). Pawson occasionally refers to 
methods as that which is to be “blended” (Pawson, 2002a: 179). Greenhalgh et 
al. take as their initial unit of analysis “the unfolding ‘storyline’ of a research 
tradition over time” (Greenhalgh et al., 2005: 419). The Cochrane Handbook 
emphasises that systematic reviews have studies, as opposed to study reports, 
as their “primary units of interest and analysis”, yet clarifies that reports of 
studies are currently the most convenient and primary source of information 
about studies and their results (Higgins and Green, 2008: 95, 97, 167). Pope, 
Mays and Popay (2007) suggest that the findings of interest in an interpretive 
synthesis may be “the interpretations offered by the authors, typically in the 
form of analytical concepts, metaphors or themes”, while in a realist synthesis 
the focus will be “more on overarching theories or explanations which can be 
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 Detailed analysis of specific uses is needed, but at least some uses of, for instance, 
qualitative meta-analysis, thematic analysis and narrative summary overlap with uses of 
(qualitative) meta-synthesis, thematic synthesis and narrative synthesis.  
 
In addition to the polysemy and polynomy described above, there are also cases of ‘ignorant’ 
overlap of the meaning of terms – e.g. the familiar from primary research confusion between 
thematic and content analysis. 
 
59
 Here I am discussing those units of analysis/synthesis that represent and carry knowledge. 
There is a further typical, maybe even more typical sense, of ‘unit of analysis’ in the context of 
research synthesis, in terms of the object of which data have been collected – e.g. an individual, 
hospital, class of intervention programmes, etc. 
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synthesized” (op. cit.: 42). Britten draws attention to the layering of 
interpretations in line with ideas of Alfred Schutz (1962): “the building blocks for 
the synthesis were the second-order interpretations of the original studies, from 
which we constructed several (third-order) interpretations” (Britten et al, 2002: 
211). 
 
The unit of analysis/synthesis is rarely placed into sharp focus and discussed in 
the abstract. When done, presentation is relatively brief; a problem is laid bare 
and only a pragmatic solution developed, e.g.  study findings comprise all the 
text labelled as ‘results’ or ‘findings’ (Thomas and Harden, 2008); discussion is 
circumscribed as highly contextual (e.g. qualitative synthesis only, or a 
particular method only) (Paterson et al., 2001: 7-8, 10; Greenhalgh et al., 2005: 
419, 423); choices of units and meanings argued for are inconsistently followed 
(Finfgeld, 2003; Estabrooks et al., 1994); the argument has rhetorical strength 
but, on deeper analysis, runs into difficulties (Paterson et al., 2001 and 
Greenhalgh et al., 2005; see Appendix to Chapter 2, Section 2 for further 
details). The main theoretical concern in debates on the units of 
analysis/synthesis seems to be derivativeness and distance from the data – that 
a synthesis study performs an “analysis of analyses” (Paterson et al., 2001: 10); 
that it represents “findings thrice removed” (Sandelowski and Barroso, 2007: 
xvi).  
 
I will focus on five supposedly basic carriers of empirical knowledge – potential 
candidates for the most fundamental unit of analysis/synthesis in research 
synthesis studies. Evidence, data and findings are the most frequently 
mentioned and problematised information carriers in methodological texts. 
Claims (sentences, statements) is infrequently used there but has been 
occasionally problematised. It is also of a similarly basic level as the others. 
Facts is found almost exclusively in the meta-scientific literature (the term is 
very rare in recent health research texts) but again has substantial overlap with 
the previous four concepts. There is also an up-and-coming research niche in 
philosophy on the “travelling” and re-use of facts (discussed later in this review: 
Howlett and Morgan, 2011; Leonelli, 2012a). Many of its concerns are akin to 
my concern with transformations in research synthesis. I address observation 
only as part of the debates on the other units. It is another concept of differential 
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importance between the (health) sciences and the meta-scientific fields. It is 
fundamental to debates in the philosophy of science; not entirely uncommon, 
but certainly not particularly important, in primary health research; and 
practically non-existent in the research synthesis discourse.   
There is no way of doing justice to any of these concepts apart from at a book 
series length. I outlined the general selection principles used in the literature 
review in the Introduction. Further to these, I prioritised discussions that relate 
data, evidence, findings, etc. to some solid ground, to “the basis for our 
knowledge, the ultimate evidence” (Glymour, 1980: 10). In this way I sought to 
anchor arguments about the reliability of evidence, which is one of the main 
concerns of the thesis. I also focus on the variety and types of the above units 
and features along which variety and types can be constructed. Presumably, 
transformations of evidence are easier and more effective when the types of 
evidence to be brought together are ‘somehow’ more compatible.  
 
4.1.  Data 
4.1.1. Data in the methodological discussion 
In the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions (Higgins 
and Green, 2008) ‘data’ has been defined, “for the purposes of this chapter”, as 
“any information about (or deriving from) a study, including details of methods, 
participants, setting, context, interventions, outcomes, results, publications and 
investigators” (op. cit.: 156). An accompanying table further specifies the items 
to consider in data collection or extraction (157)61.  
The most detailed presentation of formal types of data in the Cochrane 
Handbook includes the following: 
1. dichotomous (or binary) data, where each individual’s outcome is one 
of only two possible categorical responses; 
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 These include: data about the source (e.g. study ID, citation and contact details); eligibility for 
review (confirmation thereof or reasons for exclusion); methods (e.g. study design, blinding 
procedures); participants (e.g. data on numbers, diagnostic criteria, age, sex); interventions 
(e.g. details of the intervention, sufficient to allow replication if feasible); outcomes (e.g. 
outcomes collected, outcome definitions, unit of measurement); results (e.g. sample size, 
means and standard deviations); miscellaneous (e.g. key conclusions of the study authors, 
miscellaneous comments of the review authors). 
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2. continuous data, where each individual’s outcome is a measurement 
of a numerical quantity; 
3. ordinal data (including measurement scales), where the outcome is 
one of several ordered categories, or generated by scoring and summing 
categorical responses; 
4. counts and rates calculated from counting the number of events that 
each individual experiences; and 
5. time-to-event (typically survival) data that analyse the time until an 
event occurs, but where not all individuals in the study experience the 
event (censored data) (op. cit.: 249-250). 
 
In a broader statistical context, there is a fundamental division between 
nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio scales and associated data. In nominal 
scales, items are labelled rather than ranked (e.g. male – female). In ordinal 
scales, items are ordered along a continuum (e.g. questionnaire respondents on 
a life stress scale). In interval scales, items are ordered along a continuum 
where equal intervals represent equal differences. Celsius and Fahrenheit 
temperature scales are typical examples. Ratio scales have the added 
characteristic of having a true zero point, which allows to make claims including 
phrases such as “half as much”, “1.222 times as long as X’. Common ratio 
scales are those of time, weight, length, volume, etc. (Howell, 2011: 18-24). 
Overall, there are some well established types of numerical/ quantitative/ 
statistical data.   
In the qualitative research literature, much of the ‘data discussion’ is dedicated 
to the strengths of qualitative data. These include, for instance, their “focus on 
naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural settings” (Miles and Huberman, 
1994: 10; italics in the original); their capacity to enable “a strong handle on 
what ‘real life’ is like”; their “local groundedness”, referring primarily to the fact 
that the data are collected on specific cases embedded in their local context; 
their richness, holism and vividness, which have a strong impact on the reader 
(ibid). Frequently highlighted are also the prior conceptual contents embedded 
in data and the “rapid ramification” of a “descriptive, first-order ‘fact’” into 
interpretations and explanations, first of the people being studied and then into 
the overlaid interpretations and explanations of the researcher (op.cit.: 9). Such 
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features are partly associated with the potentially non-representational, in terms 
of some uniform external reality, nature of data (Green and Thorogood, 2004: 
87). The validity of qualitative data as accounts, perceptions, interpretations of 
the world is often defended against a positivist expectation that data should be 
a proxy representation of the external world (op. cit.: 89). 
The typologies of qualitative data are less well established than those of 
statistical data.  The most widely used classifications seem to be in terms of 
source (e.g. interview, documentary analysis, focus group data, etc.) and 
modality (e.g. textual, visual, auditory and multimodal data). 
In addition to such more or less standard typologies of quantitative and 
qualitative data, there are numerous other labels with an extremely high 
frequency of usage in the research literature. The following list is a selection 
based on phrases appearing in the Cochrane Handbook (Higgins and Green, 
2008) and Green and Thorogood’s Qualitative Methods for Health Research 
(2004).  
Most obviously, data in both texts were qualified in terms of their thematic 
contents or ‘object’ to which they related (e.g. “survival data”, “quality of life 
data”, “data on blood pressure and proteinurea”) and/or methodological 
provenance (e.g. “clinical trials data”, “survey data”, “observational data”).  But 
many other implicit classifications can be found, too.  
A very clear one goes, for instance, along the lines of the scientific virtues or 
usability of data. The ‘troublesome’ data or data pools can be “incomplete”, 
“missing”, “insufficient”, “skewed”, “sparse”, “limited”, “unnecessary”, 
“duplicated”, “misleading”. The ‘good’ data or data pools can be “complete”, 
“full”, “normally distributed”, “trustworthy”, “useful”, “reliable”, “unbiased”, simply 
“good”, “valuable”, “rich”62. The ‘reformed’ data can be, for instance, “imputed” 
and “log-transformed”. 
Data can also differ in terms of their proximity to the data collection procedure 
and, supposedly, the world  – “raw data”; “primary data” (opposed to a number 
of data types, e.g. “reported data”, “transcribed data”, “interpreted data”); “data 
                                                          
62
 The majority of these descriptors have been taken from the Cochrane Handbook – so much 
so for the value-free language of quantitative research. 
113 
 
‘as extracted’” vs. “consensus data”; “original research data” vs. “summary”, 
“pooled” “aggregate(d)”, “de-aggregated” data.  
Many perspectives have been taken towards data in the methodological 
literature. One dictum appears again and again. It is found in methodological 
texts on quantitative and qualitative, primary and secondary research; it is 
reiterated in undergraduate and postgraduate courses; it is rediscovered by 
experienced and novice researchers alike. You are asking which one?  Well, it 
is obvious. You need to ask, you need to interrogate data. “Data never speak 
for themselves.” 
 
4.1.2. Data in the meta-scientific discussion 
To my reading, there are three main aspects of the concept of data in the 
philosophical and broader meta-scientific literature: 1) data of the senses and/or 
“sense data”; 2) data as subsumed within the concepts of observation and 
perception in science and as used to develop and test scientific theories; and 3) 
data as very material traces and (arte)facts, including data as a commodity. 
The debates on data of the senses and/or “sense data” concern that of which 
we are aware of in perception and its directness. In much of modern 
epistemology, data of the senses have been regarded as the foundation of all 
evidence (Hacking, 1975: 32). “Sense data” can have a more technical meaning 
than that of data of the senses/ perceptual data most broadly. Sense data can 
be seen as “the alleged mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in 
perception, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have” (Huemer, 
2011). The general doctrine here is that “we never see or otherwise perceive (or 
‘sense’), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or 
material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, 
sense-perceptions, percepts &c.)” (Austin, 1962: 2, italics in the original). 
Sense-datum theorists seek the “incorrigible” (op. cit.: 103-5), even in cases 
where we go wrong in our observations, as when we call aeroplanes ‘birds’ 
(Hanson, 1958: 22). Debates on sense-data extend towards deep philosophical 
worries – such as of the possibility of true knowledge of the external world, 
solipsism, mind-body dualism, difficulty in locating sense data in physical space 
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(Huemer, 2011, Feigl, 1958), and similarly deep “hankerings”– after absolute 
certainty, truth, foundations (Austin, 1962: 104). Topics as grand as objectivity, 
empiricism and scepticism are not far away either.  
More strictly science-related philosophical debates on data are those on 
observation and perception as grounds for the development and testing of 
scientific theories. The word ‘data’ is rarely incorporated in the formulation of 
key problems and arguments in such debates, but is subtly omnipresent – used 
directly but with secondary functions, used as an alternative label for certain 
meanings of the concepts of observation and perception, or even absent but 
being the word which scientists/researchers are more likely to use in similar 
contexts.  
Historically, the richest debates on observation and perception in relation to 
scientific theories seem to take up the logical positivists’ proposals of a purely 
observational language – and the idea that only what is expressible in this 
language can provide an independent test for a theory (discussed in section 
4.5.2 below). This view has been discredited in favour of what is still current 
orthodoxy, of theory-laden, paradigm-dependent observations (Hanson, 1958; 
Kuhn, 1996). Presently, the liveliest philosophy of science debate where 
observation and perception remain centre stage is that on the relationship 
between the observability and reality of theoretical entities (e.g. van Fraassen, 
1980; 2002; 2008; Churchland, 1979; 1982; Hacking, 1983). In a language 
more comprehensible to scientists, this debate concerns the extent to which the 
data/evidence we have of theoretical entities give us a good enough reason to 
believe in the existence of those theoretical entities. To give some specifics of 
the issues addressed, I will use Bogen and Woodward’s classic article on 
"Saving the Phenomena” (1988).  
“According to a widely shared view of science”, they begin, “scientific theories 
predict and explain facts about ‘observables’“ – i.e. objects and properties 
perceived by the senses or detected through processes that can be regarded as 
extensions of perception, for instance involving the use of instruments (op. cit.: 
303, 305). The authors argue against this view. Their argument revolves around 
a distinction between data and phenomena. “For the most part” data (such as 
bubble chamber photographs, patterns of discharge in electronic particle 
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detectors and records of reaction times in psychological experiments) can be 
“straightforwardly observed” (op. cit.: 305, 306), but are not typically predicted 
or systematically explained by a theory. It is facts about phenomena (such as 
weak neutral currents, the decay of the proton, and chunking and recency 
effects in human memory) that scientific theories aim to predict and explain. 
Although detected through the use of data, phenomena are generally not 
observable in any interesting sense of the term (306). Both facts about data and 
facts about phenomena can serve as evidence, but with regard to different 
‘targets’ – respectively claims about phenomena and high level general theories 
(306). Bogen and Woodward suggest that this historically strong but misguided 
emphasis on observables as the focus of explanation and prediction of scientific 
theories and the failure to distinguish between data and phenomena have had a 
number of negative consequences. For instance, it is not appreciated that 
discrediting the reliability or possibility for observation (e.g. by appealing to its 
theory-ladenness, expectancy effects and sets, or the impossibility of observing 
theoretical entities) does not discredit the possibility for having objective criteria 
for the comparison of theories or claims to reality and scientific legitimacy (305). 
Similarly importantly, the significance of non-perceptual considerations that 
have a bearing on reliability (e.g. related to avoiding confounding factors, 
procedures for data analysis and statistical inference, etc.) has escaped 
philosophical attention (311, 312, 327). 
 
Finally, the third strand in the meta-scientific debate on data highlighted here 
concerns the objects available to, generated, handled and shared by scientists 
– such as specimens, datasets, photographs, recordings, model organisms, 
simulations; often peculiar, unwieldy and precious. In recent years there has 
been a rapidly growing meta-scientific interest in data-driven science, data-
sharing and the travelling of data, facts and artefacts (Howlett and Morgan, 
2011; Leonelli, 2012a). Issues such as standardisation, commodification and 
meta-data accompanying data are major concerns. I return to this issue in the 
section on transformations (6.3). 






4.2.1. Evidence in the methodological discussion  
In a classic editorial entitled “Evidence based medicine: what it is and what it 
isn't”, Sackett et al. (1996) state that “[b]y best available external clinical 
evidence we mean clinically relevant research, often from the basic sciences of 
medicine, but especially from patient centred clinical research into the accuracy 
and precision of diagnostic tests ..., the power of prognostic markers, and the 
efficacy and safety of therapeutic, rehabilitative, and preventive regimens” (op. 
cit.: 71-2). For Guyatt et al. “any empirical observation about the apparent 
relationship between events constitutes potential evidence” (Guyatt et al., 2000: 
1292). They accompany this broad definition with a Hierarchy of Strength of 
Evidence for Treatment Decisions which ranks, in a descending order of 
strength, the following sources of evidence:  
1) N of 1 randomized trial (randomised trials of treatment responses of an 
individual patient);63 
2) Systematic reviews of randomized trials;  
 
3) Single randomized trial; 
4) Systematic review of observational studies addressing patient-
important outcomes;  
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 In representations of the limitations of EBM it is often claimed that the hierarchy of evidence is 
topped by the randomised controlled trial, and, more rarely, by the systematic review of RCTs. 
Although I cannot claim systematicity, I have not come across a hierarchy in any of the 
authoritative texts where the RCT, as opposed to the systematic review of RCTs, comes first. In 
recent texts, N of 1 trials or meta-analyses of these (trials of the treatment response of 
individual patients) are consistently at the top, but as can be seen from Guyatt et al.’s article 
above they were there at least as early as in 2000. Of course, an argument can be made as to 
what types of studies are most often carried out or available to decision makers but, strictly 
speaking, claims that the hierarchy of evidence in EBM is dominated by the randomised 
controlled trial are false. 
 
It is a further question of how exactly N of 1 studies are similar and different to randomised trials 
and whether the designation of ‘N of 1 randomized trial’ is a reasonable typological ascription or 
sign of the fetishisation of RCTs (this is one of many astute observations that came from my 
supervisors, in this case Prof. John Dupré. And it is one of those I feel I would never have 




5) Single observational study addressing patient-important outcomes;  
6) Physiologic studies; 
7) Unsystematic clinical observations.  
 
Hierarchies of evidence are a defining feature of EBM. They differ according to 
the type of decision that needs to be made (e.g. associated with treatment, 
prognosis, diagnosis, etc.) and also demonstrate some internal variety. In 
defence against a recurrent criticism, Sackett et al. (1996) state that “[e]vidence 
based medicine is not restricted to randomised trials and meta-analyses” (op. 
cit.: 72). For instance, assessments of the accuracy of a diagnostic test would 
require “proper cross sectional studies of patients clinically suspected of 
harbouring the relevant disorder”. Sometimes the evidence “will come from the 
basic sciences such as genetics or immunology”. Even with some questions 
about therapy an RCT may not be required, as with “successful interventions for 
otherwise fatal conditions” or if it cannot be waited for (ibid.).  
 
The notion of evidence in evidence-based medicine has been vigorously 
attacked in the methodological literature. The “definition of evidence challenge” 
is seen as one of four challenges that EBM should meet “to establish its claims 
to universality and legitimacy” (Upshur, 2004: 197). In her paper “Accounting for 
EBM: Notions of evidence in medicine”, Lambert (2006) summarises the 
criticisms of evidence-based medicine raised in over 86 publications in medical 
and health professional journals into a typology of six alleged limitations (op.cit.: 
2634, note 1). One major type of concern is that evidence derived through 
population studies is “incommensurate” with the forms of evidence required for 
the clinical management of individual patients (2634). A second concern is that 
EBM has legitimised a bias towards individual focused and simple treatments 
(e.g. drugs) as opposed to behavioural, psychosocial, community based and 
multiple component interventions. This is because evidence of effectiveness of 
the former is much easier to obtain through evidence-based approaches than 
evidence of effectiveness of the latter (2635-6). A third salient criticisms is that 
EBM fails to take patients’ views into account: its reliance on strict evidence 
hierarchies results in predominance of evidence of clinical and cost 
effectiveness  (2635), whereas the narratives of patients and doctors should 
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also bear on decision making (2642). Finally, a range of concerns has been 
raised about the very dominance of evidence and scientific knowledge in 
medicine. EBM is seen as excluding clinical skills – “the diagnostic art”, clinical 
expertise and judgement, clinician’s intuition and tacit knowledge (2635).64  
 
Some of the above criticisms have had an impact. There are numerous re-
explications of evidence-based medicine to the effect that it is not restricted to 
the randomised controlled trial and that clinical judgement, patient preferences, 
values and other types of evidence are of ultimate importance (e.g. Sackett et 
al., 1996; Petticrew, 2001). More systemic changes can also be observed. For 
instance, the Cochrane collaboration is opening up to qualitative research65 and 
“logic models” (roughly, models that represent middle-level theorising as 
opposed to ‘pure’ evidence) (Anderson et al., 2011). The depth and motivations 
of such changes, or the possibility for a “truly satisfactory” reformulation of 
evidence to fit the distinctive epistemologies and standards of different 
disciplines have, however, been questioned (Lambert, 2006: 2639, 2643).  
 
 
When it comes to types and dimensions of difference along which bodies and 
pieces of evidence can be described, the variety of labels is enormous 
(analogous to that for data illustrated in 4.1.1). Established typologies seem to 
go primarily along the lines of source study methodology, as represented in a 
variety of hierarchies of evidence. As these have already been attended to, I will 
turn to three features of evidence which seem to pervade the methodological 
literature: its strength, relevance and heterogeneity/homogeneity. I will start with 
the least technical of these – relevance.  
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 The remaining types of criticisms as summarised by Lambert are less ‘evidence-focused’ and 
concern: the development of formulaic guidelines (e.g. clinical guidelines, protocols, algorithms), 
seen as potentially eroding clinical autonomy, limiting patient choice and impacting negatively 
on physician learning; and the problem of translating research evidence into clinical practice, 
health policy and health services delivery. 
 
65
 Adding templates for systematic reviews of qualitative research in RevMan was discussed as 
an upcoming development 19
th




In the current health policy, advocacy and research discourse, ‘relevance’ of 
evidence is understood in terms of the likelihood that some body of evidence 
will 1) be used in clinical practice, self-care, commissioning and policy 
development and 2) be understood and felt as needed, important and helpful by 
various stakeholders outside the research and/or policy making community.66 
The concern with relevance is associated with a well defined, emotional and 
rhetorically dense debate, with frequent opposition between research-oriented 
and user-oriented evidence and powerful-user-oriented evidence (e.g. for 
clinicians and policy makers) and ultimate-user-oriented evidence (for patients 
and carers). The following excerpts are typical illustrations: 
Consumer or public uses of evidence invoke a fundamental question 
about the nature of the evidence: who decides what evidence to seek 
and how to seek it? A discourse about citizens invokes the right to be 
involved in the generation of evidence as well as the planning and review 
of services. Patient and public involvement in decisions about their own 
care, or reviewing services, is meaningless if, in an evidence-informed 
culture, the evidence is irrelevant to either group (Oliver et al., 2008: 73). 
 
INVOLVE defines public involvement in research as research being 
carried out ‘with’or ‘by’ members of the public rather than ‘to’, ‘about’ 
or ‘for’ them (INVOLVE, 2013). 
 
Next, it may be worth introducing the methodological debate on the 
strength/quality of evidence by suggesting what it isn’t. It is not exhausted by a 
concern with evidence hierarchies. There is richness to the methodological 
debate that critical texts, including many philosophy of evidence-based 
medicine texts, fail to appreciate. Hierarchies of evidence are only one of the 
tools, and a crude one, through which evidence is assessed. As for the very 
concept of “quality of evidence”, many texts and speakers presenting quality 
assessment endeavours are at pains to explain why the term is inaccurate and 
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corresponds to stronger claims than those they are prepared to make and why it 
may be preferable to use, for instance, “risk of bias”, “study validity” (Higgins 
and Green, 2008: 189-190) or “confidence in estimates of effect”. This does not 
mean, however, that hierarchies of evidence are particularly flexible; that the 
crude assessments made on their bases are not amongst the most 
consequential; that quality is not a fetish in some texts or the fall-back-on word 
even in texts which disclaim their use of the term (see, for example, Higgins and 
Green, 2008: 190). 
   
Over 10 years ago, a report of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
on Systems to Rate the Strength of Scientific Evidence (West et al., 2002) 
identified over a 100 systems (tools, checklists, scales67) to rate the quality of 
studies and/or grade the strength of bodies of evidence from one or more 
studies. The differences between the pronouncements of different tools have 
been an object of investigation (Jüni et el., 1999), as well as the development of 
“walkovers” from one grading system to another (Ebell et al., 2004: 555). It is 
more likely that the number has tripled since 2002 than to have remained the 
same. 
 
In the context of the Cochrane Handbook, evidential quality is conceptualised in 
terms of minimal risk of bias. It is assessed with the “Risk of Bias Tool” (Higgins 
and Green, 2011: 8.5). Recently, the GRADE (Grading of Recommendations 
Assessment, Development, and Evaluation) system of rating quality of evidence 
in systematic reviews and guidelines, and of grading strength of 
recommendations in guidelines (Guyatt, Oxman, Akl et al., 2011) has been 
gaining popularity. It is likely to become the orthodoxy in evidence evaluations.68 
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 The Cochrane Handbook “explicitly discourages” (191) the use of scales in assessing risk of 
bias and the summary scores they provide. Some of the main concerns relate to the use of 




 The rating capacity is one of the aspects of GRADE. It is claimed that it is “much more than a 
rating system. It offers a transparent and structured process for developing and presenting 
evidence summaries for systematic reviews and guidelines in health care and for carrying out 
the steps involved in developing recommendations. GRADE specifies an approach to framing 
questions, choosing outcomes of interest and rating their importance, evaluating the evidence, 
and incorporating evidence with considerations of values and preferences of patients and 




It is predicated on a starting point of high quality evidence for RCTs and low 
quality evidence for observational studies. Five quality parameters may be used 
to downgrade evidence – risk of bias, inconsistency, indirectness of the 
evidence, imprecision of the estimates and publication bias. Evidence can be 
upgraded on the grounds of large effect, the presence of a dose-response 
gradient, and a judgement that all plausible confounding factors would normally 
decrease an observed effect (Guyatt, Oxman, Sultan et al., 2011). GRADE is 
“outcome centric” – the quality of evidence for a specific outcome/finding is 
rated rather than that of the study as a whole (Guyatt, Oxman, Akl et al., 2011: 
385). 
 
Across quality of evidence tools, it is stressed that these (may) involve 
subjectivity, judgement, interpretation and do not eliminate disagreements 
(Higgins and Green, 2008: 191; Guyatt, Oxman, Akl et al., 2011: 392). Quality is 
a continuum and there are limitations to using discrete, rigid categories (Guyatt, 
Oxman, Akl et al., 2011: 389). The difficulty of distinguishing between 
incomplete reporting and inadequate study conduct is a key obstacle to valid 
assessments (Higgins and Green, 2008: 191). In brief, the strength of evidence 
is constituted by numerous building blocks and diminished by numerous 
missteps whose relative importance and effect may be very difficult to judge 
objectively, even with structured tools. 
 
 
Finally, the third characteristic of (bodies of) evidence that seems to dominate 
the methodological literature concerns its homogeneity/heterogeneity.  The 
narrow statistical meaning of homogeneity/heterogeneity covers the variability 
of intervention effects across studies (see also Chapter 1, Section 2.2). 
Methodological texts on the systematic review also discuss clinical 
heterogeneity, associated with variability in participants, interventions and 
outcomes of interest, and methodological heterogeneity, associated, for 
instance, with the use of blinding or allocation concealment or different 
approaches to defining and measuring outcomes.69 Admissible heterogeneity is 
determined primarily by decisions about the scope of the review (Higgins and 
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Green, 2008: 277). In the context of reviews that use a greater variety of 
studies, heterogeneity is often associated with a diversity of disciplines, 
theoretical orientation, worldview assumptions and ‘paradigms’. A brief 
discussion of ‘paradigms’ in health research is given in 4.7. 
 
4.2.2. Evidence in the meta-scientific discussion 
The nature of evidence in evidence-based medicine is the pre-eminent topic for 
the philosophy of evidence-based medicine. Most frequently, this is addressed 
through (often harsh) criticisms of EBM’s over-reliance on randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses; through arguments undermining claims 
about their unbiased nature and methodological supremacy; through criticisms 
of EBM’s strict, categorical, solely study design-based hierarchies of evidence; 
through insistence on the admission of a broader range of quality of evidence 
criteria and methodological alternatives (e.g. observational evidence, 
mechanistic evidence, causal claims, pathophysiologic rationale); through 
emphasising the distance between RCTs and effectiveness in real life (Worrall, 
2002; 2007a, b; La Caze, 2008; 2009; Bagshaw and Bellomo, 2008; Grossman, 
2008; Cartwright, 2011; Cartwright and Stegenga, 2011; Howick, Glasziou and 
Aronson, 2010, Howick, 2011). Further examples of the various other ways in 
which EBM’s concept of evidence has been unsettled in philosophical writings 
include: challenging the thoroughgoing avoidance of any prior (subjective) 
knowledge in obtaining evidence in the style of classical as opposed to 
Bayesian statistics (Dowe, 2008); highlighting the irreducible fuzziness of the 
boundary between evidence and lack of evidence (Vineis, 2004); drawing 
attention to the implicit normativity in the production and presentation of facts 
within evidence-based medicine (Molewijk, 2004, Goldenberg, 2006). 
 
The second main line of debate in the philosophy of EBM extends the concern 
with the ‘other’ types of evidence advanced as valuable. The relationship 
between EBM and its alternatives is explored in terms of the types of knowledge 
they generate, the practices in which they are used, the sources of their 
authority and the values associated with them. Specific topics include: clinical 
judgement, wisdom and reasoning  (Wifstad, 2008; Parker, 2002; Upshur, 1999; 
2003); tacit knowledge (Thornton, 2006, Henry, 2006, Braude, 2009); the 
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relationship between EBM and psychiatry and psychotherapy, which are prime 
examples of fields of meanings, values, irreducible personal individuality and 
contextual understanding (Fulford, 2004; Fulford, Thornton and Graham, 2007; 
Gupta, 2007; Ayob, 2008; Bolton, 2008; Falkum, 2008; Thornton, 2008); the 
relationship between EBM and the complementary and alternative therapies 
(Ernst, Cohen and Stone, 2004; Parker, 2007; Clark-Grill, 2007; Derkatch, 
2008; Dysart-Gale, 2008); between EBM and basic science (Sehon and 
Stanley, 2003); EBM and clinical medicine (Kulkarni, 2005). In some cases the 
discussion is critical, sometimes condemnatory of evidence-based medicine. It 
is seen as a threat to those ‘others’ or neglectful of them to the detriment of 
good care. In other cases their role is taken to be to limit, balance EBM. In still 
other cases some form of integration is sought, usually requiring minor 
adjustments to claims and standard interpretations of EBM. 
 
Two further issues that appear in the above lines of research have a strong 
independent presence, too. The first is the relationship between evidence-
based medicine and values, ethics and a values-based medicine. The ethical 
implications of the spread of EBM are explored (Goodman, 2003; Saarni and 
Gylling, 2004; Goldenberg, 2006). Critical analyses are offered of the explicit 
and implicit values with which EBM aligns (Molewijk, 2004; Goldenberg, 2006; 
Zarkovich and Upshur, 2002; Rogers, 2004; Watine, 2011) or of the value 
commitments it fails to make (Bolton, 2008). Proposals are made as to how to 
incorporate values, alongside evidence, into clinical decision making (Fulford, 
2004; Fulford, Thornton and Graham, 2007; Zarkovich and Upshur, 2002; 
Thornton, 2006; 2008). The second of those further issues is the tension 
between the evidence-based as general(ised), objective, population-based and 
external and the individual, subjective, context-specific, internal to a situation 
(and supposedly non evidence-based). It is explored, for instance, by Tonelli, 
1998; Kulkarni, 2005; Ayob, 2008; Falkum, 2008; Wifstad, 2008.  
 
Overview works on the philosophy of evidence-based medicine or ones that 
claim to bring the philosophy of science to bear on EBM generally cover the 
issues outlined above. For instance, Sehon and Stanley in “The challenges of 
evidence-based medicine: A philosophical perspective” (2003) go back to a 
closer reading of Kuhn to argue that the advent of EBM is not a paradigm shift, 
124 
 
as claimed by its proponents. Quine’s metaphor of “web of belief” is then used 
to intertwine EBM and the basic sciences (op. cit.: bmc 9). Ashcroft (2004) 
suggests that “further work is needed on the theory of evidence and inference; 
causation and correlation; clinical judgment and collective knowledge; the 
structure of medical theory; and the nature of clinical effectiveness” (op. cit.: 
131). Goldenberg in “On evidence and evidence-based medicine: Lessons from 
the philosophy of science” (2006) brings ideas from post-positivist, feminist and 
phenomenological philosophies of science to problematise objectivist claims 
made about evidence in evidence-based medicine and draw attention to a 
variety of features of its social nature and social and political effects. Howick in 
The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine (2011), which seems to be the 
only book-length treatment of the subject, provides detailed critical, yet often 
sympathetic, analysis on EBM’s stance on randomisation, double masking, 
placebo controls, mechanistic reasoning and expert judgement. 
 
There is no preferred classification scheme for evidence in the philosophy of 
evidence-based medicine. A broad range of labels, possibly with a 
predominance of method-based ones, are used.  Rather than adding detail in 
this direction, I will extend the discussion with a typology of concepts of 
evidence in science offered by Peter Achinstein in The Book of Evidence 
(2001). It comes from the general philosophy of science rather than the 
philosophy of medicine. It seems, however, a particularly useful tool in 
distinguishing between different concepts of evidence in operation in health 
research synthesis and in considering how the status of a piece or body of 
evidence can change as a result of being contextualised within a synthesis 
study. 
 
Achinstein argues that there are at least four different concepts of evidence or 
perspectives to the concept of evidence in science (Achinstein, 2001: 18). He 
distinguishes between “ES-evidence” (with “ES” standing for “epistemic 
situation”), “subjective evidence”, “veridical evidence” and “potential evidence”.  
125 
 
In the first case, evidence is evidence that h relative to a particular epistemic 
situation.70 In 1883, Heinrich Hertz was in an epistemic situation – including his 
experimental setup, results, the techniques for removing gas from cathode 
tubes at the time, his background assumptions – which completely justified his 
belief that cathode rays are not charged (op. cit.: 18). Later, it was 
demonstrated that they were in fact negatively charged. The reasons for what, 
with the benefit of hindsight, was found to be an erroneous conclusion on the 
part of Hertz was that he had not evacuated sufficiently the gas in his cathode 
tubes, yet scientific knowledge of his time did not allow him to recognise this 
(19). In his epistemic situation, he was justified in believing the hypothesis that 
cathode rays are not charged.  The requirements of this view are not as weak 
as they may appear either – to be justified in believing a hypothesis h on the 
basis of P1,. . . , Pn, a person must be justified in believing P1,. . . , Pn (21). 
Achinstein formalises the subjective view, the second concept of evidence in 
science, as follows: 
 
E is X's evidence that h at time t (with X being a person or a group) if and only if 
at time t  
1. X believes that e is evidence that h; 
2. X believes that h is true or probable; and 
3. X's reason for believing that h is true or probable is that e is true (23). 
 
Subjective evidence only demands that X believes that e is true, not that e is 
true (24), as well as that X has a reason to believe that h is true or probable on 
the basis of e, not that X be justified in believing h on the basis of e.  Even if it 
was the case that Hertz’s experimental results had not warranted his belief in 
the neutrality of cathode rays, he could have viewed his results as evidence for 
that hypothesis (ibid).  
 
In the case of “veridical evidence”, if e is evidence that h, then e provides a 
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 “[A]n epistemic situation is different from what philosophers usually call “background 
information.” The latter consists solely of propositions (assumed to be true). The former is an 
abstract type of situation in which, among other things, one knows or believes that certain 
propositions are true, one is not in a position to know or believe that others are, and one knows 
(or does not know) how to reason from the former to the hypothesis of interest, even if such a 
situation does not in fact obtain for any person” (Achinstein, 2001: 20). 
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good reason to believe h (24). When a belief is justified without the invocation or 
implicit presence of an epistemic situation, a “good reason to believe” has been 
provided (25). “Good reason to believe” functions as a “sign” or “symptom”. A 
certain type of a rash may be a sign or symptom of a disease irrespective of 
medical experts’ unawareness of the connection and thus lack of justification for 
believing that the disease is present. Nevertheless, the rash is a good reason to 
believe that the disease is present (ibid). The concept of veridical evidence 
requires the truth of hypothesis h (26). Veridical evidence should, however, be 
distinguished from “conclusive” evidence where not only is h true, but e 
establishes h with certainty (27). 
 
Finally, the concept of “potential evidence” does not presuppose the truth of the 
hypothesis (28). A patient may have a rash typically associated with the 
measles virus but not have the measles virus. If we say that whatever his rash 
was, it was not a sign or symptom of the measles virus, we are invoking the 
concept of veridical evidence. If we say that, in spite of his not having the 
measles virus, he had its signs or symptoms, we are employing the concept of 
potential evidence. Thus, in the case of potential evidence, some fact e may be 




“Seek and you will find”. You will, but little, if you are seeking for a discussion of 
‘findings’ in meta-scientific texts. The concept appears only marginally there. I 
thus discuss ‘findings’ only from a methodological perspective. And while in 
most methodological texts it is a vague concept, some posit findings as the unit. 
Originally, this has been done within the context of distinguishing between 
synthesis studies and the secondary analysis of data. In the latter, primary 
study datasets are re-analysed as opposed to only drawing on study reports. 
Some authors sharpen this contrast to suggest that secondary analysis always 
deals with raw data while synthesis studies always deal with reported and 
interpreted data referred to as ‘findings’. For instance, Finfgeld describes 
metasynthesis as “a complete study that involves rigorously examining and 
interpreting the findings (versus the raw data) of a number of qualitative 
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research studies” (Finfgeld, 2003: 894). Estabrooks, Field and Morse (1994) 
state that “data aggregation is appropriate in the single study, whereas 
aggregation of findings is the appropriate approach when working with multiple 
studies” (op. cit.: 505). “Like a secondary analysis, qualitative synthesis could 
involve re-interpretation, but unlike secondary analysis it would be based on 
published findings rather than primary data” (Britten et al, 2002: 209-10). 
 
The most extensive conceptual exploration of findings in the context of research 
synthesis studies appears to have been performed by Sandelowski and Barroso 
(2002), who analysed reporting practices and purported findings of 99 studies 
on women and HIV. 
 
The authors assert that research integration projects require that the findings in 
primary studies be clearly delineated (Sandelowski and Barroso, 2002: 218), 
separable from other elements of the study, easy to find. Many theoretical 
positions associated with qualitative research challenge the assumption of 
separability of findings from other elements of a study, such as research 
problem, method, data, analysis, interpretation, researcher (op. cit.:  214, 215). 
Practices of using non-standard representational forms also complicate the 
identification of qualitative findings (215). As much as the authors acknowledge 
the grounds for such views and recognise the value of alternative 
representational formats (215, 219), they insist that synthesis projects 
necessitate such separations, “albeit imperfect and controversial” (214). 
 
Five main problems in “finding the findings in qualitative studies” are identified. 
The first is the misrepresentation of data as findings. In reports where this 
happens, researchers were prone to “descriptive excess” but offered practically 
no interpretation of their data (Sandelowski and Barroso, 2002: 216, also 
quoting Lofland & Lofland, 1995: 165).71 The opposite to this is a tendency 
towards “analytic excess”. In such studies researchers present their 
manipulations and rearrangements of data (lists, coding schemes, categories, 
concepts, frequency counts, etc.) as if they were coherent interpretations of the 
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 Lofland, J. and  Lofland, L.H. , 1995. Analyzing social settings: A guide to qualitative 
observation and analysis. 3rd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
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phenomenon of interest (Sandelowski and Barroso, 2002: 216, also quoting 
Lofland & Lofland, 1995: 164). 
 
A common problem is the use of quotes and examples that do not seem to be 
fitting the findings they are supposed to illustrate. This leaves the reader 
wondering whether the researchers had other evidence to support the 
interpretation and, potentially, how to handle the line of interpretation suggested 
(Sandelowski and Barroso, 2002: 217).  Further difficulties include failures to 
provide the grounds for designating something as a “theme or pattern” (op. cit.: 
217) and problems of researchers’ use of existing concepts or theories. For 
instance, researchers drift from one concept to another in presenting their 
findings, leaving the reader to decide if to report several different findings. In 
other cases, the theories used to interpret data do not fit the data well, or the 
purpose of using a theory is unclear (218).  
 
The authors conclude by insisting on the importance that findings of qualitative 
research be found: “if research integration is considered an essential means 
toward that end [generating knowledge for practice], any report of a study in 
which the findings cannot be discerned might just as well not have been written. 




Similarly to findings, ‘facts’ is a one-home term. It does not appear in recent 
health research texts, while being a key concept in the philosophy and social 
studies of science. In an age where everything in the wider world is information 
and data, it was also curious to find that facts, of the five carriers of knowledge 
discussed here, appeared most often in claims with predicates of ubiquity and 
exhaustiveness. For Wittgenstein “[t]he world is the totality of facts, not of 
things” (1922: 1.1). Russell inhabits a similar world where everything is a fact, 
but things are facts, too: “Everything that there is in the world I call a “fact”. The 
sun is a fact; Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon was a fact; if I have a toothache, 
my toothache is a fact. If I make a statement, my making it is a fact, and if it is 
true there is a further fact in virtue of which it is true, but not if it is false” 
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(Russell, 1948: 159). Recently, those same ubiquitous facts are also seen as 
travelling, circulating, being transmitted and transformed (Howlett and Morgan, 
2011: i) – i.e. as going even ‘more everywhere’. Below, I will point to four 
themes in specifying a network of meanings associated with ‘facts’: facts in 
relation to laws; facts in the context of the analytic-synthetic statements 
distinction; facts as firm or infirm, of the world or of us; and facts in opposition to 
values.  
The received view in the philosophy and history of science is that important, 
interesting, even beautiful, facts can be distinguished from unimportant, 
uninteresting facts by their recurrence (Poincaré, undated: 17), reliability and 
validity across contexts and times. Recurring facts make scientific laws, or at 
least provide the basis from which they can be derived. Outside of these, we 
have accidental, contingent facts.  Scientific laws thus state the (important) facts 
about the world. This intuitive claim has been discredited in the philosophy of 
science, most notably in the work of Nancy Cartwright (Cartwright, 1983, 
Cartwright, 1999). One of her central arguments rests on the idea of 
“nomological machines” which are seen as the source of our most valued 
scientific facts. A nomological machine is “a fixed (enough) arrangement of 
components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of 
stable (enough) environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind 
of regular behaviour that we represent in our scientific laws” (Cartwright, 1999: 
50). The cost of those scientific truths, however, is a huge number of constraints 
and specifications that need to be met for those facts to obtain.  It is thus 
questionable whether they can be said to obtain in the world, simpliciter. 
Facts are also party to the debate about the existence or not of “some 
fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in 
meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic, or 
grounded in fact”, which, in Quine’s famous phrase, is one of the “two dogmas 
of empiricism” (Quine, 1951: 20).72 A sharp boundary between the two is rarely 
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 As traced back by Quine, Kant’s cleavage “was foreshadowed in Hume’s distinction between 
relations of ideas and matters of fact, and in Leibnitz’s distinction between truths of reason and 
truths of fact” (ibid.). 
 
The original paper has “truth which are synthetic” rather than “truthS”. I take it to be a typo that 
has not attracted much speculation about deeper meanings. 
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asserted in present-day philosophy, with different positions as to whether a 
weaker version of the distinction is justified or not and how it can be drawn.  
Facts, or most facts, or proper facts, or at least some facts are again in more 
traditional views something real, solid about the world. Cognitively, they provide 
a test for the truth or falsity of beliefs and statements, including those 
embedded in scientific theories. Affectively, they better be met with acceptance 
as many are independent of our volitions and even of our existence (Russell, 
1948: 160). Conatively, they provides grounds for rational action. Not that it is 
easy to do any of the above. But facts are foundational and some more so than 
others – the “ultimate”, “irreducible”, “brute” (Feigl, 1958: 472); “hard”, 
“stubborn”, “ineluctable” facts (Russell, 1948: 160). Science either reveals those 
or builds on them to reveal other hard, reliable facts. 
This cluster of views – of (some, proper, scientific, proper scientific, etc.) facts 
being  rock solid, providing the grounds from which to build reliable knowledge 
and science, and of the world outside rather than of human perception and 
interaction – has been challenged in a number of ways. Some of these involve 
arguments familiar from the theory-ladenness and paradigm-dependence 
debates. Polanyi, for instance, questions the stability of facts relative to 
interpretations: what is “frequently said that the facts of science remain and only 
the interpretations change” is “not true or ... at least very misleading” (Polanyi, 
1946: 74). If we recognise many of the facts of earlier science, it is because 
their basic interpretation is still preserved. “But while to Kepler in 1596 it 
appeared as an indubitable fact that the planetary orbits are related to the 
geometry of perfect solids, we regard this to-day as mere fancy” (ibid). This is 
one of many expressions of the “factual relativity doctrine” – “the doctrine that 
factual propositions exist only within a given conceptual framework rather than 
independently of theories and conceptual schemas” (Weimer, 1975: 450). 
Cartwright challenges views of reliable knowledge being based on the solid 
foundations of solid scientific facts through a different approach (Cartwright, 
1999).  According to her, it is not the exemplary scientific facts – facts “that are 
legitimately regimented into theoretical schemes”, that are generally “about 
behaviour in highly structured, manufactured environments” – that should have 
a privileged status and be seen as grounding objectivity. It is the vague, 
131 
 
imprecise, inexact , “refugee facts” that are to perform this role – knowledge that 
an oak tree can grow from an acorn but not from a pine cone, that a child will 
grow more secure if nurtured, or that one can head north if they follow a 
compass needle (Cartwright, 1999: 23-25).  
In the meta-scientific fields more broadly, the stability of (scientific) facts has 
often been undermined through attending to the process of constructing facts, 
its contingencies and the social negotiations involved in it. For Latour (1987) for 
instance, facts are historical, socially constructed and mutable, the result of the 
collective efforts of a large number of people. They either do not possess a 
strength of their own, or it is of little importance. Their fate and development 
depends to a small extent on their primary builder and mostly on the behaviours 
of others. The strength and consequently the reality of a scientific fact depend 
on the number of elements tied to it and the extent to which those elements 
have been glued together into an organic whole. Facts are always dependent 
on people, even when they have turned into a black box (Latour, 1987, see 
Chapters 1 and 3 in particular).  
Finally, and going back to the broader themes associated with facts, the 
philosophy of science is showing an increasing interest towards values and the 
fact-value dichotomy (Longino, 1990; 1996; Kitcher, 2001; Machamer and 
Wolters, 2004; Fulford, Thornton and Graham, 2007; Kincaid, Dupré and Wylie., 
2007; Douglas, 2009). The fact-value distinction is typically associated with the 
writings of Hume (as the impossibility to derive ‘ought to’ from ‘is’). It is seen as 
fundamental to the received view of science. Its validity, usefulness, 
absoluteness have, however, been extensively questioned or its strength 









4.5. Claims, sentences, statements 
 
4.5.1. Language in the methodological discussion 
Claims, sentences, statements – and similar concepts highlighting linguistic 
form, propositional structure and issues of representation involved in handling 
and sharing scientific knowledge – are rarely used in health research synthesis 
texts to denote the basic unit of analysis/synthesis. But the research synthesis 
debate is concerned with language and expression. For instance, the non-
transparency, incompleteness, ambiguity and imperfections of source study 
texts are frequently commented on informally and occasionally in 
methodological texts. Problems tend to be attributed to authors’ skills and 
precision and space constraints in journals rather than to something more 
general about language and representation. The politics, meta-messages, 
subtle leanings, epistemological and ethical commitments, etc. of language are 
an object of analysis in more ‘deconstructive’ synthesis methods, e.g. the meta-
study of Paterson et al. (2001), meta-narrative of Greenhalgh et al. (2005) or 
critical interpretive synthesis of Dixon-Woods et al. (2006). 
In the broader health research literature, the treatment of the linguistic and 
propositional forms in which data, evidence and findings come73 shows clear 
differences between fields. In the context of clinical research, which feeds into 
the mainstream systematic review, language tends to remain unnoticed. If 
noticed, it is generally seen as a tool that is difficult to master, but once 
mastered and used well, as providing a reasonably transparent window to 
research findings and the world. Discussions of language occur most 
prominently in handbooks on survey design (how to formulate and order 
questions and prompts so that valid and reliable responses are obtained) and 
how to write scientific/research texts (e.g. Alley, 1996; Fraser, 1997; Browner, 
2006; Hall, 2013). 
In the context of methodological literature on qualitative health research, 
language is seen as having a much more central place (Green and Thorogood, 
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 Obviously, evidence, findings and data used in research synthesis studies are represented in 
other ways, too. Ideally, one should also address how tables, graphs, images, etc. are 
discussed in the methodological literature. 
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2004: 81), a house and a view rather than a window only. The form of the 
majority of data produced by qualitative researchers is linguistic. Many of the 
methods used in data production are also based on language use (e.g. 
interviews) (ibid). But there is more. Qualitative research uses a range of 
methods to scrutinise language for non-obvious meanings and states of affairs. 
Linguistic analysis, for instance, may uncover hints of social acceptability, 
engagement or detachment by attending to the use of active or passive voice 
(Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 220). Conversation analysis may be observing 
“turn-taking sequences” and “repair of turn-taking errors” so as to trace the 
creation and maintenance of intersubjective understanding (op. cit.: 221). In 
narrative analysis, socially accepted plots, temporal and social structures, 
actors’ and objects’ typological characteristics will be elicited (222-225). In 
discursive and dialectical approaches, contradictions in individuals’ discourses 
will be laid open and related to historical situations and discursive practices 
(226-227). The majority of synthesis methods, however, stay with a ‘language 
as a window’ view, usually labelled as ‘positivist’ by critics. This is not 
necessarily a justified attribution, as will be shown immediately below. 
 
4.5.2. Sentences, vocabulary and language in the meta-scientific 
discussion 
The naive empiricist view of the relationship between claims and state of affairs 
is, in the words of Kuhn, “that truth and falsity are uniquely and unequivocally 
determined by the confrontation of statement with fact” (Kuhn, 1996: 80). In an 
interesting way, this facile idea is both advanced and implicitly opposed by the 
logical positivists. It is advanced through their belief in an observational 
language. It is implicitly opposed through the very attention they give to 
language. 
Logical positivists were concerned with developing a “logically perfect” language 
(Wittgenstein, 1922, as per Suppe, 1977: 13), which would guarantee the 
cognitive significance of whatever was expressed in it. Cognitive significance 
was ensured by the possibility for empirical verification. This language L was to 
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be free of all metaphysical terms, which were considered nonsensical (Suppe, 
1977: 13-14). It would include three sublanguages (op. cit.: 50-52):74 
a) The observation language LO contains only terms from an observation 
vocabulary VO and a logical calculus KO. It contains no theoretical terms 
and no quantifiers or modalities (50). The terms in the observation 
vocabulary VO refer to directly observable physical objects or attributes of 
physical objects (45). This is a physicalist vocabulary. There was initial 
disagreement as to whether VO terms should be given a phenomenalist 
sense-data interpretation or a physicalist interpretation, but the two 
alternatives came to be seen as equivalent and a physicalist 
interpretation was settled for (45-46). Carnap suggests that “any 
quantitative magnitude that can be measured in a relatively simple, direct 
way” is an observable (op. cit.: 47, citing Carnap, 1966: 225-226).75 The 
assertions made using VO as their only non-logical terms are seen as 
“intersubjectively unproblematic with regard to truth: any two observers 
who possess the words from VO used in the assertions, regardless of 
their scientific or theoretical background, will be able to agree upon the 
truth of such VO assertions” (Suppe, 1977: 48). That is, such assertions 
are scientifically and theoretically neutral (ibid). 
 
b) The logically extended observation language LO’ is an augmentation of L 
which incorporates a more complex logical apparatus and syntax, 
including, for instance, quantifiers and modal operators (op. cit.: 49, 51). 
The price for this augmentation, however, is that the sentences of LO’ do 
not satisfy the verification criterion of cognitive significance, which 
requires for sentences to be non-analytic, i.e. amenable to complete 
verification by observational evidence (49). 
 
c) Finally, there is the theoretical language LT which contains only terms 
from a theoretical vocabulary VT and its associated logical calculus, KT. 
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In addition to sentences formulated in any of the above sublanguages, L also 
contains “mixed sentences” which contain both VO and VT terms. One of the key 
types of mixed sentences are the correspondence rules C, which offer a partial 
observational interpretations of theoretical terms (51).76 In this (positivist) view, 
data, evidence, facts and findings are likely to be represented through, or 
potentially just are, statements made in an entirely observational language or as 
mixed sentences. 
This and related positivists view have received harsh criticism. The dichotomy 
between observation and theory, observational and theoretical statements has 
been challenged (e.g. Maxwell, 1962; Feyerabend, 1975; Fraassen, 1980). It is 
current orthodoxy in the philosophy of science, particularly as a result of the 
work of Hanson (1958) and Kuhn (1996), that observations are theory-laden.  
Not all agree with such a state of affairs. Hacking (1983), for instance, sees this 
as a philosophical fashion which has distorted commonplace facts about 
observation (Hacking, 1975: 167). There are plenty of pre-theoretical 
observation statements (op.cit.: 168).77 Experimentally, philosophically minded 
psychologists have demonstrated that there is a difference between 
observational and theoretical terms and that statements made using 
predominantly observational terms may indeed be more intersubjectively 
shareable (Clark and Paivio, 1989). Current philosophical research on data 
sharing takes it to be the case that, after all, observations, data, evidence may 
not be so theory-laden (Leonelli, personal communication).  
 
4.6. ‘Becoming and feeding the other’ 
Whatever defining features and distinctions between data, evidence, findings, 
facts, claims (and observations) may have emerged above, these require much 
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further exploration. The boundaries between the six units are very uncertain – 
the units are ‘in the habit of becoming and feeding the others’.  
The above terms are often used interchangeably in the same text, for instance: 
This remark is not, of course, intended as a criticism of data gathering: 
those engaged in the process no doubt try to select facts that might 
prove relevant to future hypotheses (Hempel, 1996: 13). 
[I]t is the methods used to collect ‘evidence’ … that define whether or 
not data are potentially applicable to evidence-based practice (Lambert, 
2006: 2641). 
A number of basic unit terms often appear together in the same sentence. In-
depth analysis may or may not help specify the nature of their relationships and 
identify fine distinctions of roles. For example:  
With respect to their evidential role what distinguishes data from 
phenomena is not that only facts about data may serve as evidence, 
but rather that facts about data and facts about phenomena differ in 
what they serve as evidence for (claims about phenomena versus 
general theories) (Bogen and Woodward, 1988: 306). 
 
[Quality criterion 7] Inclusion of sufficient original data to mediate 
between evidence and interpretation (Harden et al., 2004: 796). 
 
In further cases, warnings are given against the tendency for some units to 
become other units: 
I labor these familiar points because I want to rescue from their normal 
oblivion three facts which I believe to be highly important: First, facts are 
not data. They are mental artifacts, selected by human concerns and 
abstracted from experience by filtering through a screen of schemata 
(Vicker, 1981: 152). 
Further relationships in which the different terms enter can be specified. But the 
above has probably been sufficient as direct illustration of the porousness of 
boundaries between units since implicit parallels between the extended 
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descriptions of evidence, data, findings, facts and claims are highly likely to 
have been detected, too. Looking back, it seems often a historical accident why 
certain debates have clustered around one rather than any of the other units 
(e.g. why not have “theory-ladenness of facts” or “data-based medicine”). 
 
4.7. The debate on ‘paradigms’ in health and other applied sciences 
research 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a foundational belief in much health 
research in the ‘purely empirical character’ of high quality evidence. As typically 
held, this belief stands for two main ideas which may or may not appear 
together. The first is that high quality evidence is free of bias, often equated with 
a claim that non-admissible effects of context and agents of production have 
been effectively controlled. The second is that evidence is direct signal from the 
world, independent of theory, untestable metaphysical claims/ worldview 
assumptions and its cultural-historical context of production.  
 
A range of positions at odds with the latter idea was already presented as part 
of the review on the five basic units. In the health research field, the debate that 
questions most strongly the idea of the purely empirical character of high quality 
evidence is that of ‘paradigm differences’ between quantitative and (types of) 
qualitative research. A background acknowledgement of ‘paradigms’ is 
formative of health research synthesis debates and methods. Issues of 
combinability of studies, findings, evidence, etc. are seen almost exclusively as 
derivative of issues of ‘paradigm’ differences between quantitative and (types 
of) qualitative research. Such differences are either claimed to determine the 
impossibility, difficulty or questionable value of combining studies from across 
the divide or denied such effects. They seem invariably mentioned though, even 
when negated. 
 
While having its origin in the mainstream philosophy (and history) of science, 
the ‘paradigms’ debate has developed a life of its own in health research and in 
other areas where the quantitative-qualitative dichotomy is internal to the field 
(e.g. educational, social services, evaluation research, etc.). There, it has 
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become the norm to refer to the constellations of philosophical commitments, 
methods, techniques, preferred questions, interpretative moves, etc. on which 
quantitative and qualitative research draw as ‘paradigms’. In a selective breach-
adherence to the Kuhnian idea (1996), those constellations are seen as 
generally incommensurable but not necessarily so. They are also constantly 
struggling for relative supremacy but definitely existing contemporaneously and 
expected to continue to do so. While earlier sources are cautious of stretching 
Kuhnian thinking, this has ceased to be the case. The usage of ‘paradigm’ in 
methodological texts in health research may thus be seen as grossly 
uninformed or simply reflecting a concept in need of a name. Below, I will follow 
convention in the applied sciences and use the concept in this modified sense, 
too.78 I will be indicating substantial distance from the original senses with single 
quotation marks or referring to ‘broad ontological-epistemological-axiological 
paradigms’ or, briefly, ‘broad epistemological paradigms’. 
 
The description of ‘paradigms’ which follows is based on a classic methods 
book by John Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed 
Methods Approaches (2003), which is a typical good quality example of 
describing social and human sciences research ‘paradigms’. In this text, the 
quantitative approach is seen as underpinned by post-positivist knowledge 
claims and the qualitative by social constructivist or advocacy/participatory 
knowledge claims.79 I complemented and adjusted Creswell’s description by 
using Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) and Patton (2002). I also toned down a 
small number of peripheral claims that would attract professional philosophers’ 
raised eyebrows. My aim has been to recreate ‘good’ applied research-style 
descriptions of epistemological positions underpinning quantitative and (types 
of) qualitative research.  
Looking at those descriptions from the point of view of mainstream philosophy 
and social studies of science, it seems that they combine local versions of 
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 Pragmatist knowledge claims, as associated with the mixed methods approach, are not 
discussed here for feasibility reasons. There is also disagreement whether pragmatism is a 
separate paradigm. Proponents of the mixed methods approach claim to be starting from 
philosophical positions that diffuse the paradigm conflicts between quantitative and qualitative 
research. These are pragmatist positions, or the “pragmatist paradigm”. 
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debates which have their ‘gold standard’ counterparts in the mainstream fields. 
These include, for example, debates on the realism – antirealism of theories 
and theoretical entities; on the normative presence of non-cognitive values in 
science; on the nature and generation of scientific theories and scientific 
knowledge more broadly; on the rhetoric of science and research; on the nature 
of evidence, etc. What also seems to be the case, however, is that the 
philosophy and social studies of science internal to health (and applied social 
sciences) research have not drawn upon those gold standard debates in their 
recent, and sometimes decades-old, forms. Neither have they contributed to 
them.  
For example, it is probably safe to assert that in present-day philosophy of 
science the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific research, the belief in 
universal laws, or the belief in an unproblematic access to a ‘world out there’ 
have been irreparably discredited. In the ‘paradigms’ debate, however, such 
views and aims are represented as underpinning one of the valid ways of doing 
science, labelled as the quantitative/post-positivist way.  
In the mainstream philosophy of science, it is still unconventional to hold the 
view that science and research are, legitimately, a space of non-cognitive as 
well as cognitive values. Many, perhaps most, health researchers and 
practitioners will acknowledge that some research is legitimately about values 
and value-laden and that this too is respectable scientific research.  
Assumptions that science and research are looking for objectivity and 
generalisations (regardless of whether we can achieve them or not) rather than 
subjectivity and idiosyncrasy are much weaker in health and applied social 
sciences research than in the philosophy of science. Both researchers and 
practitioners have grown to see some research as aiming to preserve 
subjectivity and idiosyncrasy.  
There are many issues to untangle here. Careful distinctions need to be made 
between credible ways of doing science and credible ways of describing the 
doing of science. Some of my descriptions of predominant views may be 
imprecise. My point for the moment is that the mainstream and ‘internal’ studies 
of science each have a trajectory of their own, and the intersections are fewer 
than one would expect.  
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After this long introduction, I finally present the illustrations of ‘good’ applied 
research-style descriptions of epistemological positions underpinning 
quantitative and (types of) qualitative research.  
 
4.7.1. Post-positive knowledge claims 
In Creswell’s rendering, post-positivism is a label that is generally 
interchangeable with the “scientific method”, empirical science, quantitative 
research, positivist/postpositivist research, etc. (Creswell, 2003: 6-7). The ‘post’ 
in post-positivism is explained as denoting a move away from the idea of the 
possibility for “absolute truth”. Evidence is always imperfect and fallible. 
Research begins with theories, hypotheses and claims. These are then refuted, 
supported or refined on the basis of acquired data. Most quantitative research 
involves theory- or hypothesis-testing. It is also reductionist, here perceived in 
the sense of reducing complex questions to small sets of discrete, highly 
specified ideas and variables to be tested. Post-positivist research is seen as 
primarily concerned with causes and their probabilistic relationship to outcomes, 
and as a result favours the experimental approach. The world is taken to exist 
“out there” and to be governed by laws. Observations, measurements and 
experiments, with their strong numerical slant, are means of acquiring objective 
knowledge of an external reality. Validity, reliability and the control of bias are 
major concerns. In researching human beings, post-positivists are seen as 
prioritising the study of behaviour and the development of numerical measures 
of it.  
 
4.7.2. Socially constructed knowledge claims 
Social constructivism, frequently combined with interpretivism, is proposed by 
Creswell as one of the two main philosophical positions underpinning qualitative 
research. Within the social constructivist view, individuals are seen as motivated 
by a search for understanding of the world in which they live and work. The 
meanings they develop are highly subjective, yet social. They are forged 
through engaging with a world open to interpretation, in interactions and 
discussions with other people, and in very particular historical, cultural and 
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social settings. The variety and complexity of the meanings thus emerging are 
huge. The aim of research is to capture and preserve this subjectivity, sociality, 
variety and complexity rather than narrow meanings into a limited number of 
categories and ideas. The questions of such research are thus typically broad, 
general and open-ended so that participants are unconstrained in constructing 
their own meanings of a situation. Constructivist researchers are particularly 
interested in processes and interactions in and through which meaning is 
constructed and in the life and work contexts which people inhabit. Qualitative 
research tends to be inductive, with data collected in the field used to develop 
theory or identify patterns of meaning. Researchers openly “position 
themselves” in the research and acknowledge how their interpretations follow 
from their own personal, cultural and historical background and experiences. 
 
4.7.3. Advocacy/ participatory knowledge claims 
The third position presented by Creswell endorses knowledge claims obtained 
through an advocacy/ participatory approach. Knowledge is political. Inquiry 
should be driven by an agenda to help marginalised and disenfranchised 
people. Issues such as empowerment, inequality, oppression and alienation are 
paramount to this position. The research process should be collaborative so 
that the participants’/collaborators’ voice is truly heard – participants may help 
formulate questions, engage in data collection and analysis, and be rewarded 
for their participation. The aim of research is to bring about change – in the lives 
of participants, the institutions they are part of and engage with, and in the 
researcher’s own life. Advocacy/participatory forms of inquiry are often informed 
by theoretical-political perspectives such as feminist thinking, critical theory, 




This is the final section of this chapter. As highlighted at the outset, there does 
not seem to be any published work that falls naturally and fills up much 
theoretical space under a heading of ‘transformations of evidence in health 
research synthesis studies’. It could hardly be otherwise if, as asserted here, 
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the very field of research synthesis is in a state of pre-formation. Theoretical 
discussions have not had the chance to develop extensively. Overlapping 
concepts from disconnected subfields are yet to be linked together. Of course, 
in a broadening circle of relevance, debates abound. Some need to be 
prioritised.  
If we look at particular processes of transformation in particular niches of the 
field of health research synthesis, there seem to be four major practices 
associated with sound articulation of processes and/or concepts, or at least the 
presentation of exemplars to follow: numerical conversions (e.g. Cochrane 
Handbook, 2011: 7.7); the practice of “translation” as conceptualised by Noblit 
and Hare in the context of meta-ethnography (1988); the practice of coding as 
underpinning most qualitative research syntheses; and visual re-representations 
(e.g. mapping and charting, widely used in synthesis studies).  
If we go to the broader methodological literature, we find the somewhat vague 
and maybe now outdated concept of “data reduction” (e.g. see Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 10-11) which may be formulated both as encompassing 
processes of transformation of data (ibid.) and being an instance of them.  
In the meta-scientific literature, the concept of “travelling of facts” is gaining 
momentum, as discussed in 3.1.2 (Howlett and Morgan, 2011). 
No matter where we look, we will be finding mentions of ‘interpretation’ which is, 
undoubtedly, a major subtype and/or element of processes of transformation of 
evidence in health research synthesis.  
No matter where I looked (in the methodological and meta-scientific literature), I 
did not find discussions of three further processes alluded to in initial 
descriptions of transformations (Chapter 1): reformulations/rephrasing involving 
a supposedly no or minimal interpretation; alternative “chunking” of information 
where, for instance, sentences are broken down in different ways; and switching 
focus towards alternative features of entities and phenomena. In an ever 
widening circle of relevance, I could have found discussions of these in general 
psychology but some limits had to be placed.  
For reasons of space constraints, I will only address briefly the literature on 
translations, coding, and travelling of facts. These were chosen in preference to 
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others of the above debates as they had a well defined theoretical and 
conceptual component and as each of them was likely to be unfamiliar to at 
least one specified group of readers. The presentation below adds key ideas to 
the background from which subsequent explorations of transformations were 
undertaken. It also illustrates the affinity of the concept of transformation to big 
concepts, big debates and rich metaphors, with all the associated 
consequences of vagueness, complexity and controversy – and with all the 
potential for some useful disentanglement. 
 
5.1. Translations 
The idea of research synthesis (of qualitative research) as involving 
“translations” of studies, accounts, metaphors, interpretations, concepts, 
themes, etc. comes from Noblit and Hare’s work on meta-ethnography (1988). It 
is based on Turner’s (1980)80 argument of sociological explanations as 
translations (Noblit and Hare, 1988: 29). According to Turner, in Noblit and 
Hare’s reading, all social explanation is comparative, whether implicitly or 
explicitly. The breakdown of an expectation of “same practices” across groups 
and cultures yields an explanatory puzzle. Such puzzles are solved on the basis 
of “translations” of one case into another (op.cit.: 30-31). Further, the basic form 
of a translation is of an analogy: “ [o]ne program is like another except… “ (28-
29). At the same time, a translation is “more involved than an analogy” (28). “An 
adequate translation maintains the central metaphors and/or concepts of each 
account in their relation to other key metaphors or concepts in that account. It 
also compares both the metaphors or concepts and their interactions in one 
account with the metaphors or concepts and their interactions in the other 
accounts.” (ibid, italics in the original).  Translations in a meta-ethnography can 
be “reciprocal”, when accounts are directly comparable, or “refutational”, when 
they are in opposition to one another. Studies may also come together into a 
line of argument rather than represent a reciprocal or refutational translation 
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(36). When translations, which are a form of synthesis, become too many, a 
second level of synthesis/ translation is possible – translations are compared 
and potentially translated into one another (28).  
 
5.2. Coding 
In the words of Miles and Huberman, “coding is analysis” (56). “Codes are tags 
or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential 
information compiled during a study”. Codes are ascribed to segments of 
information of varying size – words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs. The 
meaning seen in a segment of text is a choice out of a range of possibilities. 
The choice derives from a particular logic or conceptual framework of which the 
researcher may or may not be aware (op. cit.: 56-57). From a perspective 
emphasising ‘ordering’ rather than meaning, “[c]odes are shorthand devices 
used to label, separate, compile, and organize data” (Charmaz, 1983 cited in 
Eaves, 2001).81 
Eaves (2001), who brought together a range of authoritative understandings of 
coding to construct her synthetic grounded theory analysis technique, 
articulates nine coding stages used in her substantive work on care-giving in 
rural African-American families. First, in “line-by-line in vivo coding” the 
researcher uses key phrases in the informants’ own words (op. cit.: 658). Then, 
“shorter code phrases” are developed on the basis of the in vivo codes. Third, 
code phrases are further reduced by grouping together similar code phrases. 
Fourth, these groupings are brought together into ‘clusters’. Clusters are further 
reduced into “meta-clusters with labels”. Fifth, the labels for the meta-clusters 
became ‘concepts’. Sixth, similar concepts are grouped together to develop 
‘categories’. “Categories are classifications of concepts, and are discovered 
when codes are compared against one another … Categories, then, are of a 
higher, more abstract order than are codes”. ‘Subcategories’ are then identified, 
which represent “characteristics and properties of categories along a continuum 
or dimensional range”. Linkages are made amongst categories and, finally, core 
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categories are identified (ibid.).82 This take on coding illustrates clearly the 
iterativity of the process and the multiple levels at which it happens. It also 
offers a particular (and maybe particularly confusing) interpretation of the 
relationships between codes, concepts, categories, classes, properties, 
characteristics, etc. Interpretations of these relationships tend to vary 
substantially across authors writing on coding.  
One can create codes starting from a provisional “start list” – using “the 
conceptual framework, list of research questions, hypotheses, problem areas 
and/or key variables that the researcher brings to the study” (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 58). In more “grounded approaches”, as originally developed 
by Glaser and Strauss (1967), no pre-coding is done (Miles and Huberman, 
1994: 58). Partway alternatives are also available, of starting from very general, 
formal coding schemes (op.cit.: 61). Some codes are descriptive. Others are 
interpretive, at varying level of interpretiveness, e.g. Miles and Huberman see 
“pattern codes” as more inferential and explanatory than typical interpretive 
codes (57). 
Codes undergo revisions. “[S]ome codes do not work; others decay. No field 
material fits them, or the way they slice up the phenomenon is not the way the 
phenomenon appears empirically.” Such codes are discarded or their level is 
changed. “Other codes flourish, sometimes too much so”. Such codes need 
breaking down into subcodes (61). The coding and recoding is completed when 
“all of the incidents can be readily classified, categories are “saturated”, and 
sufficient numbers of “regularities” emerge (62). 
In addition to codes, a researcher generates “marginal remarks” (or 
“annotations”) in a coding process – ideas and reactions to the material and the 
coding process as they come in the coding process. They may suggest new 
interpretations, capture leads, draw connections to other parts of the data, point 
to issues to look into in further data collection. They may point to problems with 
codes and provide the grounds for revisions of the coding scheme (66-69). 
More extensive “memos” are also produced in the coding process – “the 
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theorizing write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships” (Glaser, 1978: 
83-4, cited in Miles and Huberman, 1994: 72).83 
 
5.3. “Travelling” 
While ‘coding’ is an old and ubiquitous concept in qualitative research, the 
“travelling of facts” is a new and possibly still niche concept in the studies of 
science. It is associated with a research project which ran at the London School 
of Economics between 2004 and 2009 and a subsequent publication on How 
Well Do Facts Travel? (Howlett and Morgan, 2011). It appears to be the 
concept from the meta-scientific literature that is closest to that of 
‘transformations of evidence for the purposes of health research synthesis 
studies’. 
In Howlett and Morgan’s edited collection, facts are seen as having the 
tendency to “travel relatively independently to other users, without much 
reference to their producing context” (op.cit.: 26). Facts are also seen as 
“travelling well” when two conditions are met. First, a certain integrity of the fact 
is preserved, even if some change in shape, kind or form may have occurred 
(25). Facts retain their original content even if wearing down, rounding off, 
enriching and sharpening occur, with some [facts] “becom[ing] simpler and 
los[ing] information while others add information and become more complex as 
they travel” (17-18). The second condition for taking facts to have “travelled 
well” is their fruitful usage – users have had them “fulﬁl various other functions 
than those of their production and intended use” (ibid.). “At its most fruitful, the 
use of travelling facts creates a new pattern, a new coherence, a new narrative 
or fulﬁls a new role” (20). As much as they were described as travelling 
independently, facts need travelling companions. These “range from the 
mundane level of labels and packaging to the more material vehicles of 
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transportation, as well as to the people involved in chaperoning, and from the 
various kinds of institutional structures that support travelling knowledge to the 
technical standards that carry facts with them” (27). Good companions are seen 
as supporting the travels of a fact, but not being part of the latter. When the 
destination is reached, they can be discarded (ibid).  
 
This chapter will conclude here, itself travelling towards becoming a much 
different collection of concepts, quotes and claims. It has provided a glimpse 
into a broad range of issues that demand many more examples of instantiations 
in the literature and extensive conceptual and theoretical analysis. The picture 
that emerges is hardly coherent. In the next brief chapter, I tighten some of the 

























Chapter 3: Postscript to Literature Review – Prescript to 
Methods 
The literature review has shown that we are far from having a network of 
established concepts for entities and processes concerning research synthesis. 
In this brief chapter, I lay out the ‘working understandings’ and vocabulary 
choices I have made in relation to research synthesis, data extraction and the 
basic unit of analysis/synthesis in research synthesis. It is becoming of little 
relevance what research synthesis is most broadly since from the next chapter I 
will be turning to a specific case study. Yet something essential will be missing 
if, for a concept from the thesis title, nothing more structured is offered than the 
collection of issues discussed in the review. Most of the vocabulary conventions 
related to data extraction I use are largely intuitive, but articulations of intuitions 
reduce ambiguity. Finally, I have settled for ‘findings’ as the main term for unit of 
analysis/synthesis in research synthesis for pragmatic rather than theoretical 
reasons (it appears to be the vaguest and thus most open of concepts). 
 
1. The field of research synthesis – a working definition and 
understanding of main components 
 
I suggest that there is heuristic value in seeing the following two (composite) 
features as ones by virtue of which a process or outcome could be classified as 
a research synthesis process or outcome, with each of the two features being 
sufficient by itself and the co-presence of both possible but not necessary. 
These two features have come together in the exemplar research synthesis 
method – the systematic review inclusive of meta-analysis – but the latter is 
both much more than them and much less than the range of their potential 
realisations: 
 
(1) The primary or only source material that is used in the ‘bringing 
together’ is health research reports. There is thus a strong element of a 
literature review, yet unlike the case of traditional literature reviews an 
attempt is made to reduce bias by making the process more 
comprehensive than usual and articulating its steps in some detail.  
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(2) There is a high level of integration of the material used, where the 
input cannot be recovered from the output, but the transformation 
process is either fully transparent or an attempt has been made to 
articulate it in some detail.  
 
I also suggest that there is heuristic value in construing, as a starting point, the 
health research synthesis field as comprising the nine subfields outlined below. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 3.3), the most widespread distinctions made 
are between traditional systematic reviews and ‘other’ reviews as well as 
between aggregative (largely quantitative), interpretive (largely qualitative) and 
mixed reviews. One of the most extensive typologies presented identified 
eleven review types: critical review, integrative review, literature review, 
mapping review/systematic map, meta-analysis, mixed studies review/mixed 
methods review, overview, qualitative systematic review/qualitative evidence 
synthesis, rapid review, scoping review, state-of-the-art review, and systematic 
search and review (Booth, Papaioannou and Sutton, 2012). The parameters 
around which the subfields below have been formed are source material, 
question type and main approaches used.  
 
(1) Exemplar “evidence synthesis” studies. These address questions of 
intervention effectiveness, take the form of systematic reviews, 
incorporate meta-analyses and have the RCT as their gold standard 
method;  
 
(2) Procedurally typical systematic reviews on untypical topics. Some 
examples are systematic reviews of methodological issues and 
approaches (Eaves, 2001; Harris et al., 2008, see also work of the 16 
Cochrane methods groups (The Cochrane Collaboration, 2013d); 
appraisal tools (Vlayen et al., 2005); predictors (Davey et al., 2009); 
arguments-based clinical ethics literature (McCullough, 2007). It is 
unclear whether  systematic reviews on untypical topics tend to apply the 
practice of systematic searching while analysing and presenting their 
material in quite traditional narrative ways (meta-analysis is not 
applicable in most cases), or whether they tend to propose innovative 
integrative processes and products. 
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(3) Qualitative research synthesis. An open access review by Barnett-
Page and Thomas (2009) brought together dispersed and little known 
methods of qualitative research synthesis and seems to have channelled 
work in this subfield. The latter is quite active, with a respective 
Cochrane subgroup (Cochrane Qualitative and Implementation Methods 
Group), voluminous register of relevant studies (Cochrane QES Register, 
2013, see also Chapter 1, Section 2.3), training courses, and a 
community for whose members qualitative research synthesis is an 
important professional identity-defining commitment.  
 
(4) Integration of qualitative and quantitative research. Some of the 
subfield’s apparent logic of development – of a large number of methods 
arising independently then brought together in an influential review 
(Dixon-Woods et al., 2004) – is similar to that of qualitative research 
synthesis. Albeit older in terms of its landmark review, the subfield seems 
less consolidated than that of qualitative research synthesis.  Studies of 
this type are potentially called mixed methods research syntheses, which 
I preserve for (6). 
 
(5) Integration of diverse data types on broad research questions. 
These are cases where the quantitative/ qualitative distinction is 
insufficient to represent the diversity of material used.  
 
An example of a very broad systematic review, designated a 
“multidisciplinary systematic literature review”, can be seen in the work of 
the Canadian Initiative for Frailty and Aging (Karunananthan et al., 2009). 
The investigators reviewed the literature in ten aspects of frailty – 
biological basis, social basis, prevalence, risk factors, impact, 
identification, prevention and management, environment and technology, 
health services, and health and social policy. Although the outcome itself 
was not a comprehensive framework of frailty (i.e. a ‘proper’ knowledge 
synthesis), the study was seen as contributing towards the future 




Realist synthesis (Pawson 2002a, b; Pawson et al., 2004) is an approach 
of a different order – usually employed in intervention evaluations – 
which also uses a wide variety of data types, including “action research, 
documentary analysis, administrative records, surveys, legislative 
analysis, conceptual critique, personal testimony, thought pieces”, etc. It 
may also go across policy domains (Pawson et al., 2004: 11).  
 
Institutionally, The Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-
ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre) at the Institute of Education, London, is 
well known for its work on integrating diverse types of evidence on broad 
research questions (e.g. Harden, Weston and Oakley, 1999; Oliver et al., 
2001; Harden et al., 2004; Brunton et al., 2006; Oliver et al., 2008). 
Some speak of the “EPPI-approach” to research synthesis (Pope, Mays 
and Popay, 2007).84 Reviews of this type are also sometimes referred to 
as “mixed methods reviews” (e.g. Harden, 2011), the idea being that they 
mix a variety of largely single-method studies.85 
 
Research synthesis work integrating diverse data types on broad 
research questions is strongly policy driven, tends to involve 
stakeholders quite intensely and is thus amongst the most influential and 
influenced type of health research synthesis.   
 
(6) Reviews of mixed methods studies. Here, these are conceptualised as 
reviews of studies that, at the primary level, mix quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, or research and non-research material. A good 
mixed methods study report will already have fused findings from the 
different methods it applied into a well integrated whole. At present, this 
type of mixed methods review is a rarity. To complicate matters further, 
there are mixed methods reviews which are reviews interested in the 
methods used by mixed methods studies (and if they are systematic, can 
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be thought of as systematic reviews on an unusual topic, the first 
category discussed above).  
 
(7) Overviews of reviews. These are reviews that bring together findings 
from a number of systematic reviews (Becker and Oxman, 2009). They 
thus provide a meta-level to what is already a meta-level. 
 
(8) Narrowly statistical evidence synthesis methods. There is much 
more to statistical evidence synthesis of health and medical evidence 
than meta-analysis.  As mentioned on several occasions, Ades and 
Sutton’s review of multiparameter evidence synthesis in epidemiology 
and medical decision making (2006) provides a glimpse of this.  
 
(9) “Social methods” of evidence synthesis. These include consensus 
conferences and approaches such as the Delphi technique.86 
 
Finally, I would suggest that whatever features become established as defining 
of a field of health research synthesis, amongst its most important boundaries 
will be with secondary data analysis/ data re-use, mixed methods research, 
interdisciplinary research, the traditional literature reviews, Campbell systematic 
reviews, integrative medicine, health decision modelling and the intervention 
mapping approach for developing behaviour change interventions. 
 
2. ‘Extraction-coding’ 
I use ‘extraction-coding’ as a shortcut to represent at least four inter-related 
processes which are under way while primary studies are processed so as to 
identify and ‘take out’ information that may be used in a synthesis study. These 
are picking/highlighting, data extraction, coding and ‘tagging’. 
In both data extraction and coding there is first, or simultaneously, a process of 
picking/highlighting of information of interest. We can extend this with 
                                                          
86
 This is a subfield of which I would not have thought if I have not read Stegenga (2011), after 




constructing if we want to emphasise the fact that the unit of information is not 
or need not necessarily be simply there, clearly individuated.  
Data extraction was discussed in Chapter 1 (4.2) and coding in the Literature 
Review (5.2). Only a note on typical associations will be added.  
 
The term ‘extraction’ has developed a strong connotation of directness, lack of 
change – with the extracted information being identical with the source study 
information. Extraction is thus associated with objectivity and reliability. In 
contrast, coding tends to associated with interpretiveness and subjectivity.  
 
Data extraction, however, cannot avoid interpretativeness entirely. The process 
of transfer to a new place requires at least re-classifying on at least some 
occasions (see, for instance, the formation of new groups under 4.3.2 in 
Chapter 1). Similarly, some coding may be quite ‘non-interpretive’/ ‘non–
transformative’:  the code repeats what is in the strip of text of interest and the 
coding acts as highlighting/picking rather than ‘proper’ coding involving a (re-) 
conceptulalisation. This type of coding is very similar to data extraction as 
associated with ‘lack of change’. As a result, how transformative a gesture of 
data extraction or coding is is a matter of judgement in particular cases only. 
I use tagging for the process of adding comments and annotations of the 
following kinds: 1) critical appraisal comments addressing the methodological 
rigour of studies; 2) ‘critiquing comments’ challenging a study’s foundations as 
supplied by the research tradition in which it is embedded; 3) meta-critical 
comments  on 1) and 2), which question my grounds for making the comments 
under 1) and 2); 4) ‘research process’ tags – showing the development of the 
ideas and conclusions of the study – preliminary observations, 
operationalisations, change of response to the material, pragmatic issues, e.g. 
behaviour of the software, etc.; 5) ‘self-monitoring for rigour’ tags – notes 
serving to observe and potentially revise problematic processes and to provide 
an ‘audit trail’ for problematic decisions; and 6) ‘self-monitoring for tendencies of 
thought’ tags – notes that aimed to capture my broader interests, concerns and 
proclivities as triggered by the material analysed. This tagging took to extremes, 
in a broadly rationalist framework, two of the main virtues of research synthesis 
– transparency and critical analysis. 
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In view of the above, the typical processing of source material for research 
synthesis can be labelled as picking-extraction-coding-tagging. A brief and 
precise re-labelling of the picking-extraction-coding-tagging would be picking-
processing. To make it easier to trigger associations for those familiar with the 
field of health research synthesis, I use extraction-coding. 
 
3. ‘Findings’ as the preferred term for the basic carrier of primarily 
empirical knowledge in a research report 
In Chapter 1, I used ‘evidence’ and ‘data’ as the standard generic terms for 
units of information of interest to a synthesis study. I anticipated revisiting the 
terminology as I wanted to avoid the strong connotations of ‘pure’, 
‘uninterpreted’, ‘theory-free’ knowledge which these terms have in the context of 
evidence-based medicine. I was inclined to think that ‘findings’, which in 
qualitative research synthesis has come to have connotations of interpreted, 
processed data, may be a better term for the basic unit of analysis/synthesis in 
research synthesis. It seemed more likely to trigger associations with 
‘transformations’ as well as with the frameworks, factors, causes, etc. that 
shape pieces of empirical knowledge over and above ‘the way the world is’ and 
make it more or less similar to other pieces of empirical knowledge. The 
literature review showed, however, that each of the basic carriers of empirical 
knowledge considered (data, evidence, findings, claims, facts and observations) 
is associated with influential debates on the complex shaping of empirical 
knowledge. Claiming that research synthesis is a synthesis of findings, rather 
than evidence or data, was not going to trigger unique associations. 
I nevertheless chose ‘findings’ as the preferred term for what, as a start, could 
be seen as the basic unit of analysis/synthesis in research synthesis as it 
seemed to be the vaguest and thus most inclusive concept. Very small 
fragments of empirical knowledge (data points), rich clusters of information 
(extended interpretations), ‘normal sentences’ which represent them, etc. are 
comfortably referred to as ‘findings’. For the purposes of the subsequent 
analysis, I will thus take as (a representation of) a finding any sentence within 
the text or any proposition represented elliptically in a table or box which has 
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been reported in the Findings/Results section of the sampled papers.  This 
operational definition is reconsidered in Chapter 5. 
I will only add a supporting concept to be used around the concept of findings, 
primarily in the Methods Chapter. ‘Matrix’ will refer, in a most generic way, to 
the factors that shape findings other than how the world is (if it is a certain way). 
It is a looser concept than the Kuhnian “paradigm”. First-line examples of 
matrices, corresponding to easily identifiable debates in the meta-scientific and 
meta-methodological literature of what shapes evidence, are: paradigms, 
theories, methods, instruments, frameworks of aims and objectives, 
fundamental assumptions about the world and knowledge, concepts, 
representational conventions, models, networks of auxiliary assumptions, and 
cultural-historical contexts of production.   
In earlier versions of the thesis, ‘matrix’ was a key concept. Currently, it does 
not carry any weight in representing the findings about transformations and their 
discussion. These were more naturally framed around other concepts. 
However, it provided an organising role in the Analysis Framework for the case 













Chapter 4: Approach to Case Study on Extraction-Coding from 
Cancer Research Publications 
There was little methodological work that could foreground directly the case 
study for this thesis, with the untypical questions it set out to explore and its aim 
to bring closer together the meta-scientific, methodological and empirical. Some 
broad similarities can be drawn with the work of Sandelowski and Barroso 
(2002) who sought to develop a research protocol for conducting qualitative 
metasyntheses in any health-related field and used qualitative research on 
women with HIV as their “method case”. The authors were not interested in the 
metasynthesis per se but in creating an audit trail of the process and 
communicating the challenges arising in it (Sandelowski and Barroso, 2002: 
213). Similarly, Popay et al. (2006) developed their guidance on narrative 
synthesis by first performing an extensive literature review on appropriate tools 
and techniques and then applying it to two bodies of evidence while taking 
detailed notes of all major decisions and the reasoning behind them. That is, 
they prospectively documented the synthesis process and urged reviewers 
adopting a narrative approach to do the same (Popay et al., 2006: 67). Some 
parallels can also be found with the work of Hasok Chang (2011) who argues in 
favour of a new framework for the description and analysis of scientific practice 
and makes initial proposals in the direction of capturing the physical, mental and 
paper-and-pencil “epistemic activities” performed by scientists,  the “doings” and 
“happenings” in science (Chang, 2011: 208).87 
 
These were, nonetheless, minor and somewhat latecoming influences. The 
multi-method approach I used is not easily relatable to any single 
methodological tradition or study design. It combines some very basic, 
fundamental and conventional health research (synthesis) and broader 
scholarship practices with practices that depart radically and uncomfortably 
from what can be found in ‘normal’ health research (synthesis) studies. It is a 
combination of the highly conventional and highly unconventional.   
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Described minimally, this case study was an empirical investigation of 
similarities and differences between types of evidence and their transformations 
in the context of an ‘extreme’ data extraction from academic journal publications 
on cancer.  
A more extended but still condensed description can be as follows: 
This case study involved the performance, observation and exploration of a 
process of ‘extraction-coding’ from research papers on cancer and exploration 
of the input and output of this process.  
The process of extraction-coding was brought to life by carrying out a test 
synthesis on how to introduce changes in behaviours and mental contents that 
may relate to cancer outcomes.  
The main input to the extraction-coding (source studies for the test synthesis) 
were highly varied research publications on cancer.  
The main output of the extraction-coding were preliminary groupings of findings, 
claims and concepts. A complete synthesis was not aimed at.  
The performance of the extraction-coding involved ‘standard’ extraction-coding, 
as done for the purposes of most synthesis studies, but was also driven by five 
non-standard ‘injunctions’.  
The non-standard injunctions driving the extraction-coding took a virtue of 
synthesis studies to an extreme or extended its scope (e.g. transparency 
became extreme transparency or the degree of comprehensiveness of literature 
searching was also applied to the extraction-coding).  
The observation and exploration of the process of extraction-coding and the 
exploration of the input/output material focused on the deployment of the 
processes of transformation, their frequency and scope, and their drivers. The 
driver of transformations that received particular emphasis, by virtue of being 
embedded in the preliminary conceptualisation of transformations, concerned 
the nature and dynamics of similarities and differences between pieces of 
evidence. The observation and exploration were both highly structured and 
receptive to the unexpected: an extensive Analysis Framework was prepared in 
advance and tools and methods were designed as the study evolved.  
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I unpack those descriptions below. In Section 1, I justify the choice of topic and 
test synthesis question. In Section 2, I describe how the material subjected to 
extraction-coding was obtained – namely the search strategies used and the 
approach to randomly sampling from the initial retrieval of over 18,000 papers. 
In Section 3, I specify features of the performance, observation and exploration 
of the extraction-coding. I first address the five untypical injunctions driving the 
extraction-coding (3.1). I then describe the Analysis Framework (3.2), starting 
from its backbone of five broad parameters and moving towards an extensive 
tabular illustration of specific parameters. Software is covered briefly in 3.3. In 
Section 4, I outline a range of supporting tools and approaches. These were 
developed largely to complement the Analysis Framework or probe further into 
unexpected findings obtained through it. Central amongst these was the 
Vocabulary of Elements of Findings. 
Further justifications of methodological choices were already given in Chapter 1. 
In Section 5.2, I explained the attention to data extraction rather than some 
other phase in the research synthesis process; the preference for a strongly 
introspective and personal approach rather than more externalised and 
community-based one; and the narrowing to textual and textual-numerical 
transformations. In Section 5.3, I discussed briefly the difficulty of separating the 
performance of data extraction from its observation and exploration. I will not be 
revisiting these justifications here but will attend to them again, in a more critical 
fashion, in the Discussion. 
 
1. Topic and question for the test synthesis underpinning the 
extraction-coding 
The extraction-coding was performed with a view of a test synthesis addressing 
the following broad question on behaviour and ‘mind’ change in cancer:  
 
What services and interventions are likely to be effective in changing 
behaviours and mental contents (cognitions, emotions, attitudes, etc.) 
that can affect the incidence, trajectory, experience, recovery or mortality 
from cancer? In a contextualised version of this question, what is the 
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contribution to improved cancer outcomes of such services and 
interventions relative to biomedically-based ones (e.g. medication, 
screening, genetic tests, etc.)? 
 
I formulated such a broad question to ensure as wide variety of findings as 
possible. As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 5.3, it is unrealistic to seek an 
answer to this question not only within the constraints of the thesis but also in 
the context of a standard research project. Only a huge research programme of 
many years and researchers stands some chance of performing a high quality 
review of the available evidence. The breadth of the question was seen, 
however, as enabling the natural coming together of health services research, 
epidemiological, psychological, psychoneuroimmunological research, 
behavioural medicine, social sciences research on health, organisational 
research, health economics, philosophy of medicine, medical humanities, etc. – 
variably individuated health-related fields outside the biomedical. These would 
bring in their potentially incongruous fundamental assumptions and concerns; 
theoretical, methodological and pragmatic frameworks; concepts, vocabulary, 
values, etc. A variety of source studies would allow for a broad range of 
transformations and ‘difficult cases’ to emerge during the extraction-coding (e.g. 
it is, presumably, more difficult to combine scientific and humanities thinking 
than two RCTs on the same topic). The variety, opportunities and limits of 
processes of transformation could thus be better explored. 
I chose cancer as the thematic focus for the same reasons – maximum 
variability and potential incongruity of types of findings and their frameworks. 
Other topics considered were obesity, dementia, psychosomatics, genetic 
testing, minor environmental cues in making health-related decisions, etc. 
Cancer is a highly heterogeneous, prevalent and potentially serious condition. 
As per one view, there are over 200 types of cancer, reflecting the variety of 
cells in the human body (Cancer Research, 2011). For the US population, the 
lifetime risk for developing cancer has been estimated as 44.81% for men and 
38.17% for women. The risk of dying from cancer has been estimated as, 
respectively, 23.08% and 19.39% (American Cancer Society, 2012). Cancer is 
thus, unsurprisingly, an intensely researched condition. Close to 11% of the 
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publications on PubMed (over 2,4 million out of 22 million) are indexed for 
“Neoplasms”, the controlled vocabulary term for cancer (search run Mar 13).  
Cancer is also associated with a highly complex psychological, social, cultural, 
ethical, etc. background that seems to have a tangible effect on how it is 
studied. A telling illustration of the effect on cancer research of such factors (in 
this case a dramatic socially shared image and psychological poignancy) can 
be found in the relationship between its volume on the one hand and a rationally 
assessed seriousness of the condition and burden relative to other serious 
conditions on the other hand. Consider the statistics below relative to the fact 
that 11% of PubMed publications are on cancer. 
Amongst the ten leading causes of death throughout the world (accounting for 
52% of all causes of death), there is one cancer-related: trachea, bronchus and 
lung cancers are estimated to cause 2.4% of the deaths around the world 
(World Health Organization, 2008). The three leading causes are ischaemic 
heart disease (12.8% of all deaths), stroke and other cerebrovascular disease 
(10.8%) and lower respiratory infections (6.1%).The ten leading causes of death 
in low- and middle-income countries do not include any type of cancer. In high-
income countries, there are three types of cancer in the top 10 – trachea, 
bronchus and lung cancers (5.9% of all deaths), colon and rectum cancers 
(3.3%) and breast cancer (1.9%) (ibid.). It was assumed that if psychological, 
social, cultural and suchlike factors are affecting the volume of research on 
cancer, they may also be affecting its contents and presentation more strongly 
than in the case of other health topics. As a result, a greater degree of critical 
analysis of the primary research may be demanded, which is likely to result in 
‘more and greater’ transformations. 
Crucially, I chose cancer in preference to other burdensome, intensely 
researched, and psychologically, socially, ethically, etc. complex conditions 
because of its strong association with alternative practices premised on mind-
body interactions and a growing scientific interest in the same direction. Claims 
of mind-body interaction may concern, for instance, the effect of prevalent 
emotional states, stress, personality type, degree of optimism, etc. on the 
likelihood for developing and recovering from cancer. These are controversial 
issues, especially when it comes to non-orthodox therapeutic modalities 
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entering into conflict with biomedical models of aetiology and treatment. But 
they are also ones from the leading edge of research (as is the case with 
psychoneuroimmunology). As a result of both the controversy and 
innovativeness, a vagueness of models and a substantial degree of conflict and 
discrepancy between them can be envisaged. Again, I saw these characteristics 
of the field as likely to be associated with substantial difficulties in the 
combinability and transformations of respective findings. Why have it easy when 
it can be difficult. 
 
2. Process of identifying the sample of papers 
To capture studies from the variety of fields targeted (e.g. health services 
research, epidemiological, psychological, social sciences research on health, 
organisational, health economics, medical humanities, etc. research), I 
combined a previously developed “brief and precise filter” for identifying 
publications on “health-related values” in MEDLINE (Petrova et al., 2012) and a 
Mind-Body search strategy. The conceptualisation of ‘values’ in the filter design 
study was very broad, to include not only ethical, moral, religious and other 
types of values ‘proper’, but also beliefs, preferences, experiences, choices, 
satisfaction, quality of life, etc. All of these have some mental representation 
and the capacity to affect decisions and behaviours (as demanded by the test 
synthesis question). The filter has been found to be highly effective in retrieving 
material from all of the above research fields. It was developed using principles 
of objective search filter design, in this case word frequency analysis, and had 
demonstrated very high levels of sensitivity, specificity and precision (op.cit.). I 
developed a pragmatic Mind-Body search strategy by selecting relevant Medical 
Subject Headings. Its aim was to identify research on supposed direct effects of 
the mental on the physical, unmediated by behaviours. (Further details of the 
search strategies are provided in the Appendix to Chapter 4.). 
 
The impact of change of behaviours and mental contents on the incidence, 
trajectory, experience, recovery or mortality from cancer, and the effectiveness 
of services and interventions to help achieve those changes, was to be 
relativised to the impact of biomedical factors and biomedically-based services 
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and interventions. As my intention was nonetheless to focus on the former type 
of factors, no separate search strategy was developed for biomedical studies. I 
used false positives from the other search strategies. They are always in 
abundance. 
Cancer studies were targeted through the Medical Subject Heading 
“Neoplasms”. 
Finally, retrieval was limited to the three years preceding the running of the 
search – between June 2007 and June 2010. No language limits were placed.   
This approach yielded 18,456 publications. From these, I sampled one hundred 
publications using a random numbers generator (www.random.org). I intended 
to extract from/ code all one hundred papers but the process produced much 
more data than I had envisaged. Certain patterns showed much earlier than 
expected. For certain other patterns to emerge, 100 studies would have still 
been an inadequately small sample. Relevant saturation was thus reached very 
early (at the seventeenth study). The approach of moving from the pool of 100 
randomly sampled studies to the final purposive sample of analysed studies is 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
3. Features of the performance, observation and exploration of the 
extraction-coding 
 
3.1. Standard and non-standard features of the performance of the 
extraction-coding  
Standard extraction-coding of information from the sampled papers included the 
identification and processing of findings, concepts and methodological features 
of the study of interest. Ostensibly, these findings, concepts and methodological 
features were to serve the purposes of the test research synthesis. My primary 
interest was, however, in the process of obtaining them. I also analysed some 
of the standard material relative to the thesis questions as opposed to the test 
synthesis question. Details of the standard extraction-coding can be found in 
Table T 4.2.  
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I envisaged non-standard practices of extraction-coding as tools for looking 
closer into the nature and drivers of transformations. Their application would 
also be a test of opportunities for methodological improvements in health 
research synthesis work. Non-standard extraction-coding was non-standard by 
virtue of adhering to the following five ‘injunctions’: 
 
 code all text (also referred to as ‘the injunction for comprehensiveness’); 
 multiple code as a default strategy (also referred to as ‘extensive multiple 
coding’); 
 first code as close as possible to the original, with no or minimal 
transformations, then experiment (‘close to the source first, experiments 
afterwards’); combine critical appraisal with critique (‘double-edged 
critical analysis’); 
 be extremely transparent (‘extreme transparency’). 
 
What makes these injunctions unusual is the degree to which and the actual 
processes by means of which the virtues underlying them are realised (e.g. the 
virtue of giving a complete account of one’s steps so as to enable criticism and 
replication). If we look at the underlying virtues in the abstract, we can just as 
well say that those are the most standard research injunctions imaginable. Each 
of the injunctions is discussed below. 
I conceptualised the injunction for comprehensiveness as a tool to help 
explore the potential contribution of any study element to transformation 
decisions in research synthesis. At least in theory, any feature of a study and its 
presentation may affect the particularity of a finding, its representation and thus 
its similarities and differences from other findings. I wanted to see the effects of 
extracting ‘more’ data (most of which would be typically considered meta-data, 
meta-information about the core data) on transformation decisions. My 
expectations of the effects were contradictory. On the one hand, more meta-
information  could furnish further lines of similarity between findings and 
markedly increase opportunities for transformations. More synthesis 
opportunities would thus arise and more varied knowledge and/or greater 
uncertainty from the multiple re-uses. On the other hand, further lines of 
difference between findings could become manifest and opportunities for 
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transformations markedly constrained. Much fewer syntheses would then be 
sanctioned as possible or rigorous. Would the similarities or differences weigh 
more? What will proposals for methodological improvements look like, since in 
both cases something of the certainty of synthesis knowledge would be lost? 
 
I introduced the injunction of extensive multiple coding so as to bring to life 
the process of transformation – to make it happen again and again with greater 
or lesser variation, and so as to provide data about the openness of the same 
source material to varied, equally justifiable, transformations. As in the case of 
comprehensiveness, I had contradictory expectations of the effects of extensive 
multiple coding and the likelihood of it contributing to methodological 
improvement in research synthesis. On the one hand, it could substantially 
increase rigour (by allowing reasoned selection from a range of options and the 
more reflective generation of transformations). It could also open up the 
richness of a study’s findings and increase their value by enabling more 
opportunities for re-use. On the other hand, extensive multiple coding could end 
up clashing with needs for actually achieving a coherent synthesis by creating 
too many analysis opportunities.  
 
The injunction for extensive multiple coding went hand in hand with a supporting 
injunction to code as close as possible to the original first, with no or minimal 
transformations, and then experiment with larger transformations – close to the 
source first, experiments afterwards. It was not the chronology that mattered 
– I could start with a ‘big transformation’ if such was triggered before any other 
– but the fact that each unit of information had to receive a minimalist coding 
involving no or a minor transformation. The aim of the injunction was to help 
track transformations occurring at a variety of levels and compare them to a 
baseline of unproblematic (or at least as unproblematic as possible) 
transformations. Coding as close as possible to the original was mandatory: 
apart from providing a comparison background of unproblematic 
transformations, it ensured comprehensiveness of the data extraction. I sought 
more interpretive transformations consistently, but did not force them if they 
were not forthcoming. In setting up this injunction, I hypothesised that synthesis 
studies with a greater number of minimal transformations are likely to be more 
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trustworthy than synthesis studies with a smaller number of minimal 
transformations. I later revised this expectation. 
 
The injunction for double-edged critical analysis – to combine critical 
appraisal with critique – used a distinction drawn by Dixon-Woods et al. (2006). 
Briefly, critical appraisal addresses methodological rigour and tends to use 
critical appraisal checklists. This is the only type of criticism that mainstream 
synthesis methods incorporate. Critique involves challenging “the ways in which 
the literature constructs its problematics”; the epistemological and normative 
assumptions it draws on; the traditions that have guided particular research 
fields; the particular forms of discourse available; the factors influencing the 
proposed solutions (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006: bmc 2, 6, 9). A critique may start 
as a challenge to a particular study, but there is always something more generic 
about it that touches on the broader research field. A critical appraisal is of a 
particular study only. I use ‘double-edged critical analysis’ to incorporate both 
activities. I took both of them to be drivers of transformations whose workings 
needed to be observed closely. Processes of critique help determine the 
meaning of studies and findings and similarities and differences between them 
and thus prepare or deny grounds for transformations. Critical appraisal gives 
reasons for adjusting the credibility and strength of claims and thus, too, 
prepares the grounds for transformations. Again, my expectations were 
unsettled if a much higher degree of critical appraisal and critique than currently 
employed had a chance of becoming a routine feature of research synthesis 
studies. Theoretically, this was appealing – music to the ears of anyone 
concerned with research rigour. But extensive critical analysis could also end up   
identifying too many and too large dissimilarities across studies, too many and 
too large quality failures and, eventually, hamper transformations. 
 
Relative to the main aims of the thesis, extreme transparency was there to 
sensitise me to yet more features of the processes of transformation and their 
fleeting enablers and controllers (e.g. associations coming from background 
knowledge, recourse to material from the text other than that in the immediate 
context, subtle triggers or warnings against certain transformations). I expected 
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that in some cases increased transparency will be heuristically productive and 
lead to more transformations – for instance, by making it more likely to catch 
easy-to-lose ideas and following their leads to transformations. In other cases, I 
expected it to be corrective and limit transformations – for instance, by helping 
to detect biased arguments in intended transformations. 
Extreme transparency was the injunction with the most ‘special status’ of all. 
One of the reasons was that apart from working independently, it had to be 
turned onto the workings of all other injunctions.88 The other reason was that I 
saw it, unlike any other injunction, as an unquestionable component of my 
proposals-to-be for methodological improvements in health research synthesis. 
A core background assumption (bias?) of mine was that transparency in current 
research synthesis studies was not enough, or not of a good enough kind, and 
more of a better transparency must be both feasible and highly desirable.  
I discussed a range of views on transparency in the literature review chapter 
(3.2.4) in the context of defining characteristics-cum-virtues of research 
synthesis. The concept remained, however, undefined. By way of preliminary 
definition, I took transparency to be  
the (realisation of the) goal of representing the details of the setup and 
workings of a research process, whether technology-driven or primarily 
mental, which involves the enlisting of all methods, approaches, tools, 
etc. used and describing as much as possible of 1) what is not typically 
represented as a method, approach, tool, etc. but has been employed in 
a particular study to drive the process forward while other plausible 
options were available, and 2) what is not represented in standard 
descriptions of a method, approach, tool application, etc. but, as above, 
has been employed while other plausible options were available.  
Unsystematic but long running observations of mine preceding this work (largely 
influenced by cognitive and social psychology thinking) had led me to conclude 
that relative to such a conceptualisation, certain aspects of transparency are 
                                                          
88
 To an extent, the critical analysis injunction worked similarly, but I took it that there is a ‘final’ 
level where transparency only remains, not followed by a critical analysis of how transparent 





consistently neglected in research synthesis89 (no detailed representation is 
given of methods, approaches, etc. where numerous, or at least several, other 
options are available), while some of the typical transparency descriptions are 
superfluous (for instance because our cognitive apparatus cannot function 
otherwise). This is a strong and controversial claim. It needs to be adequately 
substantiated. I will not be able to do it here, as its defence requires a stand-
alone study, if not a research programme. While it is not a claim which is 
incorporated in any key argument of the thesis, which would make its adequate 
justification crucial, it has had an effect on many of my decisions and emphases 
– from constructing a methodology of certain features (including the 
injunctions), through the choice of issues to report on, to the presentation style.  
My valorisation of transparency was not without its boundaries. I expected that, 
most likely, I will hit them much sooner than I hoped. At the very least, when we 
(re-)engage in serious thinking about thinking, our own on a very particular 
occasion or thinking in general, we (re-)discover what an opaque process it is. 
At the very least, transparency in research synthesis would inevitably be hitting 
the boundary of an inability to reconstruct our own mental processes. One of my 
aims in going for an extreme transparency injunction was precisely to explore 
the boundaries of the extremeness and formulate a realistic methodological 
recommendation. 
For example, I saw the exploration of the boundaries of transparency in 
transformations (and there could be transparency of data extraction, 
transparency of critical analysis, transparency about transparency, etc.) as 
concerned with the following questions: To what extent is it possible to specify 
which discrete and (relatively) simple elements within a finding gave grounds for 
a particular transformation of this finding? To what extent is it possible to specify 
how these elements became part of a more or less complex derivation of a 
transformed finding which preserved the truth value of the original finding either 
categorically or probabilistically? And, finally, what are the known and unknown 
steps in this derivation? 
My views on the boundaries of transparency were amongst those that changed 
the most as a result of the case study work. As a background assumption, 
                                                          
89
 And research more broadly. 
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however, transparency was a major determinant of methodological and 
presentational choices. 
Going back to all five injunctions, the main prompts for choosing them were as 
follows. Comprehensiveness, transparency and some form of critical analysis 
are all virtues of health research synthesis. As commented in Chapter 1, 
Section 6, these are, however, applied in very particular ways. A question arises 
whether further ways can be added. This was an attempt to do so. Multiple 
coding was a practical translation of theoretical ideas of non-essentialism and 
pluralism in the philosophy of science, mainly as in Dupré (1993; 2001). It was a 
particular attempt of having current philosophical ideas about science feed back 
into actual research practice. The injunction to code close to the source first 
was another expression of a concern with transparency and rigour and an 
attempt to realise those virtues in new ways. 
The injunctions were operationalised as parameters in the Analysis Framework 
(such as critical analysis prompts or prompts for the generation of 
alternatives/lateral thinking). More consequentially, they were mental notes that 
structured my internal process of extraction-coding which, in turn, generated 
outcomes that materialised them (e.g. a large number of transparency/critical 
analysis memos, a large number of multiple codes, transformations at a variety 
of levels, etc.). 
The extraction-coding was performed initially in QSR NVivo 8 for more 
qualitative data (QSR International, 2013) and Excel for more quantitative and 
categorical data. It was later moved to EPPI-Reviewer 4, specialised research 
synthesis software (EPPI-Centre, 2013). These are all standard health research 
(synthesis) tools combined in a non-standard, and in certain respects sub-
standard, fashion. Data collection and analysis software is discussed in greater 
detail in Section 3.3. 
 
3.2. Analysis Framework underpinning the extraction-coding  
The original version of the Analysis Framework underpinning the extraction-
coding from recent publications on cancer comprised 205 parameters. These 
were extended further during extraction-coding. 
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The Analysis Framework combined parameters generated on the basis of the 
literature review and my previous research experience, and parameters 
operationalising more freely questions and hypotheses of this thesis when little 
directly relevant literature or experience were available. Five main versions of 
the Analysis Framework were developed, in Excel, without direct testing on 
studies. Testing on an actual publication made it immediately clear that I 
needed to change platform (rather than Excel only, a combination of NVivo and 
Excel). Further revisions were introduced in the process of transferring Excel 
categories into NVivo codes (prompted primarily by the fact that NVivo allows 
hierarchical ordering which Excel does not and by the capacity of any 
reorganisation to reveal new relationships and omissions). A second ‘initial’ 
testing on two studies was then performed. As a result of it, categories were 
further revised and some were ‘quarantined’ as currently ineffective (practically 
none of the quarantined categories was used later –  40 days of isolation turned 
into eternal damnation). The Analysis Framework was thus reasonably stable 
from the third analysed study onwards. Smaller revisions were introduced 
throughout the analysis, with their number substantially diminishing after the 
tenth study. 
There were five broad types of parameters included in the Analysis Framework.  
The first type of parameters served to bring to life the processes of extraction-
coding and transforming core contents that is conventionally extracted for the 
purposes of research synthesis (such as findings, information on research aims, 
methods, settings, etc.).90 This was standard research synthesis work with a 
non-standard aim – not to lead to an answer to the synthesis question but to 
have it happening so as to observe the extent to which processes of extraction-
coding are direct or transformative, how transformations happen, and how they 
can be made more rigorous.  
                                                          
90
 As I found no sufficiently abstract analysis in the literature, I took that most synthesis 
researchers would agree that prima facie the core information they extract and which allows 
them to make the claims they are making in a synthesis is on findings (possibly including 
interpretations), study design and method, study aims and objectives, populations, settings and 
(some) concepts. I used this as a starting point to specify an understanding of ‘conventional 
core contents’. ‘Conventional’ was added as for some ‘non-conventional’ synthesis methods 
information on theories and other matrices can also be ‘core’. 
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The second type of parameters aimed to compress the varied conventional 
contents extracted for the test synthesis into more formal types and features. I 
expected this to illuminate lines of consequential similarity/ difference between 
various units of information. 
The third type of parameters served to elicit a broad range of matrices of the 
source studies (factors that have shaped findings other than how the world is, 
see end of Chapter 3 for a brief discussion) and explore their effects on the 
combinability of findings.  
Parameters prompting me to identify matrices of the test synthesis study and 
the broader thesis work (i.e. factors that were shaping my own findings) were 
the next type of parameter of interest.  
Finally, ‘paired parameters’ were included that aimed to compare output from 
the test synthesis with input from the primary studies. Conclusions could then 
be drawn about the transformations that led from one to the other. 
Table T 4.1 below presents the five types of parameters and the questions for 
which they enable observations or data collection. The question formulations 
modify the initial specification of the broad thesis questions as given in Chapter 














Table T 4.1: Types of parameters in the Analysis Framework  
 





1. Parameters which prompt 
to identify, extract, 
describe and analyse 
conventional core 
contents for the synthesis 
study (on behaviour and 




How direct/ transformative is the extraction-coding of the 
material conventionally extracted-coded in synthesis 
studies? What is involved in the process? How reliable and 
transparent is it? Can it be made more so? 
 
How does the conventional core material compare to what 
is extracted-coded through the range of parameters used 
in this study? How useful is this other material for informing 
processes of transformation of the conventional core 
material? 
 
2. Parameters that serve to 
describe formally,  
theoretically the 
conventional core 
contents of a synthesis 
 
 
How can we describe the core contents conventionally 
extracted-coded in research synthesis studies with a view  
to similarities/ differences between different types of it? 
E.g. what types of findings, along a range of dimensions, 
can be identified? 
 
How do different types of findings and interpretations differ 
in terms of their distance from (raw) data? How does the 
extraction-coding and the transformations inherent in it 
further increase, or not, this distance? What are the 
implications of this for our trust in different types of 
synthesis studies? 
 
(see also Parameters Type 3) How are matrices entangled 
with the core material? For instance, to what extent can a 
finding be separated from the theory, method and 




3. Parameters that prompt to 
identify, extract 
information about, 
describe and analyse the 




What are the matrices of which one can identify ‘sufficient’ 
information in a health research report?  
 
How direct/transformative is the extraction of information 
about matrices from source studies? Is much 
interpretation, critical analysis and external knowledge 
required? 
 
Can one develop specific enough hypotheses as to how 
matrices have shaped a finding and how it could have 
been different?  
 
Is extracting more information on matrices likely to 
enhance the confidence and rigour with which we bring 
together core material? Or, on the contrary, will it 
demonstrate how few pieces of information are 
unproblematically combinable? 
 
Even if desirable, would it be feasible to expand existing 
synthesis methods in the direction of more extraction-
coding of information on matrices? 
 
 
4. Parameters that prompt to 
identify, describe and 
analyse matrices and 
processes of the test 
synthesis study and of  
the broader thesis work 
as activated and 




What further than the conventional background and 
method information accompanying a research synthesis 
study may be needed so that its own matrices (which too 
will affect transformations) are more clearly and accurately 
represented?  
 
How feasible are such increased self-reflexivity and 
transparency? How effective are they in tracing and 




5. ‘Paired parameters’ that 
aim to explore input 
relative to output (units of 
information as appearing 
in the source studies 
relative to their 
transformed version in 
the synthesis study) 
 
What can we learn about processes of transformation by 
comparing various types of input to and output of a 
synthesis? To what extent is the output predictable from 
the input? 
 
Can we use knowledge of the predictability or otherwise of 
transformations to facilitate and improve research 
synthesis? E.g. can we improve indexing and linking 
practices in bibliographic databases? 
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Table T 4.2 below illustrates extensively specific parameters from the Analysis 
Framework coming under the first three of the broad types presented above.  
Specific parameters of type 4 (concerning the matrices and processes of the 
test synthesis study and the broader thesis work) and of type 5 (paired input-
output parameters) are not included as they were used to a very limited extent. 
Pre-formulated prompts for identifying subliminal matrices of the test synthesis 
turned out not to be particularly effective (e.g. prompts for ascertaining my 
levels of familiarity with topic/method or prompts aimed to capture my overall 
attitude and potential biases towards certain research questions, types of 
studies, methods, etc.). Unprompted memos, annotations and entries in a 
detailed log were used much more extensively. These served as raw material 
for further analysis, including further coding. Paired input-output parameters 
(such as on the contents, form, centrality, quantitative and modal qualifiers of 
findings, concepts, entities, indexing terms, etc.) were used rarely. The depth of 
data extraction has left synthesis concepts and findings underdeveloped and 
the intended analysis of input-output relationship was not performed. This is 
discussed further in the Findings and Discussion chapters. 
In the NVivo and EPPI-Reviewer environments where the actual data collection 
and analysis were performed, the specific parameters illustrated below were 
organised differently – around structural elements of a research article rather 
than around the five broad parameters. It needs to be noted that specific 
parameters were seen as naturally belonging to more than one category. That 
is, not only the source material was multiply coded. Elements of the Analysis 
Framework also had multiple memberships. ”See also” or “shared with” notes 
were added (for instance, findings may reveal new aspects of a core concept). 
A disadvantage of such an approach was that shared codes had to be updated 
separately – changes in one of them were not reflected in automatic changes in 
the other(s). Such synchronisation was often not achieved. Current health 
research software is not well suited to extensive multiple coding. Software and 
its use here are addressed matter-of-factly in the section immediately after the 




Table T 4.2: Examples of specific parameters from the Analysis Framework 
Note: This is a long table including varied information (while being only illustrative of a much more extensive Analysis Framework). A consideration that 
may help in going through it is that parameters from the Analysis Framework were both instructions and ‘boxes’ for storing information. For instance, 
‘Secondary aims and objectives’ is both an instruction Identify secondary aims and objectives/ Derive on the basis of indirect claims and a sign that in 
the actual software environment relevant information was stored under this heading.   
 
 
Type of parameter 
 
Examples of specific parameters 
 
1. Parameters that 
prompt to identify, 
extract, describe and 
analyse conventional 













1.1. Parameters that broadly  map the domain of findings  
Examples:  
 Explicit key aims and outcomes of the study 
 Secondary aims and outcomes 
 Research design, in broad terms 
 Brief analytical description of study – on the basis of critical comparison of study aims and actual outcome, what would 
you say this study is and does? 
 
1.2. Parameters concerning the primary knowledge carriers in an empirical report  
1.2.1. Empirical findings (data, evidence)  
1.2.2. Concepts 
1.2.3. Interpretations of findings  
 
Examples of parameters concerning concepts:  
 Explicit definition, description or brief operationalisation 




1. Parameters that 
prompt to identify, 
extract, describe and 
analyse conventional 
core contents for the 






















 Types  
 Types of data collected about it 
 Other concepts/variables relative to which it is explored 
 Further characteristics from parts of the paper other than main locus where the concept defined 
 Author’s meta-comments on concepts, e.g. in strengths and limitations 
 
1.3. Parameters concerning the entities, phenomena and contexts that are sampled and/or to which the study 
findings and interpretations pertain 
In health research studies on humans, those entities, phenomena and contexts are typically: 
 Diseases, health conditions and their trajectory, as objective entities and processes; the phenomenology of their being 
lived, experienced, managed and encountered by people (relevant parameters mostly under features of study sample and 
findings) 
 Interventions (relevant parameters mostly under methods and findings) 
 Health and well-being outcomes (relevant parameters mostly under concepts and findings) 
 Populations, individuals and groups 
 Settings/contexts – to include both the narrow study context and the broader context within which the populations, 
individuals, groups and interventions studied are situated 
 
Examples of parameters concerning study context: 
 Broad context – country, region, type of healthcare system, culture and values – partly pre-formulated, partly emerging 
features; from main locus where setting discussed and as dispersed throughout the text 
 Narrower setting, e.g. hospital, GP practice, community centre – hardware features (geographical location, size, number 
of patients served, etc.) and software features (interpersonal dynamics, policies, etc.) – partly pre-formulated, partly  
emerging; from main locus and as dispersed throughout text 
 Features of context explored in relation to which variables of interest? Correlate with which of these? Which parameters 




1. Parameters that 
prompt to identify, 
extract, describe and 
analyse conventional 
core contents for the 




 Based on the above information, how easy/difficult is it to make a claim about the similarity/ difference of context and the 
relevance of certain features to judgements of combinability/compatibility? 
 Authors’ claims concerning strengths and limitations of carrying out the study in a particular context and generalisability 
of findings; attention to the rhetoric of those claims 
 Prompts and spontaneous comments concerning context and its representation – e.g. further information required, 
potential relationship with study variables, features which may have had a stronger explanatory potential in comparison to 
the reported ones, etc. 
 
2. Parameters that 
serve to describe 
formally, theoretically 
the conventional core 








The parameters of this group aimed to prompt the 1) identification (from the report) or generation (on the basis of information 
from the report) of types of entities and scientific artefacts comprising the conventional core contents of a synthesis study, 2) 
the identification of more or less standard features to describe entities and scientific artefacts comprising the conventional 
core contents, and 3) the generation of further more abstract re-descriptions of such types and features. 
Examples: 
 Types of ‘work’ (study, paper)  
 More abstract re-descriptions of aims 
 Types of data 
 Types of findings 
 Features of typical entities, phenomena and contexts – left to emerge from the source texts 
- Of disease entities (in this case cancer) – cancer type, stage, time since diagnosis, etc.  
- Of interventions – stage, type, mode of delivery (e.g. of a drug), elements of services, lifestyle interventions, etc. 
- Of patient groups – e.g. diagnosis, comorbidities, age, sex, ethnicity, social class, educational status, clinical 




3. Parameters that 
prompt to identify, 
extract information 
about, describe and 
analyse the matrices 






















3.1.  Matrices Type 1: coming from the means of obtaining scientific knowledge and from the visions of what 
knowledge is to be obtained 
 
3.1.1. Research aims and outputs (hypotheses, concerns, questions, etc.)  
3.1.2. Methodologico-theoretico-conceptual-classificatory matrices 
3.1.3. Ontological, epistemological and axiological foundations – matrices incorporating fundamental beliefs about 
the world, knowledge and humans 
 
Examples of parameters concerning ontological, epistemological and axiological foundations: 
 Most basic assumptions about the world, knowledge, humans, the aims of science and research, a researcher’s role, etc. 
– direct claims as well as inferring from ‘traces’, such as interpretation of supposedly conventional signs (e.g.  a concern 
with patient voices as associated with an activist agenda) 
 Overall orientation and concerns – from direct claims and inferred from ‘traces’ (e.g. theoretical references in text, journal 
title, contextualisation within other research, etc.) 
 Broad, far-reaching societal goal to which the study is trying to contribute 
 Prompts and spontaneous comments concerning alternatives to what posited as fundamental/self-evident, the reliability 
of deducing positions from the traces, etc.  
 
3.1.4.Narrower grounding – clearly stated background beliefs and auxiliary assumptions 
Examples of parameters: 
 Elements from other  theories (e.g. particular concepts, laws/principles, mechanisms, metaphors, etc. from these) 
 Elements from previous research (e.g. particular findings, claims about important gaps)  
 Practice-based knowledge 
 ‘Common sense’ beliefs  
 Local and practical needs, affordances and constraints 
 Current norms and legislation 




3. Parameters that 
prompt to identify, 
extract information 
about, describe and 
analyse the matrices 






















3.1.5. ‘Quieter’ supporting premises incorporated in the study fabric – vaguer than the above, implicit, potentially 
hidden  
Examples of parameters: 
 Any concerns about the relationship between explicit study foundations and grounding on the one hand and its aim and 
methods on the other? Between aims and methods? 
 Any concerns about the move between findings and interpretations, interpretations and conclusions?  
 How are contradictory/conflicting and converging findings addressed? On what grounds are the findings of ‘own’ study 
preferred or interpreted with caution? 
 Prompts and spontaneous comments concerning, for instance, possible alternatives to the supporting premises thus 
identified, the effectiveness of deducing missing premises, the possibility for ‘saving’ arguments of imperfect logic 
through minor adjustments, etc. 
 
3.2.  Matrices Type 2: coming from the knower – the person-people-community who obtain scientific knowledge 
Examples of parameters: 
 Statements/extended descriptions of a researcher’s history and relationship to the question researched 
 Sideline information – e.g. on background and academic credentials  
 Statements/extended descriptions of a researcher’s role and position in the study – e.g. interaction with and response to 
study participants and material collected 
 Statements/extended descriptions of practices of guarding against bias – e.g. double coding, participant validation, 
discussions with colleagues, etc.  
 Prompts and spontaneous comments – e.g. concerning generic biases of human cognition that seem to have escaped 
the control of a method or (self-)reflexivity of a researcher; the assumptions taken for granted in a research community; 







3. Parameters that 
prompt to identify, 
extract information 
about, describe and 
analyse the matrices 






















3.3. Matrices Type 3: coming from epistemically relevant locations and orientations 
3.3.1. Study setting (the context of the researched objects/ participants, with or without the researchers)  
3.3.2. Researchers’ context 
Examples of parameters: 
 Context of the research programme/ project – in terms of stakeholders (funders, users, advisors) and ethos of a place – 
most likely from sideline information (e.g.  affiliations, acknowledgements, grant-giving body) 
 Perceived attitude towards this type of research in the broader community – amongst health professionals, basic 
researchers, patients and the wider public, policy makers 
 Spontaneous comments about current influences on research, if UK study 
3.3.3. Uses, users and contexts of use 
3.3.4. Broader social context? 
 
3.4. Matrices Type 4 – as coming from the nature of (scientific) representation 
3.4.1. Parameters helping to identify the ‘work’ needed to generate a ‘most complete and accurate’ representation 
of information from the source studies 
Examples: 
 Compare multiple representations of the same objects within the same study (e.g. aims, concepts, findings of the study) 
 Compare a variety of representations of standard processes and practices from across studies – e.g. various reporting of 
sampling in trials or of analysis of interviews; compare against what you know is going on 
 
3.4.2. Representations of the practical and mental processing of research material where full transparency/ 
procedural objectivity is problematic  
Examples: 
 Claims about the mental processes involved, their complexity and strongest determinants – e.g. how interpretative/ 





3. Parameters that 
prompt to identify, 
extract information 
about, describe and 
analyse the matrices 







 Claims about the following of good practices and fully rational process – what happens at the intersection between the 
prescriptions/ambiguities of a method and their practical realisation/resolution 
 Consider difficulties of separating stages, factors, etc. and presenting a linear process – e.g. use overlap of coding 
between phases of a research study as an indicator 
 Parameters taking a note of rhetorical devices (generally under parameters concerning core contents, e.g. under Method 
– author’s comments on strengths and limitations) 
 Parameters that explore the extent to which standard descriptors of entities, phenomena and contexts (e.g. socio-




3.3. Software used in the extraction-coding 
As mentioned above, the extraction-coding was performed first in QSR NVivo 
(Version 8), one of the premier software packages for analysing qualitative and 
mixed methods research, and in Microsoft Excel for more quantitative and 
categorical data. It was then transferred for all data types to EPPI-Reviewer 4, 
the literature review software of the Evidence for Policy and Practice 
Information and Co-ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre) at the Institute of 
Education, University of London – one of the key UK institutions engaged in the 
production of research synthesis studies, with a particular focus on syntheses 
bringing together a large variety of types of studies. As described on the 
software webpages, EPPI-Reviewer is “for all types of literature review, 
including systematic reviews, meta-analyses, 'narrative' reviews and meta-
ethnographies” (EPPI-Centre, 2013). 
Initially, I intended to use an entirely tabular format to extract data for the 
purposes of the test research synthesis and collect data for the broader thesis 
work. The Analysis Framework was thus first generated as an Analysis Table in 
Excel. Traditionally, synthesis studies have been extracting data in tables in 
Word or tables and boxes in software packages. Extracting data into a table 
was seen as the most appropriate format to explore transformations. 
It quickly became clear, however, that this format is too constraining for the 
amount of data needed in view of the questions asked. I switched to NVivo as 
the primary technological environment. It was the tool of choice when detail and 
context were needed. It also enabled effective hierarchical representation of 
information. Excel was used as supporting software for numerical or categorical 
data. Such data can be coded but cannot be represented effectively in NVivo.  
At the point of starting my work, there was no obvious choice of specialised 
software for research syntheses using highly heterogeneous material. Such 
work seemed to be done primarily in word processing documents or split 
between different packages depending on the particular type of material 
analysed. The most popular research synthesis software, Cochrane’s RevMan 
(The Cochrane Information Management System, 2013), met the needs of 
mainstream quantitative systematic reviews but was not adapted to more 
conceptual and theoretical work. Its use was going to constrain the process 
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similarly to the tabular format considered initially. I had experience of using 
EPPI-Reviewer but considered the combined functionalities of NVivo and Excel 
a better choice (e.g. better memoing and linking functions, easier entry of 
numerical and categorical information). Other options considered were the 
SUMARI tool (System for the Unified Management, Assessment and Review of 
Information), the Joanna Briggs Institute’s “premier software for the systematic 
review of literature” (The Joanna Briggs Institute, 2013) and MAXQDA (2013). 
All specialised research synthesis software however, apart from RevMan, is 
paid for and not available through University of Exeter licenses for student use. 
As, at least relative to the synthesis software I was familiar with, the 
combination of NVivo and Excel served me better, I decided to stay with it.  
Later in the study I moved from NVivo plus Excel to EPPI-Reviewer 4. The main 
reason was that after 12 heavily coded studies the use of NVivo was becoming 
unwieldy. A ‘lighter’ software was needed. As EPPI-Reviewer uses cloud 
technology, meaning that the processing is done on servers external to one’s 
own computer, the size of files was not a barrier to the efficient processing. 
Transferring into EPPI-Reviewer reduced the effectiveness of some data 
collection processes. It also created difficulties of combining data and limited 
opportunities for presenting same-format data in the analysis. But it had 
substantial advantages in terms of ease of coding when large amounts of data 
had accumulated. 
The process of performing the extraction-coding in these three environments 
was also a process of identifying software features that constrain good research 
synthesis and identifying features of ‘the perfect research synthesis software’. 
Some of these are considered in the Discussion Chapter. 
The choice of software has affected the scope of findings about transformations 
in this study. Had I used a fully tabular format for data extraction, which allows 
for no direct access to the original data and reflects standard practice until very 
recently, I will have claimed that greater than the here observed degree of 
transformations was under way and that their reliability was lower. In software 
like NVivo or EPPI-Reviewer, source studies can be accessed within the 
software. This direct access to the original data reduces the degree of 
transformation needed at this early stage of a synthesis and is likely to improve 
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the rigour of all transformations. Arguably, when a researcher wishes to 
transform the already transformed, it will be much more likely that they make a 
few extra clicks on the same screen rather than go back to the original paper in 
another programme or as a physical object. Changes have been rapid. A 
technological challenge to the rigour of transformations has been overcome. 
Claims about transformations made here are thus in line with what seems to be 
current practice. They are likely, however, to underestimate the extent and 
overestimate the rigour of transformations in many (the majority of?) synthesis 
studies that are continuing to exert effects on services and research. 
 
4. Further approaches and tools used 
Some of the data produced by the extraction-coding could be used, with 
minimal further analysis, to answer questions posed by the thesis. Other 
datasets, however, required extensive further processing through 
supplementary tools and approaches before they could be related clearly to the 
thesis questions. This section outlines the main supplementary tools and 
approaches.  
 
4.1. Approaches to exploring types of, similarities and differences 
between, and grounds for (non-)combinability of findings 
The largest set of tools for further analysis of data obtained through the 
extraction-coding addressed similarities and differences between findings. 
These were investigated along the continua of ‘formal – thematic’, ‘standardised 
– non-standardised’ and ‘paradigmatic – non-paradigmatic’. That is, similarities 
and differences were sought between findings in terms of formal characteristics, 
such as composition and structure, and in terms of thematic coverage. Next, 
levels of similarity and difference were explored between supposedly highly 
standardised parameters (e.g. socio-demographic information) from different 
studies, and between ‘normal’, non-standardised findings from the same and 
different studies. Finally, similarities and differences between findings were 
related to the quantitative or qualitative ‘paradigm’ in which they were seen as 
embedded or were investigated independently of such framing. Of the tools 
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used, the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings was the most innovative and 
extensively articulated. 
 
4.1.1. The Vocabulary of Elements of Findings  
I developed the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings as a tool for representing 
and exploring the composition and structure of findings in health research 
reports. Its intended uses were two. First, it was to serve as a tool for exploring 
compositional and structural similarities and differences between findings – put 
more precisely, similarities and differences in the composition and structure of 
propositions represented through standard sentences or as encoded in tables, 
graphs and images but convertible into standard sentences. The ‘composition’ 
of a finding was seen as the set of elements within a finding, irrespective of their 
relationship to one another. ‘Structure’ was used to add this further concern with 
relationships and a potential hierarchy. 
Second, I intended to use the Vocabulary to explore opportunities for and 
limitations to increasing the transparency of transformations in synthesis 
studies. I had operationalised the exploration of the boundaries of transparency 
in transformations (see 3.1) as concerned with the following questions: Which 
discrete and (relatively) simple elements within a finding gave grounds for a 
particular transformation of this finding? How did those elements become part of 
a more or less complex derivation of a transformed finding which preserved the 
truth value of the original finding either categorically or probabilistically? What 
are the known and unknown steps in this derivation? The Vocabulary offered a 
possibility to split findings reliably into discrete and relatively simple elements. It 
was thus a step towards exploring the boundaries of transparency in 
transformations. The better the Vocabulary performed across different and 
difficult cases, the higher the likelihood that an increased transparency of 
transformations was possible.91 This duplicity of aims contributed to an 
occasional redundancy in the coding, arising in the first place by the 
interdependence of several of the key elements of the Vocabulary.  
                                                          
91
 The opposite assertion was much weaker. If the Vocabulary did not perform well across 
different and difficult findings, this was first going to be seen as a negative reflection on the 
qualities of the Vocabulary rather than as evidence that increased transparency of 




The Vocabulary was developed from an initial set of 20 findings – single 
sentences or clauses representing prima facie different finding types. These 
were sampled from the pool of findings generated through the extraction-coding 
of the first 10 reports in the case study. The approach involved giving abstract 
labels to semantic units – individual words, or phrases comprising a main word 
plus qualifiers. The process was inductive and iterative and was guided by the 
questions What is there in research? What does research capture from the 
world? What is there in the world that is represented in research? I expected to 
identify and label elements like theory, method, fundamental worldview 
assumptions, theoretical entity, agent, object from the world, capacities, etc. As 
will become evident, those expectations were quickly overturned. Initially, I 
labelled ‘surface elements’ (elements couched in words or numbers) but also 
attempted to elicit ‘silent elements’ (such as missing indicators of an agent or 
knowledge process – ‘the researcher’, ‘analysed’, ‘reported’). Gradually, I 
decided to focus on surface elements and only formalise silent elements 
opportunistically. This was primarily because the omission of some types of 
elements (e.g. indicators of the researcher as an active agent) is a widely 
shared feature of findings and would not be discriminating; because of 
substantial limitations to the reliability of recovering silent elements; and 
because of the fact that, if silent elements are elicited ‘properly’, one may well 
begin to see “the world in a grain of sand” – the whole study in a particular 
finding. 
To get a more specific idea of how the labelling proceeded, consider the 
following simple finding from the study of Whitaker, Brewin and Watson, 2008, 
Study 2 in the analysis (see Table T 5.1 in Chapter 5 for a schematic 
representation of the studies analysed): 
Thirty patients (23%) reported an intrusive cognition. 
(“Intrusive cognitions”, or “intrusions”, are largely negative memories, images 
and thoughts that tend to come abruptly, to be difficult to dispel and to recur 
repeatedly.) 







 an intrusive cognition 
Thirty and 23% were labelled ‘quantifiers’. Patients was labelled a ‘carrier’. 
Reported was labelled a ‘knowledge something’ or, alternatively, an 
‘expression’. Intrusive cognition was labelled an ‘obsessive something’. 
Nomenclature is clarified further below. 
The process went through a number of iterations. Formal descriptors (labels, 
types of elements) were being redefined, added or discarded until the rules of 
token-type assignment had become unambiguous and easy to follow, or it 
became clear that the tokens of certain types could be included, without 
exception, under certain other types. 9 key and 16 sub-elements were 
formulated in the Vocabulary development phase. The key elements were 
named ‘obsessive something’, ‘carrier’, ‘expression’, ‘relationship’, ‘knowledge 
something’, ‘privileged something’, ‘subsidiary something’, ‘quantifier’ and 
‘qualifier’.  The application of the Vocabulary to over 300 further findings 
suggested one further key parameter – ‘indexical’. The number of sub-
elements, however, was extended considerably and can continue to be 
extended almost indefinitely. 4.1.1.1 presents briefly the ten key elements of the 
Vocabulary of Elements of Findings. In 4.1.1.2, I outline the rules for applying 
the Vocabulary – performing the coding. 4.1.1.3 offers a conceptual discussion 
of several high level features of the Vocabulary.  
 
4.1.1.1. Key elements of findings as per the Vocabulary of 
Elements of Findings 
The obsessive something was taken to be the key ‘thing from the world’ or the 
key research variable the study reports about and relative to which all other 
things and/or variables are positioned (and with which researchers involved in 
the study do appear obsessed – they think and talk too much about it, relate 
everything to it, see it as explaining three-quarters of the world, as touching on 
most of the age-old questions of humanity and opening a vast array of 
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extremely interesting new ones). Some examples of obsessive somethings from 
the case study papers are intrusive cognitions (Study 2, Whitaker, Brewin and 
Watson, 2008), cancer pain (Study 15, Al-Rowaili et al, 2009), oxygen therapy 
(Study 14, Jaturapatporn et al, 2010), post-traumatic growth (Study 7, Thombre, 
Sherman and Simonton, 2010), work changes (Study 5, Mols et al., 2009), etc. 
Overall, there is a clear single obsessive something in most studies, but there 
are exceptions. For instance, in Study 10 (Rapp  et al., 2008) the relationship 
between cancer risk and weight change was explored. The variables appeared 
equally dominant. In such cases I generally coded for obsessive something 1 
and 2 rather than posit one of the parameters as more central. 
The carrier was taken to be (a representation of) the entity, substance or 
collection of these which somehow ‘has’ or ‘gives’ the obsessive something. It 
can, for instance, contain or capture it – such as the receptors to which insulin-
like growth factor 1 (IGF-1) bind and which can be found on normal colonic 
mucosal cells and colon cancer cells (Study 3, Thomas and Davis, 2007). It can 
emit it – such as patients fitted with a breast wire who give off radiation (Study 
8, Meades et al., 2010). It can experience it – such as individuals or groups who 
experience intrusive cognitions (Study 2, Whitaker, Brewin and Watson, 2008). 
Learning about the obsessive something is also a way of learning about the 
carrier but the carrier is explored in other ways, too, so that this knowledge can 
be related to knowledge about the obsessive something. Nevertheless, the 
carrier is, for the purposes of a particular study, more stable, fixed, known than 
the obsessive something.  
Expression was used to designate (a representation of) a single property, 
behaviour, state, pattern of occurrence, etc. of an object of study which it 
demonstrates in the process of being studied through observation, query, 
experimentation or interpretation.  Syntactically, expressions are typically of the 
obsessive something or carrier, but they can also be of any of the other 
‘somethings’ specified below (‘privileged’, ‘subsidiary’ or ‘knowledge 
something’). ‘Expression’ is the concept corresponding to the most frequent 
element of findings. An expression is the proper finding within the finding, the 
evidence within the evidence – (representations of) the very properties, 
behaviours, states, etc. which were sought in the study or which the study 
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delivered unexpectedly rather than the objects they are properties, behaviours, 
etc. of or the processes and tools through which they were revealed. 
Relationship denoted, for instance, an outcome of a comparison (smaller, 
higher, also, was no longer, different), (a representation of) a causal or 
explanatory connection (because, based on, has affected, threatened, led), 
statistical covariation (significantly associated with), etc. Relationships can be 
thought of as a particular form of expression where properties, behaviours, 
patterns of occurrence, etc. of the obsessive something are explored in relation 
to variables, properties, behaviours, etc. external to it. 
Knowledge something was used to label (a representation of) a knowledge 
process (e.g. explore, analyse, report), research tool (scale, QIAGEN DNA 
Isolation kit, narrative analysis), fundamental research entities (e.g. data, 
results), background literature (e.g. references), knowers (the researcher, we, 
our) and similar drivers, preconditions, deployments or outputs of knowledge 
generation processes.  
Privileged something was used for ‘things from the world’/ variables whose 
associative and causal relationship with the obsessive something were given 
prominence in a study – such as standardised socio-demographic and disease-
related characteristics (age, gender, education, ethnicity, stage of disease, etc.) 
and non-standardised variables incorporated in a study-specific model.  
Subsidiary something labelled ‘less important’ things/ variables whose 
associative and/or causal relationships with the obsessive something were 
explored or speculated about. These were given limited attention in a study 
report and often left quite vague. 
‘Qualifier’, ‘quantifier’ and ‘indexical’ are probably self-explanatory. Qualifier 
was used primarily to denote evaluations, attitudes and, linguistically, adverbial 
phrases of manner (e.g. significantly, moderately, relatively high, as expected, 
interestingly, only).  
Quantifier stood for sizes, quantities, frequencies, etc. and, symbolically, for 
precise numbers and loose expressions such as ‘some’, ‘many’, etc. Quantifiers 
tended to either accompany carriers (as in Six out of eight patients used oxygen 
all the time – Study 14, Jaturapatporn et al, 2010), or further specify an 
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expression (as in Examples of such symptoms included … feeling irritable 
(0.35), diarrhea (0.39), and having sweats (0.27) at T2 – Study 12, Molassiotis, 
Wengström and Kearney, 2010).  
Indexical stood for (the reference behind) pointing words and phrases such as 
‘this’, ‘that’, ‘the latter’.  
 
The Vocabulary did not contain designations for negations. It did not have a 
grammar connecting its elements either.  
 
 
4.1.1.2. Rules of coding 
 
The main rule for applying the Vocabulary was that no word should remain 
unacknowledged. Everything in a finding, whether a natural language sentence 
or proposition represented elliptically in a table, was to be coded. Overall, I 
coded elements following the order in the natural language sentence or tabular 
representation. As explained in the beginning, I only coded silent elements 
opportunistically, after I assessed initial attempts to elicit them more consistently 
to be of limited value.  
 
In many cases alternative formalisations were possible. For instance, a 
knowledge something like ‘reported’, let’s say as in reported an intrusive 
memory of girlfriend leaving him over 50 years ago (Study 2, Whitaker, Brewin 
and Watson, 2008), can also be seen as an expression of a carrier. The 
flexibility of the Vocabulary arose from the interdependence and orientation-
towards-the-other of several of the key elements of the Vocabulary (discussed 
in 4.1.1.3). Coding alternatives were recorded opportunistically, with the 
exception of cases where a knowledge something was present in one of the 
options (knowledge somethings were involved in a hypothesis about differences 
between qualitative and quantitative findings). This openness to alternatives 
does not mean arbitrariness. Elements were well specified. The surface 
structure of a finding – e.g. the syntax of a sentence or layout of a table – 
privileges one coding over another in the majority of cases. Much more rarely 
are surface structures ambiguous and prompt multiple formalisations. Also, 
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reformulations cannot be too numerous, as only some functional equivalences 
are there or changes of perspective possible (e.g. a quantifier cannot become a 
carrier).  
 
A simple example of coding is given below. More complex ones are given in the 
conceptual discussion in 4.1.1.3. In each of the coding tables presenting the 
examples, the left-hand column contains the units into which the finding was 
broken up. The right-hand column contains the element of the Vocabulary 
ascribed to a particular unit. In some cases, silent units derived from other parts 
of the study report were added to the left-hand column to clarify a reference. 
This first example of a coded finding is, apart from simple, also typical in a 
number of ways. It has a fairly typical knowledge something and expressions 
although a somewhat unusual obsessive something. There seems to be no 
‘classic’ finding to give as a first example. The coding of each finding had 
something which distinguished it from the great majority of findings. 
Six symptom clusters were identified at baseline (Study 12, Molassiotis, 
Wengström and Kearney, 2010: 850). 
Symptom clusters Obsessive something, composite 
Were identified at baseline Knowledge something 
Were identified Expression, covering [presence, 
existence, occurrence] 
Six [were identified] Expression 1 
[Were Identified] at baseline Expression 2 
 
“Symptom clusters” was the obsessive something in the study of Molassiotis, 
Wengström and Kearney, 2010 addressing symptom cluster patterns in the first 
year after cancer diagnosis. This is a case of a ‘composite’ obsessive 
something – the set of symptom clusters included several somewhat dynamic 
individual clusters, such as gastrointestinal, respiratory and body image 
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clusters. ‘Obsessive something, composite’ is one of the subtypes of the 
obsessive something.  
“Were identified at baseline” is a knowledge something – a reference to some 
‘work’, tool, artefact, agent, etc. that had a causal role in bringing about the 
finding reported. An alternative formulation of the same finding which ignores 
the knowledge generation process and drivers may be, for instance, ‘Six 
symptom clusters were present at baseline’.  
Three expressions follow in the coding table – “identified”, “six [identified]” and 
“[identified at] baseline”.92 The contents of these three expressions partly 
overlaps with the contents of the knowledge something. As indicated above, this 
was due to the interdependence and orientation-towards-the-other of several of 
the key elements of the Vocabulary, allowing for the same claim to be 
formulated from the perspective of at least two concepts, and due to the 
duplicity of aims for the Vocabulary, preventing the prioritisation of a single 
coding pattern in ambiguous cases. 
‘Were identified’ was coded as ‘a covering expression’ concerning ‘presence, 
existence, occurrence’. ‘Covering expression’ was a frequently occurring 
subtype of expression, and ‘presence, existence, occurrence’ was a label for a 
frequently occurring subtype within this subtype. As much as the notorious 
predicate of existence immediately recedes into the background of more 
specific findings, it is a finding in itself that there are symptoms which cluster in 
the first year after cancer diagnosis as opposed to having a diversity of 
individual unrelated symptoms. The ways in which this presence of clusters is 
specified here is through its temporal fixation (‘at baseline’, namely towards the 
end of the first month after cancer diagnosis – Expression 2) and through the 
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 The parts of the expressions in the square brackets are in this case ‘old information’. I used square 
brackets containing various types of additional information often in the coding, as the examples in this 
section will illustrate. For the moment, I have standardised only partially the types of information added 




4.1.1.3. Some conceptual issues associated with the key 
elements 
 
The Vocabulary of Elements of Findings emerged as much more minimal at its 
highest level and as much more uniform across finding types (in particular 
quantitative and qualitative findings) than I had expected. One of the reasons 
was that I did not want to make too early judgements, choices and distinctions 
associated with certain big philosophical debates and challenges. Thus, the 
naming and conceptualisation of the key elements are characterised by extreme 
openness to alternative views. Commitments to more particular philosophical or 
methodological claims are captured at the level of sub-elements. This section 
outlines how the abstaining from assumptions worked at the level of key 
elements and what directions the formulation of sub-elements took. 
 
At the level of key elements, the Vocabulary remains open to various positions 
on the relationships between things in the world – things in research – 
phenomenal experiences – representations through language and other 
symbolic systems, which can give quite varied answers to the question of ‘what 
is there in a finding?’. 
I aimed to name and conceptualise key elements of the Vocabulary in such a 
way so that they can accommodate both a world-focused perspective 
concerned with ‘things in the world’ and a research-focused perspective 
concerned with variables and symbolic representation. At the very start of 
generating labels for units of findings, it became clear that taking only one of 
these perspectives will misrepresent ‘what there is in a finding’. This duplicity of 
perspectives is particularly visible in the choice of the awkward word 
‘something’ (rather than ‘entity’ or ‘research variable’, for instance). A 
‘something’ made room for the divide in philosophical thinking about the reality 
of theoretical entities. Its inclusiveness allowed not to commit to a claim whether 
a thing spoken about in a research report really existed in the world or was a 
theoretical construct. In addition, it could refer quite naturally both to the thing or 
research variable studied and its representation in a research paper, whether 




In some cases the vagueness of ‘something’ was just what was needed: no 
easy claim could be made as to what was represented in a finding (e.g. a thing 
from the world or a theoretical entity). In other cases, there was a much greater 
certainty about the what. A sub-element was then created. Consider the phrase 
“adjustment to cancer diagnosis”. When a research paper claims that health 
professionals should monitor patients’ adjustment to cancer diagnosis so that 
counselling referrals can be made when needed, this is a statement about a 
thing from the world (be it from the world of lived experience). When the 
abstract of a research paper highlights as a key finding that No difference was 
found in adjustment to cancer diagnosis in patients who are practising 
Christians as opposed to practising Buddhists, the thing from the world and the 
research construct cannot be neatly separated. It is a matter of perspective 
and/or theoretical commitment to express a preference for one or the other 
description. When a finding is that The average Mini-MAC adjustment to cancer 
score of the intervention group was lower than that of the control group, where 
Mini-MAC is a scale for assessing patient adjustment to cancer diagnosis,93 
then the obsessive something is represented from a strongly research 
perspective. In the first case, ‘obsessive something, world perspective’ was 
used. In the third case, ‘obsessive something, knowledge perspective’ was 
used. The majority of cases were of the second type. These were labelled with 
the generic ‘obsessive something’. 
 
A further set of philosophical debates whose complexity was both 
acknowledged and avoided through the conceptualisation of key elements 
addressed questions of whether, when we are talking about evidence, we are 
talking about propositions, phenomenal experiences, or objects and events. In 
the brief presentation of the key elements in 4.1.1.1, (representation) – a 
concept to include or omit depending on context and stance – was used 
frequently to reflect some of the alternatives in the above set of debates. Ideally, 
further distinctions would have been drawn, primarily between representations 
of the world by means of research entities, such as variables, data, models, 
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etc., and representations (of the world and of research entities) by means of a 
natural language or another symbolic system. However, as in this work findings 
were analysed only in terms of their composition and structure as represented 
symbolically, mostly as standard sentences and tabulated information in study 
reports, these otherwise important distinctions were not brought into a 
foreground. 
 
The Elements in the Vocabulary are closely interdependent and ‘oriented-
towards-the-other’, i.e. definable through other elements in the Vocabulary. 
Coding alternatives arise, as the same proposition can be represented from the 
perspective of different key elements. 
 
The above feature of the Vocabulary is most clearly illustrated by attending to 
the ‘owner’, the ‘locus’, the ‘originator’ of an expression – whose expression is 
an expression? The brief answer is – of many. I aimed to formulate a concept 
which embodies, rather than glosses over, a central difficulty of adjudication in 
science and research. I will call it the ‘whose effect’ difficulty. Using concepts 
from the Vocabulary, it may be described as follows. The aim of a research 
study is to identify some stable or traceably dynamic property of an obsessive 
something (to use one of the examples above, the composition of symptom 
clusters in the first year following a cancer diagnosis). But it is practically never 
definitive enough if a finding tells us more about 1) the obsessive something; 2) 
the particular milieu from which the obsessive something was taken or in which 
it was explored, i.e. the carrier (in this case a particular sample of patients); 3) 
the approach used to study the obsessive something (the set of all relevant 
knowledge somethings); or 4) about factors that could not be articulated and/or 
controlled in the study. An expression is thus an attention-grabbing intersection 
typically between an obsessive something (or more rarely, one of the other 
somethings), a carrier, a set of knowledge somethings and study-relevant 
factors that could not be articulated and/or controlled. An expression is a finding 
about all these elements and a thorough data extraction requires it to be 
attributed to all (or at least the first three) of them.94  
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 In discussing expressions and when I am not focusing first and foremost on their being an 
intersection of effects, I attribute an expression to the obsessive something. 
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For instance, in the example 
Some people saw themselves as different to who they once were, 
suggesting that a disruption to their sense of self had occurred … 
(Hubbard, Kidd and Kearney, 2010: 137). 
‘saw themselves as different’ is syntactically an expression (in this case 
perception) of the carrier (people with colorectal cancer in the first year following 
diagnosis). It is also an expression of the obsessive something (biographical 
disruption, not mentioned in this sentence): namely, biographical disruption 
takes the form of a discontinuity of identity. It is also an expression of the 
privileged something (sense of self): the sense of self undergoes a disruption in 
the context of a recent colorectal cancer diagnosis. Finally, it expresses those 
knowledge somethings which ground the study in biographically informed 
approaches to understanding chronic illness. 
The concept of ‘expression’ thus bundles together the study object and context 
and avoids committing to a principled position on the ‘whose effect’ difficulty. It 
treats the resolution of that difficulty as pertaining to a particular case rather 
than as a matter of principle. 
 
The key elements of the Vocabulary do not discriminate between elements of 
lower or higher level of interpretiveness, lower or higher level of theory-
ladenness or greater or lesser proximity to raw data.  
Again, the concept of expression is the clearest example of the above feature of 
the Vocabulary. A representation of the raw data concerning an obsessive 
something, carrier, etc. is treated as an expression of that obsessive something, 
carrier, etc. just as much as an interpretation that is several levels removed 
from the raw data. I wanted to avoid distinctions in this direction primarily to 
avoid certain claims of reliability associated with them – ‘if it is conceptually and 
formally closer to the raw data, it is more reliable’. 95 Perhaps yes, perhaps no. 
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 Even though at the start of the thesis I endorsed them. 
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The coding for the next example (the full version of the finding above) shows 
four layers of interdependent expressions, at a different level of 
interpretiveness/ theory-ladenness/ distance from the raw data.  
Some people saw themselves as different to who they once were, 
suggesting that a disruption to their sense of self had occurred: 
One of the questions is that the thing is, do you look in the mirror and 
think that you look different or something? Well I do feel some days 
I’m the same person as I was. In some respects I’m stronger; in other 
respects I’m weaker. I think I’m stronger mentally and physically 
weaker but I mean you look in the mirror and sometimes and you 
think it isn’t me sort of thing but it’s, can be strange. But the other day 
I was getting a contact lens thing and the woman says, ‘Go and put 
your contact lenses for me son’. I was at this big mirror right in front 
of me and it was like looking at a stranger, it was incredible because 
you’re right up the mirror like that. (P28, I3, employed, male) 
(Hubbard, Kidd and Kearney, 2010: 137). 
Some quantifier 
People Carrier-cum-knower, composite 
Saw themselves as Knowledge something [weak] 
[were] different Expression, covering [comparison] 
Saw themselves as different to who 
they once were 
Expression 1, layer 1 
Suggesting that Knowledge something  
Sense of self Privileged something 
A disruption had occurred Expression 1, layer 2 
One of the questions is that the thing 
is, do you look in the mirror and … 
Expression 1, grounding (raw data) 
(P28, I3, employed, male) Carrier-cum-knower 
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On the basis of the ‘grounding expression’ – the raw data representation, in this 
case an interview quote – the authors formulate two more general 
interdependent expressions. Expression 1, layer 1 is an expression of a 
subsample of the carrier (“some people”) – they perceive themselves as being 
different to who they once were. Expression 1, layer 2 is an interpretation of 
Expression 1, layer 1 – the sense of self (a privileged something) has become 
disrupted. The covering expression, which derives directly from the raw data, is 
of comparison ([were] different).  
Expressions can thus be at a different proximity to the raw data: be 
(representation of) the raw data itself; a more general claim based on the raw 
data that remains within the framework of concepts appearing in the raw data 
as in Expression 1, layer 1; a more general claim based on the raw data which, 
however, shifts the reference framework within which the raw data were stated 
as in Expression 1, layer 2. Similarly to the case of expressions, relationships 
were coded at different levels, with very general, somewhat ‘metaphysical’ 
concepts (e.g. association, causality) at the one end and raw data at the other: 
Results indicated that caregiver PTGI [Post-traumatic Growth Index] 
scores were significantly associated with the patient’s recurrence status 
(p < .05) and marginally associated with time since initial diagnosis (p = 
.08) (Study 7, Thombre, Sherman and Simonton, 2010: 180). 
 
Results indicated Knowledge something 
Caregiver Carrier 
PTGI scores Expression 1 
Patient’s recurrence status Privileged something 1 
Time since initial diagnosis Privileged something 2 
Associated Relationship, covering [association] 
Associated [PTGI scores; 
patient’s recurrence status] 
Relationship 1, knowledge perspective 




[PTGI scores; patient’s 
recurrence status] 
Relationship 1, knowledge perspective, layer 1– 
with qualifier 
Significantly associated (p < 
.05) [PTGI scores; patient’s 
recurrence status] 
Relationship 1, knowledge perspective, layer 2 – 
with quantifier 
Associated [PTGI scores; 
time since initial diagnosis] 
Relationship 2, knowledge perspective 
[expression 1; privileged something 2] 
Marginally associated 
[PTGI scores; time since 
initial diagnosis] 
Relationship 2, knowledge perspective, layer 1– 
with qualifier 
Marginally associated (p = 
.08) [PTGI scores; time 
since initial diagnosis] 
Relationship 2, knowledge perspective, layer 2 – 
with quantifier 
 
Going back to the last but one example, it also demonstrates that 
interdependent expressions arising from the same raw data need not come into 
a clear hierarchy where a more abstract expression is more closely related to 
another more abstract expression than to the raw data. For instance, the 
covering expression ([were] different) is directly connected, through an identity 
of concept, with the level of raw data (One of the questions is that the thing is, 
do you look in the mirror and think that you look different or something? …) and 
Expression 1, layer 1 (saw themselves as different to who they once were) but 
not with Expression 1, layer 2 (disruption to their sense of self had occurred), 
regardless of the fact that the latter is based on Expression 1, layer 1. 
The relationships between levels and layers96 of expressions can be quite 
varied: deductive, inductive, abductive, analogical, metaphorical, tautological, 
etc. This means that an expression building on another expression can be a 
valid representation of the state of affairs even if the expression underneath it is 
not. Luckily or worryingly, if our reference expression was derived from an 
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 I use ‘layers’ for levels within levels. 
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invalid expression through an inference type that does not preserve truth, it can 
end up being a valid representation of the state of affairs. Much further work is 
needed to specify the ways in which expressions at different layers and levels 
relate to one another as well as how this variety of levels of interpretiveness, 
theory-ladenness and distance from raw data is realised in the context of the 
other key elements of the Vocabulary. 
 
The key elements of the Vocabulary aimed to circumvent metaphysical 
commitments associated with stability and dynamics. 
  
The key elements of the Vocabulary also aimed to avoid alignments with an 
ontology of stability or dynamics. For instance, in philosophical discussions of 
empiricism the term “occurrent properties” seems to be used similarly to the 
term ‘expressions’ as defined here. Another word was preferred so as to open 
more space for what things ‘do’ as opposed to what features they demonstrate. 
‘Expression’ was seen as avoiding the narrowness of connotations of ‘property’, 
‘feature’ and ‘characteristic’ (connotations of essential, static) and of ‘behaviour’ 
(dynamic, intentional), arising even when the definitions of those terms explicitly 
disavow such boundaries of meaning. 
 
In the case of the ‘something’ concepts, I constrained the concept nominally 
more than I wished. Some of the somethings are processes rather than things – 
for instance, post-traumatic growth and weight change in the case of the 
obsessive something or research processes such as ‘analyse’ and ‘report’ in the 
case of the knowledge something. If I was not running the risk of creating an 
overly bizarre vocabulary, I would have used ‘something-someflowing’ to 
emphasise this fact. I preferred not to write like Heidegger on this occasion. 
 
Finally, the Vocabulary encompassed a broad range of sub-elements and is 
open to the formulation of many more sub-elements. 
While I kept the highest level of concepts in the Vocabulary minimal, I was 
generating a broad range of concepts at lower levels and attempting to specify 
their relationship to philosophical and methodological discussions about how 
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science and research work. In some cases, a degree of standardisation of 
subtypes was achieved. 
 
For instance, ‘knowledge perspective’ was used consistently to accompany key 
elements where these were strongly represented in research terms or as things 
from the world of research:  
 
 At the beginning of 4.1.1.3, I gave the example of a strongly knowledge 
perspective towards the obsessive something – the average Mini-MAC 
adjustment to cancer score as an ‘obsessive something, knowledge 
perspective’ in contrast to the ambivalent obsessive something of 
adjustment to cancer diagnosis. 
 
 In the context of relationships, ‘relationship, knowledge perspective’ was 
recorded when relationships between scientific artefacts were reported 
which themselves took the form of scientific artefacts par excellence – 
e.g. comparison of the means of two groups using a t-test, with the 
relationship reported as a t-test statistic and a p-value for its significance.  
 
 The knowledge element was also added to the ‘carrier’ label, though in a 
somewhat different form – as ‘carrier-cum-knower’. This was used when 
the carrier was a person and, apart from ‘having’ the obsessive 
something, also reported on it. For instance, a study participant 
experiences anxiety but is also the one to report the anxiety. In this way 
the study participant is also a ‘tool’ for obtaining knowledge, a knowledge 
something. 
 
Three further types of the obsessive something were frequently applied, in 
addition to ‘obsessive something, knowledge perspective’: 
 ‘Obsessive something, aspect’ was used when the obsessive something 
was discussed through its components or the aspects it revealed in 
particular situations. For example, in Study 9 of the case study papers 
(Andrykowski, Donovan and Jacobsen, 2009), the obsessive something 
was “shift in fatigue ratings”, with two main aspects being studied – “shift 
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in most fatigue” and “shift in average fatigue”. When each of these was 
mentioned separately in a finding, ‘obsessive something, aspect’ was 
coded for.  
 
 Another stable type of an obsessive something was ‘obsessive 
something, variant name’. It was ascribed when a synonymous word or 
phrase was used in place of the study’s own preferred nomenclature 
(e.g. “intrusions” rather than “intrusive cognitions”).   
 
 ‘Obsessive something, composite’ was the third of these types (see the 
example in 4.1.1.2 on symptom clusters). 
 
A stable sub-element but difficult to code consistently was ‘relationship, through 
juxtaposition’. Not infrequently in research papers, relationships are left to the 
reader to construct from juxtaposed parameters. For example, from Analgesics 
were given orally in 70.5% of the patients, 26.5% were prescribed fentanyl 
patches, and 3% intravenous morphine (Study 15, Al-Rowaili et al., 2009: 39) 
conclusions can be drawn that in the study setting oral analgesics were used 
more often than any other form of pain medication, that fentanyl patches were 
used more often than intravenous morphine, etc. In such cases ‘relationship, 
through juxtaposition’ was coded for. As it was a silent element, it was not 
coded consistently at this stage. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, subtypes of knowledge somethings are clearly 
many and still in the process of becoming consolidated. I have been testing out 
a variety of labels, aimed to foreground a typology of knowledge somethings in 
health research findings, but do not consider them sufficiently rich and 
informative. 
 
The two examples below illustrate some such test labels. The examples are 
unusually rich in knowledge somethings: there are three in each, and an 
additional ‘knowledge perspective’ in the second example, while most findings 




version of the same finding without or with a toned down knowledge something 
(complete avoidance is not always possible). 
 
“However, the interviews do not suggest that this experience led to loss 
of self as defined by Charmaz (1983)” (Hubbard, Kidd and Kearney, 
2010: 140). 
 
However Knowledge something [expectations 
contradicted] [weak] 
The interviews do not suggest that Knowledge something [method as 
agent] 
This experience Subsidiary something 
Led Expression, covering [being a 
cause/contributing factor] 
Led to loss of self Expression 1 
As defined by Charmaz (1983) Knowledge something [background 
theory] 
 
Without a knowledge something this finding could read: ‘This experience [of 
being diagnosed and living with cancer] did not lead to loss of self’. 
 
“Twelve patients showed comparable results between measurements 
and estimated doses” (Study 8, Meades et al., 2010: 529). 
Twelve Quantifier 
Patients Carrier 
Showed results Knowledge something [data, findings] 
Measurements Knowledge something [data, findings] 
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Estimated doses Knowledge something [theory] 
Measurements [of radiation obtained] Expression 1 
Comparable results Relationship, covering [similarity] 
Estimated doses Privileged something  
Comparable results between 
measurements and estimated doses 
Relationship 1, knowledge perspective 
[expression 1; privileged something] 
 
A reformulation of this finding with a toned down knowledge something could 
be: ‘Twelve patients received doses of radiation close to the ones expected’. 
With the exception of subtypes labelled for a ‘knowledge perspective’ and 
‘obsessive something, aspect’, sub-elements of the Vocabulary were not used 
for the analysis presented in Chapter 5. I considered the method insufficiently 
reliable at the level of most subtypes. 
 
The above discussion has certainly demonstrated the need for much further 
work on developing the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings. I hope it 
demonstrated its potential, too.  
 
4.1.2.  ‘Simple’ approaches  
Three further main approaches were applied to study types of, similarities and 
differences between, and grounds for the (non-)combinability of findings: 
exploration of types and labels of findings for ‘lines of tension’, exploration of the 
degree of thematic differences across findings, and exploration of the contents  
of highly standardised parameters, namely socio-demographic and cancer-
related parameters. These approaches were technologically simple (though not 
quick to execute). They involved basic techniques of classification and, in the 
latter two cases, calculations of proportions. 
The first approach probed into one of the most typical strategies for asserting 
how challenging it is to combine findings in health research syntheses on broad 
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topics. This strategy involves the presentation of long lists of varied labels for 
types of studies, evidence, data, etc. that tie the mind in knots and prime 
effectively subsequent statements of serious challenges to combinability. Here 
is a typical example - an excerpt from Pope, Mays and Popay (2007: 3) which 
continues well beyond the quote here: 
Every year a vast number of health-related research studies are carried 
out. There are randomised controlled trials of new treatments, surveys of 
patient experiences, evaluations of interventions designed to improve 
health and/or reduce health inequalities, analyses of routinely collected 
hospital episode statistics, economic evaluations of the costs and 
effectiveness of health care, case studies of new practice, research on 
the experience of service users, patients and health care professionals 
and so on. This research is conducted by researchers from a diverse 
range of disciplinary and professional backgrounds, including statistics, 
epidemiology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, political and 
economic science, geography, public health and the medical, nursing 
and therapy professions, and it draws on a variety of different theoretical 
and methodological approaches. 
The numerous classes of types of findings, data and studies that were 
generated in the process of extraction-coding were further grouped together.  
Attempts were made to identify and create ‘groups of tension’ – i.e. groups in 
which the different types of findings fell at very different points on a shared 
continuum, to the extent to which this would thwart the bringing together of such 
findings. 
The second simple approach was of exploring thematic differences between 
findings. The application of the injunction to code first as close as possible to 
the original, with no or minimal transformations, allowed for minor differences 
between units of information to be preserved. The function of NVivo which 
registers number of “references” (units of information) under a code permitted to 
identify the number of codes which had one, two or more units of information 
within them. The larger the proportion of codes with only a single unit of 
information, the larger the degree of thematic differences across studies.  
205 
 
Finally, the third simple approach explored similarities and differences across 
studies in terms of supposedly highly standardised parameters – basic cancer-
related information (such as cancer type, stage, treatment type, etc.) and socio-
demographic parameters (such as age, gender, socio-economic status, etc.). 
Similarities and differences in the collection, contents and representation of 
such information were explored.  
 
4.2. Relating findings about types of findings to findings about the 
presence and effects of matrices 
All the approaches described above – the extraction-coding through the 
Analysis Framework, the development and application of the Vocabulary of 
Elements of Findings, the simple approaches – aimed to identify various types 
of similarities and differences between findings and various types of matrices 
(factors that shape findings and thus determine similarities and differences 
between them). Within the conceptualisation of this study, these are two sides 
of the same coin. Similarities and differences of findings will be partly traceable 
to similarities and differences in matrices, and similarities and differences of 
matrices will be partly traceable to similarities and differences in findings. As the 
approaches took different routes to the same questions, it was going to be 
informative to relate their findings. 
Types of findings, as identified through applying the Vocabulary of Elements of 
Findings, were to be mapped onto types of findings as generated 1) by 
transforming and grouping findings during the extraction-coding for the 
purposes of the test research synthesis and 2) by applying Parameters 2 in the 
Analysis Framework, which aimed to enable the development of formal, 
theoretical descriptions for the core contents of synthesis studies, including 
findings, data and evidence (see Table T3.2.). In turn, findings about matrices 
as obtained by applying Parameters 3 in the Analysis Framework were to be 
compared to findings about matrices as obtained through applying the 
Vocabulary of Elements of Findings. This intention was superseded after the 
Vocabulary was fully developed. Initially, expectations were that it would contain 
a fair number of elements for traces of matrices. As its description in 4.1.1.1 




Finally, as the quantitative-qualitative paradigms debate was the only meta-
scientific debate used to illuminate the combinability of highly heterogeneous 
evidence, findings about the composition and structure of findings, as identified 
through the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings, were to be related to their 
quantitative or qualitative status. Findings were to ‘inherit’ the status of the 
studies they came from. Unlike the typical practice of ascribing a single label – 
quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods study, studies were to be given a 
primarily quantitative/ primarily qualitative label on four features:  1) study topic, 
2) method of data collection and type of source material, 3) method of data 
analysis, and 4) presentation style.  
 
Those initial intentions were modified substantially as findings from the core 
method (the application of the Analysis Framework) and the contents of the 
main supporting tool (the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings) strongly defied 
expectations. The world of research had other things to show while casually 
disconfirming hypothesis after hypothesis. In fact, only the relating of 
quantitative and qualitative status of findings to their composition and structure 
was performed. The particulars of the approach are given along with the 
presentation of its findings in the Findings Chapter.  
 
4.3. Further generic methods used to complement the Analysis 
Framework and the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings 
A number of generic methods were used opportunistically to obtain further data 
concerning questions whose exploration was embedded in the Analysis 
Framework and the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings. This was either to 
counteract deficiencies of methods which became visible in their deployment (a 
highly probable outcome in the case of novel methods) or to use affordances 
which were not foreseen. For instance, it became clear that the approaches for 
exploring the multiplicity of findings incorporated in the Analysis Framework 
require much further operationalisation. A simpler method of capturing this 
multiplicity was devised. Or the process of formalising findings using the 
Vocabulary showed a further, and very telling, way of exploring missing 
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information in studies, in addition to the ones embedded in the Analysis 
Framework. Brief comments on those methods are given in introducing relevant 
findings. The use of such additional methods was kept to a minimum. They 
always related to questions that were already asked and operationalised, with 























Chapter 5: Case study findings 
 
1. Contents and structure of the chapter 
 
This chapter presents the empirical contents of the thesis as well as 
modifications of positions set out in earlier chapters. Both the data and re-
conceptualisations concern various aspects of the question of how findings are 
transformed for the purposes of health research synthesis studies. As 
transformations are seen as a way of smoothing out differences between 
findings, provided relevant similarities between these findings are in place, this 
is also a chapter on similarities and differences between findings.   
Section 2 describes the sample of papers analysed for obtaining the empirical 
data. Section 3 describes the overall deployment and outcomes of the analysis. 
Section 4 takes a step back to revise the initial conceptualisation of 
‘transformations’ in view of the findings that emerged in the analysis. The 
subsequent sections focus on individual elements of the re-conceptualisation of 
‘transformations’, generally by way of describing these elements, quantifying 
them, and identifying subtypes within them. Section 5 presents four different 
perspectives towards the question of how similar/ different are the findings with 
which research synthesis needs to deal. Section 6 makes tangible the 
multiplicity of findings. Section 7 addresses that which is missing from findings. 
Section 8 discusses the effectiveness of the tools for enabling and controlling 
transformations used in this study.  
This chapter contains more methodological information than is typical of ‘results’ 
sections in empirical studies. A number of the techniques used to obtain the 
results could be fully specified only after an advanced stage of the analysis has 
been reached (completion of its most extensive component – the extraction-
coding in NVivo, Excel and EPPI-Reviewer). The description of these 
techniques in the Methods Chapter would have made for ‘too many results’ 
there. Another reason for the untypical proportion of methodological information 
is the experimental character of the methods. The discrepancies between pre-
specified study design and its actualisation in practice, which are normally 
discussed in results sections, were many. To avoid breaking down the 
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presentation too much, however, methods not described previously are 
presented briefly before their respective findings, with most of the detail 
provided in the Appendix to Chapter 5.  
 
2. The sample of papers 
 
2.1. Outcomes of the sampling process and key features of papers 
As described in the Methods chapter (Section 2), 100 papers were first sampled 
randomly from within the search strategy retrieval (18, 456). From this pool of 
100, papers were sampled purposefully until saturation. The first and thus 
anchoring paper was “How Should We Design Supportive Cancer Care? The 
Patient’s Perspective” (Casarett et al., 2008). Of all sampled titles, I judged this 
title to correspond most closely to the test synthesis question. The process of 
selection involved varying the features of papers instantiating parameters such 
as topic, method, stakeholders under study, sample size, etc., while also taking 
tendencies within the broader sample into account (e.g. more papers were 
sampled from more frequent topic types). I considered saturation to have been 
reached after the comprehensive extraction-coding of 17 papers. Saturation 
was constructed in terms of formal features of papers (such as what the 
elements of a research paper on the health of humans are and how they are 
linked together), in terms of approaches to their handling under the Analysis 
Framework, and in terms of patterns of data relevant to the questions of the 
thesis. Saturation did not relate to any thematic threshold concerning the test 
synthesis question.  
13 of the papers were primary research studies, 2 were reviews (one systematic 
and one non-systematic), 1 involved secondary data analysis, and 1 was a 
‘research directions’ paper proposing a vision for the future of a field. 4 papers 
addressed issues such as experiences, perceptions, preferences and quality of 
life of cancer patients and informal caregivers; 4 addressed quality and safety of 
care, organisation of services and provider skills; 3 explored illness in a 
spiritual, existential and intensely emotional context; 2 were basic biomedical 
research papers; 2 were papers on predictors (clinical and socio-demographic) 
of cancer-related outcomes, and 2 were methodologico-theoretical papers. All 
papers touched on patient-relevant outcomes. 4 studies were set in the UK, 2 in 
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the US, 1 in Australia, Austria, Canada, India, Israel, the Netherlands, Saudi 
Arabia and Sweden. The reviews and the research agenda article included 
papers from various countries. One journal was found to have been sampled 3 
times after which the variety of journals was explicitly considered, too. One 
author was noticed to appear twice, in both cases at third place (still a lottery 
winning chance for a sample that started with over 18,000 papers!). The 
methodologies of the sampled papers are discussed in the next section. Table T 
5.1 below presents a snapshot of their main features.  
 
2.2. Quantitative/ qualitative status of papers 
As per intentions set out in the Methods Chapter (4.2), studies had to be given a 
primarily quantitative/ primarily qualitative label on four features – 1) study topic, 
2) method of data collection and type of source material, 3) method of data 
analysis, and 4) presentation style. In the end, only a ‘study topic’ and an 
‘integrated method’ feature were used. This was because in this particular 
sample there was only one study where a qualitative method of data analysis 
went with a more quantitative style in presentation, and only three studies (the 
two reviews and the research agenda study) where the relationships between 
method of data collection, type of source material, and method of data analysis 
were relatively more complex. These particularities were handled individually. 
Table T4.1 presents three partly overlapping quantitative/ qualitative status 
ascriptions (see shaded columns). Alternatives were generated so as to enable 
several types of testing of hypotheses concerning differences between the 
findings of quantitative and qualitative studies. Dramatic differences in structure 
had to be observed across classifications to be considered reliable. 
 
The ‘preferred’ classification, seen to reflect best the internal variety of studies, 
comprised 4 ‘hybrid’ studies, 9 quantitative studies and 4 qualitative ones. 
Hybrid status was assigned if there was a supposed internal tension (e.g. as in 
Study 7, where religious coping and post-traumatic growth, seemingly typical 
qualitative research topics, were explored through scales).97  
                                                          
97
 Hybrid status was not assigned when the method was strongly associated with one of the 
‘paradigms’ and the topic was ‘common’ – one which can be, or has traditionally been, 
approached by both quantitative and qualitative studies. Methodologico-theoretical issues or the 
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In the first of the alternative classifications, hybrid studies were split into 
primarily quantitative or primarily qualitative through prioritising their method. 12 
studies were labelled as quantitative and 5 as qualitative.  
 
In the second of the alternative classifications, hybrid studies were split into 
primarily quantitative or primarily qualitative through prioritising their topic. 9 
studies were labelled as quantitative and 8 as qualitative.  
                                                                                                                                                                          




Table T 5.1: Key features of sampled papers 
NB: The numbers assigned to papers in Column 1 are used from here onwards as their main identifier (e.g. quotes are attributed to Study 1, 
7, 12, etc.) 
 
The order of parameters (apart from those on quantitative-qualitative status, which draw on the first two parameters) follows the priority given to them in 
achieving variety through the purposeful sampling. I.e. first, studies had to differ by topic and method, then by stakeholders studied, then by country, 
etc. 
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3. The extraction-coding process and outcomes 
3.1. Basic features of the extraction-coding process and outcomes 
As discussed in the Methods Chapter (Section 3.3), the extraction-coding was 
first performed in NVivo 8 in combination with Excel (12 studies) and then in the 
synthesis research specific EPPI-Reviewer 4 (5 studies). Five untypical 
injunctions had to be taken into account: for comprehensiveness, extensive 
multiple coding, extreme transparency, double-edged critical analysis, and for 
first coding as close as possible to the source material and experimenting with a 
variety of more distant transformations afterwards (Chapter 4, 3.1). 
 
It took between one and four days to process a paper, and typically two – two 
and a half. Coding was mostly done at the level of sentences and clauses, 
occasionally at the level of words and larger units of information. There was no 
gradual increase in the intensity of coding (number of codes per paper) from the 
beginning towards the end of the case study, judging by NVivo data.98 The 
extraction of numerical data was done for each individual data point for studies 
1 to 12 (the NVivo-Excel sample). After this, only cancer-related and socio-
demographic numerical data were extracted in detail in keeping with the 
streamlined analysis intentions.  
 
The text below describes further the processes and outcomes of the extraction-
coding, separately for each of the three software environments. The largest 
amount of meta-data (number of codes and units of information) is provided for 
NVivo, which appears to have superior functionalities in that respect. 
 
3.1.1. Extraction-coding in NVivo 
1514 codes grouped under 25 main codes were generated in NVivo. These 
included  codes of the Analysis Framework, set up on the basis of the literature 
review and expectations from practical experience (approximately 205 codes), 
as well as thematic and formal elements prompted by the analysis of the 12 
papers.  
                                                          
98
 The statistic on number of codes per paper was immediately available in NVivo. If it can be 
obtained automatically in EPPI-Reviewer, I have not identified how as of yet. 
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The largest numbers of sub-codes were generated under Findings (260), 
Methodological (249) and Conclusions and Suggestions (167). The smallest 
numbers of sub-codes were under Classification and Coding issues (none), 
Vocabulary (1), Unclear points (2) and Ethical Issues (2). 
Of the 1514 codes, a third (505) were empty. Some of these were ineffective 
pre-formulated codes from the Analysis Framework. Others were more abstract 
‘tags’ (in the sense described in Chapter 3, Section 3). Still others were high 
level codes where the coded contents appeared only at lower levels (e.g.  
Variables was such an empty high level code with the contents coming under 
subtypes of variables). In a minority of cases (I identified 15, approximately 1% 
of the codes), empty codes represented omissions of coding – a category was 
created on the basis of some contents but the latter was not coded thereafter. 
Put flatly, these were errors on my part. They are correctible and they are not 
something that is reported in research publications. I report them as a 
background consideration. Individual errors (which of course are many more 
than these since it is a single point in the work) are tightly controlled for in most 
synthesis studies, through double or triple extraction for instance. This chapter 
discusses many other factors that potentially limit the reliability of synthesis 
studies and for which no control is instituted. 
The ineffective pre-formulated codes were primarily ones found to require too 
multidimensional and intense critical analysis before they can be filled in (such 
as what alternative explanations for findings can be offered) and a much more 
advanced stage of the test synthesis study than could be achieved (such as 
codes aimed at exploring transformations by comparing preliminary synthesis 
output with source study input). As both these types of codes relate to 
explorations of the process of transformations, some of the intended analysis of 
transformations could not be performed. 
1009 codes were thus effectively used across papers. There were 2294 units of 
information under them. 
(By way of crude comparison, a primary qualitative study where I did the coding 
(Munday et al., 2009), used NVivo and performed more multiple coding than I 
had done in previous work – i.e. at least the researcher and software are the 
same – used 37 sources, and had 73 codes and 758 units of information. That 
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is, the injunctions have contributed, along with other relevant parameters in 
terms of which the two studies differ, to almost 14 times more codes in the 
current study (73 vs. 1009) for approximately half of the sources (37 vs. 17). 
Approximately 30 times more codes could then be expected for the same 
number of sources. In terms of units, the injunctions have contributed to slightly 
over 3 times more units of information in the current study (2294 vs. 758) for 
approximately half of the number of sources. Approximately 6 times more units 
could then be expected for the same number of sources. Note again that this is 
a very crude comparison, as the comparator study was not a synthesis study.) 
761 codes (50.3%) had units of information from a single paper. As discussed 
above, 505 codes (33.4%) were empty. 50 codes (3.3%) had units of 
information from 4 or more papers, with a maximum of 11.99 Some of these 
‘richer’ codes were highly inclusive categories addressing aims of the thesis 
rather than the test synthesis (e.g. Keywords for Paper, to help explore how 
themes highlighted by authors or indexers lose or gain importance in the 
process of moving from the primary into the synthesis study). Others of the 
richer codes were for issues of limited interest to both the thesis and test 
synthesis but frequently reported in health research papers (e.g. research 
ethics). The richest codes of interest to the test synthesis were on sampling and 
on temporal and dynamic features of phenomena (such as frequency, duration, 
intensity, etc.).   
In terms of units of information within codes (as opposed to number of papers 
from which these were taken), 511 codes (33.8%) contained a single unit of 
information. 505 (33.4%) were empty. 190 (12.4%) of the codes had 4 or more 
units of information, with a maximum of 53. The codes which received the 
largest number of units of information were broad codes on nomenclature and 
descriptions of methods.  
Further detail on numbers of papers and units within codes can be found in 
Appendix to Chapter 4. 
                                                          
99
 These numbers treat each code as unrelated – i.e. with no codes below and above. 
Otherwise each of the main codes and a large number of other codes would have had many 
more units of information from many more papers. 
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NVivo was the environment where the largest number of separate tagging 
documents, with various critical, reflective, heuristic and pragmatic notes in 
them, were produced – a total of 19. 
 
3.1.2. Extraction-coding in Excel 
The Excel extraction-coding was used to extract numerical or categorical data 
as a complement to the NVivo extraction-coding. Thematically, there were two 
main types of such data extracted. One concerned parameters on the basis of 
which similarity between studies, populations, health conditions, settings, 
interventions, outcomes and methods are determined and groups formed. The 
other were data representing numerical findings about the phenomena of 
interest to a study, often in relationship to the aforementioned properties (e.g. 
hazard rate ratios for developing cancer relative to degree of weight change 
from baseline, Study 10).  
 
3.1.3. Extraction-coding in EPPI-Reviewer 
The extraction-coding in EPPI-Reviewer combined features of the NVivo and 
Excel processes, as the software is well adapted to handling numerical 
information, unlike NVivo. The framework of codes from NVivo and the 
categories from Excel were not transferred into EPPI-Reviewer. This was to 
allow for new conceptualisations to emerge. The novelty thus achieved was 
primarily of lower level conceptualisations and not for the overall framework.  
Differences in the software environments notwithstanding, findings from the 
three platforms pointed in the same directions. They are discussed together in 
the remainder of this chapter. But not quite as expected. 
 
4. A conceptual transformation of transformations 
The initial conceptualisation of ‘transformations’ in this work was framed 
strongly in terms of similarities and differences. Transformations were thought 
of as driven by differences in findings, provided some right type of similarity was 
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there, too, and having as an outcome a right type of reduction of those 
differences. This understanding was then intertwined with the concept of 
matrices – those frameworks, causes, factors which drive the generation of and 
co-constitute findings, contribute to their similarities and differences, and enable 
and constrain their combinability. The Analysis Framework was organised, to a 
large extent, around prompts aiming to detect key matrices in a study report. 
The process of accumulating and analysing data suggested, however, that a 
conceptualisation in terms of matrices can contribute little to a descriptive 
account of transformations. A primary reason was the rather limited degree to 
which presumed key matrices, with the exception of methods, were detected in 
source studies.  
I then built on the emerging empirical findings and on ideas from the 
introductory description of transformations to formulate a revised understanding 
of the concept. It focused on the capacity of a finding for meaningful 
transformation. At the very least, this capacity was taken to depend on: 
 the contents of the set of findings S whose combinability or 
compatibility with f (‘our finding’) is in question; 
 the extent of differences and similarities (thematic, formal and factual) 
between f and the other findings in S;100 
 the presence of characteristics of a finding that come into a ‘logical 
contradiction’ with specifications made in the synthesis question; 
 the multiplicity of f – the extent to which f can be broken down into 
smaller findings (called here ‘inherent multiplicity’) and the extent to 
which it can be interpreted in different ways by different users and 
relative to different aims (‘relational multiplicity’);  
 the extent of missing and available pieces of information in f;  
 the breadth of the synthesis question and its distance from f; 
 the effectiveness of the tools used to enable transformations and of 
those used to constrain them; 
                                                          
100
 Initially, I considered excluding factual differences. Transforming them, provided sameness 
of thematic and formal characteristics of a finding, appeared to mean changing the data. 
However, one can envisage cases where extreme findings are adjusted in accordance with 
some weighting principle that takes into account size of sample, reliability of method, etc. 
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 the familiarity of the researcher with the research area of S and that 
of the synthesis question; 
 a still-to-be-specified set of environmental influences on cognitive 
processes and idiosyncratic cognitive characteristics of the 
researcher – such as order of presentation of findings, recent salient 
information available to the researcher, his or her capacity for lateral 
thinking, chance juxtaposition of information, etc. 
The primary reason for offering a re-conceptualisation of transformations at this 
stage is to explain the interconnectedness between the seemingly disparate 
empirical findings that follow. As mentioned above, this re-conceptualisation 
was not only derived from the data but through independent re-thinking of more 
abstract claims, too. Many holes in the empirical material remain as a result. No 
sections on transformations in relation to the synthesis question, researcher’s 
expertise, logical contradictions, sets of findings, or environmental and 
idiosyncratic personal factors affecting cognitive processes are included. 
Although some relevant data were collected on the researcher’s expertise (and 
that particular subject is always available for more data collection), these were, 
ultimately, considered insufficient, unreliable or requiring the development of 
further analysis methods. To the remaining elements of the re-
conceptualisation, a separate section is dedicated. Section 5 is on differences 
and similarities of findings; Section 6 is on the multiplicity of findings; Section 7 
is on ‘omissions, silences and half-silences’. Section 8 offers observations on 
the tools for enabling and controlling transformations used in this study.   
 
5. Differences and similarities between findings 
Four types of findings on differences and similarities between findings are 
presented: findings on compositional and structural similarities and differences 
between quantitative and qualitative findings explored through the Vocabulary 
of Elements of Findings (5.2); a small set of other formal similarities and 
differences obtained through an analysis of typologies of findings and 
descriptors of data, evidence, studies and findings (5.3); quantification of the 
scope of thematic similarities and differences between findings (5.4); and 
findings on similarities and differences of supposedly highly standardised 
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parameters of health research studies on cancer (socio-demographic 
information and cancer-related variables). These represent different ways of 
exploring where the most relevant similarities and differences between findings 
lie, as far as transformations aimed to make them more combinable are 
concerned, and what their extent is. 
 
5.1. Starting points  
 
5.1.1. A (conventional) finding 
In the Postscript to Literature Review – Prescript to Methods, the concept of a 
finding was chosen to represent the main carrier of empirical knowledge in a 
health research paper but was left vague. The processing of study findings in 
the analysis suggested the following refinements. 
 
For the purposes of this work, a (conventional) research finding is taken to be 
any proposition, data point, material object or a closely connected set of these 
that IS and/ or represents primarily (a framing of) some empirical contents 
obtained through the methods of a specifiable research study.101  
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 Here is a clarification of some of the choices of words in this definition:  
 Primarily, in ‘primarily empirical contents’ takes into account what is now a received 
idea that empirical knowledge cannot be entirely theory-free as well as of boundary 
cases where a description of a method, theory, background assumption, etc. appear in 
a proposition together with empirical knowledge. 
 
 IS and/or represents tries to accommodate the fact that we speak of findings as: 1) 
things (whether material objects, data points or propositions) procured by researchers in 
a laboratory, a field, etc.; 2) representations of these things for further manipulation and 
the outcomes of such further manipulation; and 3) representations of 1) and 2) aimed at 
being shared with others. The and/or tries to accommodate views which distinguish 
between some finding ‘in and of itself’ and its representation and ones which see a 
representation as integral to a finding, with no finding being there before it is 
represented. 
 
 A framing of has been added to acknowledge positions that some (understood as the 
‘same’) empirical contents can be there or be represented in various ways – e.g. 
through the highlighting of different features, the application of a different theory, 
conceptualisation, analysis, the use of different words and sentence structure, etc. ‘IS 





More narrowly, the findings which the papers analysed in this study provided 
stand anywhere on a continuum  
going from 
representations of raw data, typically quotes (e.g. At work you have to force 
yourself to stay awake of course, Study 6); 
through  
findings that could (appear to) be purely observational claims, e.g. Analgesics 
were given orally in 70.5% of the patients, 26.5% were prescribed fentanyl 
patches, and 3% intravenous  morphine (Study 15)  
to 
interpretations that show a high degree of recourse to external sources and 
transformations of the raw data, but nevertheless point to some empirical 
contents from the current study, be it framed entirely within the language of 
those external sources, e.g. Using Bury’s (1991) definition of biographical 
disruption and Charmaz’s (1983) concept of ‘loss of self’, several of the people 
in this study appeared to experience cancer as biographical disruption because 
it represented a threat to their identity (Study 16). 
The latter are findings whose evidential status may be questioned from certain 
‘positivist’ positions, but are considered typical qualitative research findings and 
are treated as such here. 
 
5.1.2.  A basic finding 
A ‘basic finding’ is understood within the framework set by the Vocabulary of 
Elements of Findings, as containing a single ‘expression’ (that is, representation 
of a single feature, state, behaviour, etc.) or a single ‘relationship’. This largely 
syntactic view of a basic finding does not discriminate in terms of the complexity 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 Obtained through the methods of a specifiable research study guards against the 
possibility that any empirical fact asserted in a research study, including those vaguely 
attributed to ‘research’ or those whose relationship to the methods of a particular study 
is unclear, are treated as a ‘research finding’. 
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of elements (e.g. a finding can be about a gene but also about a hospital) and 
interpretiveness (e.g. a finding can be ‘purely observational’ or heavily laden 
with sociological theory).  
 
5.1.3. Boundaries of findings 
Two approaches to the setting of boundaries of findings were resorted to in the 
exploration of similarities and differences between types of finding.  
One of them was to pick/construct units of meaning that gravitated around a 
normal sentence. Often these were coterminous with a normal sentence but not 
necessarily. Several sentences could be extracted together as a single 
‘composite’ finding. Elements of a single sentence could be extracted 
individually if perceived as separable and important. This was the approach 
used in the extraction-coding in NVivo, Excel and EPPI-Reviewer.  
The other approach was to set narrow and more rigid boundaries for findings. 
For connected text, a finding was an individual sentence or a verbless heading. 
For tables, a finding included the data for a feature or entity with a limited 
number (0-5) of subtypes beneath (e.g. education with its five levels). This was 
the approach used in the formalisation of findings through the Vocabulary of 
Elements of Findings.  
 
5.2. Similarities and differences between quantitative and qualitative 
findings 
In response to by far the most prominent issue in the debate on combinability of 
studies in health research synthesis, the search for similarities and differences 
between quantitative and qualitative findings gained priority. It was carried out 
through the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings and was thus a search for 
compositional and structural differences between quantitative and qualitative 
findings. The development of the Vocabulary had already re-scaled 
expectations about the likely extent of such differences. Its 10 key elements 
(‘obsessive something’, ‘carrier’, ‘expression’, ‘relationship’, ‘knowledge 
something’, ‘privileged something’, ‘subsidiary something’, ‘quantifier’, ‘qualifier’ 
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and ‘indexical’) were generic. They appeared indispensable in any type of 
research even if not in any one finding. They did not appear to cluster in stable 
patterns. Such impressions had to be, however, formally verified.  As the 
refinement of the approach could only happen at an advanced stage of the 
analysis, it is briefly described here rather than as part of the initial 
methodological set-up. Details are provided in the Appendix to Chapter 5. 
Findings were sampled from each group into which findings were classified 
during the extraction-coding, with the exception of some of the lowest level 
groups in EPPI-Reviewer. The initial sample consisted of 327 items. 26 of these 
were excluded as a result of applying the conceptualisation of ‘conventional 
finding’ given in 5.1.1. The final sample contained 301 findings. 
The data – the formalisation for each finding – were transferred into IBM SPSS 
Statistics, Version 19 (IBM, 2013). New variables for each of the key elements 
of findings were computed, to reflect the number of times a particular element 
appeared in a finding (e.g. Finding 1: obsessive something – 1, carrier – 1, 
expression – 2). Each finding was also ascribed a label for quantitative, 
qualitative or hybrid status reflecting the classifications of the sampled studies 
described in 2.2. As per the ‘preferred grouping’, there were 128 quantitative, 90 
qualitative and 83 hybrid findings in the sample. As per the alternative grouping 
where method was prioritised, there were 182 quantitative and 119 qualitative 
findings. As per the alternative grouping where topic was prioritised, the 
numbers were of 150 quantitative and 151 qualitative findings.  
Five well established claims about distinguishing features of quantitative and 
qualitative studies were operationalised into hypotheses about the relative 
prevalence of certain elements. Frequencies for the Vocabulary elements 
participating in these hypotheses were obtained, for each of the groups of the 
above categorisations. For the remaining elements frequencies were still 
obtained to explore the possibility for unexpected differences of composition.   
 
The first claim tested was that quantitative studies are markedly more ‘positivist’ 
and/or ‘naively realist’ than qualitative studies, which are, purportedly, more 
sophisticatedly realist (e.g. critically realist) or constructivist. This was 
operationalised as the task to compare, between groups, the number of findings 
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containing at least one knowledge something (which I had conceptualised as 
indicator of the mediated or uncertain character of knowledge) and the number 
of findings formulated as if of “a world out there” (a common, somewhat 
pejorative, description of the representational conventions of quantitative 
research). Let me remind some of the features of knowledge somethings 
discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1.1). For instance, “Noise related to the 
equipment was another minor disadvantage of oxygen usage” (actual 
formulation of a finding from Study 15) spoke directly about ‘the world’. ‘Noise 
related to the equipment was reported to be another minor disadvantage of 
oxygen usage’, or ‘Analysis suggested that noise related to the equipment was 
another minor disadvantage of oxygen usage’ would be examples of 
formulations that contain a knowledge something. In contrast, “The monthly 
personal monitoring dosimetry readings were lower than the minimum 
detectable radiation dose for both the chest-badge and finger-ring dosimeters 
(10 μSv and 300 μSv, respectively)” (actual formulation of finding from Study 8) 
is a finding expressing by means of several knowledge somethings what can 
also be expressed through none, as in ‘The radiation received by radiologists 
performing breast wire localisation was very low’. I hypothesised that most 
qualitative studies would contain a knowledge something, while most or all 
quantitative studies would have none. 
As per the preferred grouping of studies (quantitative, qualitative and hybrid), 
59.4% of the quantitative findings, 47.8% of the qualitative findings and 51.8% 
of the hybrid findings referred to some knowledge something. The numbers for 
alternative classification 1 (method prioritised) were 55.5% for quantitative and 
51.3% for qualitative findings, and for alternative classification 2 (topic 
prioritised) were 57.3% for quantitative and 50.3% for qualitative findings. Thus, 
regardless of the manner of classifying studies, quantitative studies were, 
contrary to expectations, somewhat more likely to make references to scientific 
artefacts and processes that mediate knowledge about the world. The 
differences were, however, minor. 
 
The second claim tested concerned the greater (acknowledged) role of the 
researcher in qualitative studies. It was operationalised as the hypotheses that 
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qualitative findings will be much more likely to contain a reference to a ‘knower’ 
engaged in a particular study and that those references will be much more 
extended in qualitative studies. This was not the case. A knower was present in 
only 7 findings, 5 or 6 of which were classified as quantitative as per all three 
classifications. Knowers were represented very simply – as ‘we’ or ‘our’ (we 
reported, our sample). As much as quantitative and qualitative studies may 
differ substantially in the extent to which they recognise the effect of the 
researcher on findings, describe relevant features and behaviours of the 
researcher, etc. such differences were not identifiable at the level of findings. 
 
As per the third hypothesis, as it is often claimed that qualitative studies are 
much more focused on context and interconnections, qualitative findings were 
expected to contain many more privileged somethings, subsidiary somethings 
and relationships than quantitative findings. Privileged somethings were coded 
for in 32.8% of quantitative findings, in 43.3% of qualitative findings and 42.2% 
of hybrid findings (the differences of these numbers with the numbers from the 
alternative groupings ranged between 0.7% and 2.9%). Relationships (at least 
one) were coded for in 34.0% of quantitative, 44.4% of qualitative and 44.6% of 
hybrid findings (the differences of these numbers with the numbers from the 
alternative classifications ranged between 0% and 2.7%). The number of 
subsidiary somethings across the sample was very low (a total of 12 for all 301 
findings). It was equal in quantitative and qualitative findings as per the 
preferred grouping and alternative classification 2 (5-5 and 6-6). Thus, the 
general tendency predicted by the hypothesis was observed (in the case of 
elements of higher frequency), but the marked predominance was not.  
 
The fourth hypothesis tested the claim that the concepts of qualitative studies 
tend to be much more complex and vaguer. I translated this claim into a 
hypothesis that qualitative findings will have a larger number of codes for 
‘obsessive something, aspect’ – the code reflecting that an obsessive 
something is studied through a particular component or perspective towards it. 
The numbers were slightly larger in qualitative findings as per the preferred 
classification and alternative classification 2, topic prioritised (in the former 
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case, 23.4% of quantitative findings, 28.9% of qualitative findings and 16.9% of 
hybrid findings contained an obsessive something, aspect; in the latter –  21.3% 
of quantitative and 25.2% of qualitative findings). The difference was very small 
as per alternative classification 1, method prioritised (22.5% of quantitative and 
24.4% of qualitative findings contained this element of the Vocabulary). 
Finally, I hypothesised that codes for ‘qualifiers’ will be much more frequent in 
qualitative studies, as a most likely pointer to evaluative (in a moral or emotional 
sense) elements in findings. The results disconfrimed this expectation, but the 
difference was unstable. In the case of the preferred and alternative 
classification 1 (method prioritised), qualifiers were more in quantitative findings 
(15.6% of quantitative findings, 7.8% of qualitative findings and 19.3 of hybrid 
findings contained a qualifier in the former case and 17.0% of quantitative and 
10.1% of qualitative findings contained a qualifier in the latter case). In the case 
of alternative classification 2, the difference was almost lost (with 15.4% of 
quantitative and 13.2% of qualitative findings having a qualifier). 
Table T 5.2 shows the relative presence in quantitative and qualitative findings 
















Table T 5.2: Presence of the ‘other’ elements of the Vocabulary of 




Group – No (%) 
Carrier 
Group – No (%) 
Expression 
Group – No (%) 
Quantifier 







Qn – 60 (46.9%) 
Ql – 43 (47.8%) 
H – 47 (56.6%) 
Qn – 55 (53.0%) 
Ql – 51 (56.7%) 
H – 47 (56.6%) 
Qn – 79 (61.7%) 
Ql – 73 (81.1%) 
H – 69 (83.1%) 
Qn – 44 (34.4%) 
Ql – 16 (17.8%) 







Qn – 90 (49.5%) 
Ql – 60 (50.4%) 
 
Qn – 81 (44.5%) 
Ql – 72 (60.5%) 
 
Qn – 122 
(67.0%) 
Ql – 99 (83.2%) 
 
Qn – 61 (33.5%) 








Qn – 77 (50.7%) 
Ql – 74 (49.0%) 
 
Qn – 64 (42.7%) 
Ql – 89 (58.9%) 
 
Qn – 98 (65.3%) 
Ql – 123 (81.5%) 
 
Qn – 52 (34.7%) 
Ql – 36 (23.8%) 
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 Group – Qn (quantitative), Ql (qualitative), H (hybrid) 
No – number of findings of a particular type (Qn, Ql, H) in which a particular element found 
% – percentage of the above number relative to the total number of findings of this type 
 
Comments to the Table: The difference in quantifiers (in the direction of quantitative findings 
having many more of these) was not as impressive as expected partly because non-precise or 
common quantifiers (some, many, one) are reasonably well represented in qualitative research, 
but more importantly because many quantifiers were coded as part of a particular type of 
‘expression’ which was then merged with expressions rather than quantifiers.  
 
One possible explanation for there being a larger percentage of expressions in the pool of 
qualitative findings is the fact that knowledge somethings were more in quantitative studies. As 
discussed in 4.1.1.2, there is a stable pattern of coding where coding for a knowledge 
something is equivalent to coding for one or more expressions. If a knowledge something was 
present, I tended to code first for a knowledge something rather than an expression as it 
participated in specific hypotheses. In the quantitative analysis, I used only one coding string 
per finding rather than all alternatives I had generated. It tended to be the first string, as typically 
this was closest to the surface syntax of a sentence. 
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Overall, compositional differences between quantitative and qualitative findings 
were found to be minor. This was unsurprising – the process of coding with the 
Vocabulary of Elements had indicated quite clearly that, through the lens of this 
method, quantitative and qualitative findings are first and foremost findings. The 
hypotheses tested above were knowingly weak. I nevertheless needed to 
perform the quantitative verification so that I was not swayed by impressions. 
‘Knowingly weak’ can only be said post factum. 
 
5.3. Other formal similarities and differences between findings 
A small set of formal similarities and differences was obtained by probing into 
the other most typical way of arguing for challenges to the combinability and 
compatibility of findings – the presentation of long lists of varied labels for types 
of studies, evidence and data (see Methods Chapter, 4.1.2).  
260 types of findings (some of them single-member ones) were specified during 
the extraction-coding. Over 50 descriptors for data, evidence, findings and 
studies were identified in the analysed texts or generated by applying further 
labels to these (e.g. “epidemiological data”, “cohort study data”, ‘emotive data’ 
‘associative, correlative, causal data’, ‘data of greater or lesser public interest’, 
etc.). These were used to create ‘groups of tension’ where types had a 
dimension in common but fell at very different points on its continuum.  
Five types of formal differences between findings were elicited. The first – 
dramatic difference of magnitude – is well recognised in the ‘heterogeneity of 
findings’ debate in the context of meta-analysis (see Chapter 1, 2.2). The 
remaining types of differences also appear to be sufficiently acknowledged 
though not in a structured way. I will describe them only briefly, without this 
being a comment on their importance. First, we have a difference of reliability 
between findings on the same issue. For instance, self-reported clinical data are 
less reliable than clinical data from medical records which are, in turn, arguably 
less reliable than clinical data collected specifically for the purposes of a 
particular study. The paradigmatic case of difference of reliability in the context 
of research synthesis is that of findings from RCTs and findings from 
observational studies. Then, we have a difference of degree of detail, such as 
234 
 
from ‘thicker’ and ‘thinner’ descriptions of emotional experiences of illness. 
Then, we have a difference of scope, such as in the case of longitudinal and 
cross-sectional findings, or descriptive and associative findings on the same 
phenomenon. Finally, we have a difference of level, as with findings directly 
about a phenomenon and with findings about the method used to obtain 
findings about that phenomenon.  
As informative as these types of differences may be, the approach of 
accumulating strikingly different labels for types of findings still bears the burden 
of showing some substance. 
 
5.4. Scope of the thematic differences between findings 
Perhaps that substance is, after all, in the thematic differences between 
findings. The proxy measure used for these was simple – the frequency with 
which more than one unit of information was coded under the same NVivo code 
(already reported in 3.1.1, in describing the extraction-coding in NVivo). By 
virtue of being in direct relationship to the injunction to code first as close as 
possible to the original, with no or minimal transformations, and only then 
experiment, this frequency is an indication of the degree of thematic variability 
within and across the sampled studies.  To remind, 511 codes (33.8%) 
contained a single unit of information; 505 (33.4%) were empty; 308 codes 
(20.4%) had 2 or 3 units and 190 (12.4%) had 4 or more units of information.103 
If we take the used rather than all codes as 100% (i.e. exclude the empty ones), 
50.7% of the codes had a single unit of information, 30.5% had 2 or 3 units, and 
18.8% had 4 or more units of information. This suggests a substantial variability 
of themes within and across studies.  
The hierarchical structure of the coding, where any inclusion in a higher level is 
an indication of a shared meaning (and there were only 25 main codes, out of 
1514), is a reminder that this individuality of meaning is relative. Also, those 
studies were intentionally sampled as highly heterogeneous. But they are 
nevertheless studies obtained for the purposes of the same synthesis question. 
They were retrieved using restrictive search strategies. Each study had at least 
                                                          
103
 The information on 2 and 3 units was available only in the Appendix. The percentage was 
calculable from the other information though. 
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one counterpart of the same broad theme, with two groups of four thematically 
similar studies and one group of three. There is a thought to be kept in mind 
that findings on the same or similar health research topic may be, in their 
untransformed or minimally transformed state, more thematically individual than 
their being ‘on the same or similar topic’ would suggest. 
 
5.5. Similarities and differences in supposedly highly standardised 
descriptors 
Maybe the above thematic variability within and across studies is expected. 
After all, a defining feature of good research is its originality. Another defining 
feature of research, however, is its high degree of standardisation. This section 
presents findings about similarities and differences in the collection and 
representation of two types of supposedly highly standardised information in 
health research papers on cancer: 1) basic cancer-related information (e.g. on 
cancer type, stage, treatment, etc.) and 2) socio-demographic data on 
participants. These contribute various elements, be it background ones, to any 
finding in a health research paper on cancer in humans. 
 
5.5.1. Similarities and differences in the collection and representation 
of basic cancer-related information  
Differences in the reporting (and, potentially, collection) of data on 6 basic 
cancer-related variables were explored. These variables were cancer type (e.g. 
breast, lung, stomach), (potential) cancer phase (e.g. predisposition & risk, 
primary prevention, occurrence), cancer stage (e.g. early, locally advanced), 
time since diagnosis, treatment phase (e.g. active surveillance, on treatment, 
post treatment) and treatment type (e.g. surgery, chemotherapy, hormones). 
Data from the Excel extraction-coding worksheets (Studies 1-12) and EPPI-
Reviewer (Studies 13-17) were used.  
Availability of information across those standard parameters. The reporting of 
data on cancer-related variables was most consistent in the case of cancer 
type. Of the 17 studies analysed, 15 were explicit of the cancer(s) they 
addressed. The two exceptions were Study 4, a review on breaking bad news to 
236 
 
cancer patients where an ‘all cancers’ can be safely presumed, and Study 17, a 
narrative analysis aiming to understand the combined use of complementary 
and biomedical care by a patient and her spouse. Cancer stage was recorded 
for 9 studies, treatment type for 6,104 time since diagnosis for 5 studies, cancer 
phase for 4, and treatment stage for 2 studies. That is, data on basic cancer-
related parameters different to cancer type were reported in between 16.7% 
and 52.9% of the analysed studies. No study reported all of them. This does not 
necessarily mean that information on those parameters could not be deduced, 
at least approximately. For instance, if a cancer has been reported as 
“advanced” in ‘cancer stage’, some of the categories from ‘(potential) cancer 
phase’ become irrelevant, such as primary prevention. Also, information may 
have been omitted if it was reported in a non-standard place or in a non-
standard way.105 Such disclaimers notwithstanding, substantial variability in the 
reporting of seemingly basic cancer-related information was observed in the 
sampled studies.  
Identity of study-level categories. As standard as they may seem, the above 
parameters and their subdivision into categories were formulated for the 
purposes of the test synthesis study. This was necessitated by differences in 
designations across studies – small in the case of the broad parameters, e.g. 
time since diagnosis, substantial in the case of specific categories, e.g. 
designations for cancer stages. In the case of cancer type and treatment type, 
the sample did not show a notable variability in labels for specific categories – 
e.g. breast cancer and chemotherapy were breast cancer and chemotherapy 
across studies, at least in this sample. In the case of treatment type, however, 
combinations of treatments were sometimes reported together (e.g. 
chemotherapy and radiotherapy), while at other times the percentages 
accumulated to the respective individual categories. In the case of cancer 
phase, where 4 synthesis categories with data from more than one study were 
formed, all source study categories were different (e.g. the synthesis level 
category of ‘progression phase’, included data on “progressive early prostate 
                                                          
104
 If only one aspect of the treatment was reported which coincided with the focus of the study 
(e.g. the use of oxygen therapy in Study 14), this was not considered sufficient to treat ‘type of 
treatment’ as reported. 
 
105
 A further level of testing requires re-reading all studies with a focus on cancer-related and 
socio-demographic information only. 
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cancer” from a study reviewed in Study 3 and “2 to 3 weeks after diagnosis, 
followed up for 1 year” from Study 12). In the case of cancer stage, where again 
4 categories with data from more than one study were formed, 1 category 
showed a partial overlap of designations (2 out of 5 studies referred to ‘their’ 
cancers as “early”). More consequentially, the criteria by which cases were 
ascribed to categories (such as what criteria were used to diagnose breast 
cancer or what counts as early stage cancer in this study) or the details of a 
category content (such as what exactly chemotherapy in this case involved) 
were not reported. Study 10 appeared to be the only one noting the 
classification system according to which a type of cancer was determined. This 
is 1 study on 1 parameter out of 17 studies and 6 parameters.  
 
5.5.2. Similarities and differences in the collection and representation 
of socio-demographic information 
In the case of socio-demographic information, differences in the reporting of 
(and, potentially, collection of data on) 7 parameters were explored: sex/gender, 
age, ethnicity/ race/ nationality, marital status, educational status, socio-
economic status, and employment. Data from the 14 primary studies within the 
sample were analysed. Reviews were excluded as I did not expect them to 
report extensive detail from the (many) studies they covered. The bar of 
completeness of information set for primary studies would have been too high 
for them. 
Availability of information across those standard parameters. Sex/gender was 
reported across all 14 primary studies. Age was reported in 13 of them. Marital 
status appeared in 6; education in 5; breakdowns of ethnicity/nationality/race 
were available in 4 studies; socio-economic status and employment were 
reported on in 3 studies. Within categories, of the 13 primary studies which 
reported age, 8 reported a mean value, 7 a standard deviation, 5 reported 
range, 4 reported age bands, and 1 reported year of birth of individual 
participants. Again, this does not mean that information on those parameters 
could not be deduced at some level of precision. 
Identity of study-level categories. Study-level categories were (expectedly) 
identical for sex/gender and for mean, standard deviation and range of age (a 
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man is a man and a standard deviation is a standard deviation quite reliably). 
The 4 studies which used age bands to report age cut them off differently, with 
1 overlap (2 studies had a category of “> 85”). Similarly, the breaking into 
categories was different for each of the 5 studies which reported marital status.  
In the 5 categories for education, out of 18 study-level categories (e.g. “did not 
graduate from high school”; education level “low”, etc.), 2 were identical (the 
designation “high school”). The most consistent study-level category of ethnicity 
across studies was “other”. In the 3 studies that reported on socio-economic 
status, 1 operationalisation was of household finances at the end of the month 
(with categories such as “just enough to make ends meet”), 1 was of caregiver 
income in Indian rupees, and 1 of annual household income in US dollars. 
Details of category contents for non-obvious or location-specific categories and 
criteria by which boundary cases were ascribed were not reported. 
In summary, findings differ formally and thematically in an aspect where they 
are supposed to differ primarily factually. 
 
6. The multiplicity of findings – illustrations of multiple meanings and 
uses  
Similarities and differences between findings are obviously a highly problematic 
issue. Not much of an original claim in the abstract – we could have just as well 
stopped with Plato’s “Parmenides” – but hopefully the specific illustrations were 
telling of the nature of research synthesis and scientific research more broadly. 
Similarities and differences between findings are a highly problematic issue not 
least because of a finding’s multiplicity. This section will aim to make the latter 
tangible. Theoretically, the multiplicity of findings is known all too well to anyone 
who has thought in some depth about language and communication even if not 
research synthesis. But it seems to slip out of view. Research synthesis studies 
are in the paradoxical position of being premised on and making use of the 
multiplicities of findings (if a finding could not have somewhat different 
meanings to the ones initially intended, most synthesis studies would not be 
possible), but never facing the implications of this multiplicity beyond the one 
that has been of use to them. If research synthesis studies were taking the 
multiplicity of findings seriously, a reversal of the process would have been 
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discussed much more frequently – starting from primary studies and proactively 
suggesting what information they can contribute to  a range of questions that 
concern us, rather than starting from a synthesis question and filtering 
information relative to it only. 
In bringing the multiplicity of findings to the limelight, I also make the point of 
specifying it in an ‘extreme but (largely) realistic way’. By ‘extreme’ I mean that I 
break up a finding or generate interpretations well beyond what a normal 
synthesis study would do. In the case when I break up a finding, I do so up to 
basic findings, where ‘basic finding’ is understood within the framework set by 
the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings as containing a single expression or a 
single relationship (see 5.1.2. on starting points). By ‘largely realistic’ I mean 
that if a sufficient number of similar studies and the technology to enable the 
data extraction and storage were available, an average synthesis researcher 
would proceed in very similar ways to the ones outlined (or so I believe).  
Three aspects of the multiplicity of a finding were specified: 
 the multiplicity of boundaries, contents and meaning of ‘the  same’ 
finding – understood as the fact that we can break a research finding 
meaningfully at a number of different points, and/or combine it 
meaningfully up to many different points.  Formulated differently – the 
fact that a posited research finding (e.g. coterminous with a normal 
sentence) can give rise to two or more self-contained units of the right 
type of relationship to the source finding, where a ‘self-contained unit’ is 
understood as one that can be expressed in a proposition and ‘the right 
type of relationship’ is understood as one where the movement from the 
source finding to the self-contained unit(s) can be justified within the 
relevant research context. 
 
 the multiplicity of meanings and uses of ‘the same’ finding – a 
multiplicity that is closely related to and partly overlapping with the above 
multiplicities but also emphasising the fact that some of the meanings 
and uses of findings cannot be seen as ‘inherently contained’106 within 
                                                          
106
 If we take extreme non-essentialist positions, no meaning or use of a finding is simply 
inherent within them. However, even from such positions one can accept that in certain contexts 
the majority of those perceiving a research finding are likely to say that it is a ‘finding about Xi’, 
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them but come from their relationships with other carriers of knowledge 
and with user’s intentions.  
 
 the multiplicity of representations of ‘the same’ finding. 
 
Multiplicity is thus sometimes seen as primarily a function of the finding 
(inherent multiplicity) and sometimes as a function of the study, its intended 
secondary uses and its users (relational multiplicity). 
Although I had incorporated the intention to quantify the multiplicity of findings in 
the study methodology, I could not realise it because of an unaccounted for 
limitation of the software. Multiply coded findings could not be retrieved unless 
the software (both NVivo and EPPI-Reviewer) was queried finding by finding 
and the coding (multiple or singular) for each finding checked.  This prevented 
the quantification, as means, of the multiplicity of boundaries, contents, 
meanings, uses and representations of ‘the same’ finding.  Instead, its tangible 
reality is illustrated through two examples and a lower level quantification.  In 
the first example, multiplicity is seen primarily as a user-independent fact of a 
complex finding being composed of a large number of clearly separable 
independent elements. In the second, multiplicity is seen primarily as user-
dependent affordances for multiple interpretations offered by the same data.107 
  
6.1. Multiplicity of contents, meanings and uses in a negative 
finding of ‘no difference’ 
Take the following example of a multi-component finding: 
Patients who preferred alternative services were no different than others 
with respect to demographic variables (eg, age, sex, income), functional 
status (ECOG score, activities of daily living), social support (Medical 
Outcomes Survey score), quality of life (Functional Assessment of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
where X1 = X2 = … = Xi, and ‘it is a finding that can be used for Yi’, where Y1 = Y2 = … = Yi. I 
treat those meanings as ‘inherently contained’. 
 
107
 I do not illustrate the multiplicity of representations of findings as, on subsequent analysis, it 
was seen as more relevant to processes of selection in research synthesis rather than 
processes of transformation. 
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Cancer Therapy-General G score), or physical or psychological symptom 
burden (physical and psychological subscales of the GDI, respectively) 
(Study 1). 
 
The details of an extreme but (largely) realistic estimate of the number of 
meanings and uses of this finding can be found in Box B 5.1. This estimate 
comes up with 12 basic findings from the above sentence, 120 versions of the 
basic finding (each of the basic findings extended with one of 10 key features of 
participants and context gleaned from the broader text) and 5 pointers 
(mentions of the scales used) to methodological findings in the broader text. 
The first line synthesis studies that can be envisaged are 14 ‘same topic’ 
studies (with the number so large because the alternative services explored 
were 6, and because alternative services can be employed not only in palliative 
care, as in the example study, but in healthcare more generally), 3 ‘transformed 
topic’ studies where the distance from the original topics is greater and the 
topics reflect the researcher’s (my) interests (e.g. attitudes to practical services 
with limited human interaction), and 1 broad methodological synthesis study. In 
total, this makes 2045 units of information (17x120 units of information to be 
used in thematic syntheses and 5 units of information to be used in a 
methodological synthesis). The unique units of information are, however, 34 (12 
expressions, 10 features of sample and context, 5 methodological pointers and 



































The finding: Patients who preferred alternative services were no different than others with 
respect to demographic variables (eg, age, sex, income), functional status (ECOG score, 
activities of daily living), social support (Medical Outcomes Survey score), quality of life 
(Functional Assessment of Cancer Therapy-General G score), or physical or psychological 
symptom burden (physical and psychological subscales of the GDI, respectively) (Study 1). 
Steps in the estimate of its multiplicity: 
1. Following the principle that a basic finding contains a single expression or a single 
relationship, we can count nine expressions that are explicit in the sentence and three 
further expressions to which it alludes (shown in square brackets),
1
 i.e. there are 12 
extractable basic findings in the ‘bigger finding’: 
- Age of the group of interest is no different than the criterion 
- Sex of the group of interest is no different than the criterion 
- Income is no different than the criterion 
- [Race/ethnicity] is no different than the criterion 
- [Marital status] is no different than the criterion 
- [Education] is no different than the criterion  
- Functional status as ECOG score is no different than the criterion 
- Functional status as Activities of daily living is no different than the criterion 
- Social support as Medical Outcomes Survey score is no different than the criterion 
- Quality of life as Functional Assessment of Cancer Therapy-General G score is no 
different than the criterion 
- Physical symptom burden as Physical subscale of GDI is no different than the criterion 
- Psychological symptom burden as Psychological subscale of GDI is no different than the 
criterion. 
 
2. These are, however, expressions in a particular group, in a particular context. Thus each 
of the above basic findings has to be ‘tagged’ with each of the key features of 
participants and context reported in the study.  
To keep to the ‘realistic’ in the ‘extreme but (largely) realistic data extraction’, where one 
does not take every feature of a group and context as relevant, I take as key 7 of the 
features reported in the table on patient characteristics (all demographic characteristics 




























text (country – US, particular setting – oncology clinics, health services programme –
Medicare). That is, there are 10 key ‘tags’ to be attached to each of the basic findings. 
 This makes a total of 10x12 = 120 versions of the basic findings.  
3. At the level of knowledge somethings, there are five scales/subscales mentioned in this 
sentence – ECOG, Medical Outcomes Survey, Functional Assessment of Cancer 
Therapy-General, Physical subscale of GDI and Psychological symptom burden of GDI. 
Although no specific information is available from the sentence, there are 5 pointers to 
methodological findings in this study. 
 
4. There are 14 ‘close-at-hand’, ‘same topic’ potential research synthesis studies, if 
we take the broad topic of this study to be ‘attitudes to alternative services’. 
These include two ‘same topic’ studies at the generic level – ‘alternative services’ – on 
alternative services in palliative care and alternative services in healthcare in general. 
The remaining are 2x6 ‘same topic’ studies at the particular level. The alternative 
services explored in this study are 1) vouchers for practical assistance at home, 2) 
transportation, 3) peer support, 4) meal delivery, 5) case management and 6) family 
care. The doubling is because, again, the attitudes to those services can be explored 
within the context of palliative care and healthcare in general. 
Again following the ‘realistic’ in the ‘extreme but (largely) realistic data extraction’, where 
a researcher’s interests make a difference, I will add three ‘transformed topic’ 
potential synthesis studies, to cover all healthcare fields – on attitudes to practical 
services with limited human interaction (the examples from this study will be 
transportation and meal delivery), human interaction-intense services (the examples from 
this study will be peer support and family care) and ‘formalising the informal services’ 
(vouchers for practical assistance at home and, possibly, case management). I will also 
add a topic for a broad methodological synthesis study – standardised measures of 
functioning and experiences used in palliative care research. 
Thus, in an extreme but largely realistic scenario 18 synthesis studies were envisaged, 
i.e. 18 different uses of the information from the ‘starting point finding’ above.  
For the potential thematic syntheses, the example finding will provide 17x120 = units of 
information (the estimate of 120 is as per 2. above). 
For the potential methodological synthesis, the example finding will provide 5 units of 




6.2. Multiplicity of meanings and uses – multiple affordances for 
interpretation offered by the same data 
The other well known but sometimes vaguely appreciated or sent into infinity 
multiplicity of findings comes from their potential for multiple theoretical and 
conceptual re-framings.  
Let us take the following extended excerpt (to include both raw data – interview 
quotes, and interpretations) from Study 16: 
The experience of threats to identity manifest as ruptures in the taken-for-
granted assumptions that comprise an individual’s social world. This includes 
bringing to the fore pain, suffering and death which in turn are experienced as 
threats to identity. An example is when the onset of illness brings to the fore 
one’s own mortality and acute awareness of the ageing process. This is 
evident when individuals perceive that their illness has affected their 
appearance and self-image: 
“I hate myself at the moment. I really hate going out because I look … oh 
my skin at the moment … my face, I’m coming out in spots and I don’t like 
the way I look. I look like a little old lady and I don’t feel like one usually … 
I’ve never classed myself as old … I look at that photo [before cancer 
diagnosis] and think now that’s me … this [talking about the present] is not 
me.” (P6, I2, unemployed, female) 
Looking older threatened P6’s previous identity and made her think that she 
was no longer the same person as she was prior to her diagnosis. She 
referred to a photograph of her former self which served to re-enforce her 
perception that she was no longer the same person. Her negative perception 
of her self-image was re-enforced by her GP who had written on a form that 
she had read that she was a ‘frail, underweight female who now looks older 
than her years’. With reference to Bury’s (1991) concept of biographical 
disruption, cancer took on symbolic significance for P6 because it affected 
how she saw herself and how others saw her. Further, her experience 
demonstrates the ways in which others, in this instance, health professionals, 




Taking into account the context of the whole study, I could reconstruct the 
following main functions and messages of the excerpt above as reflecting the 
authors’ intentions: 
 to illustrate and assert the effect of illness on appearance, self-image and 
awareness of aging – with these effects being such that they constitute 
an identity threat; 
 to assert the potential influence of health professionals on perceptions of 
identity; 
 to assert that the effects of cancer on the interviewee’s life are to be 
taken to mean that cancer took on symbolic significance for her and that 
it acts as biographical disruption. 
 
Next are some possible re-uses of the same excerpt for synthesis studies – the 
outcomes of an extreme but (largely) realistic generation of associations: 
 the interview quote shows evidence of ‘verbal self-harming’ (“I hate 
myself at the moment”, “I don’t like the way I look”; possibly the silences 
are meaningful in this direction, too -  
“I really hate going out because I look … oh my skin at the moment … 
my face”); 
 the description of the consequences of reading the GP notes prompts an 
interest in non-biomedical information in patients’ records and issues of 
access to them; 
 
 that same description may be used as data for a study on health 
professionals’ words that hurt – for better or worse; 
 
 more  directly, the interview quote provides evidence of the effects of 
colorectal cancer and respective treatments on appearance, and the 
centrality of those effects for patients; 
 
 the concern with appearance of this interviewee, coupled with recurring 
comments in the study of the effect of cancer on social life, raises the 
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question if the effect of cancer on social life may be mediated in a 
significant way by appearance concerns; 
 
 elements of the first quote along with the second quote and its framing 
may be used in a study of illness and crossing the young-old boundary (“I 
look like a little old lady and I don’t feel like one usually … I’ve never 
classed myself as old …”; Her negative perception of her self-image was 
re-enforced by her GP who had written on a form that she had read that 
she was a ‘frail, underweight female who now looks older than her 
years’); 
 
 This excerpt provides data for an exploration of photos as an identity 
anchor point. 
 
I will not be quantifying or evaluating the multiplicity of this research finding. My 
point has been to illustrate another aspect of the multiplicity of findings and 
provide some boundaries to it as a reference point – much broader than the 
ones currently applied in research synthesis but not unthinkable. If I were the 
researcher extracting data from this excerpt, this would be the point before 
which I would feel there is more that is interesting in this finding and beyond 
which I would consider I am “data dredging”. I will come back to the issue of 
multiplicity in Section 8, in discussing the application of the injunction for 
multiple coding. 
 
7.  Omissions, silences and half-silences 
The relationship between missing and available information was another 
determinant I posited of the capacity of a finding for meaningful transformations. 
I use ‘missing’ or ‘omissions, silences and half-silences’ to stand for anything 
that is ‘not (sufficiently) there’, in a piece of finding or in the broader study as 
relevant to this finding – missing altogether or intentionally or unintentionally left 
vague. Omissions, silences and half-silences are sometimes only a function of 
the study, in the sense that most of its competent and careful readers will 
consider certain additional information as highly relevant. Sometimes they are a 
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function of the study and its intended secondary uses: that is, most of the 
competent researchers working to some synthesis specifications will require 
certain additional information, even if it was not an omission in the terms of the 
primary study. Finally, they can be a function of any of the above and the 
sensitivities of a competent user: different types of users, even if competent, will 
be responsive to different omissions, silences and half-silences. If the original 
study failed to provide a needed element or provided an imperfectly specified 
one, a transformation could help in ‘creating’ the missing, or a substitute for it, 
from other information available in the research report. The ‘missing’ was 
conceptualised as a negative determinant of transformations, too – it would 
block the possibility for certain transformation as the acceptable directions 
would be insufficiently determined. 
A range of codes, tagging documents and tags were used to explore what was 
not there. Just as with people, there are so many ways for a piece of 
information to be missing and to be missed. The section on supposedly highly 
standardised types of information has shown some of these. Further to these, 
there are often discrepancies between intentions and outcomes, e.g. a study 
sets out to explore certain associations but does not report on them. There are 
“deletions” of the context of production of a finding. There are missing elements 
that are automatically supplied by the reader and as such are not really missing 
in an extended understanding of what makes a text (such as objective 
descriptions of gruesome experiences prompting conclusions about the 
importance of the research). There are silences behind associations with 
standard parameters which health researchers and readers appear to have 
accepted comfortably. For instance, associations between outcomes and time 
elapsed are frequently sought with no speculation offered of what may have 
filled this time to produce change or how something ‘dissipated’ in the course of 
time so as to make a difference to outcomes.108 There are half-silent findings on 
relationships – the numbers are laid out and the reader has to make and 
interpret the comparison.  
I will report in greater detail findings concerning omissions, silences and half-
silences from an analysis supporting the application of the Vocabulary of 
Elements of Findings. As the formalisation of findings required a ‘perfect’ 
                                                          
108
 The same applies often to sex, age, etc. 
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understanding of their meaning, I took note of my uncertainties of that meaning, 
perceptions of missing information, and ‘wishes’ for a further explanation. The 
process was not strictly methodologised – I would record an issue if it arose 
spontaneously. The results provide only a rough orientation of the frequency of 
missing information at the level of findings. Maybe more importantly, they 
demonstrate how sensitivity to missing information is gradually lost with the 
advancement of a study, if left to arise spontaneously. 
 
Four main types of omissions, silences and half-silences were distinguished by 
grouping cases encountered in the process of applying the Vocabulary of 
Elements of Findings. A fifth group was also formed, but I attributed my sense 
of missing information to unfamiliarity with the topic. Findings from this group 
are treated as irrelevant here as I was not fulfilling the requirement for being a 
competent user outlined at the start of this section. 
 
The first of the four groups was of lack of clarity of the linguistic expression 
when this had implications for understanding the research. (“Economy of 
language” omissions or lack of clarity which appeared simply as clumsy 
sentences were not considered relevant.)  
 
For instance, the following sentence from Study 4: 
 
Much of the intervention effort was directed towards improving provider 
skills rather than patient outcomes (9.8% of studies) 
leaves a hesitation if the 9.8% refers to the percentage of studies on improving 
provider skills or those on patient outcomes. 
 
The second type of omissions, silences and half-silences covered cases of 
unreported research knowledge whose presence may be expected in such a 
context and which may be missing for three main reasons: 1) it is unremarkable 
and/or has been considered dispensable, in a balancing act between brevity, 
clarity and comprehensiveness; 2) relevant data have not been collected; and 
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3) it undermines something of the (strength of) claims or procedures of the 
study. In the first case, the omission is justified, or at least understandable. In 
the latter two cases, credibility concerns arise. 
For instance, the following sentence from Study 12 (or any of the sentences in 
the text) 
Sample size in subsequent assessments was 125 at T2, 123 at T3, and 
113 at T4 (attrition 20.1%, total number of assessments = 504) 
does not report explored or supposed reasons for attrition in a situation where it 
is not minimal but covers over 1/5 of the original sample.  
 
Third, we have cases where the expected reporting is complete but something 
potentially unusual or ‘disturbing’ about it, which may be commented on, does 
not receive any attention.  
For instance, the fact that the confidence intervals in two of the cases below 
include 1 weakens the claims made but this is not commented upon:109 
In men, there was an inverse association between high weight gain 
(versus stable weight) and all cancers combined (HR 0.76; 95% CI 0.57–
1.02) (Table 2) which appeared to be driven by a strong inverse 
association between high weight gain and prostate cancer (HR for high 
weight gain and prostate cancer 0.43; 95% CI 0.24–0.76; HR for high 
weight gain and all cancers except prostate 1.00; 95% CI 0.71–1.40) 
(Study 10). 
 
A fourth category was added – ‘silencing through sentence structure and 
formulation’ – to include cases where the phrasing of the finding is such that 
certain elements of it receive a much greater importance than others or that the 
finding as a whole begins to appear formulated in a biased way.  
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For instance, the exception below receives much less attention than the general 
tendency: 
They also reported higher HRQL scores compared with those with 
reduced work hours or who have stopped working (all p-values < 0.0001; 
except spiritual well-being p = 0.61) (Study 5). 
Or the phrasing of 
However, not all patients preferred alternative services (Study 1) 
sounds somewhat strong for a case when the ‘not all’ covers 42% of 
participants (20% not having a clear preference and 22% having the opposite 
preference).110 
A total of 45 omissions, silences and half-silences were recorded (15; 18; 10; 2 
for each of the four groups). With a single exception, these were in the first two-
thirds of the findings (up to 199 from 301). In view of the fact that the drive for 
registering an omission or silence was my spontaneously felt need for 
clarification/ more information, such a distribution suggests that one gradually 
loses sensitivity to missing information and the motivation to seek for more. In 
the set of findings where I actively recorded omissions, I felt that 22.1% of the 
findings were missing something. How important this is for a particular synthesis 
study is unclear.  
 
8.  Tools for enabling and controlling transformations 
 
The last factor affecting the capacity of a finding for meaningful transformations 
I will address is the effectiveness of the tools used to enable or control 
transformations. In this study, these were the injunctions underpinning the 
extraction-coding: for comprehensiveness, extensive multiple coding, extreme 
transparency, double-edged critical analysis, and for coding as close as 
possible to the original first and experimenting afterwards. I will start by 
                                                          
110
 There is a sense in which the 3
rd
 and the 4
th
 categories appear very similar. The distinction I 
am making is that one would not expect a reformulation of the sentence in 3 to give more voice 
to the silent but a separate explanation, while in the case of 4 a more balanced representation 
requires a reformulated sentence and not a comment to that sentence. Category 4 was part of a 
‘rhetorical category’ which went beyond omissions and silences. 
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presenting overall impressions concerning the effectiveness of the injunctions. 
These are, indeed, impressions based on limited operationalisations. The 
expansion of this analysis is a matter of much further work. I will then provide 
further observations on the extensive multiple coding and, jointly, on 
transparency and double-edged critical analysis. Brief information on the 
application of the comprehensiveness injunction was already given in 3.1. The 
limiting effects of staying as close as possible to the original text can be seen in 
the discussion of thematic differences between findings in 5.4.  
 
8.1. Expectations and actualities 
At the outset of the study I had conflicting expectations whether the injunctions 
for comprehensiveness, double-edged critical analysis and transparency would 
enable or constrain transformations. For instance, the comprehensiveness and 
double-edged critical analysis appeared likely, on the one hand, to ‘open up’ a 
finding – by providing alternative perspectives towards it (the critique part of the 
double-edged critical analysis) and by contextualising it better and thus showing 
its richness (the comprehensiveness injunction). In both cases a finding’s 
capacity for transformation would increase. On the other hand, it was also 
plausible that the application of the injunctions for comprehensiveness and 
double-edged critical analysis would demonstrate the fixedness of a finding 
within a certain context. This would decrease a finding’s capacity for 
transformations. In turn, extreme transparency was a way to capture fleeting 
associations which, once pinned down and developed, might trigger further 
transformations. But extensive transparency could also highlight biased 
directions of interpretation and thus be a delimiter of intended transformations. It 
was an empirical question which of those two types of potential would be 
realised or prevail. The injunction for coding as close as possible to the original 
first and experimenting afterwards was seen as necessarily dual – both 
controlling and enabling transformations. As for the injunction for multiple 
coding, it could only enable transformations. It was, however, unclear to what 
extent. It is one thing to code multiply an isolated finding, as was the case in 




Transformations of findings in the test synthesis were certainly more than in a 
typical extraction-coding. As a whole, the injunctions then served as 
transformation-enabling rather than transformation-constraining tools. My 
perception was, however, that this was entirely due to the multiple coding 
injunction and the greater number of pieces of information rather than to any of 
the other injunctions – e.g. seeing more of the richness of a finding through a 
critique of it or through having more information on the matrices in which it was 
generated.111 I did not experience the injunctions for transparency, double-
edged critical analysis and comprehensiveness as having the opposite effect 
either – of constraining already intended transformations. As constructed and 
applied here (and this was in a minimal way), these three tools made no 
substantial difference to the capacity of a finding to transform.  
Those issues are taken up again in the Discussion. I will now provide further 
detail of the application of the injunction for multiple coding, which was the only 
one clearly responsible for the increased number of transformations.  
 
8.2. Observations on the application of extensive multiple coding 
The capacities of the software packages did not permit an estimate of the 
average number of times the same unit of information was coded. My informal 
impressions were that after the fourth recoding of the same piece of information 
I would begin to consider the returns very limited and move to the next piece of 
information, and that I would code a substantial number of pieces of information 
only once, regardless of the injunction (discussed below). Much of the multiple 
coding followed formal categories – e.g. ‘strength of findings’, ‘valence of 
finding’ (is it positive or negative relative to what is ‘good’ for patients), or semi-
formal/ semi-thematic categories – e.g. ‘something common and unpleasant, 
not fully understood, not effectively managed, etc.’ Some of the multiple coding 
arose from the fact that the higher level categories did not have clear 
boundaries or tended to mix quite often (e.g. the broad thematic category of 
‘findings about phenomena’ often crosses that of ‘findings about relationships’). 
                                                          
111
 The comprehensiveness injunction thus worked in an enabling manner in a superficial way – 
simply providing more information to be coded. In contrast, I expected that if it enables 
transformations, it will enable them by providing information that contextualises findings better 
and thus opening up a richness of associations for them. 
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The above two types of multiple coding were generally unproblematic provided 
appropriate operationalisations, but carrying them out could not be effectively 
sustained. First, they are repetitive and mechanistic and thus burdensome. 
More importantly, relevant formal and semi-formal/ semi-thematic categories 
grew to a substantial number and only a reverse process (of the researcher 
being queried how a certain piece of information stands relative to a category 
rather than proactively ascribing it) would have ensured completeness of 
coding.  
Much clearly available multiple coding was not performed as it involved simple 
reversal or extrapolation of information (e.g. ‘accepted to participate’ is the 
opposite to ‘declined to participate’, or ‘reasons given for non-participation’ 
means that attempts at discussing reasons, which had a category of their own, 
have been made). Clearly available multiple coding was also not performed 
because the whole high level category could be consistently treated as 
providing information on another high level category (e.g. the findings, which go 
under Findings, are also findings about the variable and should thus go 
invariably under Variable, too).  
 
The spontaneous lower level thematic multiple coding was more limited than I 
had expected. In some cases, I experienced findings as fully fixed. For instance, 
I would not spontaneously code the finding Of the 34 intrusive cognitions, 6 
lasted only seconds, 23 lasted minutes, and 5 lasted hours into something 
different to ‘frequency, level, duration, dynamics’. Many findings appeared to 
have quite a limited capacity for thematic transformations, maybe because the 
source study provided a very strong framing that was difficult to escape in the 
process of extraction-coding. Overall, I experienced a strong tendency to slip 
back into singular thematic coding. The framing of a paper leads you very 
effectively once left to lead you. Multiple coding requires an intensity of critical 
and creative thinking –  a constant need to overcome the grip of the source 
study – which is hard to sustain. 
Nevertheless, when the internal recognition of the need to code more than a 
handful of studies was temporarily suspended, the multiplicity illustrated in 
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Section 6. 2 above would easily come forth.112 The grip of a study seemed to 
relax once the mental framing of having to extract all data from all sampled 
studies was relaxed. The affordances for multiple thematic coding thus appear 
more limited by the context of data extraction than by the study matrix. The 
multiplicity of findings and papers opens up through an injunction for multiple 
coding, but the process has to be set up and implemented quite differently, as I 
will argue in the Discussion. Otherwise we will always come out defeated – by 
limits to human attention and memory, a sliding slope of creativity and individual 
limits to the scope and directions of that creativity, boredom in the face of 
repetition, and a tendency to automate within a narrow range of actions. 
 
8.3. Observations on the application of the injunctions for 
transparency and double-edged critical analysis 
In introducing the concept of ‘tagging’ in Chapter 3, I presented what were 
largely ‘later ideas’ – as developed from observations of how the injunctions for 
extreme transparency and double-edged critical analysis worked in practice. 
These two injunctions are highly intertwined and the processes that realise 
them are often inseparable. Critical analysis tends to be presented transparently 
as a series of steps, rather than only as an outcome in the form of a critical 
conclusion. If not, the critical conclusion has the sound of ‘I don’t like it’ and ‘I 
like it better that way’ (or ‘I don’t like you and your ways’). Transparency, in turn, 
can reveal inconsistencies and paths not taken, which gives rise to critical 
analysis. As described in reference to tagging, the application of the injunctions 
for double-edged critical analysis and extreme transparency took the following 
forms: 
 critical appraisal comments addressing the methodological rigour of 
studies; 
 ‘critiquing comments’ addressing its foundations; 
 meta-critical comments on the critical appraisal and critiquing comments. 
This type of tag showed that double-edged critical analysis did not have 
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 Even if one would still not code multiply the above finding, a range of uses can be envisaged 
(typical duration of an intrusive cognition, contents of shorter and longer intrusive cognitions, 
personality characteristics associated with these, etc.). 
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enough of an edge and, ideally, should be ‘triple-edged’ critical 
analysis;113 
 ‘research process’ tags – notes which registered the development and 
origins of the ideas and conclusions of the study, both the test synthesis 
and the broader thesis. These could be notes on, for instance, 
preliminary observations, operationalisations, change of response to the 
material, pragmatic issues, e.g. behaviour of the software, etc.; 
 ‘self-monitoring for rigour’ tags – observations on problematic processes 
and decisions and actions implicated in them. These were to serve as an 
‘audit trail’ for problematic decisions but also aimed to help explore the 
source of difficulties and, as a result, possibly enable refinement of 
problematic processes; 
 ‘self-monitoring for tendencies of thought’ tags – notes that aimed to 
capture broader interests, concerns and proclivities of mine which were 
triggered by the material analysed and which are likely to be shaping my 
interpretation and uses of it. 
The processes and outcomes of applying the injunctions for double-edged 
critical analysis and extreme transparency remained in a broadly rationalist 
framework – for instance, overall, I was not recording ‘irrelevant thoughts’, such 
as on whether I was hungry, anxious, blissfully working or heart-broken. I would, 
however, record occasionally if a process has started feeling boring or 
burdensome. This was seen as relevant to the quality with which it was 
performed and its potential for becoming a normative requirement (no 
irrevocably boring processes were to be admitted as a methodological step). 
My observations on the effectiveness of the injunctions for extreme 
transparency and double-edged critical analysis are again, as with multiple 
coding, impressionistic rather than structured. I coded the study log in NVivo 
and thus performed a formal analysis, too. However, a truly fruitful analysis of 
these observations needs further operationalisation and theoretical backing 
from debates on critical thinking, introspection and self-reporting. I offer these 
observations in the spirit of thinking that some evidence is better than no 
evidence. Also, although generally unsurprising, they negated strong 
                                                          
113
 Critical appraisal and critique were taken to comprise ‘double-edged critical analysis’. Self-
reflexivity on these could be seen as extending it into a ‘triple-edged critical analysis’. 
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expectations with which the study started – for instance, that the transparency 
of current synthesis studies can be markedly improved within the existing 
overall model of research synthesis. I had high expectations of identifying a 
point of greater rigour and heuristic potential somewhere between current 
practices and the extreme transparency I was testing out.  
As far as the effectiveness of applying the injunction for double-edged critical 
analysis is concerned, it became evident that the critiquing element of it needs 
to be supported by a much more tightly specified analytical structure than 
general ideas form the meta-scientific literature, by much more information 
external to the study report and, ideally, by expert support.  
As far as the effectiveness of applying the injunction for extreme transparency is 
concerned, the following main impressions crystallised. As expected, many of 
the transformations were swift, automatic and subliminal and their drivers were 
hard to trace. Trying to capture transformations in progress and to elicit their 
causes was sometimes effective but not to the extent that would allow me to 
claim that current practices are failing to use a readily available potential. I felt 
that all too often transformations would happen while I was preparing to register 
them rather than when I was ready to do so. As if I would blink just when my 
eyes had to be wide open. Similarly, eliciting drivers of transformations seemed 
to hits walls of rationalisation and folk theories of thinking more often than I had 
hoped. Next, I found much transparency to be painful, and not only because it 
was tedious. I was tempted to rationalise suboptimal decisions more frequently 
than I had expected. Somewhere in a vague experience of disquietude I could 
sense that I was withholding relevant information but it would take effort to see 
the shape of what I was withholding. An expectation of transparency forces one 
to write down the shortcuts one has used, to do the whole work properly, or play 
a game of transparency. The first two options are costly. It is understandable 
why a substantial part of our transparency is a game of transparency, even 
without us being fully conscious of it. And it is too much to expect that science 
and research will move to a completely different standard of honesty in 
reporting. It will be ugly, as the social studies of science have seen well. Finally, 
a requirement for extreme transparency questions the boundary between 
relevant and irrelevant factors in research. Maybe it is, after all, relevant if one is 
hungry, anxious, blissfully working or heart-broken. But I doubt we would want 
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research reports to tell us all this although we may be interested in psychology 
of science research on such issues.  
With the benefit of hindsight, these findings about the limits of transparency 
could not have been more self-evident. And yet they are not part of the 
discourse on transparency in research synthesis or the critical analysis of our 
transparency practices. In the Discussion section, I expand the analysis of 
where our current synthesis methods stand in terms of transparency and try to 
move beyond the self-evident – and pessimistic – conclusions following from 























Chapter 6: Discussion 
1. Structure of the chapter 
This is the final chapter of the thesis. Section 2 summarises the intent, 
approach and main findings of the work. Section 3 highlights its contributions to 
knowledge. In Section 4, these contributions are located within the debates on 
evidence in the philosophy of evidence-based medicine, Big Data, and 
quantitative and qualitative research. Section 5 re-examines the key concepts of 
the work – evidence and transformations. Section 6 lays out the study 
limitations. Finally, Section 7 channels findings about challenges to the process 
of rigorous and heuristically promising transformations into a radical vision for 
the future of research synthesis. I claim that if there is a normative ideal of 
research synthesis we need to aspire to and compare our current efforts with, it 
is very similar to that vision. I am, however, pessimistic of the likelihood of its 
approximation in practice.  
 
2. Summary of the intent, approach and findings of the thesis 
2.1. Intent and approach 
This work aimed to probe the extent to which we can place trust in and improve 
on one of the major knowledge technologies of health research – a family of 
disparate and often non-communicating methods and study designs here 
referred to as methods of research synthesis. This technology was taken as 
demanding careful and urgent philosophical attention as its outcomes are 
increasingly incorporated in clinical practice in a culture of evidence-based care 
and, at least theoretically, it produces the only fully legitimate type of research 
knowledge underpinning health policy decisions. When evidence is used in 
making evidence-based decisions and recommendations, at least in a health 
context it is assumed to be synthesised evidence whenever there is sufficient 
evidence to synthesise. I saw current philosophical debates as placing 
disproportionate emphasis on criticising preferred types of evidence (RCT 
evidence) and arguing for the value of ‘other’ types of knowledge (e.g. 
observational evidence, mechanistic evidence, causal claims, clinical wisdom), 
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while being oblivious to the variety of approaches to and complex procedures of 
evidence synthesis. 
I claimed that ‘transformations of evidence’ are the element of research 
synthesis methods which has to bear the heaviest burden of proof of reliability, 
if the trustworthiness of the outcomes of such methods was to be established 
solidly. The very existence of this element of health research synthesis methods 
has not been clearly acknowledged in the literature although, subliminally, the 
formal methodological debate and informal discussions in the community 
constantly refer to various instantiations of it. An argument by way of 
illustrations was made that such processes of transformation are ‘very real’. 
Transformations for the purposes of research synthesis were conceptualised 
minimally as driven by differences in evidence, provided some right type of 
similarity was there, too, and having as an outcome a right type of reduction of 
those differences or, from the opposite perspective, an increased combinability 
or compatibility of pieces of evidence. 
The aim of the thesis thus became to describe how transformations of evidence 
happen and what drives them, and to do so through close attention to the first 
major stage of a research synthesis process where transformations are 
performed – that of ‘data extraction’.  
The approach I took combined two main features.  
First, ideas from the ‘meta-scientific’ literature, mainly about factors that make 
evidence what it is and potentially fix it to a particular context, were brought to 
bear on observations of the process of data extraction. ‘Meta-scientific’ was 
understood to include the literature from fields external to science that explore 
science, such as the philosophy and social studies of science (meta-scientific 
literature in the narrow sense), and the critical methodological and theoretical 
literature internal to health research (referred to as ‘meta-methodological’ 
literature if a distinction was needed). I found most of the ideas from the meta-
scientific literature to be more abstract than I had expected, to have been 
developed primarily outside health research contexts, and/or to have been 
operationalised in ways that were not relevant to this work. I added to those 
ideas my own experiential knowledge of health research and  turned them into 
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prompts and parameters for analysis of the contents of research papers and the 
process of extraction of information from such papers.  
Secondly, the approach aimed to apply the self-professed virtues of mainstream 
research synthesis (such as transparency, exhaustiveness, critical analysis, 
rigour) in ways and to aspects of the process of data extraction that have not, 
so far, been covered by those virtues. Exploring ways of enhancing 
transparency was a primary concern.  
Put differently, the attempt to give a descriptive account of the processes and 
drivers of transformation of evidence in health research synthesis studies was, 
on the one hand, an experiment of whether this can be framed by bringing 
together and operationalising disparate ideas from the meta-scientific fields. On 
the other hand, it was a test of how faithfully the virtues of research synthesis 
are applied in current synthesis work.  
A less explicit red thread running through this work may be worth mentioning. It 
was of attention to the mundane and trivial, to what looks too minor to matter. 
The thesis aimed to draw attention to the automatic, highly repetitive and/or low 
level decisions taken in research. These have no glamour, no drama and thus 
tend to evade critical analysis while at the same time having, potentially, a 
profound influence on research outcomes. 
 
2.2. Summary of findings 
The novelty of this thesis was in its methods and not only in its data and claims. 
Three main types of findings will thus be summarised: methodology-relevant 
findings concerning the feasibility and effectiveness of the overall approach and 
specific steps within it; substantive findings about questions of transformation 
and types and features of evidence; and findings which are simultaneously 
about method and topic. 
 
2.2.1. Findings on the feasibility and effectiveness of methods 
At its most general, the methodological work in this study was about developing 
and applying a reliable framework for the analysis of transformations and types 
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of evidence, well grounded in the meta-scientific literature. I found the 
realisation of this intent problematic. There was less complementarity, cross-
referencing and/or mirroring between the meta-scientific and meta-
methodological literature and between niches within each of these literatures 
than I had envisaged. It was an unstable assumption that the studies of science 
and the critical discussion in health research come together into a  coherent 
enough meta-scientific field on the grounds of their meta-position to actual 
scientific practice. Debates are disconnected. They are also prone to excessive 
simplification of arguments upon which they build castles or whose supposed 
castles they seek to demolish (see 3.1. below). Concepts are used quite 
differently between the meta-scientific and meta-methodological debates (e.g. 
relevance, transparency, quality) and key concepts are not shared (e.g. 
propositions, observations, properties, coding, homogeneity/ heterogeneity). 
Philosophical debates that are prima facie relevant to the field of research 
synthesis and evidence-based medicine – e.g. on unity and disunity of science, 
interdisciplinary work, total and optimal evidence, quality in science, 
classification, pluralism, etc. – have neither been noticed by it, nor have noticed 
it. This much more limited than expected level of complementarity, cross-
referencing and/or mirroring of debates was observed even between fields that 
are much closer and share many more researchers than philosophy and health 
research synthesis. For instance, issues of data and study integration, as 
discussed in the mixed methods literature, do not seem to have found a way 
into the research synthesis literature.  
 
Secondly, I found certain meta-scientific debates I had posited as central to the 
thesis little articulated and associated with limited community agreement. For 
instance, I expected that a more structured discussion of types of data, findings, 
evidence, etc. would be readily identifiable. It was not. I thus formulated more 
contentious hypotheses concerning similarities and differences between 
evidence than befitting a ‘reliable’ and ‘well grounded’ framework of analysis. 
Similarly, I expected that there would be a number of well known models of the 
structure and composition of pieces of evidence in the philosophical literature. 
Again, this was not the case and led to the development of the somewhat 
unconventional Vocabulary of Elements of Findings. 
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Third, the most direct operationalisations of certain abstract claims of long 
history and substantial intuitive plausibility fell apart very easily (e.g. of the 
differences between quantitative and qualitative findings). Much more contrived 
ways had to be sought to preserve the thrust of such claims rather than dismiss 
them as unsubstantiated. As a result of such features of the meta-scientific 
debate, the reliability and good grounding in the meta-scientific literature of the 
analytic approach is debatable (see also Section 6 on limitations).  
 
2.2.2. Main substantive findings from the perspective of 
transformations 
Substantively, one of the key sets of findings from this work concerned the 
frequency with which transformations are demanded in research synthesis 
studies.  
An approach of estimating the number of units of information coded in the 
lowest level NVivo codes showed that, in their original or minimally transformed 
form, health research findings on broadly the same topic are highly individual 
thematically – 50.7% of the used codes had a single unit of information in them, 
30.5% of codes had two or three units of information, and 18.8% had four or 
more units of information. This means that at least in the case of largely 
heterogeneous studies by far the greater majority of findings – over four fifths of 
those obtained here – needs some level of transformation so that sufficiently 
high level, aggregated findings can be obtained. This is a finding about a 
sample of largely heterogeneous studies. It cannot be generalised to collections 
of homogeneous studies. Nonetheless it has important implications. It is 
precisely such pools of studies that are used to answer ‘big and complex 
questions’ that matter the most to individuals and society.  
At what may be thought of as the opposite end of a continuum of expected 
variety – namely, supposedly highly standardised parameters such as cancer-
related and socio-demographic information, an extensive variability across 
studies was found, too. While in some cases the measurement unit and 
subcategories were by and large fully predictable (such as age and gender), 
higher level categories often broke down into numerous lower level categories 
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with no or minimal overlap (as in the cases of cancer phase, education, 
ethnicity, etc.).  
It may be argued that such findings are an artefact of the small sample of 
studies. Indeed, it seems inevitable that in a larger sample a crystallisation of 
standardised categories will be observed, though probably within a broader 
range of standards than we are inclined to assume.114 Even if this is found to be 
the case though, the variability of particular instantiations of those standards 
across studies will leave studies being, ultimately, one of a kind. To start with 
one of the most consistently reported and most invariable in terms of 
differences in nomenclature categories observed here, cancer type, there are 
over 200 types of cancer (Cancer Research, 2011). A minimal number of sub-
categories in all other standardised categories, of which only some were 
explored here, is enough to keep each study like no-other.  This means that 
even the supposedly non-interpretive research syntheses, in which the source 
studies are as similar as possible, have to transform a broad range of low level 
parameters so that any aggregation of findings may be achieved. Some higher 
level of standardisation of categories may be beneficial. Appeals for greater 
standardisation of the reporting in health research are frequent and frustrated.  
But too strong a move in that direction will hide or suppress a state of affairs 
that deserves recognition – of hypotheses of associative and causal 
relationships that vary immensely across contexts and of a large degree of 
arbitrariness in setting cut-offs. 
 
Another key set of substantive findings from this study concerned the reliability 
and validity of transformations. Transformations are performed on limited 
information as even extremely thorough data extraction ends up with much 
missing data. The study also illustrated that the affordances of pieces of 
evidence, in terms of multiplicity of contents, meanings and uses, are much 
more extensive than what is used. This is not only a matter of missed 
opportunity but of rigour, too – the preference for one transformation amounts to 
suppressing alternative transformations. 
                                                          
114
 There must be a limit to the difference-making ways in which you can be married or not, 
educated or not, even if it is not reached too easily … Or maybe not. 
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Some of the findings underpinning such claims came again from the analysis of 
standardised parameters. Levels of missing information were much higher than 
expected. For example, cancer type was the most consistently reported cancer-
related parameter and yet it too was not always mentioned (being unimportant 
to the concerns of a particular study). Data on the remaining cancer-related 
parameters considered (such as cancer phase, time since diagnosis, treatment 
phase, etc.) were reported in between 16.7% and 52.9% of analysed studies. 
Perhaps most importantly, the criteria by which cases were ascribed to 
categories or the details of a category content were practically not reported 
(with 1 study out of 17 noting the classification system used to determine cancer 
type, and with cancer type being 1 out of 6 parameters traced). Results were 
similar in the case of socio-demographic parameters. We have good reasons to 
believe that the completeness of reporting of RCTs, the material for traditional 
systematic reviews, will be higher – much effort has gone into developing 
reporting guidelines such as the CONSORT statement (www.consort-
statement.org). It is, however, over-optimistic to expect that missing information 
will be a problem entirely dealt with in this type of studies and, from there, in 
their syntheses. 
A range of further findings supported claims that transformations in research 
synthesis are performed on uncertain grounds more often than fitting a truly 
rigorous process. Information on matrices available in research papers was 
limited. Omissions, silences and half-silences at the level of individual 
propositions were found to be too many. Such were registered in over a fifth of 
the cases (44 out of approximately 200) where focused attention was given to a 
sense of I wish that more was said! What also happens, however, is that we 
forget to wish. For instance, when acute awareness receded into the 
background, omissions, silences and half-silences receded, too (only one was 
registered in a sample of 102 findings once internal expectations were 
adjusted). Sensitivity to what we would want to know in optimal research 
reporting conditions fades away quickly. It cannot be otherwise. The current 
main format of study reporting, research papers, cannot be expected to provide 




As far as the multiplicity of contents, meanings and uses of pieces of evidence 
is concerned, there is too much, too varied information in at least some pieces 
of evidence. This information is not used proactively. Multiple coding is the 
exception rather than the rule in current research synthesis. Also, approaching 
a paper with an aim has no alternative in the direction of simply extracting 
information from papers for re-use. There are thus at least two ways in which 
current practices are suppressing or ignoring alternative transformations, with 
the implications this has for constraining the rigour of processes and underusing 
research knowledge. That said, the process of multiple coding also showed that 
some findings are best treated as unidimensional. The multiplicity of the 
complex, rich, clearly ‘multiple’ findings was not inexhaustible either. Such 
observations can be seen as having the potential to give grounding to criteria of 
reliability and validity of transformations. It did not appear as if we can go in any 
direction, indefinitely. A unidimensionality and finiteness, reassuring in terms of 
the possibility of trust in the research synthesis project, with all its 
transformations, could also be perceived.  
 
The last set of key substantive findings from this work related to hypotheses 
about productive/ non-productive or impossible transformations. No evidence 
was found of fundamental, insurmountable obstacles in any of the directions 
considered. In contrast to certain well entrenched assumptions, health research 
findings appeared to be highly similar in terms of generic composition and 
structure. This is what the development and application of the Vocabulary of 
Elements of Findings suggested. Its elements were consistent across the  
different ‘paradigms’, disciplines, research fields, methods, functions,  etc. from 
which findings for its development and testing were sampled (over 300). The 
tests for less noticeable differences of composition and structure between 
quantitative and qualitative findings were largely negative, too. Method effects 
of how the procedure for developing the Vocabulary was conceived and 
implemented are likely to have contributed to the observed degree of uniformity 
of findings. Also, the question of typological similarities/ differences between 
findings is inexhaustible. The approaches taken here and hypotheses tested are 
only a fraction of what can be tried out. Nevertheless, such empirical results 
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weaken claims about typologically-running incompatibilities of findings. There 
do not seem to be directions of transformation denied in principle. 
 
2.2.3. Findings throwing light on both methods and substantive issues 
A set of findings that were both substantively and methodologically relevant 
concerned the applications of the injunctions for comprehensiveness, 
transparency, double-edged critical analysis and multiple coding. Substantively, 
I did not perceive the injunctions for comprehensiveness, transparency and 
double-edged critical analysis as having an effect of constraining or enabling 
transformations. The value of all injunctions was found to be ambiguous. They 
worked. More of the richness and complexity of studies came forth in 
comparison to any standard process of data extraction. But they were also 
found to be too unreliable and/or too burdensome, while providing no clear 
benefit in terms of rigorous facilitation or constraint on transformations. 
Metaphorically, the sleeping beauty of studies could not be fully awakened by 
injunctions, although eyelashes fluttered. The Prince should come with an 
appropriate infrastructure, too. From a methodological point of view, this was a 
further case where the study approach turned out to be less effective than 
anticipated. This is discussed again in the Limitations section. 
 
3. Main contributions to knowledge 
3.1. Opening up questions and linking disconnected debates 
This work generated a range of specific findings concerning the frequency and 
drivers of transformations of evidence. But its main contribution is most likely 
elsewhere. It drew attention to and in certain respects constituted the field of 
research synthesis as an intriguing object for philosophical and broader meta-
scientific investigation. It can, of course, be argued that this object is already 
receiving intense attention from the philosophy of science and other meta-
scientific fields. After all, the nature and value of RCT evidence on the one hand 
and of alternative forms of evidence on the other can be seen as the two 
defining topics of the philosophy of evidence-based medicine. As much as it 
may seem like a minor shift in emphasis, from evidence (that tends to be 
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synthesised) to processes of evidence synthesis, the change in “puzzles” of 
interest is far reaching. I see this change as highly beneficial, not least because 
extensive meta-scientific research has already accumulated on ‘isolated’ 
medical evidence and that on the integration of medical evidence is close to 
non-existent. I take the view that if the philosophy of evidence-based medicine 
re-oriented itself towards issues of bringing evidence together, it would become 
much more relevant, influential, lively and engaging. As far as the philosophy of 
science more broadly and other meta-scientific fields are concerned, a clear 
structuring of a niche on bringing evidence together seems likely to open 
surprising conundrums and directions for investigation. This work tried to 
contribute to a re-thinking of the research priorities in the philosophy of 
evidence-based medicine and to provide some pointers in a broader meta-
scientific subfield on information integration in an era of information overload. 
The development of modern practices of health research synthesis is closely 
associated with the rise of availability of information and information processing 
technologies. It is still a relatively recent development (beginning in the late 80s 
– early 90s).115 Constituted in the way proposed in this work, the field of 
research synthesis is non-existent not only as an object of philosophical 
attention but as a recognised research field, too. The similarities and 
connections between what have been suggested as its constitutive areas may 
appear obvious once drawn. Yet links between most of these areas are 
tenuous. Mutual awareness is vague, if at all there. Such a disconnection, 
although at times beneficial for methodological innovation, seems to be already 
functioning to the detriment of exchanges of good methodological practices, 
mutual theoretical enrichment and joint effort. If the proposal of this work for a 
broader construction of the field of research synthesis is taken as valuable, 
there may be immense opportunities for the meta-sciences to contribute to the 
self-reflective formation of a research field, the setting of its foundations and 
clarification of its terminology. If not, the meta-scientific work of the future has 
another interesting case study for investigating the principles by which science 
‘lives’ – by observing how fields connected by parallel concerns, concepts and 
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 If we are looking for a specific date, we can choose between 1992, the year of the 
announcement of the evidence-based medicine movement, or 1988, the year in which Noblit 
and Hare published their booklet on meta-ethnography. 
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practices, yet disconnected in terms of actual exchange of knowledge, end up 
developing and gaining or losing prominence. 
In spite of this state of pre-formation of the field as a whole, specific subfields, 
primarily the mainstream systematic review inclusive of meta-analysis, have 
come to have enormous power in clinical practice and health policy. If a 
decision about health policy is claimed to be evidence-based, and nowadays 
they are expected to be, the evidence which forms that base should be from a 
synthesis study or synthesis studies, provided more than one study is available. 
If this is not the case, the term is used without the principles of evidence-based 
medicine having been applied. The policy drive has also resulted in a growing 
impact of types of syntheses using non-RCT evidence. In this context, a high 
quality and highly relevant philosophical and broader meta-scientific debate will 
matter directly to the health and well-being of people and to processes in 
society. 
In addition to the overarching appeal for philosophical attention to (health) 
research synthesis, this work proposed a range of specific ground-level 
questions arising from such attention. The topics of transformations, units of 
analysis/synthesis, and types of evidence were given priority, though with the 
caveat that an area cannot settle its priorities well before sufficient substantive 
work has accumulated. I also tried to bring to the fore a range of other issues 
that call for critical analysis – the debates on the characteristic features of 
research synthesis, the terminological variety, the numerous lower level 
decisions taken in research synthesis, etc. Such issues, apparently peripheral 
to the core interests of the work, fell into its visual field as they had some part to 
play in the foundations required to handle the core concerns. They were 
addressed to the extent of reaching some acceptably stable starting point and 
then closed off. An initial framing was nevertheless given for attending to a 
range of conceptually interesting and complex issues. 
Similarly, links were drawn between a range of disconnected areas within the 
meta-scientific and health research synthesis fields. Attempts were made to 
identify, bring together or juxtapose debates that have a high level of overlap of 
claims and concerns but tend to be isolated (even within the same broad field), 
dramatically pitched against one another, or precarious in their own terms, and 
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thus difficult to analyse and present jointly. The aim was to draw a more 
comprehensive picture of research synthesis, but also to point to directions for 
enriching or challenging those debates through relevant counterpart debates. 
For instance, jointly considered and represented were the discourse of 
mainstream research synthesis and alternative methods; methodological 
handbooks, critical work and actual synthesis studies; theoretical literature in 
health research, philosophy of evidence-based medicine, general philosophy 
where philosophy of medicine was not enough, ideas from the social studies of 
science, elements of psychology of science debates; accounts based on 
avowed positivist, constructivist, realist, etc. positions. 
 
It seemed that most frequently those debates were not, as charitable 
assumptions of inter-field exchange would have it, complementary, ‘the same’ 
but adapted to the needs of the particular field, or oppositional through a ‘fair 
play’. Too often they misrepresented their source or critical target, primarily 
through crude simplification or lack of awareness of recent relevant 
developments (of a few decades). For instance, as pointed in the literature 
review, the ‘paradigms debate’ in the philosophy of science internal to health 
research and to applied social sciences research is far from a good up-to-date 
simplified version of relevant debates in the mainstream studies of science. 
Maybe we can ignore that it is based on a conceptualisation of ‘paradigm’ that is 
too far from that developed by Kuhn and yet consistently attributed to him. This 
is just one concept and one that is so variably interpreted anyway. But it is also 
the case that a fair number of elements of the paradigm accounts appearing in 
the meta-methodological debate and represented as ‘what philosophy says’ 
have been clearly discredited in the mainstream studies of science. There, they 
are no longer seen as descriptive of how science is done or have much more 
sophisticated formulations. Similarly, the representation of understandings of 
evidence in medicine and health research, as given in the philosophy of 
medicine, seems to be failing to represent. Even if we put to one side the 
argument made here, that thinking of evidence in evidence-based medicine 
should go, fundamentally, through considerations of research synthesis, the 
philosophy of evidence-based medicine fails to acknowledge the complexity of 
thinking about evidence in health research. This work has tried to point to some 
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such issues which require detailed critical analysis and a much improved inter-
field exchange. 
A related feature of this thesis is that it brought together entities and processes 
that tend to be discussed in isolation while having much in common. In some 
cases new concepts resulted. This aggregation of entities and processes could 
be seen in the very concept of ‘transformations’ – its instantiations included 
processes of reclassification; rephrasing and simplification; minor, 
uncontroversial interpretation; radical, controversial re-interpretation; re-use of 
the same information in a different area, etc. It can also be seen in the joint 
discussion of coding and extraction or the formulation of concepts like 
‘expression’ or ‘knowledge something’ in the Vocabulary of Elements of 
Findings. This redrawing of lines of similarity and difference between entities 
and processes has variously helped to make more generic claims about the 
research synthesis process; challenge or refine definitions; borrow 
considerations and richness from ‘other’ debates; and question credibility claims 
associated with  traditional study type distinctions (for instance, ‘high on 
interpretiveness – low on credibility’ is associated with qualitative syntheses; 
drawing attention to transformations, which are performed across synthesis 
study types, re-opens the question of credibility).  
 
The forging of links between disconnected debates has hopefully drawn 
attention to features of the debates, too, rather than only to their objects. 
Practices of research synthesis are shared and established through particular 
types of discourses and rhetorics. These discourses and rhetorics then seem to 
get consolidated on their own terms, in search of a greater coherence and 
persuasive power, while obscuring some realities of practice. In turn, this has a 
stabilising and limiting effect on practice. For instance, the discourse/ rhetorics 
on transparency – the virtue of research synthesis whose extension was of 
primary interest to this work – is powerful in mainstream research synthesis and 
in current methodological texts, including qualitative ones. This is a persuasive 
and coherent discourse which subtends confidence in a range of 
methodological steps directed at achieving transparency. ‘Research in action’, 
however, shows that the quest for transparency meets serious obstacles as this 
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work has also illustrated. With the benefit of hindsight, every researcher knows 
this. But we know it mostly vaguely. And we know it mostly vaguely partly 
because the mainstream discourse/ rhetorics of transparency hides it, or, put 
more neutrally, lacks a good articulation of it. A counterpart argument can be 
developed with regard to the ‘negative’ discourse on transparency (on its limits) 
running in some alternative synthesis methods. The discourse is coherent, 
confident and persuasive. A closer look into practice and conflicting discourses 
breaks some of it. Its strength and disconnectedness from other discourses, 
however, prevents this closer look. Coherent conversation and practices 
concerning transparency reinforce one another in complex ways. As a result, 
practices of ensuring or avoiding transparency persist unchanged even when 
change is desirable and may be feasible.  
This work was not in a position to address discourse features in detail or to 
make claims as to what is of the object, in this case research synthesis, and 
what is of language, research tradition and broader culture. But I hope it has 
implied that the exploration of research synthesis should also, and very 
importantly, be an exploration of the discourse and rhetorics of research 
synthesis. And it is not only the mainstream discourse and rhetorics that should 
be of interest, as is currently the case. Work that deconstructs the mainstream 
discourse and rhetorics is itself in a discourse and rhetorics. Just as this work is. 
 
3.2. ‘Empiricising’ what tends to be discussed in the abstract; 
methodological innovation associated with this 
This thesis addressed philosophically and scientifically important questions 
(primarily about the drivers and extent of change of evidence during its 
aggregation, with a view to the trustworthiness of the outcomes) by drawing on 
philosophical and other meta-scientific ideas (primarily about the nature of 
carriers of empirical knowledge and the factors that shape and co-constitute 
them). In broad terms this combination of the scientific and 
philosophical/broader meta-scientific is fairly standard in the studies of science, 
not least because the distinction between the philosophical and scientific is 
problematic. The difference here was that the questions were addressed in the 
manner of a (health) sciences investigation. Data were collected through well 
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specified procedures. Data were collected until saturation or up to large 
samples (rather than what seems to be more typical in philosophical and other 
meta-scientific explorations, of exemplary cases described in depth). The 
principle of no commitment to positive results or specific outcomes was upheld 
(as opposed to strong commitment to a position put forward, which is the norm 
in philosophical and other meta-scientific work).116 Standard approaches to 
quantitative and qualitative analysis were used. Reporting on method, process 
and findings also followed standard health research practices. Although it can 
be claimed that this is in line with practices in experimental philosophy, the 
issues addressed and methods used do not seem to have a precedent in 
experimental philosophy.117  
The use of the ‘health scientific’ to address the philosophical and meta-scientific 
resulted in modifications of the scientific, too. Modified versions of health 
research methods, new tools borrowing from methods from other fields, and 
untypical material were used in addition to standard health research practices. 
For instance, the process of extraction-coding and the analysis of material 
collected through it included steps from framework, thematic and content 
analysis – well established analysis approaches in the health sciences. The 
method of coding of elements of findings was developed specifically for this 
study while borrowing from an external field – linguistic content analysis 
methods. Most untypical, however, were the realisation and effect of the five 
injunctions (comprehensiveness, transparency, double-edged critical analysis, 
multiple coding and minimal transformations). They led to the analysis process 
departing substantially from the standard. This was in spite of the fact that the 
basics of the extraction-coding process were unchanged and that all injunctions 
reflected both generic scientific and research synthesis-specific virtues. Yet the 
intensity with which they were used, the context in which they were applied, 
and/or their specific contents resulted in a different style of health research 
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 I use a roundabout expression as I am not sure that belief in this principle of no commitment 
translates too easily into no commitment. Of course it feels better when your approach works 
and when your findings fit your expectations or violate them in intriguing ways. It is interesting if 
scientists get over such ‘failures’ quicker than other scholars, provided messages that this is 
useful knowledge and we should have no bias for positive findings are strong in the field. 
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 The preferred object of experimentation there seem to be lay intuitions and assumptions, e.g. 




conduct. This was mostly in terms of allowing multiplicity of interpretations and 
meta-knowledge comments to proliferate beyond any communally accepted 
limit. As discussed in the Findings Chapter and the summary of findings above, 
this style was found to be largely ineffective within the current broad model of 
research synthesis. In Section 7 I will consider whether this innovation using 
tools as old as science may need different conditions rather than the scepticism 
it so naturally invites.  
Throughout, I have aimed to position this work in the middle between 
philosophy and the meta-sciences on the one hand and health research on the 
other. I wanted its findings to feel interesting and credible to both philosophers 
and scientists. The risk was that they may have ended up being credible to 
nobody. As no similar ‘empiricising’ work seems to have been done in the 
philosophy of medicine or in meta-methodological research in the health 
sciences, the experimentation with such an approach and the testing of its 
credibility is in itself a contribution to knowledge in the area where philosophy 
attempts to be directly useful to science.  
 
3.3. Conceptual innovation and refinement 
A range of conceptual innovations and refinements were proposed in this work. 
As discussed in 3.1, new concepts tended to be broad and to enable the 
perception of ‘bigger pictures’ and the formulation of more general claims. 
Examples include the very concept of ‘transformation’ of evidence; concepts 
from the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings, such as ‘obsessive something’, 
‘carrier’, ‘expression’; the concept of ‘tagging’ for various ways of generating 
and recording meta-knowledge in the research process, etc.  
Refinements to existing concepts were also made. Most obviously, the concept 
of research synthesis was given a new interpretation. Its breadth was extended 
by including more research fields than typically subsumed under it. Specificity 
was preserved by emphasising some, but not exclusive, use of research 
reports; an output from which the input cannot be fully recovered; and a greater 
than a local baseline, but not necessarily high, articulation of a process of 
bringing knowledge together. The concept of ‘transparency’ was redefined in a 
way that aimed to draw attention to cases of superfluous transparency and 
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invisible non-transparency. ‘Coding’ and ‘extraction’ were given a closer look, 
similarities were highlighted and certain distinctions affirmed by the relevant 
discourses questioned. ‘A finding’, too, was refined in the direction of a greater 
breadth and compatibility with a range of epistemological positions. 
A number of clearer distinctions between types were also made, articulating 
differences between commonly used meanings that tend to be entangled or 
appear in separate debates. This included, for instance, the articulation of 
different meanings attributed to ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ as per features of 
exemplar cases which are not, however, uniquely defining of the broad type; 
different types of multiplicity of a finding; the different ways for something to be 
missing, etc. As much as such distinctions are quite close to the surface, they 
are often not made while underpinning mismatched arguments. 
In the case of less central concepts, their clarification may have burdened the 
presentation unnecessarily. If only most direct relevance to key questions of the 
thesis is taken as a criterion, it may have been better to suppress such 
conceptual clarifications in favour of readability. Yet in a field where there is 
substantial terminological variety and vagueness and some basic entities, 
processes and occurrences do not seem to have good names and descriptions, 
this was seen as contributing to broader aims of support for research in the 
field. As much as both the new concepts and refinements of old ones need 
extensive further critical analysis and enrichment, they have the potential of 
being useful tools in organising the discourse on health research synthesis. 
 
3.4. Highlighting and challenging inconsistency where none have 
been noted 
This work challenged some unquestioned inconsistencies in health research 
synthesis and explored whether the reasons for this neglect are justifiable. All 
injunctions guiding the extraction-coding reflected a concern with an 
inconsistency. For instance, the study questioned the contradiction of research 
synthesis studies being premised on and making use of the multiplicities of 
studies and findings (if a finding could not have somewhat different meanings to 
the ones initially intended, most synthesis studies would not be possible), but 
never facing the implications of this multiplicity beyond the one that has been of 
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use to them. The thesis thus set out to explore how far a multiple coding of 
findings can go. Or it questioned the fact that a commitment to 
comprehensiveness, extremeness in literature searching as a way of achieving 
rigour is not paralleled, if not across the board then at least in some models of 
research synthesis, by a similar extremeness in data extraction. It thus set out 
to explore how far the comprehensive coding of studies can go.  
I concluded that, overall, there are good reasons for current methods not to 
challenge those inconsistencies. Bringing to light the loci where a virtue is 
applicable and attempting to extend its command created trouble and gloom. 
One has seen both the inconsistency, with the effect this has on our trust in 
current health research synthesis methods, and the lack of promise of the 
obvious methodological revisions, with the effect this has on our trust in the 
progress of such methods. A sceptical argument seems fully justified. Yet 
maybe there is some way forward that also makes good on the above 
inconsistencies. I take this issue up in Section 7.   
 
4. Contribution of this study to the ‘nesting’ debates 
For lack of focused philosophical and broader meta-scientific debates on 
(health) research synthesis, this work was linked with a different level of 
explicitness to three big debates: the debate in the philosophy of evidence-
based medicine; the interdisciplinary debate on ‘Big Data’; and the debate on 
the division between and the mixing of quantitative and qualitative research. 
Comments on the contribution of this work to such debates follow. 
 
4.1. The philosophy of evidence-based medicine debate 
As reviewed in detail in Chapter 2, the philosophical discussion on evidence-
based medicine is most visibly a discussion of the nature of medical evidence. 
The thesis was partly an argument that by ignoring the methods and the whole 
culture of research synthesis, the philosophy of evidence-based medicine and 
the other meta-scientific fields are missing factors that are at least as defining of 
the nature of evidence used in clinical practice and health policy as the 
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centrality of the RCT is. A voluminous new set of questions relevant to the 
philosophy of evidence-based medicine was thus pointed at.  
 
4.2. The Big Data debate 
Similarly, the topic of research synthesis does not appear to have become part 
of the ‘big data’ debate and its concern with issues of hypothesis- versus data-
driven research, data re-use and data sharing. At the same time it makes an 
interesting case study in all these directions. The data and methods used in 
research synthesis are generally ‘small’, but within the context of much data of 
potential relevance that are gradually filtered away – partly automatically 
through search strategies, partly mechanically through ‘sifting’ on the part of 
researchers. For good or bad reasons, the technological and methodological 
sophistication of big data research has not made its way into mainstream 
research synthesis. Methods of text mining, for instance, are only now 
beginning to be used (Thomas, McNaught and Ananiadou, 2011). Some further 
peculiarities of research synthesis as a (boundary) big data enterprise are that 
much of its data are extensively processed rather than (relatively) raw; that in 
some types of synthesis work the process is clearly hypothesis-driven while in 
others can be seen as data-driven; that although a process of data re-use and 
sharing is under way, the model is very traditional, with research papers being 
by far the most typical route used.  
Because of some of the above characteristics, it is also possible to see 
research synthesis as an enterprise to be phased out or greatly modified by Big 
Data initiatives. For instance, at a recent public debate on Big Data, it was 
discussed how routinely collected data can begin to replace RCTs (Boyle, 
2012). Go a step further and the traditional synthesis – meta-analysis of RCTs –
will be replaced by the synthesis of routinely collected data. Personal 
biomedical data, as through personal genome sequencing, may render certain 
general conclusions for the effectiveness of interventions unnecessary. Some 
key issues associated with research synthesis, such as of combinability and 
transformations, can never be phased out. Many of the concerns raised here 
will remain enduringly valid. Yet the face of the enterprise may change 
thoroughly if it becomes more attuned to work on Big Data. 
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The (partly) opposite development is also possible. A greater attention to 
research synthesis may modify our concern with Data in Big Data. In a recent 
special issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences on data-driven research, introduced as “the first concerted attempt to 
make sense of data-driven science within the fields of history and philosophy of 
science” (Leonelli, 2012b: 3),118 O’Malley and Soyer (2012) attend to the 
distinction between data-driven and hypothesis-driven science and see the 
emphasis on data-driven science as only very generally informative of the 
dynamics of contemporary life sciences. Using molecular systems biology as a 
reference point, they suggest that the process of ‘integration’ is much more 
defining of today’s life sciences than the scale of data production. In addition, 
they suggest that attention to the distinctions between and interactions of data-
driven and hypothesis-driven research will do comparatively little to illuminate 
integration and, more broadly, the dynamics of the contemporary molecular life 
sciences and scientific change. There is much more promise in addressing 
issues such as exploratory questioning, technological development, and the 
(transformative) transfer of already developed systems of knowledge 
production, such as tools, methods and explanations, into new research areas 
(op. cit.: 59, 64, 65). 
How exactly research synthesis and Big Data relate, as scientific practices and 
discourses, thus appears a fruitful topic for philosophical and other meta-
scientific debates. The two fields do not seem to have been linked in any 
sufficiently visible way so far.  
 
4.3. The quantitative-qualitative divide and integration 
The debate on the differences and possibility for productive interaction between 
quantitative and qualitative research was the third of the major nesting debates 
for this work. Conceptually, it seems hard to enrich this so heavy debate – 
heavy on arguments asserting unbridgeable differences between quantitative 
and qualitative studies and the importance of preserving character; heavy on 
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 Callebaut (2012) suggests that in this respect scholars in the social studies of science, 
information studies and the history of science have done some serious work and are ahead of 




arguments about relative advantages and disadvantages and amicable 
interaction; heavy on arguments about why this debate is unproductive, 
exasperating and needs to stop. To my knowledge, the particular claims made 
here have not been made elsewhere, but their implications (e.g. of reducing the 
energy and effort expended on this debate, of challenging polarising assertions, 
etc.) are all too familiar. I will thus try to summarise only briefly the particular 
claims made in this study.   
The foregrounding of this study (through the literature review) challenged the 
quality of claims concerning quantitative-qualitative ‘paradigms’ made in the 
meta-methodological literature through comparisons with debates in the 
mainstream studies of science. If we continue to take broad epistemological 
paradigms as major determinants of similarities and differences between health 
research findings, the shortcomings of their descriptions will keep on affecting 
our theorising on the synthesisabilty of findings. Extensive professional 
philosophical critique of the philosophy of science internal to health research, 
open enough to see the particular needs of health research rather than only 
‘straighten’ the debate, is much needed. 
Maybe more importantly, however, findings from this study questioned, in 
unusual ways, if differences in broad epistemological paradigms are sufficiently 
relevant to the combinability of findings. This doubt is commonplace. But it 
tends to be voiced in the abstract, along the lines of commensurability of 
paradigms, or justified in the reverse – since we are carrying out mixed methods 
primary studies and syntheses of largely heterogeneous studies, then it must be 
the case that either paradigms are commensurable or they do not matter that 
much. Here, the challenge arose from the limited success of operationalising 
claims from the abstract paradigms debate. Using a range of operationalisations 
and a large enough sample of findings (over 300), this study was unable to 
identify with any clarity, at the level of findings, prominent features from the 
paradigm descriptions. The broad epistemological  paradigms, as discussed in 
the meta-methodological literature, disappeared almost without a trace by the 
time a finding, as represented in a health research paper, was reached. 
Of course, many criticisms of the operationalisations chosen in this study can 
be given. In view of the stability of the debate within the health and social 
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sciences, it is necessary to propose and test a broad range of alternative 
operationalisations. But if we give some credence to the lack of evidence for 
marked traces of the broad epistemological paradigms at the level of findings, 
we need to say something about the debate, too.  
Three main options seem available. The position that is least damaging to the 
debate is somewhat contrived, but not inconceivable. We can argue that its key 
claims are solid but subtle and this work, just as any work that has discussed 
the combinability of health research findings in terms of paradigm differences, 
has missed the subtlety:  the debate is primarily about differences of studies 
and research, not of findings from these. Indeed, in the case study, features of 
paradigms and traces of these were much more easily identifiable at the level of 
studies. This would show, however, that the paradigms debate is reticent as to 
whether distinctive features of studies, as determined by differences of broad 
epistemological paradigms, are gradually lost until a finding is represented and 
how this relates to the combinability of findings. Alternatively, we can argue that 
the broad epistemological paradigms are solid determinants of similarities and 
differences between findings but that their typical accounts are flawed. As a 
result, the ‘wrong’ features of paradigms had been operationalised in this work. 
The broad epistemological paradigms need to be reconceptualised and 
redescribed so that the true determinants of differences between quantitative 
and qualitative findings can be identified. Finally, it may be the case that other 
things matter more for how health research findings differ than the quantitative/ 
qualitative matrix within which they were generated. Of all possibilities 
considered, this is most damaging to the quantitative-qualitative debate. For 
many scholars this will be no loss. But a contextual problem remains. If we give 
up a commitment to the explanatory model of quantitative-qualitative 
incommensurability, we are left with no well worked out alternative and an 
incontestable phenomenal experience of some health research findings being 
rather difficult to combine with some other health research findings. This debate 
was our only fully grown leg. 
 
The empirical work also showed that the majority of health research studies are 
best described as some form of hybrid studies, rather than as quantitative and 
qualitative, even if they are not explicitly mixed methods studies. Such a claim 
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of grey zones between the quantitative and qualitative is not infrequent in health 
research. But hybridity is still thought of as the exception rather than the norm. 
This work offered some initial ideas of how quantitative/ qualitative/ hybrid 
status can be specified. Applying them to larger samples is one way of testing if 
a primary typological distinction in health research does not hide more than it 
reveals. 
There are certainly very important epistemological questions discussed and 
positions articulated in what now appears as the quantitative/ qualitative and 
mixed methods debate in the health and social sciences. There is energy in the 
debate. It is also the most direct point of access of health researchers to 
thinking in the philosophy and social studies of science. At the same time there 
are well known problems with and challenges to it. The main challenges from 
this work, which do not seem to have been extended in the existing literature, 
came from highlighting the discontinuity of the quantitative/ qualitative debate 
from current thinking in the mainstream studies of science and from a failure to 
find evidence, sought through tight operationalisatons, that differences between 
broad epistemological paradigms are traceable at the level of findings and in 
this sense are well specified or ‘real enough’. 
 
5. A little more on the key concepts of the thesis 
 
5.1. The unit of research synthesis 
This thesis was framed as being about transformations of evidence – the 
predominant concept for a carrier of primarily empirical knowledge in the health 
research synthesis discourse, as shaped by the broader one of evidence-based 
medicine. ‘Data’ was also an early framing concept, suggested by the use of 
‘data extraction’ for processes of taking out material from primary studies so as 
to include it in synthesis studies. 
From the very beginning, however, the reference to evidence (and data) as the 
unit of analysis/synthesis in research synthesis was put into question. This was 
mostly in response to views that knowledge gained from research synthesis is 
purely empirical, theory-free, minimally interpretive. ‘Evidence’, as used in the 
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context of mainstream health research synthesis and health policy documents, 
has such connotations of absoluteness.119 Writings on alternative synthesis 
methods challenge this image. They prefer to speak of findings, emphasising 
the roles of analysis, interpretation and theory in moving from primary data to 
‘knowledge’. But as this preference remains confined to their texts, it is only 
they that end up carrying the connotations of uncertainty and subjectivity. In 
addition, the insistence on a reference of ‘findings’, as associated with heavy 
analysis, theory and interpretation, ends up misbalanced in the other direction – 
research synthesis studies can and do use (almost) raw data, such as non-
interpreted interview quotes or data on individual cases.  
My concerns in illuminating the unit of analysis/synthesis in health research 
synthesis, in preparing to address its transformations, were thus two. The first 
was to bring forth that which is not purely of the object being studied, but comes 
from theories, auxiliary assumptions, researcher background, possibly cultural-
historical contexts, etc. in research synthesis and to search for its place in 
judgements of combinability and processes of transformation of the primarily 
empirical. The second was to explore if source study material (i.e. the data from 
primary studies to be used for research synthesis) can be typologised reliably in 
terms of its distance from raw data – that is, in terms of all the transformations 
under way in primary studies, too. 
As the literature review showed, in spite of the tendency in some 
methodological literature to oppose ‘evidence’ and ‘data’ as the ‘raw’ and ‘purely 
empirical’ to ‘findings’ as the ‘processed’ and partly theoretical and interpretive, 
each of the main contenders for being the primary unit of analysis/synthesis in 
research synthesis studies had connotations going both ways in the broader 
literature. Evidence, data, findings, facts and claims are each discussed as an 
embodiment of empiricism and/or as necessarily reflecting something over and 
above pure observation and the world readily revealing itself. Thus, it did not 
appear consequential whether one or another concept is used to denote the 
main unit of analysis/synthesis, provided one takes it to be the case that the 
main unit is indeed some carrier of the empirical contents of studies.  
                                                          
119
 The same holds for data. However, evidence is the preferred term, especially in policy 
documents referring to health research. 
282 
 
For the majority of synthesis studies, this is indeed the case – they aim to bring 
together empirical contents from previous research. But not necessarily. Some 
synthesis studies aim to integrate other types of research contents. Others end 
up doing so while integrating empirical contents. A wide range of synthesis 
studies may be having as primary or equally important units of 
analysis/synthesis concepts, theories, descriptions of cultural-historical 
contexts, methods, etc. Further to that, if we look closer into findings 
themselves, it becomes immediately evident that this unit of analysis/synthesis 
is not quite unitary. It is made of concepts, references to methods, references to 
samples, representations of objects, representations of features of objects, 
traces of theory, qualifiers of degree of certainty in the presented knowledge … 
From a different perspective, it is made of words, numbers, images, graphs … 
The ways in which such different components of a finding and/or study are 
brought together will be at least somewhat variable. A variety of descriptions will 
also be available.  
Thus, it has been a temporary stabilisation of uncertain grounds to take a 
‘finding’ as the main unit of analysis/synthesis in research synthesis studies. 
There is much to be explored about the different units of analysis/synthesis in 
synthesis studies and how they are brought, or come, together. The 
development of the Vocabulary of Elements of Findings was some movement in 
this direction. Relative to the vision of the future I discuss in Section 7 below, 
the most scientifically useful way of continuing a philosophical debate on the 
units of analysis/synthesis in research synthesis is by focusing on what there is 
in a research report, what there is in a finding, the many ways in which we can 
split a finding, and on specifying the matrices which shape and co-constitute 
findings. Probably of little interest to science, but otherwise quite intriguing 
philosophically and historically, is how the variety of concepts of carriers of 
primarily empirical knowledge (data, evidence, observations, facts, claims and 
findings) overlap and why certain debates on relationships with the ‘non-
empirical’ have clustered around one rather than any other of those concepts. 
 
As for the other main initial concern, of exploring if source study data (evidence, 
findings, etc.) can be typologised reliably in terms of their distance from raw 
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data, it became clear that the operationalisation of such an intention would be 
forbiddingly complex. More importantly, the use to which it was envisaged to 
contribute – a measure of the reliability of individual synthesis studies, in an 
attempt to counteract a tendency for typological judgements of reliability along 
quantitative/ qualitative lines – lost its initial value. In light of the case study 
findings, the level of reliability of synthesis studies began to appear too low 
across the board. Greater attention to more homogeneous studies and 
numerical transformations will, undoubtedly, reveal more loci of reliability in 
research synthesis. I also acknowledge that there are crucial differences of 
reliability across individual synthesis studies within a type, that it is important to 
explore them, and that attending to the average distance from raw data may be 
one such tool. But relative to the yardstick of reliability I use here, these are all 
‘small’ differences. My focus is on approaches for radically enhancing the 
reliability of health research synthesis studies. A concern with proximity to raw 




At the start of the thesis, I took transformations of findings for the purposes of 
research synthesis to be processes and outcomes of presumably subtle and/or 
well grounded changes in the form, or the contents and form, of findings that 
are driven by differences perceived as hampering their ready integration but 
also as bridgeable, as some right type of similarity is there, too. Such 
transformations lead to or demonstrate a reduction of relevant differences 
between findings which may or may not be sufficient to ensure combinability or 
compatibility. That is, transformations can be a test of similarity that turns out 
negative and not only a successful attempt at increasing similarity. 
I also distinguished between processes of transformation and re-location, with 
‘transformation’ seen as the generic process and ‘re-location’ as the process 
where evidence is moved to a rather different type of domain (e.g. theory about 
other kinds of phenomena, as may often be the case in highly interpretive 
qualitative synthesis) or related to a rather different type of entity (e.g. when 
new groups of entities and phenomena are formed, as may often be the case in 
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meta-analysis). In line with this distinction, transformations would enable/ test 
for a greater degree of similarity between a finding to be transformed and a 
reference finding, while re-locations would enable/ test for a greater degree of 
relevance of a finding to a reference framework.  
In the process of the work, I collapsed the distinction to a distinction of degree: 
re-locations were seen as ‘bigger’ transformations. This was partly related to 
recognising the complexity of the unit of analysis/synthesis in research 
synthesis by virtue of which findings stopped being seen as the only object of 
transformations (see 5.1. above). As I could directly attend to the 
transformations of concepts, groups, types of interventions, etc., rather than 
seeing these as something static to which a transformed finding is applied, the 
re-attribution process highlighted in re-locations was no longer that important.  
 
In combining initial ideas and observations from the case study, I suggested 
that the capacity of a finding f to transform is determined by the number of 
findings in the set with which it is to be made combinable or compatible; by the 
extent of differences and similarities between f and the other findings in the set; 
by f’s having characteristics that come into a ‘logical contradiction’ with 
specifications made in the synthesis question; by the degree of its multiplicity; 
by the extent of missing and available pieces of information in f; by the distance 
between it and the synthesis question; by the effectiveness of the tools used to 
enable transformations and the tools used to constrain them; by the familiarity 
of the researcher with the research area of the findings and that of the synthesis 
question; and by a combined factor of harder to capture influences, such as 
order of presentation of findings, recent salient information available to the 
researcher, his or her capacity for lateral thinking, chance juxtaposition of 
information, etc. In the presentation of findings from the case study, different 
aspects of some of those drivers of transformations were illuminated. 
Many more remain to be illuminated, including some basic ones. The contents 
of some of the determinants needs much further specification (partly because 
they were not subjected to sufficient empirical exploration in the case study) or 
re-examination (partly because the case study showed some problems with the 
initial conceptualisation). For instance, how exactly should we conceptualise the 
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distance between a finding and a synthesis question? How can we 
operationalise the measurement of multiplicity? What is the ‘full’ set of currently 
employed tools for enabling and constraining transformations, what difference 
do they make and can we separate the two types of tool easily? Issues of 
relative importance and interaction between the determinants also need to be 
given further thought and possibly more plausible hypotheses offered. For 
instance, how likely is it that the extent of ‘all’ differences and similarities 
between a finding and its reference findings matters for its capacity for 
meaningful transformations rather than a smaller subset of these brought to the 
fore by the synthesis question? Or how strongly does the perception of missing/ 
available information relate to characteristics of the researcher? Relative to a 
high quality descriptive account of transformations, within the framework of 
parameters proposed above, a large number of questions remain that require 
further empirical and/or conceptual exploration. I am inclined, however, to argue 
against giving those questions much of a priority though certainly not against 
addressing them.  
I take this position on pragmatic grounds and relative to the concerns of this 
work. My interest in transformations was tied to the question of how much we 
can trust current research syntheses and how we can make transformations in 
future ones more rigorous and creative. Below, I outline a picture of the 
credibility of current synthesis studies. I suggest that the ways in which 
transformations are performed in them are reactive, rather than deliberate, 
responses to the pressures of insufficiency and/or excess of information. I add 
to this claim findings from the case study and broader observations of the 
research synthesis field. If the resulting picture of hugely problematic credibility 
of synthesis studies is valid, it will be self-evident why working out details about 
drivers of transformations will not be an effective way of improving those 
processes. It needs, however, to be taken as a provisional picture. I do not have 
direct evidence of data extraction from RCTs and numerical transformations in 
preparation for meta-analysis. I cover such studies and transformations on the 
basis of features I identified in this case study and consider largely 
generalisable (e.g. levels of missing information within a research report) and 
on the basis of knowledge and observations from my broader experience. 
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A major way in which mainstream synthesis studies resolve both the 
insufficiency and excess of information is by a strong leaning towards identities 
and ‘almost identities’ (of interventions, population groups, settings, finding 
types, etc.) and ease of judgement about similarity/ difference. This already 
creates a context where the need for transformations and the facing of their 
uncertainty are kept to the minimum. The strong leaning towards identities and 
‘almost identities’ is a somewhat intended, somewhat unintended consequence 
of asking very narrow questions and setting up very specific inclusion/ exclusion 
criteria. As much as there is nothing devious in the approach of the mainstream 
systematic review – narrow questions tend to be easier to answer and specific 
inclusion/ exclusion criteria ensure reliability – the combination is not without 
disadvantages and not without alternatives. The main disadvantage is that 
relevant information is not taken into account. Many apparently different or 
irrelevant findings that can be used through transformation are left out. The 
main alternative to the ‘narrow question – highly specific criteria’ combination is 
to ask narrow questions by approaching them through a broad range of 
information. This would require, among other things, many more 
transformations. The reliability of the synthesis process will decrease in ways 
that are visible. 
The leaning towards ease of judgement in the mainstream systematic review is 
realised through the contents of inclusion/ exclusion criteria. Theoretically, the 
contents of inclusion/ exclusion criteria has to reflect hypotheses of factors 
affecting an outcome. But judgements about correspondence with inclusion/ 
exclusion criteria should also be feasible, in the sense that the relevant 
information should be reliably available across studies. They should be 
generally easy, too, so as to be reliable. Thus, only widely reported (standard) 
parameters characterising studies tend to inform inclusion/ exclusion criteria. 
Also, similarity/ difference along such parameters is judged by making the 
comparisons easy to operationalise. Yet standard parameters correlate with 
outcomes only sometimes and, as the findings from the case study suggest, 
there is striking variability in the ways in which they are reported on and very 
limited information of what the labels used in such reporting stand for. 
Transformations in mainstream synthesis studies are thus often performed or 
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avoided on the basis of ‘unimportant’ parameters and on appearances of 
similarity rather than detailed background information.  
In contrast, many alternative synthesis methods (with qualitative syntheses as 
the exemplar case) start from a variety of material where only a few dimensions 
of relevant similarity/ difference are specified. A much larger number of 
directions for exploring the combinability of findings are open, with the demands 
this would place on transforming findings. This excess of potential, however, 
needs to be curtailed. Three main approaches seem to be used. The first is the 
‘insight’ approach. An insight flashes – a pattern is seen – findings transform 
towards a few common features. The possibility for and the value of justifying 
why those similarities, differences and transformations rather than others is 
denied (it is interpretive, it is a leap of thought, it is researcher dependent, it is 
context of discovery) against the strong valuation of transparency in research 
synthesis. Second, we have the approach where largely uncontroversial 
transformations are performed which go for the lowest common denominator of 
messages and limited criticism – very broad similarities are derived, often in line 
with well established narratives. Reliability and transparency are preserved at 
the cost of reaching rather generic and predictable conclusions. Finally, we 
have a combination of largely uncontroversial transformations and no 
transformations at all, where the generic and predictable conclusions are 
accompanied by non-synthesised descriptions of individual cases (see 
Pawson’s criticism of narrative reviews in Pawson, 2002a on which the 
description of the latter two situations draws). 
Exceptions notwithstanding, the following principles concerning transformations 
thus prevail in health research synthesis, largely for pragmatic reasons 
associated with a duality of too much and too little information: do not look for 
transformations along lines of similarity that are unusual or not immediately 
obvious; do not explore alternatives to the transformations you have carried out; 
transform on prima facie similarities rather than detailed checks of similarities 
and differences; transform to the lowest common denominator; transform on an 
insight.120 This amounts to severe underuse of the richness of findings and 
                                                          
120
 All this can be re-formulated, equivalently, from the perspective of similarities: do not create 
unusual groups; do not test your grouping against alternatives; create groups on the basis of 
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insufficiency of rigour in studies which define themselves precisely through 
comprehensiveness and rigour. 
 
My assumption at the beginning of the thesis was that having a better 
awareness of how processes of transformation happen and what drives and 
hampers them, for the right and wrong reasons, will allow us to make them 
more rigorous and creative – that is, that we need detailed descriptive 
knowledge before we can get to the normative. I no longer see the details of a 
descriptive account of transformations, as they are currently performed, as a 
particularly valuable guide towards a normative account. This is because, in 
response to the study findings, I no longer see the processes of transformation, 
as performed within current models of health research synthesis, as 
meaningfully rectifiable. One of my initial hypotheses was that if we extend the 
scope of certain virtues of research synthesis (e.g. transparency, 
comprehensiveness and critical analysis) and if we turn to a default mode of 
multiple coding,121 we can noticeably enhance the rigour and creativity of 
transformations in current research synthesis, and hence the trustworthiness of 
its outcomes. The case study showed quite starkly that the tools I implemented 
in trying to extend the scope of the methodology’s own virtues offered 
something but not enough, their reliability was low, and their cost in terms of 
feasibility on a larger scale would not be worth paying.  It also suggested very 
strongly that minor modifications of such tools will not change this, and that a 
completely different model and infrastructure are needed. 
A corollary of the above assertions is that, within the current overall model of 
research synthesis and the infrastructure that supports it, our methods are 
simply realistic in their selectivities and the inconsistency with which they apply 
the virtues of the enterprise. In addition, some of their outcomes are good 
without any relativisation to the ‘best we can do’. There is value in bringing 
together the very closely similar and avoiding transformations. There is also 
                                                                                                                                                                          
prima facie similarities; create big safe groups; create groups following an insight of what fits 
together. It can be reformulated from the perspective of differences, too, for that matter … 
121
 This need not be taken as separate from extending the scope of the methodology’s own 
virtues – we can see multiple coding as another way of enabling comprehensiveness and 
systematicity. It is mentioned separately as the typical associations for ways of realising those 
virtues do not include multiple coding. 
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value in jumps of thought taking us to places that would never be reached if the 
path had to be walked step by step, always thinking of those who may wish to 
follow or of finding our way back.   
But the facts that current methods are realistic in their approach, good in certain 
senses, and cannot be reformed in a substantial difference-making way under 
the same overall conditions do not mean that they are good enough or that the 
majority of them cannot be replaced in a very radical way. The vision for the 
future I have referred to on a number of occasions will be discussed shortly, 
immediately after the limitations of this work.  
 
6. Limitations  
The novelty and breadth of the work have resulted in compromises of precision, 
depth and systematicity. This is particularly visible in the literature review. As its 
aim was not only to contextualise the work and its key questions, but to prepare 
the ground for the empirical investigation, limitations of the literature review may 
have translated very directly into limitations of argument and findings. Many of 
the issues branching out of the topics of evidence, its combinability, and 
transformations are fundamental epistemological issues. A range of immensely 
rich and complex debates were thus touched upon. Broad claims were made 
and highly specific detail given, but the complexity of the middle level was not 
addressed. Representing this middle level adequately was also impeded by the 
fact that it was not possible to rely on a shared understanding of the basics, as 
issues that are self-evident to health researchers are not evident to 
philosophers and vice versa. Some highly relevant debates were altogether left 
out, such as the mixed methods, interdisciplinarity and secondary data analysis 
debates. Some of the debates I was most committed to bringing forth, such as 
those in the psychology of science, had to be given up for the sake of 
consistency and remained very much in the background, as considerations I 
was using in the analysis but at a limited depth.  
A different and better informed background framing may have resulted in a 
different specification of questions and methodology. Many attempts were made 
to achieve some local systematicity – e.g. through ‘microstudies’ based on 
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carefully selected samples (obtained, for instance, through exemplary texts or 
bibliometric data), but these could only serve as a partial remedy. The state of 
preformation of the field of research synthesis, its disconnectedness from the 
philosophy of science and other meta-scientific debates, and the breadth of the 
issues addressed meant that this work would be falling often into traps of 
ignorance and obvious omissions. The price and risk of early attempts at 
something unusual and broad are high. On a more positive note, this is simply 
an approach of a very particular grounding in the meta-scientific debate, which, 
although limited in its scope and reliability, will provide a useful reference point 
to help direct further exploration. 
The novelty of the methods resulted in a substantial imbalance between 
methods and analysis. On the one hand, many more methodological steps were 
prepared, envisaged and actually executed in comparison to the lines of 
investigation that were followed in detail – both in terms of analysis and 
reporting. For instance, the exploration of issues of representation was 
extensively prepared in the Analysis Framework and voluminous data were 
collected.  These were not, however, analysed in depth after primary analysis 
showed that such findings will not explain enough of what is happening in 
processes of transformation. Rigour and transparency demand that the analysis 
is followed through as set up and that negative findings are reported more 
clearly, but constraints of feasibility had to be taken into account. Overall, my 
approach has been to do justice to the strongest hypotheses within a set 
(relative to current knowledge and the aims of the thesis) and report clearly 
positive and negative findings concerning these. Findings about weaker 
hypotheses were reported only if highly salient, whether positive or negative. 
For instance, issues of combinability arising from differences between 
quantitative and qualitative studies related to strong hypotheses, while issues of 
combinability arising from the variability in representations of the same finding 
did not. The reason for ‘over-designing’ the study was that, in such a new 
territory, many directions of exploration appeared to have equal chances of 
offering interesting and informative findings, and yet came with no guarantee 
that they lead anywhere.  
Another aspect of the imbalance between methods and analyses was that many 
methods did not provide sufficient information for analysis. For instance, many 
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operationalisations for identifying and isolating elements and effects of matrices 
were of limited effectiveness. Expectations of a sufficiently high level of 
preliminary synthesis concepts and claims were not realised and comparisons 
between ‘input’ and ‘output’, seen as central to understanding processes of 
transformation, could not be carried out. Fundamental elements of the Analysis 
Framework were thus found to be weaker than anticipated. Although this was 
not unexpected – in a field of no sufficiently similar precedents failure is at least 
as likely as success – there may have been an approach where risks of 
methodological steps not working were better distributed. 
 
The novelty of methods also meant that some of them were not pushed to their 
logical limits. As a result, they provided data that could support or disconfirm 
hypotheses, but without excluding alternatives as reliably as possible. Most 
typically, as patterns of difference were expected to be found closer to the 
surface, methods were unsuited to provide data about potentially important 
differences at deeper levels. For example, the composition and structure of 
quantitative and qualitative findings were found to be quite similar by using the 
Vocabulary of Elements of Findings. It was clear, however, that many avenues 
remained unexplored at the level of sub-elements – for instance, at the level of 
types of ‘expressions’ and ‘relationships’. Although unlikely in light of existing 
debates, the theoretical possibility was open that differences between 
quantitative and qualitative findings appear at such finer levels. The directions 
of how to refine the methods further were clear in their general outline but were 
not followed. Such a process would have generated too many additional 
operationalisations, data and analyses. I thus settled for less secure claims. 
 
A further key limitation of this work concerned the sample of studies. It was 
intentionally highly heterogeneous. The sampling framework aimed to pull 
together studies of a wide variety of health-related fields with their potentially 
incongruous fundamental assumptions and concerns; theoretical, 
methodological and pragmatic frameworks; concepts; values, etc. I saw this as 
an opportunity to allow for a broad range of transformations and challenges 
associated with them to emerge during the extraction-coding. Presumably, this 
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has opened more of the variety of transformations and their drivers. At the same 
time it generated evidence of the frequency and range of transformations and 
the force of their drivers which will not to be readily applicable to the synthesis 
of largely homogeneous studies. In having to choose whether I address 
transformations in largely homogeneous or highly heterogeneous studies, 
where doing both simultaneously would be a contradiction in terms, I went for 
the option that underpins answers to much more complex health-related and 
social questions. While I acknowledge that focused work is needed on 
homogeneous studies and, even more narrowly, on homogeneous RCTs on 
biomedical topics where standardisation is expected to be at its highest, I do 
consider some of the case study findings sufficiently generalisable to such 
contexts. No realistic prediction based on even minimal familiarity with health 
research will maintain that the variety and incompleteness of information found 
at the level of standardised parameters will disappear without a trace in a 
sample of homogenous RCTs. It will be reduced for a variety of reasons, not 
least due to the widespread use of reporting guidelines such as the CONSORT 
statement. It will not disappear. The need to ascertain similarity and difference, 
make inclusion-exclusion judgements and create groups on the basis of such 
far from uniform and complete information on standardised parameters will 
remain. Controversial transformations will thus be made in any synthesis of 
RCTs, even if all other transformations involved in it are numerical conversions 
that are entirely innocuous, reversible and independent of problematic statistical 
assumptions (and we have good reasons to believe that not all numerical 
conversions are innocuous, reversible and independent of problematic 
statistical assumptions). 
 
Very importantly and unfortunately, the approach I have used is also a classic 
case of the research process interfering intensely with the phenomenon 
researched and/or merging of method and object of study. In studying data 
extraction and transformations relative to demanding criteria of rigour and 
heuristic promise, and in approaching this through observing my own data 
extraction and transformations in progress, I brought to life a process which is 
some way, maybe a long way, away from ‘normal’ data extraction as executed 
by the majority of health researchers. Other approaches of studying 
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transformations in data extraction, such as comparing input and output material 
or performing ‘cognitive interviews’ with researchers while they are extracting 
data, are certainly valuable. But unsatisfactory trade-offs seem inevitable. If the 
exploratory processes used interfere little with the ‘normal process’ of data 
extraction, fewer questions can be asked. If the sample used is more 
representative of the health researchers population, further errors of 
communication are added (e.g. of communicating aims to study participants in a 
way that would not shape their observations). The study of transformations in 
research synthesis seems to be in the category of cases where many methods 
need to be triangulated for a fuller picture of the phenomenon of interest, with 
no method having a superior balance of strengths and weaknesses. 
 
Finally, as much as I have clarified on a number of occasions that the questions 
asked and answered here concern the process of data extraction, which is only 
one of many stages of a research synthesis process, I fear that the description 
of what is happening at this stage has begun to sound as a description of ‘the’ 
research synthesis process, with some detail missing. It is far from it. At least as 
much can be said about many other elements of the process, maybe most 
notably those of literature searching and critical appraisal.  In addition, the 
description of transformations is not a description of transformations happening 
and prepared in research synthesis, but in one of its phases only. Very 
interesting issues of, for instance, statistical assumptions used in quantitative 
transformations have thus received no attention as they tend to become 
relevant at later stages. Also, in accordance with the way in which the scope of 
the study was narrowed at the beginning (focus on ‘words’ and ‘numbers within 
words’), certain types of research material received minimal attention. These 
include, for instance, graphs, figures and images, of which only individual cases 
were analysed. There is sufficient indication that processes of transformation 
will work differently there.  
Future research will hopefully address some of these limitations, perhaps in 
continuity with ideas presented here. But some of this future research better 




7. Vision for the future or an ‘impossible synthesis’? 
7.1. Existing visions for the future of research synthesis 
Information technology has changed immensely since the beginnings of 
research synthesis studies within an evidence-based medicine framework. The 
software underpinning research synthesis has also changed immensely in line 
with user needs, feedback and new technological solutions. That said, the field 
does not engage in high visibility discussions on alternatives to the current 
infrastructure of research synthesis and whether technological advancements 
are making it possible to do research synthesis in a radically new way. I have 
encountered several proposals made in this direction, all of these only minimally 
articulated. Chalmers, Hedges and Cooper (2002), in discussing the future of 
research synthesis, see us as moving towards the analysis of raw data, once 
they become more broadly available and shared (op. cit.: 31-2). Computer 
scientists see opportunities for text enrichment, where abstracts or published 
papers are tagged with further information enabling much more effective 
automatic capture of knowledge through data mining.122 This would reduce the 
need both for developing traditional literature searching strategies and for 
manual data extraction. Researchers at the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality in the US have created a Systematic Review Data Repository 
where researchers can deposit data extracted for their review, in recognition of 
the time-consuming work involved in data extraction and the fact that data can 
have multiple uses. There are 104 projects in progress in the Repository as of 
May 2013 (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2013). Finally, much 
hope is being placed in big datasets, e.g. collections of electronic health 
records. These have been discussed as having the potential to reduce the need 
for randomised controlled trials (Boyle, 2012) and, respectively, for their 
synthesis. Circulating views on the future of research synthesis thus veer, 
variably, towards proximity to primary data, richer meta-data, larger volumes of 
information, greater automation of processes, accumulation of data enriched by 
critical analysis, increased connectivity between existing reviews, and increased 
use of routine data.  
 
                                                          
122
 Informal discussion at the International Conference on Biomedical Ontology, Buffalo, US, 26-
30 July 2011. 
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7.2. An alternative? 
I wonder if we can have our cake and eat it (and even save it for later). I wonder 
if this can happen by expanding on a basic vision for 1) mega-databases on 2) 
big questions 3) that bring together a broad range of resources, from raw data 
through critical analyses to non-research material, and 4) that are able to break 
down, in a fractal pattern, into smaller databases on narrow review topics.  
This broad vision is a mirror image of limitations and strengths of three main 
types of enterprises – traditional systematic reviews, non-traditional reviews on 
broad topics, and Big Data databases. A main criticism directed at traditional 
systematic reviews is that they address very narrow problems, yet the precision 
with which they formulate these narrow problems is a great virtue. Reviews on 
broad issues are not as broad as the title suggests, as they tend to use a 
narrow range of disciplinary perspectives and resource types. Nevertheless, 
they make the attempt and often achieve a much deeper critical perspective in 
the process, as a result of the juxtaposition of highly diverse material. Large 
databases accumulating material on a phenomenon are a treasure trove of 
information, but this information is meaningless without hypotheses/research 
questions from which to analyse it.  
Referring to a (potentially significant) number of mega-databases, rather than 
one mega-database, is not only out of a concern with feasibility but a reflection 
of a fundamental position of this thesis – it does not believe in a final, 
consistent, unified picture. The big questions I have in mind in constructing and 
probing this new vision are at the level of generality of the following examples: 
How to change health behaviours? Do physical or psychological factors have 
more weight in prognosis in life limiting illnesses? What is the relative 
contribution of individual versus social and environmental factors in making 
health-related decisions? What are the effects of nutrition on health and how to 
institute change in nutrition behaviours? Are different types of communication in 
healthcare associated with different hard and soft outcomes? … For simplicity, I 
will revert to speaking of ‘the mega-database’, or ‘the super-synthesis database’ 
in specifying this vision for a possible or impossible synthesis. I will be meaning 
a single representative of this type of super-synthesis databases, generically 
construed. The features of the super-synthesis database presented below draw 
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on assumptions and findings of this work, broader criticisms of research 
synthesis, virtues and good practices in it, promises of and concerns about Big 
Data, and characteristics of our current research cultures. The description of 
these features is followed by discussion of the limits this utopia hits, too. 
 
If, as per background claims of this work, the primary route to increasing the 
rigour and heuristic potential of transformations goes through increased access 
to information about the matrices of a study and if, as per findings from this 
work, this is not information we can get satisfactorily out of published papers, 
our super-synthesis database will need structured ways of collecting it from 
primary researchers and theorists/critical analysts. Building on theoretical 
thinking of what the matrices that shape and co-constitute findings are, the 
database will be prompting primary researchers to supply such information. For 
instance, established study designs will be associated with fields and prompts 
that correspond to items in current quality assessment checklists. The specifics 
of how certain steps were realised will be entered by researchers in a 
combination of structured and free text. Researchers will be prompted to 
articulate hesitations and concerns about rigour. The information demanded by 
the mega-database will be more extensive than the information demanded by 
either papers or data depositories. For instance, it will be asking for 
background, connecting information that tends to remain only in the minds and 
unshared notes of researchers – partly because it has become so normalised 
that it is not considered unknown or relevant, partly because a researcher’s 
intuition is to withhold it as things could have been done better. The information 
about matrices on the super-synthesis database will also be much more 
consistent across studies and better structured than it is in papers and data 
depositories, with the benefits this has in terms of judging comparability of 
findings and explorations of matrix effects. In addition, research that challenges 
normalised matrices and often comes from distant fields will be appropriately 
linked. For example, empirical findings about self-management interventions will 
be directly connected to more theoretical research on the politics of the concept 
of self-management, or studies based on surveys relying on self-reporting will 
be connected to basic psychological research on memory and social biases. 
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Constructive and deconstructive work on the same topic will be placed side by 
side.  
If, as the social studies of science, history of science and the psychology of 
science would suggest, we have good reasons to believe that some of the main 
drivers of research cannot be reconciled with a picture of science making as a 
fully rational enterprise, we need to find structured ways of collecting 
information about such drivers and relating it to the nature of research findings. 
For instance, this would include information on the researcher as an individual 
and on the social processes in his or her research team. Since, however, many 
scientists resist the idea of a far from perfect rationality of science and those 
who do not will be concerned that they will be undermining their work, relevant 
information may need to be collected sensitively. For instance, it may be 
anonymised and at least partly disconnected from the area of study (‘normal’ 
data entered on the super-synthesis database will be relatable to a traceable 
user and extensively connected). Alternatively, attempts may be made to foster 
a culture which rewards the extensive empirical exploration of purported non-
rational effects on health research. Currently, the culture is of asserting or 
denying them rhetorically or on the basis of limited examples.  
 
The description so far suggests that much of the information on the super-
synthesis database will be supplied by primary researchers rather than, for 
instance, data extractors.123 This would then demand the development of 
mechanisms through which the value of the peer review process characterising 
research papers and the further critical appraisal and re-interpretations coming 
from synthesis researchers are added and potentially improved on. A practice 
may be instituted, for instance, where the peers who have reviewed a paper for 
a journal also sanction the entries made by authors on the mega-database. At 
the same time, the disadvantage of a single story coming out of the authors-
reviewers debate characterising research papers may be circumvented. As the 
text presented no longer needs to be linear and consistent, different 
                                                          
123
 In the context of health and medical research this practically means a default of several 
primary researchers supplying information on the same study. The division of labour in the field 
is such that different researchers have privileged knowledge of different aspects of the same 
project – e.g. data collectors, statisticians, analysts, etc. 
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perspectives on the same research decision or outcome can be left in. As for 
the perspective of synthesis researchers, this, too, can be incorporated as a 
further layer of critique and interpretation. Finally, comments of readers can also 
be added, with a clear indication of their source. This openness to comments of 
a broad range of readers will overcome the limitations of knowledge of a couple 
of reviewers and a single synthesis researcher or a small team. As this study 
made all too clear to its author, no amount of generic critical thinking, theoretical 
support from the meta-sciences, and internal checks and balances arising from 
inter-connections between entities and findings across studies can make up for 
the lack of narrowly specialised knowledge of a synthesis researcher. We may 
take this community contribution even further – if we are claiming that findings 
are always generated and seen within a range of matrices, we will want the 
super-synthesis database to ask for background information on all those 
community users so that its relationship to the nature of their contribution can 
be explored. 
 
As a further way of getting the most out of the same piece of research, the 
super-synthesis database will encourage multiple classifications of concepts 
and findings. This will be done partly by the primary researchers, reviewers, 
synthesis researchers and peers. For instance, the data entry process for 
primary researchers will prompt them to consider where else their research fits. 
The synthesis researchers’ and peers’ commenting outlined above will naturally 
involve this, too (“this reminds me of …”). In addition, database curators and 
contributors may proactively explore relationships between concepts and 
findings and propose new relationships of membership and instantiation. These 
could be variously approved by authors, indicated as curator/contributor 
suggestions, and commented on by peers. 
 
If, as per findings from this work, rigorous multiple coding in ‘easy but many 
cases’ cannot be achieved proactively, as it is too cognitively demanding and 
emotionally destructive, then the super-synthesis database should be 
underpinned by extensive capacities for linking, self-population/transformation 
of information and simplified entry of information. For instance, as far as linking 
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is concerned, authors may be prompted to answer questions of how their key 
concept relates to a network of concepts the system already holds as 
connected, or, if the concept is new, what concepts the authors see as related 
to it and in what ways. This would be a further way of multiply coding 
information, while the demands on proactively coming up with ‘all’ related 
concepts, phenomena, etc. are lessened. As far as self-population of 
information is concerned, the super-synthesis database may, for instance, have 
different pre-set levels for saliency of findings, some of which context-specific, 
some of which generic (e.g. applies to over 80% of the population studied) 
which get self-populated on the basis of information provided. Or once 
information is provided on initial and final sample, dropouts become 
automatically calculated. Depending on the degree to which the change of 
perspective may require readjustments, the authors will be given the opportunity 
to correct automatically populated information. 
 
If there are arguments both in favour of the value of processed findings and raw 
data, the super-synthesis database should enable the entry of both, depending 
on the preferences and capacity of researchers performing the data entry. It 
should also enable ways of automatic extraction of data from other sources – 
e.g. the working databases of researchers contributing data to the super-
synthesis database or national statistical databases. 
 
The super-synthesis database should also attempt to counteract one of the 
biggest problems in research, the bias towards positive findings.124 To avoid this 
bias at the level of studies, where studies having positive findings are much 
more likely to be published, the incentives for contributing ‘no difference found’ 
data should be just as strong as those for contributing positive data. To avoid 
this bias at the level of findings, where positive findings are much more likely to 
be reported within a study and attended to in its discussion, hypotheses and 
expectations will be first reported in detail and findings then ‘demanded’ rather 
than the reporting being driven by findings. As researchers will no longer be 
                                                          
124
 I mean primarily in opposition to ‘no difference found’ rather than negative findings although 
the latter is also relevant. 
300 
 
constrained by journal word limits, some of the practical constraints 
underpinning a positivity bias will also be dealt away with. 
 
As it is becoming more and more widely recognised in health research that 
there are questions on which formal research is not the only way in which ‘data’ 
are collected, the super-synthesis database will allow for other forms of 
knowledge to be contributed, with appropriate indication of their source. For 
instance, patient perspectives and experiences are being shared extensively 
outside of a research context such as on social media and personal pages, to 
the extent to which research is beginning to use these as a key data source. 
Lay users may be encouraged to contribute these to the super-synthesis 
database, too.  
Finally, it will be a ‘clever’ system. It will scan itself for areas of a great variety of 
findings, or distant areas with overlap in vocabulary, or highlight gaps and over-
researched areas. And it better be used on big screens125 … 
 
7.3. Can it work? Will we want it to? 
It is obvious that the feasibility of a super-synthesis database with such features 
is hugely problematic. 
This is a model as per which researchers are much more involved in, and 
responsible for, making research amenable to synthesis efforts and/or re-
analysis – both their own and that of other researchers. Such a model requires 
a profound change in the research culture and in its system of awards and 
recognition. Contributing to such a database should become just as important 
as publishing a research paper. It will be a matter of positive incentives, but not 
only. It will also be a matter of the extent to which the disruptions and 
destructions following from the implementation of such an enterprise are 
amenable to assimilation, whether voluntary or forced by other actors. Most 
current practices of research synthesis will need to be dismantled, yet they have 
                                                          
125
 I mean this in a very literal way. Certain things need to fall in the same visual field so that 
they can be connected – just as in Köhler’s experiments where the wooden boxes, stick and 
bananas had to come within the same visual field so that the chimps retrieve the bananas. 
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become deeply rooted in health and other applied sciences research. They are 
associated with a powerful infrastructure, culture and mentality; spread of 
knowledge and skills; and external support. The level of interconnectedness 
between research areas will begin to show its dangers, too – the 
precariousness of fundamental assumptions of certain areas of work, invisible 
because facts that challenge them are too far off, will become obvious. The 
commitment to non-essentialist ideas and the merging of scientific research with 
critical scientific and meta-scientific thinking will be unsettling as they break 
down our (easy) confidence in science. The degree of openness about one’s 
research practices demanded can be quite uncomfortable, too. The messiness 
and imperfection of research will be much more visible. If all these are ways of 
improving research or being realistic about it, this is good. But if it discredits 
research relative to factors that deserve to be much more strongly discredited, it 
is not. 
Finally, the smoothness of the descriptions above should not hide the fact that 
we are talking about a highly complex enterprise, both conceptually and 
technologically. The work needed to go in specifying the desiderata for the 
system and its conceptual underpinnings (e.g. classification systems) seems 
enormous, even before the feasibility of various technological solutions is taken 
into account.126 This is also a system that should be accessible and editable by 
multiple users, the majority of whom should be fully identifiable and bear formal 
responsibility for the contents of their contributions. The system should have 
different levels of editing rights and clear lines of approval. The conceptual 
structure under which the data are entered is likely to be highly dynamic, at 
least in initial stages. That said, these are not issues without a sufficient number 
of precedents for effective solutions in our day and age. Feasibility is 
problematic, but no unique practical hindrance has been identified. 
 
What would the benefits of such super-synthesis databases be? They will 
enable the gradual accumulation of ideas and findings from fields, resources 
and studies in numbers that are incomparably larger than those in any of the 
current synthesis models. A greater linkage, more varied use and extensive re-
                                                          
126
 In actual practice they cannot but be developed concurrently, with each of them taking the 
requirements and limitations of the other into account. 
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use of information will become possible – the same set of findings will have the 
chance to contribute to a much broader range of synthesis studies and to 
receive support or be challenged from many more directions. Innovative or 
narrowly specialised work which is not visible in the mainstream or outside of its 
discipline will become better connected. Such increased use of findings and 
ideas and increased degree of interconnectedness amongst them will have 
important heuristic, financial and ethical implications. The super-synthesis 
databases will hold much more ‘complete’ information from studies that any 
research paper. It will also hold it in a highly structured way. This will enable 
automatic juxtaposition and comparison of information along a broad range of 
parameters which no paper collection or data depository can achieve. Added to 
the fact that simply ‘more’ information will be available, these features will 
enable transformations in bringing information together that are much more 
rigorous and creative than any of the current models of research synthesis can 
allow. Super-synthesis databases will enable a much greater degree of critical 
analysis of findings than that in a standard appraisal for the purposes of 
research synthesis (let alone a standard peer review process). They will make 
the meta-knowledge – criticisms, deconstructions, authors’ concerns, etc. – sit 
side by side with the ‘positive knowledge’. Issues raised in meta-work will thus 
be easier to take into account or challenge. Super-synthesis databases will also 
make it easy to identify where enough knowledge has accumulated for 
qualitatively new conclusions and where the research gaps and 
disconnectedness lie. The very process of using them may help researchers 
achieve greater reflexivity, learn about related areas (if, indeed, they are 
prompted to draw connections with other research) and achieve closure or 
clarity of new directions. This is a completely different way of performing 
research synthesis work, which also has profound implications for the ways in 
which primary research is conducted and shared. 
 
Do I urge for movement in this direction? Yes, I do. I do not feel that any 
synthesis study which is underpinned by lower than this level of availability, 
interconnectedness and critical appraisal of information can be taken as 
sufficiently credible. In light of findings from this study, I see our current 
syntheses as having only a slightly greater likelihood of capturing ‘truth’ than 
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chance bestows, although for lack of anything better, I will continue using them 
as a preferred source of information. Do I see super-synthesis databases as a 
way of reaching some ultimate knowledge of a small number of fundamental 
laws in health and medicine and a greater confidence in our knowledge? No, 
this is not part of the vision.  
This is a model of research which will be showing the tiniest differences 
between apparently similar concepts, samples, contexts, questions, etc. In 
every moment of bringing information together we will be aware of the large 
number of assumptions on the basis of which we are combining information and 
reaching higher-level, supposedly more generalisable, conclusions. We will be 
able to easily vary those assumptions and in a good number of cases our 
findings will vary, too. That which is currently hidden in our processes of 
transformation will no longer be. Seeing low-level differences and the difference 
making potential of differences will hardly make us more secure in our 
knowledge. But I doubt it will make us less secure. Retrospectively, we will see 
how unjustifiably confident we were before in our synthesis work and findings. 
But in a moment, we will continue to believe, or know, that we are doing the 
best we can and the assumptions on the basis of which we are bringing 
evidence together are the most reliable we have at the moment. Yet it should be 
the case that, without getting ultimate knowledge or being more justifiably 
secure in our knowledge, we will manage to deal more effectively with a large 
variety of questions in health research, as the rigour of our transformation 
processes and the variety of alternatives we have tried before settling for one 
will have increased dramatically. 
 
How can we begin to work in this direction? The first and foremost thing to do is 
to obtain the support of the Cochrane Collaboration. This is to be followed by 
selecting pilot topics and bringing together teams of synthesis researchers, 
information specialists, researchers who explore issues related to the topic of 
interest in a variety of areas as well as researchers working in the meta-
scientific fields – partly to develop the desiderata for the database, partly to map 




What should the relevant meta-scientific research be so that work on such a 
super-synthesis database is enabled? I would suggest that it should focus 
primary on biomedical and other health-related ontologies, operationalisation of 
thinking about matrices, and work on breaking down studies and findings into 
elements that can become building blocks of the data collection so that it is valid 
and reliable and so that those building blocks can then be effectively linked, 
retrieved, compared and analysed. 
 
How likely is it that such super-synthesis databases become a reality? It is one 
of those occasions when I think history weighs too heavily, systems are too 
strong, and resistance comes from highly cherished beliefs and statuses and is 
thus close to insurmountable. I am pessimistic that such type of work can get 
off the ground. Doubt will keep it a vision only. At the very least, a long time will 
pass before we can reach such a stage. In my view, the aspect of this vision we 
can realistically hope to achieve and which will bring about ‘good’ well worth 
bringing about is to integrate more closely the scientific with the meta-scientific 
in health research synthesis, both in thinking about research synthesis and in 
synthesising actual research. 
 
Maybe I am wrong to be pessimistic. Maybe at this point, at the end of an 
investigation which should have suggested something practical and easier to 
do, and on this grey day of November, my trust in visions of a radically better 
science cannot come to life. Doubt me. Doubt me if you can. 
 














The window-screen sifts the blue cumulus 
From my cigarette. 
I sit and ponder the big synthesis but the answer 
I just forget. 
 
Constellated at my feet papers pepper 
And salt the truth 
I taste in them nevertheless as I squirm and shift 
From the rage to the ruth 
 
Of the somewhat helpless who is and who is not 
Quite able 
To say “Just kill the witches and you’ll be a lot 
More comfortable.” 
 
And against much advice I read in the Bible 
A love-lorn column 
With wish then to use such passion and scruple without 
Getting solemn 
 
And queasy, but can’t do it, and the mixed-up 
Jig-saw 
Puzzle cut from the Garden and scattered in a world 
For the cats-paw 
 
Mankind to put together in the pain of its truth 
Stays shining 
More dear, derelict, strict though asunder 
Than all our repining 
 
Has learned. I must hope that solution mankindled 
May find breath 
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Wiser than any we know if the solving’s a matter 
For life, not death. 
 
Gray Burr. Garden Puzzle. 
 
The original had “Constellated at my feet newspapers pepper/ And salt the 
truth” rather than “papers”. I could not resist the transformation. I believe I can 























It is their work, too, so you do not thank them. This is roughly what Umberto Eco 
says about thanking your supervisors in the thesis acknowledgements. It is their 
work, too – I could not agree more. But I do not see a valid argument leading 
from the premise to the conclusion. My biggest “thank you’s” are for Professor 
John Dupré and Dr Susan Kelly. If I had made a wish list of what my 
supervisors should be like, I would have chosen worse. I am very grateful for all 
their feedback, advice and encouragement. I am also grateful for the freedom 
they gave me to experiment. Precious little comments of theirs have shifted 
many habits of thought and style. John’s insistence on examples gave life to 
many pages of abstraction, the empirical grounding for which was known only to 
me. I also relaxed that ‘I need not be showing that I’ve read it all’, nor to have 
read it all. Many more sentences now begin with what is important in them 
rather than end with it because of a comment about reverse sentences by 
Susan. (Not sure about this one though!) They supported me invariably for 
‘other’ things I wanted to do and apply for during the PhD years. Last but in 
many ways first, it has been inspiring to see how razor sharp minds can go with 
kindness and openness, a sense of humour, and creative responses to rules 
that hamper rather than help. I have been exceptionally lucky with my 
supervisors. 
My mentor, Dr Hannah Farrimond, has given me much down-to-earth yet 
extremely helpful advice. She was able to see right into the many ways I could 
devise to make my life more difficult than unnecessary. And it became easier. 
Recently, we have been talking extensively about women in academia. It has 
been enormously motivating. 
My examiners, Professor Nancy Cartwright and Professor Nicky Britten, have 
helped improve this work more than I thought possible at this stage of the 
research. Thanks to their advice, it has much more integrity than originally – it 
states more often what I have done rather than what I intended to do and is 
more transparent about its starting assumptions, including the value I had 
ascribed to being transparent. The stylistic advice on reducing the use of 
passive voice made many difficult passages more readable and dynamic. I also 
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liked the feeling of owning more of what I have done. It has been a privilege to 
have academics whose work I have enjoyed reading so much to read mine. 
I would next like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council for funding 
me, through a grant attached to Egenis, the ESCR Centre for Genomics in 
Society. I am grateful to the decision makers who found promise in my unusual 
proposal and background. But I am also grateful to the invisible, let’s say, Jane, 
Peter, Esther and Nathaniel – the taxpayers – who made this possible. Having 
come back to earning and paying taxes a few months ago, I remembered that 
you really want them well used.  
I owe much to my friends and colleagues at Egenis and the broader 
department, and especially to Ann-Sophie Barwich, Pietro Berti, Louise 
Bezuidenhout, Daniele Carrieri, Antonio Carvallo, Jo Donaghy, Chris Elphick, 
Trijsje Franssen, Kate Getliffe, Jean Harrington, Anna Harris, Pierre-Olivier 
Méthot, Ginny Russell, Kai Wang and David Wyatt. I always felt very welcomed 
and have some wonderful memories of downtime together. Each has taught me 
something, in his or her unique way. It was also a curious law that every time 
my motivation would waver, I would hear one of them talk about their project. 
Their enthusiasm would shine through. It will catch on within hours. They would 
forgive me for saying that every time I saw or heard them anxious, over-
stressed and over-worked, I remembered what I do not want to do. I hope I 
have been a help and mirror to them, too. 
I have learnt much from my senior colleagues at Egenis and the broader 
department. The Egenis seminars have long been a place of questions to 
dread. I could see how but I could see the point, too. Intellectual atmosphere 
aside, my senior colleagues and the administrative staff at Egenis have also 
made me feel very welcomed and supported. I am particularly grateful to Dr 
Sabina Leonelli. Reading her work and attending the events on data-driven 
science she organised have helped me immensely with my work. We seem to 
have many interests in common. We also seem to have many interests, period. 
There was never enough time to talk ‘properly’. Staffan Müller-Wille still has my 
admiration for a person ‘who knows it all’ (be it sometimes darkly!). They may 
not necessarily know it – I would often just listen – but I have learnt precious 
things from Professor Barry Barnes, Dr Christine Hauskeller, Professor Steve 
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Hughes, Dr Dana Wilson-Kovacs, Dr Maureen O’Malley, Dr Michael Morrison, 
Professor Andy Pickering and Professor Brian Rappert. Sometimes it was 
factual knowledge and lines of argument. Maybe more often it was how to be an 
academic with one’s own curious idiosyncrasies. Laura Dobb, Sue Harding, 
Claire Packman, Natasha Simcock, Cheryl Sutton and Chee Wong, our 
administrative and communications staff at various points, have helped me with 
much paperwork, navigation of rules and random queries. Amy Rager from the 
Graduate School has been very helpful with squeaky administrative wheels. 
In a world where quality, time and money are so inter-related, I am indebted to 
Georgi Iliev. He helped me achieve the quality of work I was aiming at when 
Jane, Peter, Esther and Nathaniel, the invisible taxpayers, could no longer do. 
He has been a close and truly supportive friend for many years now. He is 
probably also the one who would ask me the most specific questions about the 
PhD and listen through my overly specific answers. 
I am very grateful to David Wyatt, Dr Paul Sutcliffe and Dr Dimitar Angelov who 
read and commented on chapters of my dissertation. All of them have a 
remarkable eye for detail, clarity and nuances of language. Paul has been a 
colleague, mentor and friend in my last couple of years as a researcher at 
Warwick. I owe much of my confidence to him as well as many tangible 
outcomes of my work. He, along with Dr Janice Koistinen, also a friend and 
colleague from Warwick, gave me invaluable advice when I was leaving to start 
my PhD. I listened. I started writing from the very beginning. Before it was too 
late, I stopped reading and focused on my own argument. Most of my PhD work 
went in a smooth flow because of their advice. Much of what I know about 
academic writing I owe to Professor Bill Fulford and Professor Jeremy Dale, 
who have directed my work at Warwick. For years they have been trying to 
teach me to stop apologising that this is not the best work in the world and 
destroying it verbally (and, in that respect, be more like a male than female 
medical student); have a strong argument that fits on a single page, single-
spaced; cut yet more detail … Still much to learn but they will recognise an 
improvement! 
Many notches of the experimental spirit and sincerity of this work I owe to 
Michael Carhart, a friend who is in a friendship category of its own. This work 
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would have been braver and more direct than my previous work just by a logic 
of internal development. But it would never have been those things to its current 
extent, be it sufficient or not, if it were not for many extraordinary conversations 
and silences with Michael. It would have had less poetry in it, too. And just as 
with those conversations and silences, I do not know where the beginning and 
end of this thesis are. 
My immediate family – Krastina Manolova, Petar Petrov and Borislav Petrov, 
my cousins Yolina Stoyanova-Brunner and Konstantina Stoyanova-Poix, and 
my closest friends – Dennitza Ivanova, Iliyana Hristova and Gloria Ayob have 
always trusted in me, my abilities and work much more than objectively 
deserved. Each of them has supported me in their own way – whether in our 
online coffee mornings each Sunday; by joking that I can go to their funeral only 
with a PhD title and that they then have many years to live; by sometimes 
asking about, sometimes completely ignoring my PhD; by saying many ‘well 
done’s’ and ‘I was telling about you to so and so’; by taking my mind off with 
their news and stories. I am particularly grateful to my mum for putting up with 
me for several months in my most intense period of writing up, 16 years after I 
left home. I was far from being good company. I was obsessed with my data 
analysis. I would leave all housework to her. I was also on the verge of deciding 
whether to let my heart go broken or whether the other person is funnily 
irrelevant to one’s love. I went for the latter. Worst of all, I made her party to a 
mega-project of reorganising the books in our library and ‘setting free’ the 
unused ones. This took us six weekends, much dust and chaos, and some 
drama around where Shakespeare should go since we couldn’t ‘multi-code’ him. 
I had forgotten it is her home now. But the smell of coffee she makes in this 
house is still a smell which makes me feel at home in every nice café, anywhere 
in the world. 
I try to remind those around me that no matter how busy I am, people always 
come before work for me. I hope they knew that, in the bigger picture, the PhD 
is just a phd. I have made it wait without a speck of hesitation when I felt my 
help or presence were needed. But I’m afraid that my sensitivity has been 
dumbed down. I also suspect that they have been limiting the information flows 
to give me space and time to write. It is a PHD after all. I am deeply grateful to 




Appendix to Chapter 2 
1. Strategies for the bibliometric searches in PubMed presented in Table T 
2.1 
The bibliometric searches I performed are only illustrative. Much more refined 
strategies and thorough analysis of the retrievals are needed to obtain accurate 
numbers. The comments accompanied by ***** indicate findings which limit the 
drawing of clear conclusions and suggest that more in-depth investigation is 
required. 
1. ("cost effectiveness" OR cost-effectiveness) AND Bayesian 
Limited to ‘review’ 
2. "Bayesian meta-analysis" OR "Bayesian metaanalysis" OR "Bayesian 
meta analysis" OR "Bayesian synthesis" 
 
3. "case survey" OR "quantitative case survey" 
Limited to ‘review’ 
 
4. “comparative case study” 
Limited to ‘review’ 
 
5. “decision modelling” OR “decision modeling” 
Limited to ‘review’ 
***** Combinations with “comprehensive” not found. 
6. “confidence profile” 
 
7. "content analysis" 
Limited to ‘review’ 
***** "Content synthesis" retrieved primarily false positives (14 vs. 2 true 
positives). Added to retrieval for “content analysis”. 
8. "critical interpretive synthesis" 
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9. "cross design synthesis" OR "cross-design synthesis" 
 
***** No hits for "grouped meta-analysis" OR "grouped metaanalysis” OR 
“grouped meta analysis”. 
 
10. "ecological triangulation" OR "ecological sentence synthesis" 
 
11. EPPI-approach OR "EPPI approach" OR  
EPPI-review OR “EPPI review” OR (EPPI AND review) 
 
12. Estabrooks, CA  
Limited to ‘review’ 
***** The names of the three authors together were not found. 
13. "framework synthesis"    
 
"framework analysis"  
Limited to ‘review’   
***** “Framework synthesis” retrieved fewer true positives than false 
positives: 7 true positives out of 28 hits for all years and 6 true positives 
out of 18 hits for last 5 years. In Table T 2.1 these were added to the 
retrieval for “framework analysis” limited to ‘review’, which was 18 
publications for all years and 12 for last 5 years. 
14. "grounded theory" OR "grounded formal theory"  
Limited to ‘review’ 
 
15. hierarchical model* 
Limited to ‘review’ 
 
16. meta-ethnography OR metaethnography OR "meta ethnography" 
 





18. meta-narrative OR metanarrative OR “meta narrative” 
 
19. "meta-needs assessment" OR "metaneeds assessment" OR “meta needs 
assessement” 
 
20. meta-study OR metastudy OR “meta study” 
 
21. cross-case OR “cross case” 
Limited to ‘review’ 
 
***** “Meta-matrix” and spelling variations retrieved no true positives. 
Miles AND Huberman, limited to ‘review’ returned only 1 publication 
related to thematic analysis in Miles & Huberman. 
 
22. "multiparameter evidence synthesis" OR "multi-parameter evidence 
synthesis" 
 
23. "narrative summary" 
 
24. “narrative synthesis” 
 
25. "qualitative comparative analysis" 
 
26. qualitative [ti] AND meta-analysis [ti] OR "qualitative meta-analysis" 
 
27. "qualitative metasummary" OR "qualitative meta-summary" OR 
“qualitative meta summary” 
***** The last parameter – “qualitative meta summary” was subsequently 
excluded. The way in which the search query was translated by the 
database, as a way of compensating for the fact that the exact phrase 
was not found, led to the retrieval of a large number of false positives. 
28. meta-synthesis OR metasynthesis OR “meta synthesis” 
 
29. “realist synthesis” 
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30. "textual narrative synthesis" 
***** The phrase was not found but a small number of abstracts (7 all, 4 
last 5 years) were retrieved that contained all three words. 
 
31. 1) “thematic analysis” 
   Limited to ‘review’ 
2) “thematic synthesis” 
3) 1) OR 2). 
 
2. Further issues with the meta-methodological discussion of units of 
analysis/ synthesis  
An illustration follows of difficulties into which even extended and persuasive 
discussions of the units of analysis/synthesis in research synthesis studies run. 
One such discussion is found in Greenhalgh et al., 2005. It is very helpful in 
articulating a range of units of information in research synthesis studies. It is 
also illuminating through demonstrating many of the complex relationships 
between such units (e.g. larger units of synthesis containing and giving meaning 
to smaller units or being constituted by them). Those persuasive descriptions 
do, however, start appearing shaky once probed. 
The authors “took as [their] initial unit of analysis the unfolding ‘storyline’ of a 
research tradition over time”: 
We took the research tradition as the initial unit of analysis for our review. 
In other words, before identifying, evaluating and comparing data from 
primary research studies, we first embarked on a systematic mapping 
phase to collect and compare the different over-arching storylines of the 
rise and fall of diffusion research that we judged relevant to our overall 
research question (op. cit.: 419). 
 
At a most basic level, “a piece of evidence” is nevertheless seen as the primary 
unit of analysis: 
The review process was thus somewhat laborious, since each piece of 
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evidence had to be double-handled — first for constructing the meta-
narrative within its own tradition and again for contributing to the ‘rich 
picture’ of one of the seven dimensions of diffusion of innovations. But the 
double handling served a crucial purpose, since each piece of evidence 
was first interpreted within its own paradigm before being added to other 
evidence generated in a different paradigm. Conflicting findings could thus 
be explored in terms of contestation between incommensurable paradigms 
(423). 
 
Contradictions, thus identified, can themselves become a piece of evidence or 
at least datum: 
 
In this way, the many contradictions we were finding in our sources could be 
turned into data and analysed systematically ... thus allowing us to go 
beyond statements such as ‘the findings of primary studies were 
contradictory’ or that ‘more research is needed’ (423). 
 
Overall, the following picture seems to be emerging from Greenhalgh et al. 
paper when reconstruction of the meta-narrative process is attempted from the 
perspective of its basic units of information. Pieces of evidence, the smallest 
unit of information in a synthesis study, are first brought together to construct 
the meta-narrative of a particular research tradition, the designated “initial unit 
of analysis”. This meta-narrative is both a synthesis product and a building 
block for further synthesis. As a building block for further synthesis, it has two 
functions. First, (along with the other meta-narratives) it provides a set of 
“dimensions” of the topic of interest (in this case diffusion of innovation) that are 
shared across meta-narratives and around which the over-arching synthesis is 
constructed. Second, it provides the context of meanings within which the 
available evidence is re-analysed and re-synthesised for the final over-arching 
synthesis.  
 
Clearly, this account is problematic, whether because of the manner of 
reconstruction or because of the claims on which the reconstruction is based. 
There is circularity in suggesting that that which is used to build a meta-
narrative (“each piece of evidence”) then draws its (partly new) meaning from 
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the meta-narrative it helps to build, and it needs to be demonstrated whether it 
is a virtuous or vicious circularity. There is inconsistency in claiming 
incommensurability of paradigms – these are seen as incommensurable when 
findings are conflicting, but otherwise share key dimensions and evidence. 
There is an interesting suggestion about ‘contradictions’ becoming pieces of 
evidence, or at least some sort of data. If contradictions can turn into data, what 






















Appendix to Chapter 4 
Search strategy used to generate the pool from which papers were 
sampled for the case study 
The “brief values filter” (Petrova et al., 2012) is as follows: 
1. Attitude* (tw) 
2. Perceptions (tw) 
3. Qualitative (tw) 
4. Coping (tw) 
5. Counseling (tw) 
6. Cultural (tw) 
7. Ethics (tw) 
8. Experiences (tw) 
9. Interviews (tw) 
10. Perceived (tw) 
11. Personal (tw) 
12. Professionals (tw) 
13. QOL (tw) OR Quality of Life (MeSH) 
14. Relations (tw) 
15. Respondents (tw) 
16. Satisfaction (tw) 
17. Staff (tw) 
18. Well-being (tw) 
19. Adaptation, Psychological (MeSH) 
20. Nurse’s Role (MeSH) 
21. Social Support (MeSH) 
22. OR/1-21 
 
The Mind-Body search strategy used was: 
1. Mind-Body Relations (Metaphysics) [MeSH] 
2. Mind-Body Therapies [MeSH] 
3. Psychosomatic Medicine [MeSH] 
4. Psychophysiologic Disorders [MeSH] 
318 
 
5. Psychophysiology [MeSH] 
6. OR/1-5 
 
Interface: PubMed (over 20 million publications around the time of running the 
search, currently over 22 million) 
Date search run – 22 November 2010 
Without year limits 
#1 Values search strategy retrieved     1,340,184 citations 
#2 Mind-body search strategy retrieved    564,417 
Together (combined with OR so as to exclude duplication), these come up to 
1,794,126. 
Of these, 1 229 709 (91.8% of retrieval of the Values search strategy) were 
unique to the Values search strategy and 453 942 were unique for the Mind-
Body search strategy (80.4% of the Mind-body search strategy). 
 
#3 Neoplasms [MeSH] retrieved      2, 177, 340 
(#1 OR #2) AND #3 retrieved      98, 931 
This represented 4.5% of the citations on cancer; 7.4% of the Values citations 
and 17.5% of the Mind-Body citations. 
 
Applying limits – last three years (June 07 – June 10) 
The search was run in November 2010. An earlier end date was chosen to 
ensure that all selected publications were indexed with Medical Subject 
Headings (MeSH), as some of the analysis parameters required exploration of 
these. 
(#1 OR #2) AND #3, add year limits    18,456 
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(18.7% of the research of interest, according to the searches, has been done in 
the last three years) 
#1, add year limits       233,517 
(17.4% of the Values citations retrieved without year limits) 
#2, add year limits       78,670 
(13.9% of the Mind-Body citations retrieved without year limits) 
#3, add year limits       268,937 






















Appendix to Chapter 5 
1. Frequency of codes in terms of the number of papers from which they 
have “references”  



























1 761 50,3 83,6 
2 158 10,4 94,1 
3 40 2,6 96,7 
4 12 ,8 97,5 
5 15 1,0 98,5 
6 10 ,7 99,1 
7 6 ,4 99,5 
8 1 ,1 99,6 
10 4 ,3 99,9 
11 2 ,1 100,0 







































1 511 33,8 67,1 
2 207 13,7 80,8 
3 101 6,7 87,5 
4 41 2,7 90,2 
5 34 2,2 92,4 
6 23 1,5 93,9 
7 16 1,1 95,0 
8 19 1,3 96,2 
9 14 ,9 97,2 
10 8 ,5 97,7 
11 5 ,3 98,0 
12 10 ,7 98,7 
14 3 ,2 98,9 
15 4 ,3 99,1 
16 2 ,1 99,3 
17 1 ,1 99,3 
18 3 ,2 99,5 
19 1 ,1 99,6 
22 1 ,1 99,7 
25 1 ,1 99,7 
28 1 ,1 99,8 
36 1 ,1 99,9 
47 1 ,1 99,9 
53 1 ,1 100,0 





3. Sampling of findings for formalisation with the Vocabulary of Elements 
of Findings 
 
For findings from NVivo 
A finding was picked from each of the branches of the coding tree, from the 
highest to the lowest level.  
For findings from the EPPI-Reviewer 
A finding was picked from each of the branches of the coding tree with the 
exception of the lowest sub-branches within a coding set, provided they were 
highly similar in topic and structure and from the same study.  
This was the case relatively frequently in EPPI and more so in comparison to 
NVivo, as findings were coded at a greater degree of granularity in the former. 
In such cases sub-branches were sampled, too (see below). 
For finding from Excel 
Findings were sampled from each worksheet (28), with each worksheet 
reflecting a separate category of findings (e.g. findings about cancer type of 
participants, hypothesised risk factors, phenomenological experiences, etc.) 
 
Sampling of findings when there was more than one finding within a code 
or worksheet 
 
1. If 2 findings within a code or worksheet, use ‘ordered alteration’ to 
select one finding (e.g. Branch 5 – finding 1 of 2, Branch 8 – finding 2 
of 2, Branch 9 - finding 1 of 2).127 
2. If 3 findings within a code or worksheet, use ‘ordered alteration’ to 
select one finding (e.g. Branch 4 – finding 1 of 3, Branch 6 – finding 2 
of 3, Branch 10 - finding 3 of 3, Branch 13 – finding 1 of 3). 
                                                          
127
 The branches are not necessarily consecutive to reflect the fact that there were branches 
with a single finding in them, to which the above procedures were not applied. 
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3. If 4 or more findings within a code or worksheet, select one from 
each represented study. 
3.1. If the number of findings within a represented study is 2 or 3, proceed 
as in 1 and 2 above. 
3.2. If the number of findings within a represented study is 4 or larger, 
query http://www.random.org/integers/ for a single random number and 
select respective finding. 
 
Sampling from lowest branches in EPPI-Reviewer 
When, at the lowest level, branches reflected specifications of a common 
thematic content (e.g. “maintaining a normal life” – through going back to work, 
engaging in social activities one used to enjoy, moving about, etc. in a long list) 
and when they concerned a single study only, one finding was chosen through 
the ‘ordered alteration’ described above or the random numbers generator. 
 
Sampling of findings in cases a finding selected as above is ‘composite’ 
(that is, contains more than one sentence or a large number of data 
points): 
1. If a composite finding with more than 2 propositions or data points of 
identical, highly similar or already well represented structure, code 2 of 
those propositions or data points.   
2. If a composite finding with more than 2 propositions or data points of 
somewhat different, but not particularly interesting structures, code 3 of 
those. 
3. If a composite finding with more than 2 propositions or data points of 
different and rarely or not encountered structure, code until saturation. 
4. If a composite finding where some of the elements are ‘other’ 
propositions, different from the specification of a ‘conventional finding’ 
(Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1), code up to 2 of these – to explore the 
specificity of the Vocabulary and also potential non-findings that can be 





Separating ‘conventional findings’ from ‘other’ 
There were a number of items that were sampled as findings (as they were 
found in the Findings/Results sections of studies) but were excluded as per the 
definition of ‘conventional finding’. These included sentences on methods; 
hypotheses, explanations and predictions that were formulated on the basis of 
or in relation to the study findings but were clearly identifiable as hypotheses, 
explanations and predictions and only minimally expressed a study’s empirical 
contents; background pragmatic information, etc. For example:  
These findings raise the emergent hypothesis of a conserved 
neurobehavioral symptom complex, which results from diverse triggering 
insults (Study 6 – hypothesis formulated on the basis of the study 
findings which are not, however, described in the sentence). 
This could, at least in part, explain why chemotherapy was a significant 
predictor of work change (Study 5 – explanation that only minimally 
mentions the study findings). 
 
At the same time, there were untypical findings (rather than other types of 
claims) which were left in the sample. These included meta-findings – findings 
about data, findings, methods and a research field; findings from other studies 
as in reviews or from background and discussion sections of a primary study, 
and typical findings mixed with ‘other’ claims. For example: 
 
Although the meaning of the VAS scale was explained, all patients seemed 
to find it difficult to translate their shortness of breath to a VAS scale (Study 
14 – finding on method effectiveness rather than a substantive finding).  
 
Through applying those inclusion-exclusion criteria, the final sample of findings 
analysed for composition and structure using the Vocabulary of Elements of 
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